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Abstract
Although New Zealand has had an active CGE modelling community since
the 1980’s, a multi-regional CGE model for the country has not been devel-
oped until now. This thesis presents a prototype multi-regional CGE model
to demonstrate the feasibility of developing a comprehensive model that cap-
tures the benefits of modelling agent behaviour with a bottom-up approach.
The prototype model is built upon bottom-up regional micro-foundations and
New Zealand data is used to operationalise a particular implementation of
the model. The thesis fills an important gap in the New Zealand CGE mod-
elling literature as none of the models in current use have a structure involv-
ing bottom-up regional modelling. The method of implementation is also a
key contribution, utilising a maximum-entropy approach to overcome data
shortages. An illustrative simulation of a natural disaster that strikes the
Wellington central business district demonstrates the strengths of the bottom-
up multi-regional approach — that the model can capture differential effects
across regions of shocks that occur at the regional level, and incorporate flow-
on and feedback effects between regions. Sensitivity testing of the substitution
elasticity between domestic sources of products reinforces the importance of
empirically-estimated parameters in CGE models.
The basic model is extended in two ways. The first is to introduce mod-
elling of distribution services as has been done in the ORANI and subsequently
FEDERAL models. The key structural difference here is that products identi-
fied as distribution services are required to facilitate movement of other prod-
ucts from seller to buyer. Thus there are no opportunities to substitute away
from these services if they become relatively more expensive. To implement
the additional structure, sets of coefficients are specified to control technical
i
ii
possibilities in the usage of the distribution services. These include switches
that can dictate, for example, that wholesale trade is only involved in the
delivery of tangible products, that retail trade is only used by in-region pur-
chasers, and that transport is required for moving physical products across
regional borders or to exporters. That these assumptions can be integrated
seamlessly into the database highlights the strength of the maximum-entropy
approach used to generate the multi-regional input-output database. Simula-
tions of an oil price shock show that the regional assumptions surrounding the
distribution networks are material to the results.
The second extension to the model is the addition of a module to control
the degree of inter-regional labour mobility. Essentially the user is given the
ability to specify the extent to which households respond to regional real wage
differences by moving to regions with relatively higher rates. Therefore, in
short-run simulations labour can be made more mobile than capital, while in
the long-run it can be less mobile than capital. The module also introduces
additional structure to link populations, households, and labour market com-
ponents. One important element of this new structure is a link back to the
endogenous labour supply theory of the basic model. Publicly available demo-
graphic and labour market data are used to implement the mobility module.
The importance of a mobility response to relative real wage changes is explored
in an illustrative application looking at the impact of regionally-concentrated
immigration flows. The simulations suggest that population movements can
work to dissipate the welfare effects of such migration inflows.
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given model.
RPEP Research Project on Economic Planning: a research unit based at Victoria Uni-
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xviii GLOSSARY
SAM Social Accounting Matrix: a table that records value flows of goods and services
(including those of factors) between and within different sectors of an economy.
Similar to IO tables but contains more detail concerning the flows between the
non-industry elements of the economy. For example, transfers from government
to households are recorded in the SAM. Every column total must equal the corre-
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are tools that help us think about the
likely effects on the structure of an economy of a wide range of shocks, including changes
in government policy, external markets, technology, the environment, and population.
The goal of CGE modelling, in common with other types of economic modelling, is to
capture the important aspects of the economy while suppressing those that are either
not especially relevant to the matter of concern or too complex to be modelled tractably.
The closer a CGE model comes to achieving this goal, the more useful it will be for the
purposes of analysis and simulation.
The field of CGE modelling has grown enormously since its beginnings in the ground-
breaking work of Johansen (1960).1 Internationally, the current state of the art is perhaps
most visibly represented by MONASH, the multi-period national CGE model from the
Centre of Policy Studies (CoPS) at Monash University, and GTAP, the multi-region global
CGE model from the Center for Global Trade Analysis at Purdue University.2 Within
New Zealand at present, CGE modelling is primarily the domain of the professional
consultancies.3 Academic research in the field has waned since the 1990’s; as far as the
1A list of models relevant to this thesis can be found in appendix A, with a brief description of each
along with citations for the reader who wishes to investigate them further.
2There are a great number of other CGE models that have characteristics similar to, and are arguably
as sophisticated as these models, but these two are perhaps the most well known, at least amongst
practitioners in New Zealand.
3Organisations that the author knows of that undertake CGE modelling in New Zealand are BERL,
NZIER, Infometrics, Market Economics, LEaP, and Landcare Research. See the Glossary for details of
each of these.
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author is aware, the most recent New Zealand PhD thesis in CGE modelling at the time
of writing is Nana (1999). Nevertheless, the consultancies have maintained close links
with the universities and there have been signs during the preparation of this thesis of
renewed academic interest flowing from the increasing usage of CGE in contracted-out
policy analysis.
All the CGE models in current use in New Zealand have a core theoretical structure
based on the modelling of activity within a single domain, such that the model simulates
the behaviour of the New Zealand economy as a whole, or that of one of its regions.4
Some of the models have a top-down regional extension module, which will be discussed
shortly, but they nevertheless are primarily national models. A Trans-Tasman regional
model was developed in New Zealand in the late 1980’s — the JOANI model, which
linked the JOANNA national model of New Zealand with the ORANI national model of
Australia. JOANI was therefore a two-region model, with an external sector consisting of
the rest of the world outside the Australia-New Zealand system. The last published work
that made use of JOANI was Nana & Poot (1996).
Until this point, therefore, there has been no fully multi-regional CGE model for New
Zealand. Our national CGE models were developed independently at roughly the same
time as ORANI was being developed in Australia.5 However, while multi-regional mod-
elling in Australia began to gain traction with the publishing of the FEDERAL model
(Madden 1990), there has been no parallel development here. A report was prepared for
the Ministry of Works and Development by Burton (1985) that set out a broad frame-
work for policy-relevant multi-regional modelling in New Zealand.6 At the heart of the
4Anything outside the geographical area covered by the model is the external sector, with essentially
exogenous behaviour. The external sector is the rest of the world (ROW) in national models and the rest
of the country combined with the ROW in sub-national models.
5The main ones being JOANNA and JULIANNE, developed under the auspices of Professor Philpott
within the Research Project on Economic Planning (RPEP) at Victoria University of Wellington. Both
of these models have an associated academic thesis lodged with the Victoria University Library — see
the list of models in appendix A for their citations. Wells & Easton (1986) review these models (amongst
others) and provide a guide to the historical RPEP papers in which their development is documented. Hall
(1992) discusses the RPEP models in the context of long-run equilibrium concepts, the macroeconomic
models of the time, and model interfacing including that of JOANI. A selection of RPEP papers relevant
to this thesis are cited in appendix B. For a broad, retrospective view of the 30 years of RPEP work, see
Philpott (2000).
6The Ministry was subsequently abolished in 1988.
3framework was to be a suite of interfaced models “to simulate the effects of policy and
development scenarios” (Burton 1985, p. xi). Models were suggested that described one
or two sectors of the economy each7 and involved a variety of modelling approaches.8 The
family of Johansen-type multi-sectoral models was reviewed in the New Zealand context
and it was concluded that JOANNA or a set of regional versions (one for each region)
could be integrated into the module. The author acknowledged that the wider framework
was ambitious not only due to the data collection and processing requirements, but also to
the need to co-ordinate a large group of researchers, policy analysts, and specialists in its
implementation. Since the report was published, it appears that there has been no further
development of this broad framework. A modern multi-regional CGE model placed at the
centre of such a framework would significantly reduce the complexity inherent in its im-
plementation. Perhaps the primary reason that such a model has not emerged here is that
New Zealand lacks the kind of data exploited in FEDERAL: regional input-output (IO)
tables obtained through survey techniques that capture interregional flows — exports are
disaggregated by destination and imports are disaggregated by source including domestic
regions and the foreign sector. There are, however, several non-survey techniques that
can be used to obtain estimates of these items.
The first multi-regional model of Australia was MRSMAE (Liew 1981), developed
prior to the availability of Australian state-level IO tables. As Madden (1990, p. 10) notes,
this meant the multi-regional input-output database of MRSMAE had to be constructed
using “very mechanical methods” — namely, the application of Leontief & Strout’s (1963)
gravity model. It might seem that for a New Zealand CGE model with many regions, one
might be able to do no better than MRSMAE due to the lack of data. A New Zealand
version of MRSMAE would also suffer the same drawbacks as the original. In particular,
it could be argued that the assumptions underlying the database construction are equally
as “ad hoc” as those used to drive top-down regional extension modules such as that of
ORANI, named ORES (ORANI Regional Equation System). Such an approach would
enable many regions to be modelled, but introduces an unknown amount of spurious
information.
7For example, one model would describe fiscal and monetary policy, another would determine prices
and wage rates, and yet another would be an interregional population and income/expenditure model.
8Amongst the model types suggested were regional input-output, linear programming, econometric,
system dynamic, and micro-analytic models.
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There have, however, been significant advances in the theory and practice of CGE
modelling since the time of MRSMAE. Important aspects include the standardisation
of modelling theory and techniques, new insights emerging from information theory, and
the ubiquitousness and power of modern computers. At the same time, the application of
CGE to regional policy issues has become increasingly popular internationally, reflecting
the increased attention being given to welfare of subgroups within populations and the
distribution of shock impacts across those groups.9
A key objective of this thesis then is to build a multi-regional CGE model exploiting
recent advances in the field. To develop a fully-fledged model of this type takes many
person-years due to the complex nature of CGE and its heavy data requirements. This
thesis makes an initial contribution towards this through the presentation of a prototype
model, named JENNIFER, and two extensions to it. Illustrative applications are used to
highlight the important aspects of the model and the over-arching framework, but should
not be interpreted as providing “real world” predictions of “what will happen” in the face
of a particular shock.10
The remainder of this chapter will show how the JENNIFER model fits into the
evolution of CGE modelling in New Zealand by expanding on those developmental aspects
mentioned above and discussing how they are manifested in the proposed framework.
1.1 Bottom-up Micro-foundations
There are two broad approaches to multi-regional modelling: handling regions either ‘top-
down’ or ‘bottom-up’. The terms are attributed to Klein & Glickman (1977) and refer, in
the first case, to regional economies being treated as ‘satellites’ of the national economy,
with only a one-way interface (from the nation to the region), and in the second case,
to regions being the building blocks of the national economy, so feedbacks run in both
directions. In CGE models, the top-down approach manifests as a regional disaggregation
module being attached to a model of the national economy. Regional shares data and
assumptions regarding sourcing and usage of products drive the disaggregation. This is
9For a broad international survey of the multi-regional CGE modelling literature, see Donaghy (2009).
10Nevertheless, paraphrasing Johansen (1960, p. 3), it can also be said that the quantitative analysis
does not solely serve the purpose of illustrating a method. The numerical results can give a broadly
indicative description of some important economic relationships in the New Zealand reality.
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the approach taken in ORANI and MONASH to derive regional results from simulations
using those models. The bottom-up approach, on the other hand, requires agent behaviour
and institutions (markets, government, etc.) to be described at the regional level. A
significant amount of structure needs to be added to a national CGE model to make it
multi-regional, as evidenced by MRSMAE and then FEDERAL and its cousins.11 From
a theoretical point of view, the bottom-up approach is preferred as it allows supply-side
differences and feedbacks from regions to the national economy. That is, since activity is
modelled at the regional level and regulated through regional market prices, it is possible
for technology, household behaviour, etc. to differ across them. Firms in the same industry
but different regions can be restricted in their access to factors to only those available
within the region. Households can face different wage rates and consumer prices across
regions and behave differently as a result. By building the economy bottom-up in this
fashion, the model can be subjected to shocks originating at the regional level. Simulation
results will indicate the extent that regional interdependencies serve to propagate the
shock through the economy and the impact observed at the national level.
At a minimum, the requirements of a bottom-up multi-regional model are the ad-
dition of a regional dimension to many variables and equations, and the incorporation
of a regional sourcing level at the bottom of agents’ decision nests. For this thesis, the
functions used for mixing product types, factors, etc. are limited to the CES (Constant
Elasticity of Substitution) level of generality. This includes mixing of products of a given
type from different regional sources to form a composite domestic product. Not all sec-
tors of the economy are modelled at the regional level — the public and trade sectors are
not given a regional dimension, although they source products from the regions as the
regionally-located agents (households and firms) do. This is partly for simplicity of the
prototype model, but also because arguably many aspects of these sectors are determined
at the national level (e.g. tax policy, foreign currency export prices). Giving a regional
dimension to the public sector, for instance, would require the splitting of the sector into
central government and local government so as to regionalise only the local government
11Namely FEDERAL-F (Giesecke & Madden 2003), MMRF (Centre of Policy Studies 2008), and
TERM (Horridge, Madden & Wittwer 2005). The comprehensive treatment of MRSMAE (Liew 1981)
is currently available only on microfilm from Monash University library. A shorter but more accessible
description is found in Liew (1984a). There is also a useful comparison of the top-down and bottom-up
approaches in Liew (1984b).
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components. In a sense then, JENNIFER is a hybrid model since not all decisions are
made at the regional level and sum up to an aggregate picture. In the case of govern-
ment, exporters, and importers, behaviour essentially occurs at the national level and is
disaggregated top-down as required.
Along with Burton (1985) and the Australian multi-regional models, it is useful to
take guidance from JOANI and GTAP even though they are multi-country models and
therefore involve structure not relevant here such as bilateral exchange rates. In particular
they suggest approaches to dealing with transport costs and factor mobility in a bottom-
up context that will become important in chapters 3 and 4.
1.2 Multi-regional IO Data and Information Theory
The data requirements for implementing a bottom-up multi-regional model come under
three broad headings: multi-regional input-output (MRIO) data, substitution and de-
mand elasticities, and other data concerning factors, investment, fiscal policy settings
etc. Since New Zealand does not have an official set of integrated regional input-output
tables, but a considerable amount of regional information is nevertheless available, we
aim to supply the MRIO data to the model using a hybrid method — that is, using a
combination of a non-survey method along with survey data where possible. There are
two broad hybrid approaches12: the GRIT method or the RAS / entropy method. Each
approach requires a national IO table and some regional data. With the GRIT method,
regional IO tables are estimated separately using location quotients and then a gravity
model is used to estimate the interregional flows. Throughout, the method requires the
use of “superior data” and professional judgement where possible.13 TERM and MRS-
MAE essentially use this approach although MRSMAE used a method more similar to
12See Miller & Blair (2009) for comprehensive treatment of the components of these approaches.
13On this point see Jensen & West (1989) and Lahr (2001). The single-region version of GRIT,
which doesn’t use the gravity model, is described in Jensen, Mandeville & Karunaratne (1979) and West
(1980). The method was extended for interregional analysis in West, Morison & Jensen (1984). Market
Economics Ltd. have recently developed a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the Auckland region using
the single-region GRIT method. The SAM is described in Zhang, McDonald, Nixon & Smith (2008) and
the development of an Auckland region CGE model that uses the SAM is discussed in Yeoman, Kim,
McDonald & Zhang (2009). Reports that make use of the SAM are Auckland Regional Council (2009)
and Enterprise North Shore (2010).
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the LMPST approach of ORES to obtain the intra-regional technical coefficients, rather
than location quotients.
The RAS and entropy techniques are usually thought of as matrix adjustment methods
but they are amenable to matrix-filling as well. That is, given borders (row and column
sums) of a matrix and initial estimates of the cells, both these methods can determine
consistent cell values. In the case of entropy methods, it is explicit in the algorithm that
an information criterion is being optimised. The simplest entropy method is maximum
entropy which, intuitively speaking, maximises the disorder of the matrix. A completely
disordered matrix would be uniform across all cells. When new information is introduced
(for example, new column totals) the maximum entropy algorithm scales the matrix as
needed for consistency but minimises any other information gain. Cross-entropy is a gen-
eralisation of maximum entropy — it minimises the distance between the solution matrix
and a given prior, not necessarily uniform matrix. (Shore & Johnson 1980) It turns out
that proportional allocation is equivalent to maximum entropy and Bacharach’s (1970)
RAS method is equivalent to cross-entropy for specific objective functions of entropy.
Along with sketching a proof of these, McDougall (1999) argues that proportional allo-
cation / RAS should be the method of choice for most cases of matrix filling / balancing
over other entropy-theoretic methods.14
In this thesis, the cross-entropy formulation of RAS is used as the starting point for
deriving a MRIO table. This is in contrast to the GRIT method, where RAS is used
at the end just to restore balance to the system of regional IO tables. This does not
prevent elements of GRIT being implemented within the information-theoretic framework.
Especially where superior data is available or professional judgement can be used, the
framework is designed to incorporate those seamlessly. Although not pursued in this
thesis, selective use of location quotients or gravity adjustments could also be made and
the optimising approach would enable the loss of entropy from each change to be calculated
for comparison. GRIT is applied in spirit then, especially with regard to its notion of
“holistic accuracy” of the database as opposed to “partitive accuracy”. (Jensen 1980)
Augmentation of the initially-derived MRIO database should be made if, and only if, it
improves the accuracy of the model output in a real-world context.
14For discussions of cases where the information-theoretic framework can be used to extend RAS, see
for example Batten (1982) and Robinson, Cattaneo & El-Said (2001).
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1.3 Implementation in GAMS
GAMS and GEMPACK are currently the two main software packages used for CGE mod-
elling.15 Each has strengths and weaknesses, and the choice of package ultimately depends
on the programmer’s and/or the user’s requirements and preferred style of implementa-
tion. GAMS is a general-purpose modelling package used for finding numerical solutions
to a wide variety of problems, including linear, non-linear, and mixed-integer program-
ming, and mixed complementarity problems (MCP). A CGE model can be implemented
in GAMS in the levels as a non-linear programme or a constrained non-linear system —
a special case of MCP.16
GEMPACK on the other hand is a purpose-built CGE modelling package that typi-
cally solves models in percentage changes. When originally developed, GEMPACK solved
models using Johansen’s method and therefore required the model equations to be en-
tered in linearised form. Early enhancements saw the linearisation errors inherent in
the one-step Johansen solution reduced through the use of multi-step methods with ex-
trapolation. It was still necessary to linearise the model equations by hand and update
statements were required to facilitate multi-step solutions. Such manual operations are
not required when implementing CGE models in GAMS and solving using non-linear
techniques. These points of difference between the two software packages have since dis-
appeared. In the latest version of GEMPACK — release 11 at the time of writing —
models can be entered as a mixture of linearised and levels equations and solved in such
a way that linearisation errors are arbitrarily small. Equations entered in levels form are
automatically linearised and corresponding update statements are not required. From the
perspective of obtaining simulation results as percentage changes of variables from one
model equilibrium to another, the only difference is how they are typically obtained.17
15GAMS documentation (GAMS Development Corp. 2011) is available at http://www.gams.com/
docs/document.htm while the GEMPACK Manual (Harrison, Horridge, Jerie & Pearson 2012) can be
found at http://www.monash.edu.au/policy/gpdoc.htm. MPSGE (Rutherford 1999) is often cited as
a third package although it is actually a subsystem of GAMS. Horridge & Pearson (2011) provide a
useful review of GEMPACK, GAMS, and MPSGE and compare their performance with a simple CGE
model implemented in all three.
16An MCP is a system of non-linear equations, inequalities, and complementarity pairs (slackness
conditions). If no complementarity pairs are specified, the MCP reduces to a constrained system of
non-linear equations.
17It is now possible for a CGE model to be implemented entirely in levels and solved using Newton’s
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What remains is that GAMS is a more flexible tool due to its general-purpose nature
while GEMPACK automates many routine programming tasks and is more user-friendly
to non-technicians. In light of this, it was decided to implement JENNIFER in GAMS,
as this package seemed more appropriate for the task of model development. Porting the
core model to GEMPACK would be relatively straightforward when the need arises to
make it accessible to other users or to increase its dimensionality.18
There are, nevertheless, GAMS-specific features of the way JENNIFER is implemented
that would not translate so well to GEMPACK. One is that an object-oriented approach
was taken in programming the model. This stands in contrast to the traditional block-
by-block, subroutine approach used in GAMS reference works such as Lo¨fgren, Harris &
Robinson (2002), Gillig & McCarl (n.d.), and Hosoe (2004). Keyzer (1997) approaches
the issue with discussion of some simple macros but these are still of the subroutine type
rather than interacting with program objects. Taking this approach simplifies program
development significantly. Variables can be added to the variable list, for example, which
acts as an object that various parts of the program interact with. In doing so the program
writes its own code for the simulation and reports. The model can be run from the
DOS command line via a batch file, which enables multiple runs with different levels of
industry and regional disaggregation, different closure, elasticities, and simulation settings
and tables of results to be produced all without the need for user input. Regarding the
reporting facility, tables are produced pre-formatted for immediate use in LATEX. None of
these features are directly replicable in GEMPACK.
GEMPACK has a side program for performing a RAS balance but if one wanted to use
a different objective function, a new side program would have to be written in FORTRAN
by the user or the developers on their behalf.19 However, since GAMS is primarily an
method in GEMPACK, and it has always been possible to input a model in linearised form and solved
in GAMS, but each of these works against the advantages of the respective packages. For a general
discussion of levels vs. linearisation, see Hertel, Horridge & Pearson (1992).
18One of the disadvantages of implementing the model in levels form is that it takes considerably
more computer resources to solve a model of given size non-linearly than when using even the multi-
step linearised method. Models with more regions and industries are therefore more efficiently solved in
GEMPACK.
19Unless such a program was already available. There is, for example, a program available on the
Internet that uses Kuroda’s method but it is unclear how it would interface with GEMPACK. See
Wilcoxen’s website at http://wilcoxen.maxwell.insightworks.com/pages/764.html.
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optimisation tool, implementing the entropy-theoretic form of RAS (or indeed any entropy
method) is easily done within the GAMS programming environment.20 The formulation
of the MRIO database as discussed above is therefore integrated fully within the program
code.
1.4 Regional Focus of Applications
The JENNIFER model can now be described as a prototype multi-regional CGE model
with bottom-up micro-foundations and implemented in GAMS on top of a MRIO database
derived using information-theoretic principles. Such a model can be used to investigate
the regional effects of external events (to the region or nation) or changes in fiscal policy.
On a deeper level however, the model can serve as a framework to consider many of the
issues raised in the review by Partridge & Rickman (2010) of the use of CGE for regional
development analysis. For example, how do population movements affect relative regional
performance and what implications are there of feedbacks from regional performance
to population movements? What are the important channels through which a shock
permeates through New Zealand’s regions or what are the reasons that it does not? That
is, what are the drivers of regional differences and similarities?
In this thesis, the model is used to investigate three questions alluded to in the Par-
tridge & Rickman review. In chapter 2, which presents the core prototype model, the
ability of the model to simulate regional supply-side shocks is demonstrated through an
application involving a natural disaster. Sensitivity testing is used to investigate how the
regional implications of the shock depend on the values of the substitution elasticities
between domestic sources of products.
Chapter 3 introduces ORANI-style modelling of distribution services.21 Long-run sim-
ulations of an (imported) oil price rise are conducted under various modelling assumptions
regarding the distribution networks. The idea under investigation here is that the function
of distribution, especially transport, is important in a regional context. Even in the long-
run when opportunities for factor substitution exist, one would expect the distribution
network to continue to constrain regions’ ability to adjust to shocks.
One issue that is given considerable attention in the Partridge & Rickman article,
20See for example Fofana, Lemelin & Cockburn (2005)
21See Dixon, Parmenter, Sutton & Vincent (1982, section 17).
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and increasingly elsewhere in the literature, is that of interregional labour mobility. This
is the topic of chapter 4. Usually the issue of factor mobility is handled by way of a
short-run/long-run closure decision whereby factors are assumed regionally immobile in
the short-run and fully mobile in the long-run. Here, allowance is also made for partial
mobility of labour across regions relative to that of capital through an extension module,
such that labour can be more regionally mobile than capital in the short-run but less
mobile than capital in the long-run. The suggested approach makes such partial mobility
operational without needing the explicit introduction of dynamic adjustment processes.
An application of the extended model investigates how the impact of higher immigration
flows depends on the regional dispersion of the flows and the degree of labour mobility in
the short-run and long-run.
Rather than focus on one broad scenario throughout this thesis, it was decided to apply
the model to separate scenarios in each chapter in order to demonstrate the flexibility
of the model, indicate the range of possibilities, and emphasise the importance of the
modelling done in each given chapter. While interregional labour mobility as discussed in
chapter 4 may have an important bearing on the results of the natural disaster scenario
of chapter 2, for example, the implications of the distribution network as discussed in
chapter 3 are less relevant without a higher degree of regional disaggregation.
The key contribution of this thesis, therefore, is a methodological approach to devel-
oping a New Zealand multi-regional CGE model, and the prototype JENNIFER model
presented herein is the first step in that development.
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Chapter 2
The Basic Model
2.1 Introduction
This chapter shows how the methodological approach summarised in the previous chap-
ter is applied to construct JENNIFER, a prototype New Zealand multi-regional CGE
model. The basic underlying theoretical structure is set out along with the key aspects
of the model implementation. Two extensions to this basic variant of the model are then
described in the chapters that follow.
2.2 Basic Description
The key characteristic of the JENNIFER model is that the aggregate economy is not only
modelled as a group of linked sectors, but also as a group of interdependent geographical
regions. It separately describes the economic behaviour within each region of those sectors
deemed to have important region-specific characteristics. The model is designed with
application to the New Zealand economy in mind, but this does not preclude the general
principles underlying the model design, or indeed the model itself, being used for another
country.
2.2.1 Sectors
The model has five sectors — the household, production, trade, public, and foreign sectors.
The household sector primarily provides labour services to producers and consumes
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goods and services made by them. The labour supply choice is endogenous, arising from
a decision of how to split the household’s time endowment between labour and leisure.
Households also own the stock of currently installed capital and so receive its rental
income. Any part of after-tax household income that is not spent becomes private saving.
The share of income that is saved is usually exogenously imposed.
The production sector produces goods and services (hereafter grouped together as
‘products’) for consumption by households, the government, and foreigners (i.e. exports),
and for use within the sector as an input into production. It relies on currently installed
capital as well as labour and intermediate inputs (domestically produced or imported) for
production. As capital by definition takes time to build (that is, more time than produc-
tion of consumption goods and intermediate inputs), capital formation takes place within
the sector concurrently with production for current usage. The associated investment
spending is financed by private and public saving and allocated to industries and regions
according to a user-selected criterion which is discussed in section 2.3.4.
The trade sector acts as a conduit for products between the domestic economy and
the foreign sector. Essentially this sector serves the function of transforming domestically
produced products into exports, and transforming foreign products into imports, ready
for domestic use.
The public sector purchases products for consumption and derives revenue from four
types of taxation: tax on labour income, Goods and Services Tax (GST, borne primarily
by domestic households and international tourists), other commodity taxes (borne by all
purchasers), and import duties. Provision is also made for some domestic purchases to
be subsidised via negative commodity taxes, and some foreign purchases to be subsidised
via export subsidies. Any excess of government revenue over spending becomes public
saving.
The foreign sector demands domestic products (exports) and supplies the domestic
economy with its own products (imports). A trade surplus is equivalent to borrowing by
foreigners, funded by net positive domestic saving.
2.2.2 Industries
Producers are classified by industry to allow for differences in production technology
between them. Each industry is also differentiated by region and produces one unique
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type of product for current use. The basic price of the product of a given industry in
adjacent regions may differ due to different production techniques. Each industry also
engages in capital formation in each region and the new capital thereby produced is also
unique to the industry and region of production.
2.2.3 Regions
The national economy is divided up into a set of regional economies, each one tied to a
geographic region of the country. Activities of the household and production sectors are
given a regional dimension while those of the trade, government and foreign sectors are
not. Households and industries can be considered located within regions but the trade
and government sectors are national in nature while the foreign sector is external.
2.2.4 Sources
From a domestic user’s point of view, the sources of products are the domestic regions
and importers that supply them. This highlights the role of the trade sector in making
foreign products available to the domestic economy. The price relevant to the purchaser
is the import price (not the foreign price) which may include duty and trade margins.
Similar reasoning holds for the foreign purchaser: as far as they are concerned, the source
of products is the exporter; the region of origin is irrelevant because the export price is
the same regardless.
2.2.5 Agents
The behaviour of the sectors of the economy is captured by modelling the behaviour of
representative agents assigned to them as follows:
Household sector: one household agent per region which represents the regional popu-
lation of actual households
Production sector: one industry agent per region for each industry engaged in cur-
rent production and/or capital formation; one investor agent which allocates the
investment budget across industries and regions
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Trade sector: one exporter agent and one importer agent per product type (i.e. per
industry)
Public sector: one government agent which decides the pattern of government consump-
tion and taxation
Foreign sector: one foreign agent which decides how much of each product to buy (ex-
port) and sell (import)
Specifying that separate activities are undertaken by separate agents amounts to assum-
ing that decisions regarding one activity are made independently of decisions regarding
another. For example, the composition of investment expenditure is decided by the in-
vestor agent, independently from the decisions by industries of how to form the units of
capital demanded by the investor agent.
The reason why exports’ region of origin is unimportant to the foreign sector as stated
above is that the agents in the trade sector operate at the national level — where they
are physically located is of no consequence in the model. This is also the case for the
other agents that lack a regional dimension, namely the investor, the government, and the
foreign agent. For example, importers pay the same price for a given product regardless
of its source country, and it is assumed that the location of government consumption of
products is irrelevant (although the source region of those products is not).
2.2.6 Endowments
Each region is assumed to have industry-specific capital stock endowments1 and an en-
dowment of time. Both endowments are owned by the household agent located within the
region, and rented out only to local industry agents for the purpose of current production.
The rental price of the time endowment is the wage rate, given in exchange for labour
services.
2.2.7 Markets
The microeconomic foundations of the model dictate that agents interact via markets,
through which any quantity traded must pass. As such, each traded quantity has an
1If a region does not have a particular industry operating in it, then it is assumed to have no capital
stock specific to that industry
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associated supply, demand, and price. Except where prices are exogenously imposed,
the market mechanism works to determine the general equilibrium price vector. The
important sets of markets in the model are summarised below:
Product markets: one market for each type of product coming from each source, includ-
ing imports; an industry agent is on the supply side of each domestic product market
while household, industry, government, and exporter agents are on the demand side;
in the case of imports, an importer agent is on the supply side and exporter agents
are excluded from the demand side; the market determines the basic price of the
relevant regional product or import
Export markets: one market for each export product; an exporter agent is on the supply
side of each market and the foreign agent is on the demand side; determines the
quantity of exports — each exporter supplies perfectly elastically at the foreign
currency price of their export (which is determined by domestic cost conditions)
Import markets: one market for each import product; the foreign agent is on the supply
side of each market and an importer agent is on the demand side; determines the
quantity of foreign product to be imported — the domestic economy is assumed a
price taker for foreign products
Investment markets: one market for each type of new capital to be installed in each re-
gion; an industry agent is on the supply side of each market while the investor agent
is on the demand side; determines the construction cost of the relevant industry and
region-specific capital
Capital markets: one market for each type of currently installed capital in each region;
a household agent is on the supply side of each market while an industry agent (in
the same region) is on the demand side; determines the rental rate of the relevant
industry and region-specific capital
Labour markets: one market for each region; a household agent is on the supply side
of each market while industry agents (in the same region) are on the demand side;
determines the wage rate for labour within the region
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Saving market: one market where finance for investment and trade surpluses (lending
to foreigners) is available; this is the market that is ignored due to Walras’ Law —
see section 2.4.5 — so modelling it is unnecessary
2.3 Theoretical Structure
This section begins by describing the behaviour of the agents of the JENNIFER model and
sets out the equations that formalise that behaviour. The conditions required to generate a
competitive general equilibrium are then explained and expressed mathematically. While
some issues surrounding closure of the model are discussed here, they are mainly matters
of model implementation and so are discussed in more detail in section 2.4 especially
sections 2.4.4 and 2.4.5.
Notation will be introduced as needed although guidance for notation can be found
in tables 2.1 to 2.3. A reference list of all the variables in the core model can be found in
appendix C. To simplify the presentation, equations will occasionally be stated with less
dimensionality than they are given in the list of equations found in appendix D. Many
equations that are straight-forward, such as those that define a national measure as a
sum of the regional measures, will not be explicitly stated in the text but are nevertheless
included in the equation list.
2.3.1 Households
Saving, Labour Supply, and Consumption
Before addressing the optimising choice of households, we need to consider the issue of
private saving. Standard microeconomic theories of the consumption / savings trade-off
are necessarily intertemporal. As this CGE model is of the static variety, such a theory is
not incorporated. The usual approach in static CGE models is to fix the level of household
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Index Default Set Elements
agent AGENTS Agents: household (hsh), industry (ind), investor
(inv), government (gov), exporter (exp), importer
(imp), foreign (for)
c CUR Currency denomination: domestic (d$) or foreign (f$)
g, h COM Products (= IND)
j, i IND Industries (user-specified)
o ORG Origins: domestic (dom), imported (imp)
p PPS Purposes: production for current consumption ((Q)),
capital formation ((K))
r, x, y REG Regions (user-specified)
s SRC Sources (= REG ∪ {imp})
v VAL Valuations: current prices and quantities — nominal
(c$), base-year prices and current quantities — real
(b$), current prices and base-year quantities — for
Laspeyres calcuations (bQ)
w TAXVAL Tax status of income measure: before tax (btax), after
tax (atax)
Table 2.1: Indices and Default Sets
Set Elements
NZREG All regions including the national ‘region’ (= REG ∪ {NZ})
ENDIND Industries for which investment is allocated endogenously to equalise
expected future rates of return (⊆ IND , user-specified)
TRDVAL Trade flow valuations: basic prices (bas), f.o.b. prices (fob), c.i.f.
prices (cif)
PINDEX Price index: Paasche (P), Laspeyres (L), Fisher (F), geometric
Laspeyres (G)
Table 2.2: Other Sets
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Part Description
P Price
Q Product quantity
EXP Exports
IMP Imported products
FOR Foreign products
L Labour
K Capital (currently installed)
F Composite factor
Knew Newly formed capital
K future Future capital stock
U Utility
N Leisure
TIME Time endowment
t Tax rate
W Real wage rate
δ Depreciation rate
φ Nominal exchange rate
ϕ Real exchange rate
ψ Scaling factor
Ω economy-wide expected net rate of return
Ξi Price index of type i ∈ PINDEX
R
A/B
x Ratio of variable Ax to Bx
X•x,y/z Share of •x,y in •z (percent)
(D) Demand
(S) Supply
[•] • (variable) evaluated at the benchmark equilibrium
•x |x a list of variables •x as x varies over its default set
f(•x |x) f is a function of the list of variables •x |x
Examples
Q
hsh(D)
g,s,r Demand for product g from source s by hsh in region r
L
(S)
r Supply of labour by hsh in region r
P
Q,ind(K)
g,s,j,r Price paid by indj,r for purchases of Qg,s for the purpose of capital
formation
Table 2.3: Variable Notation Scheme
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expenditure as a proportion of household income, and is followed here:2
SPN c$r =
1
100
· APC ataxr · INC atax,c$r (2.1)
with variable descriptions:
APC ataxr average propensity to consume of hshr (out of after-tax
income) and 0 < APC ataxr < 100%
SPN c$r nominal expenditure of hshr
INC atax,c$r nominal after-tax income of hshr
To fix the level of spending relative to income, the average propensity to save of
each household agent is set exogenously,3 so essentially the consumption propensities are
exogenous, since:
APC ataxr + APS
atax
r = 100 (2.2)
Nominal after-tax income and saving are defined as follows:
INC atax,c$r = P
L,atax
r · L(S)r +
∑
j
PKj,r ·K(S)j,r (2.3)
SAV atax,c$r = INC
atax,c$
r − SPN c$r (2.4)
with variable descriptions:
K
(S)
j,r capital endowment specific to production by indj,r
L
(S)
r supply of labour by hshr
SAV atax,c$r nominal after-tax saving of hshr
PL,ataxr after-tax wage rate paid to hshr
PKj,r rental rate on Kj,r paid to hshr
The assumption underlying the definition of household income is that the household
agent of each region only receives the income earned by the capital located within their
region, and only supply labour to the firms within their own region.
2The equation that is included in the computer model is slightly more broad to allow for measurement
of propensities to consume and save out of gross income and their national averages. The actual equation,
as listed in appendix D, is:
SPN c$r =
1
100
·APCwr · INCw,c$r ∀r ∈ NZREG
3This has important implications for macroeconomic balance which are addressed in section 2.4.5.
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Labour supply is an endogenous choice resulting from a consumption / leisure trade-
off, which implies the household agent has a time endowment to divide between labour
and non-labour activities. To facilitate incorporating the trade-off into the agent’s opti-
misation problem, we define endowment income and labour supply as follows:
ENDINC atax,c$r = P
L,atax
r · TIME r +
∑
j
PKj,r ·K(S)j,r (2.5)
L(S)r = TIME r −Nhsh(D)r (2.6)
with variable descriptions:
TIME r time endowment of hshr
N
hsh(D)
r quantity of leisure demanded by hshr
Since a region’s household agent represents all the actual households located within
the region, an easy way of quantifying the time endowment is to define it as the number
of full-time equivalents (FTEs) in the working-age population.4
Given the relationships between endowment income, expenditure, and saving, the
behaviour of the household agent in region r is summarised in a set of demand equations
derived from optimisation. The equations have a nested form so that for example the
decision of how much of each product to consume is separated from the decision of how
much of each given product is to come from each source.
The top level of the decision nest consists of an optimising choice over the level of
total composite product Q
hsh(D)
r and a level of leisure N
hsh(D)
r to consume. That is, the
utility function
Ur = Ur(Q
hsh(D)
r , N
hsh(D)
r )
4FTEs are a measure of labour hours, deflated by what is considered average for an individual working
full-time. The Statistics NZ definition is that 1 FTE is equivalent to 30 hours of employment per week.
The ratio of FTE employment to persons employed is proportional to average hours worked per person.
To convert the working-age population to FTEs, we assume that the unemployed and non-labour force
(but still of working age) would work the same number of hours on average as those currently employed
if they were to enter employment. That is, the conversion rate from people to FTEs is the same for all
components of the working-age population. How this is applied can been seen in section 2.4.3.
However it is measured, the size of the time endowment relative to capital and employment determines
the labour supply elasticity — see appendix G — so care needs to be taken that the resulting elasticity
is reasonable.
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is maximised subject to the definition equations set out above and
PQ,hshr ·Qhsh(D)r + PL,ataxr ·Nhsh(D)r = ENDINC atax,c$r − SAV atax,c$r
where PQ,hshr is the price of composite product paid by hshr. The righthand side of the
constraint above is the expenditure of after-tax endowment income (valued at current
prices), which is determined indirectly by the exogenous average propensity to save.
This thesis restricts the function Ur(•) to be of the Constant Elasticity of Substitu-
tion (CES) class, such that the function’s shape depends primarily on the value of the
elasticity of substitution parameter σhshr , which dictates the degree of substitutability be-
tween composite product and leisure.5 In general σhshr is non-negative but there are two
special cases with specific values of σhshr : Leontief utility (σ
hsh
r = 0) and Cobb-Douglas
utility (σhshr = 1). The solution to the above utility maximisation problem provides the
household demand functions, and the form of the demand functions depends on whether
Ur is one of these special cases or is the general CES case (0 < σ
hsh
r <∞ and σhshr 6= 1).
The main difference is which prices appear in each demand function. For example, the
demand functions arising from maximisation of Cobb-Douglas utility do not involve the
cross-prices. Then if Ur is Cobb-Douglas P
L,atax
r will not be an argument in the expres-
sion for Q
hsh(D)
r and PQ,hshr will not be an argument in the expression for N
hsh(D)
r . It is
convenient here to express the demand function in general, without assuming a particular
functional form (that is, a value of σhshr ) for Ur, so that all possible prices are listed as
arguments of the functions. Thus the household demand functions are written as:
Qhsh(D)r = Q
hsh
r (P
Q,hsh
r , P
L,atax
r ,ENDINC
atax,c$
r , SAV
atax,c$
r ;σ
hsh
r ) (2.7)
Nhsh(D)r = N
hsh
r (P
Q,hsh
r , P
L,atax
r ,ENDINC
atax,c$
r , SAV
atax,c$
r ;σ
hsh
r ) (2.8)
This approach of expressing agents’ objective functions and resulting demand functions
in general and listing all potential arguments will be followed throughout this chapter.
Appendix E shows how the functions would be written algebraically for each of the cases
discussed above. The expressions found there are in levels form, which are difficult to
5Using this general class of functions implies that there are no scale effects (Ur is homothetic). We
also restrict σhshr to be finite so that composite product and leisure are not perfect substitutes (Ur is not
linear). This ensures that household demand functions are well-defined and continuous (since preferences
are strictly convex). These properties are needed for existence of a unique competitive general equilibrium.
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interpret.6 The functions can however be expressed in linearised form so that the equilib-
rium effects of changes in prices, endowment income, or saving can be seen more easily.
The linearised equations also reveal the implications of the functional form assumption
(i.e. the value assigned to σhshr ). Using a simplified notation and following the convention
of using lowercase letters for percentage changes,7 Appendix F shows that for a given
value σ ≥ 0, the above demand functions can be written in linearised form as:
q = e− ([XQ] · pQ + [XN ] · pL)− σ(pQ − ([XQ] · pQ + [XN ] · pL))
n = e− ([XQ] · pQ + [XN ] · pL)− σ(pL − ([XQ] · pQ + [XN ] · pL))
with variable descriptions:
q percentage change in total composite product demanded
n percentage change in leisure demanded
pQ percentage change in purchase price of total composite prod-
uct
pL percentage change in after-tax wage rate
e percentage change in nominal after-tax endowment income
net of saving
[XQ] weight on total composite product
[XN ] weight on leisure
The weights [XQ] and [XN ] are constant expenditure shares — in this case the shares
6Appendix E states that for the general CES utility maximisation case, the solution is given by:
Qi =
ai
σPi
−σ∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ · E ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
The algebraic form of the demand functions at the top of the household agent’s decision nest would
therefore be:
Qhsh(D)r =
(aQ,hshr )
σhshr (PQ,hshr )
−σhshr
(aQ,hshr )
σhshr
(PQ,hshr )
1−σhshr
+ (aNr )
σhshr (PL,ataxr )
1−σhshr
· ENDEXPatax,c$r
Nhsh(D)r =
(aNr )
σhshr (PL,ataxr )
−σhshr
(aQ,hshr )
σhshr
(PQ,hshr )
1−σhshr
+ (aNr )
σhshr (PL,ataxr )
1−σhshr
· ENDEXPatax,c$r
where ENDEXPatax,c$r = ENDINC
atax,c$
r − SAV atax,c$r .
7For levels variable Z, the variable in the linearised equation is z = dZ/Z, so the equations are
approximately true for small percentage changes from the benchmark equilibrium.
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of consumption and leisure in expenditure out of endowment income.8 The linearised
expressions make it clear that a change in endowment income net of saving will result in
the same proportional change in total composite product demanded — the expenditure
elasticity is 1. The effect of single price changes can be described by expressions for
own-price and cross price elasticities (ε and η respectively) derived from the above:9
εQ = −σ − (1− σ)[XQ] εN = −σ − (1− σ)[XN ]
ηQ = −(1− σ)[XN ] ηN = −(1− σ)[XQ]
If σ > 1 the own-price elasticities will be greater than one in absolute value and the
cross-price elasticities will be positive, regardless of the relative sizes of the expenditure
shares.
More generally the linearised equations help us see the influence of endowment expen-
diture, own-price, and weighted-average price on demand for consumption and leisure.
For instance, if endowment expenditure rises proportionately more than the average price
but less than the wage rate, then leisure demanded will fall (labour supplied will increase)
if σ is large enough (i.e. the substitution effect dominates). Regardless of the size of σ,
total composite product demanded will rise.
The effects of changes in endowment income and saving can be separated in the lin-
earised demand functions by replacing e with i · [XI ] − s · [XS] where i and s are the
percentage changes in endowment income and saving while [XI ] and [XS] are the con-
stant ratios of those to endowment expenditure.10 Then for example a 1% increase in
endowment income with no change in saving would produce a [XI ]% rise in both con-
sumption and leisure demand.
For similar reasons, a 1% rise in leisure demand will imply a less than 1% decrease in
labour supply for a given time endowment. The expression for labour supply in equation
(2.6) implies that l = t · [XT ] − n · [XN(L)] where l and t are the percentage changes in
labour supply and time endowment while [XT ] and [XN(L)] are the constant ratios of the
8As usual for linearised equations, the weights are constants evaluated from the base-period data. The
square brackets are used to signify that they are benchmark equilibrium values.
9For a given proportional price change pi, set p−i (all other price changes) and e to zero and divide
through by pi
10This is from the definition of endowment expenditure, which would be, in terms of our simplified
notation here, E = I−S. The ratio of endowment income to endowment expenditure is of course greater
than one, and [XI ]− [XS ] = 1.
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time endowment and leisure to labour supply. Thus if leisure demanded increases 1% for
whatever reason, labour supplied will fall by [XN(L)]%.
While (2.8) could be replaced by a labour supply equation
L(S)r = L
(S)
r (P
Q,hsh
r , P
L,atax
r ,ENDINC
atax,c$
r , SAV
atax,c$
r ;σ
hsh
r )
such that leisure demand is determined by (2.6), the interpretation of such an equation
is more difficult than (2.8). Appendix G derives labour supply functions for the different
functional forms of Ur.
The Composition of Consumption
Once households have decided how much of their endowment income to put towards
consumption, it remains to be decided how much of each type of product to consume, and
how much of each type to buy from each source. These represent the second and third
levels of the households’ decision nest respectively. The source choice is divided into two
parts: a choice between the domestic and imported varieties, and then a choice between
the domestic regions’ varieties. This division is made so that the substitution elasticity
involved at each stage may differ. We may assume, for example, that the elasticity
between domestic and imported varieties of a product is lower than that between the
domestic regions’ varieties.11 The full decision nest of the household agent in each region
r is shown in figure 2.1.
Each optimising choice is an expenditure minimisation problem except the top-level
decision, which is the utility maximising choice discussed above. Once the optimal level of
total composite product Qhshr has been decided, the household agent seeks the minimum
cost combination of the different types of product to form the composite product subject
to a CES mixing function (including the special cases of Leontief and Cobb-Douglas).
That is, minimise∑
g
PQ,hshg,r ·Qhsh(D)g,r
11This could be extended further by having a choice between the local variety and a composite out-of-
region variety, and then a choice between the out-of-region sources. We could then assume, for example,
a higher substitution elasticity between the out-of region varieties than between the local variety and the
out-of-region varieties. This would serve as a proxy for transport costs if they are not explicitly included
in the model. If they were, such an assumption would imply pure home-bias in households’ preferences
— there would still be some quality of the local variety that makes it preferable to out-of-region varieties.
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Figure 2.1: Household agents’ decision nest
subject to
Qhsh(D)r = Q
hsh
r (Q
hsh(D)
g,r |g)
with variable descriptions:
PQ,hshg,r price of composite product g paid by hshr
Q
hsh(D)
g,r composite product g demanded by hshr
The notation Qhshr (Q
hsh(D)
g,r |g) is a shorthand for saying that Qhsh(D)r is a function
of Q
hsh(D)
1,r , Q
hsh(D)
2,r , ... with g ∈ COM = {1, 2, ...}. Currently no provision is made in
the prototype model for industries to produce multiple product types, so COM and IND
always contain the same elements.
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The same assumptions are made for the mixing technology Qhshr (•) as were made for
the utility function — it is of the CES class which includes Cobb-Douglas and Leontief
functions as special cases, and has an associated elasticity of substitution, in this case
σQ,hshr . Thus it is possible for the substitution elasticity for product types to differ from
that for the consumption / leisure trade-off, and these can also vary across the regional
household agents.12
The demand functions that solve the above expenditure minimisation problem can be
written as:
Qhsh(D)g,r = Q
hsh
g,r (Q
hsh(D)
r , P
Q,hsh
h,r |h ;σQ,hshr ) (2.9)
As above, the demand functions have different algebraic forms depending on the value
of σQ,hshr , and their interpretation is made easier by considering their linearised form.
13
Appendix F shows that for a given σ ≥ 0, the linearised equations are:
qg = q − σ
(
pQg −
∑
h
[XQh ] · pQh
)
with variable descriptions:
qg percentage change in demand for composite product g
pQg percentage change in price of composite product g
[XQg ] weight on composite product g
The weights [XQg ] are the constant shares of product g in total expenditure. As before
we can derive expressions for own-price and cross-price elasticities:
εQg = −σ
(
1− [XQg ]
)
ηQg,h = σ · [XQh ]
where εQg is the own-price demand elasticity of composite product g and η
Q
g,h is the cross-
price elasticity of demand of composite product g with respect to the price of composite
12While the model design allows for such flexibility, it is reasonable to assume they do not vary over
regions unless information is available that suggests otherwise. Indeed, this should be the default position.
13Readers familiar with ORANI (Dixon et al. 1982) or FEDERAL (Madden 1990) will see that these are
of a similar form to ORANI’s equation (14.11) and FEDERAL’s equation (2.16) except those equations
concern choices over sources whereas the equations here are for choices over products. The two models
mentioned employ Klein-Rubin (Stone-Geary) utility at their top level rather than the simpler CES
utility used here, and their household decision nest top level is the choice over products rather than the
consumption / leisure trade-off modelled above.
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product h. The cross-price elasticities will always be positive, but whether demand is
more than unit elastic with respect to its own-price depends jointly on the size of the
substitution elasticity and the expenditure share. The linearised demand functions imply
that in general if the price of composite product g rises relative to a share-weighted index
of all the composite product prices, ceteris paribus, the demand for composite product g
will fall by an amount determined by the value of σ. The higher the value of σ is above
1, the more elastic demand is to changes in own-price relative to the weighted-average
price.14
The Source Choice for Consumption
The remainder of the nested demand functions for household agents are derived in a sim-
ilar manner to the above. Referring back to the diagram in figure 2.1, the choice over
the domestic and imported product varieties, and then the domestic regions’ varieties are
each expenditure minimisation problems analogous to that seen directly above. We there-
fore omit the statements of the constrained optimisation problems and list the demand
functions directly:15
Q
hsh(D)
g,dom,r = Q
hsh
g,dom,r(Q
hsh(D)
g,r , P
Q,hsh
g,dom,r, P
Q,hsh
g,imp,r;σ
hsh
g,r ) (2.10)
Q
hsh(D)
g,imp,r = Q
hsh
g,imp,r(Q
hsh(D)
g,r , P
Q,hsh
g,dom,r, P
Q,hsh
g,imp,r;σ
hsh
g,r ) (2.11)
Qhsh(D)g,x,r = Q
hsh
g,x,r(Q
hsh(D)
g,dom,r, P
Q,hsh
g,y,r |y ;σhshg,dom,r) (2.12)
with variable descriptions:
14Demand is inelastic in this sense for σ < 1. The interpretation of the linearised demand function
given here is due to Dixon, Parmenter, Powell & Wilcoxen (1992, p. 126).
15Equations (2.10) and (2.11) can be written more compactly as:
Qhsh(D)g,o,r = Q
hsh
g,o,r(Q
hsh(D)
g,r , P
Q,hsh
g,a,r |a∈ORG ;σhshg,r )
For clarity these origin demands are written separately, due to the inclusion of Q
hsh(D)
g,dom,r in equation
(2.12). Later we will also find it useful to combine variables like Q
hsh(D)
g,imp,r with Q
hsh(D)
g,x,r as Q
hsh(D)
g,s,r with
s ∈ SRC , source demands for products from all domestic regions plus imports.
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PQ,hshg,dom,r price of domestic product g paid by hshr
PQ,hshg,imp,r price of imported product g paid by hshr
PQ,hshg,x,r price of product g from region x paid by hshr
Q
hsh(D)
g,dom,r domestic product g demanded by hshr
Q
hsh(D)
g,imp,r imported product g demanded by hshr
Q
hsh(D)
g,x,r product g from region x demanded by hshr
The demand functions can be interpreted by considering their linearised form, anal-
ogous to those directly above. For example, they imply that if the purchase price of a
product g from region x that the household agent in region r faces rises relative to the
weighted-average price of that product from all regions, the agent will substitute away
from region x’s variety towards the other regions’ varieties, with the strength of the sub-
stitution determined by the value of σhshg,dom,r.
Summary
This section has introduced a block of equations that describe the behaviour of house-
holds. Equations (2.1) - (2.6) set out definitions of household income, saving, endowment
income, labour supply, and average propensities to consume and save. A system of de-
mand equations were then derived in (2.7) - (2.12). The decision nest shown in figure 2.1
may appear to have many tiers (levels) compared to other CGE models such as ORANI
and FEDERAL. However, this is simply because the form of the utility and mixing func-
tions have been restricted to CES. FEDERAL in contrast uses CRESH functions, which
are a generalisation of the CES form that allows the substitution elasticity between any
two sources to differ from that between any other two sources. While this makes for
a more elegant and complicated model, for this thesis the choice was made to assume
constant elasticities over the domestic regions. This assumption is reasonable until New
Zealand data becomes available to support such an extension of the household decision
nest. It also enhances the transparency and simplicity of the model.
2.3.2 Industries – Current Production
Within the production sector the following activities take place:
- production of goods and services for consumption by households, the government,
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and the foreign sector,
- production of goods and services for use as an intermediate input by other firms,
- construction of new capital, and
- investment in new capital
Each industry agent is assumed to engage only in the first three of these activities
– i.e. making products for current use and construction of capital. This latter activity
involves deciding the best mixture of inputs to produce a given quantity of new capital.
The decision of how much new capital is desired by each industry in each region is the
fourth activity in the list above and is undertaken by a separate agent. The implication
of dealing with these activities separately is that the optimising choice involved in one
activity is made independently of decisions regarding the other activities. For example
production decisions are made independently of investment decisions.16 This section will
set out the behaviour of the industry agents with respect to current production and the
following section will deal with capital formation decisions.
Factors, Inputs, and Output
For each industry there is one agent in each region that produces a single unique product.
Each industry is therefore named according to its product. Industry j in region r makes
product g and g = j. Intermediate inputs and factors of production are used in the
production process. The full decision nest of the industry agent indj,r in the production
of Qg,r is shown in figure 2.2.
The industry agent indj,r aims to minimise costs of production by choosing the optimal
combination of total composite product Q
ind(D)
j,r and composite factor F
ind(D)
j,r to produce
a given level of output of its product Q
(S)
g,r . That is, indj,r minimises:
PQ,indj,r ·Qind(D)j,r + P F,indj,r · F ind(D)j,r
subject to its production function
Q(S)g,r = Qg,r(Q
ind(D)
j,r , F
ind(D)
j,r )
16Naturally the outcome of investment decisions will affect production decisions. The point is that
the decisions are made separately so that agents’ optimisation problems only involve a single objective
function.
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with variable descriptions:
PQ,indj,r price of total composite product paid by indj,r
P F,indj,r price of composite factor paid by indj,r
The production function Qg,r(•) is of the CES class of functions so the form of the
resulting demand functions depends on the assumed value of the elasticity of substitution
parameter σindj,r . The approach taken in section 2.3.1 of expressing the demands using
function notation and interpreting them using linearised equations is followed here.
The demand functions that solve the above cost minimisation problem are:
Q
ind(D)
j,r = Q
ind
j,r (Q
(S)
g,r , P
Q,ind
j,r , P
F,ind
j,r ;σ
ind
j,r ) (2.13)
F
ind(D)
j,r = F
ind
j,r (Q
(S)
g,r , P
Q,ind
j,r , P
F,ind
j,r ;σ
ind
j,r ) (2.14)
As discussed above in the context of the household agents’ decision nest, the form of
the demand functions for specific values of σindj,r can be seen from appendix E and can be
interpreted by considering their linearised form. Linearising the above demand functions
for a given value of σ ≥ 0 gives:17
q = s− σ(pQ − ([XQ] · pQ + [XF ] · pF ))
f = s− σ(pF − ([XQ] · pQ + [XF ] · pF ))
with variable descriptions:
q percentage change in total composite product demanded
f percentage change in composite factor demanded
pQ percentage change in purchase price of total composite prod-
uct
pF percentage change in price of composite factor
s percentage change in output (supply)
[XQ] weight on total composite product
[XF ] weight on composite factor
17These linearised functions are analogous to ORANI’s equation (12.23) and FEDERAL’s equation
(2.1) (See Dixon et al. 1982, Madden 1990); the forms differ as ORANI and FEDERAL derive their
demands from CRESH rather than CES functions and include technology coefficients which are treated
here as structural parameters for simplicity. Introducing technology coefficients would make it possible
to run simulations of unbalanced growth or technology shocks. A few simple changes to the program
code would be all that is required to reassign the parameters as exogenous variables.
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Figure 2.2: Industry agents’ decision nest for current production
The weights [XQ] and [XF ] are product and factor shares in total costs. If the price
of composite factor rises (price of composite product falls) relative to a weighted average
price index constructed using these weights, the industry agent will substitute away from
the use of factors towards the use of material input, to the degree allowed by the value of σ.
In order to increase output by a certain proportion, the industry agent needs to increase
its use of composite product and factor by the same proportion in the absence of input
price changes. This confirms the constant returns to scale property of the production
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function.
To this point, all prices that have been introduced have been purchase prices — the
price paid by the purchasing agent for the product itself plus any auxiliary charges such
as taxes, transport costs etc. Thus there is a distinction between these prices that are
relevant for demands, and the prices that the seller receives — the basic price. There
is a basic price associated with the industry agent’s output, PQg,r and we will see this is
determined by the market clearing condition of the relevant product market. In this basic
version of the prototype model, the only items that may put a wedge between the purchase
and basic prices are ad valorem product subsidies and taxes (such as GST, import duties,
and excise taxes). Purchase prices will be discussed fully in section 2.3.10.
The Composition of Input Demand
The industry agent’s choice of how to form its composite intermediate input from the
set of available products and sources is analogous to the choice by household agents
over the composition of their consumption discussed in sections 2.3.1. With appropriate
adjustments to notation, it follows that the demand functions that describe each industry
agent’s input product mix are:
Q
ind(Q)(D)
g,j,r = Q
ind(Q)
g,j,r (Q
ind(D)
j,r , P
Q,ind(Q)
h,j,r |h ;σQ,ind(Q)j,r ) (2.15)
with an interpretation analogous to that of equation (2.9) for households. The quantity
variables carry a superscript (Q) to distinguish these demands for inputs to current pro-
duction from demands for inputs to capital formation, which are denoted with (K) instead.
Similarly, the purchase prices carry the superscript (Q) to allow for the possibility that
the industry agent pays a different price for the same composite product depending on
its use. It may be that purchases of some products are subsidised if they are used for
capital formation, for example. It is usual to assume Leontief mixing (no substitution,
σ
Q,ind(Q)
j,r = 0) at this level of the industry agent’s decision nest but here the technology
is specified for any given positive substitution elasticity so that this assumption may be
relaxed if desired.18
18That is, the Leontief technology is not hard-coded into the program; the user may change the elasticity
by simply altering the appropriate number.
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The Source Choice for Inputs
For each product demanded as an input to production, the industry agent decides how
much of the product will come from each source in a fashion identical to how household
agents made this choice as detailed in section 2.3.1, so the demand functions that describe
each industry agent’s source choice are:
Q
ind(Q)(D)
g,dom,j,r = Q
ind(Q)
g,dom,j,r(Q
ind(Q)(D)
g,j,r , P
Q,ind(Q)
g,dom,j,r , P
Q,ind(Q)
g,imp,j,r ;σ
ind(Q)
g,j,r ) (2.16)
Q
ind(Q)(D)
g,imp,j,r = Q
ind(Q)
g,imp,j,r(Q
ind(Q)(D)
g,j,r , P
Q,ind(Q)
g,dom,j,r , P
Q,ind(Q)
g,imp,j,r ;σ
ind(Q)
g,j,r ) (2.17)
Q
ind(Q)(D)
g,x,j,r = Q
ind(Q)
g,x,j,r (Q
ind(Q)(D)
g,dom,j,r , P
Q,ind(Q)
g,y,j,r |y ;σind(Q)g,dom,j,r) (2.18)
Here again the purchase prices may differ across uses for a given industry agent, and
any differences will feed through to higher levels in the decision nest. In general any
auxiliary cost (or benefit) accrued in acquiring products for one purpose but not the
other can cause the purchase prices to differ.
The Composition of Factor Demand
As indicated in figure 2.2, industry agents demand a combination of labour and capital
to form their composite factor input. The important feature of this choice is that they
can only demand labour and capital from within their own region, and indeed this is
what gives the industry agents their regional characteristic. Additionally, they can only
use capital specific to their own industry.19 The model implicitly assumes that labour
is perfectly mobile between industries. Therefore additional labour requirements can
be met by acquiring employees from other industries. The extent they also may be
met by acquiring employees from other regions depends on the regional labour mobility
assumption, which is a closure issue in this basic version of the model. Similarly, the
only way additional current capital requirements may be met is if the closure allows
capital mobility between industries and/or regions.20 Consider the industry agent’s factor
composition problem:
19This is why the labour supply variable L
(S)
r only has a region subscript but the capital stock variable
K
(S)
j,r has both industry and region subscripts.
20Additional capital formation cannot be used because it is assumed that new capital only comes online
after the current period — an essential element of the comparative-static framework.
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Minimise
PL,btaxr · Lind(D)j,r + PKj,r ·K ind(D)j,r
subject to
F
ind(D)
j,r = F
ind
j,r (L
ind(D)
j,r , K
ind(D)
j,r )
with variable descriptions:
L
ind(D)
j,r demand for labour by indj,r
K
ind(D)
j,r demand for capital by indj,r
Notice the relevant wage rate for the industry agent is the before-tax (gross) rate while
it was the after-tax rate that entered the household agent’s optimisation problem. There
is therefore provision for direct tax to be imposed on labour income, but no such provision
has been made at this stage for tax on capital income.
The solution to the factor-cost minimisation problem is:
L
ind(D)
j,r = L
ind
j,r (F
ind(D)
j,r , P
L,btax
r , P
K
j,r;σ
F,ind
j,r ) (2.19)
K
ind(D)
j,r = K
ind
j,r (F
ind(D)
j,r , P
L,btax
r , P
K
j,r;σ
F,ind
j,r ) (2.20)
Analogous to the demand function for composite factor and its linearised form seen above,
the linearised demands for labour and current capital are:
l = f − σ(pL − ([XL] · pL + [XK ] · pK))
k = f − σ(pK − ([XL] · pL + [XK ] · pK))
If demand for composite factor rises but levels of capital stocks are fixed (under a short-
run closure assumption), there must be a rise in the rental rate relative to the wage rate
for market clearing, and a subsequent fall in the K/L ratio.
Summary
This section has presented the block of equations (2.13) - (2.20) that describe the be-
haviour of industry agents with respect to production for current usage. These equations
are a set of nested demand functions that formalise the composition of production inputs
as summarised in figure 2.2. As with the household agent’s decision nest, the degree of
nesting employed here allows different substitution elasticities to be used at each level of
the nest.
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2.3.3 Industries – Capital Formation
At the same time as producing products for current usage, industry agents construct
capital for future use. Their behaviour with regard to product and source composition
of inputs for capital formation is analogous to that for current production. The decision
nest is essentially the same except the top-level choice between materials and factors,
and the composition of factor demand, are not present — see figure 2.3. As per common
convention, no labour or capital are directly employed in the construction of new capital;
the only costs are purchases of goods and services which have already used labour and
capital in their production. It is assumed that industry agents decide how a given quantity
of new capital is formed while the issue of how much should be constructed is determined
by behaviour of the investor agent, discussed in the next section. For a given level of
new capital K
new(S)
j,r constructed by the industry agent indj,r, the product and source
composition is described by the following demand functions:
Q
ind(K)(D)
g,j,r = Q
ind(K)
g,j,r (K
new(S)
j,r , P
Q,ind(K)
h,j,r |h ;σQ,ind(K)j,r ) (2.21)
Q
ind(K)(D)
g,dom,j,r = Q
ind(K)
g,dom,j,r(Q
ind(K)(D)
g,j,r , P
Q,ind(K)
g,dom,j,r , P
Q,ind(K)
g,imp,j,r ;σ
ind(K)
g,j,r ) (2.22)
Q
ind(K)(D)
g,imp,j,r = Q
ind(K)
g,imp,j,r(Q
ind(K)(D)
g,j,r , P
Q,ind(K)
g,dom,j,r , P
Q,ind(K)
g,imp,j,r ;σ
ind(K)
g,j,r ) (2.23)
Q
ind(K)(D)
g,x,j,r = Q
ind(K)
g,x,j,r (Q
ind(K)(D)
g,dom,j,r , P
Q,ind(K)
g,y,j,r |y ;σind(K)g,dom,j,r) (2.24)
The meaning of the variables in equations (2.21) - (2.24) are the same as those in equations
(2.15) - (2.18) except that they are for capital formation instead of current production.
This is indicated by the variables having (K) superscripts instead of (Q)’s. Note that
the substitution elasticities also carry the (K) superscripts to indicate that the mixing
technology may differ from the current production counterpart, although without good
reason to assume so, the default position of invariance should be taken.
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Figure 2.3: Industry agents’ decision nest for capital formation
2.3.4 Investment Allocation
The specification of an investor agent inv allows the separation of the investment alloca-
tion decision from the capital formation process. It also allows capital construction costs
to be established, which can be compared to rental rates to determine rates of return on
investment in new capital. The investor agent takes the level of aggregate gross invest-
ment as given and decides how to allocate that investment between the industries and
regions. That is, the agent decides the level of gross investment demand I
ind(D)
j,r for each
industry j in each region r. There are two possible options for the investment agent’s
behaviour:
exogenous investment demands are fixed at exogenously determined proportions of, and
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therefore mimic changes in, real aggregate investment. The latter is also usually
exogenously specified, either its level or its share in absorption or GDP.
endogenous investment demands respond to relative rates of return, such that expected
rates of return on investment are equalised. This option is based on the ORANI /
FEDERAL endogenous allocation module.
Regardless of which option is chosen, in equilibrium I
ind(D)
j,r = K
new(S)
j,r ∀j, r. That is,
the set of market clearing conditions for the investment markets will establish that the
supply of new capital for each industry in each region will equal the respective investment
demand. The market clearing price, PK,newj,r , is the construction cost of the new capital.
In order to facilitate the endogenous investment allocation mechanism we first define
a set of variables:
GRORj,r = 100×
PKj,r
PK,newj,r
(2.25)
NRORj,r = GRORj,r − δj,r (2.26)
R
GROR/NROR
j,r =
GRORj,r
NRORj,r
(2.27)
R
Knew/Kfuture
j,r = 100×
K
new(S)
j,r
K futurej,r
(2.28)
K futurej,r =
(
1− δj,r
100
)
K
(S)
j,r +K
new(S)
j,r (2.29)
with variable descriptions:
GRORj,r gross rate of return
NRORj,r net rate of return
R
GROR/NROR
j,r ratio of gross to net returns
R
Knew/Kfuture
j,r ratio of new to future capital stock
δj,r depreciation rate
K futurej,r future capital stock
Of the sets of new variables listed above, one set of J × R variables needs to be
exogenously specified, where J is the number of industries and R is the number of regions.
In this thesis, depreciation rates are the exogenous components. Depending on what data
is available, in general the user may wish to exogenously specify new to future capital
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ratios (a measure of capital growth) or gross to net rates of return ratios instead, hence
the inclusion of their defining equations to facilitate this.
As discussed later in section 2.4, since the model is implemented in levels, base-period
or benchmark equilibrium values of all model variables have to be established. This
enables real measures to simply be defined in constant prices. Real aggregate investment
is therefore defined as:
Ib$ =
∑
j
∑
r
[PK,newj,r ] · I ind(D)j,r (2.30)
where [PK,newj,r ] is the benchmark equilibrium value of P
K,new
j,r and I
b$ is real aggregate
investment — investment measured at constant construction-cost prices. Shares of real
aggregate investment XI,b$j,r/tot are defined by the equation:
XI,b$j,r/tot = 100×
[PK,newj,r ] · I ind(D)j,r
Ib$
(2.31)
To allow for equalisation of expected rates of return on capital, we adapt the FED-
ERAL (Madden 1990, eq. 2.54) expected net rate of return schedule so that:
NRORfuturej,r =
(
K futurej,r
K
(S)
j,r
)−βj,r
· NRORj,r (2.32)
with variable descriptions:
NRORfuturej,r expected net rate of return on indj,r’s capital
βj,r elasticity of expected/current rate of return ratio with respect
to future/current capital ratio — the marginal efficiency of
investment (βj,r > 0)
When the investment shares are exogenous, this equation causes the expected rates
of return consistent with those shares to be reported as part of the equilibrium solution,
and simulation results will report how the specified shock causes the expected rates to
diverge. To implement endogenous allocation, all that is additionally needed is a set of
equations to tie all the expected rates of return together:21
NRORfuturej,r = Ω ∀j ∈ ENDIND (2.33)
21In terms of the system of equations that constitute the model, these equations replace those that are
used to set XI,b$j,r/tot exogenously.
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where Ω is the economy-wide average expected net rate of return on capital. The equation
holds for those industries included by the user in the set ENDIND which is a subset of all
industries IND . Thus the user can exclude some industries from endogenous allocation,
in which case their investment level will be as required to meet the exogenously specified
real investment share. For those industries for which endogenous allocation is allowed,
investment levels can only adjust in a way consistent with (2.32) and (2.33). It can be
shown analytically that this means:22
XI,b$j,r/tot
100
=
1
Ib$
((
NRORj,r
Ω
) 1
βj,r −
(
1− δj,r
100
))
K
(S)
j,r ∀j ∈ ENDIND
The higher the current net rate of return for an industry agent’s capital, the more in-
vestment will be allocated to it. Industries and regions that have relatively more capital
or higher depreciation rates will also be allocated proportionately more gross investment
(for given rates of return).23
2.3.5 Exporters
The exporter agents act as simple conduits between the domestic and foreign sectors.
They purchase domestic products and transform them into exports. The main purpose of
identifying these agents at this stage is to provide for the possibility of export subsidies,
which would place a wedge between the domestic (basic) prices and foreign (purchase)
prices. Their inclusion also makes it possible to introduce model enhancements that for
example relax the assumption of costless transformation of domestically produced goods
into exports.
There is one exporter agent expg for each product g and the costless transformation
assumption is embodied in the following set of demand functions:
Qexp(D)g = EXP
(S)
g (2.34)
22See the derivation of this expression in appendix H.
23The implications for the level of investment demand I
ind(D)
j,r depends on the closure assumption with
respect to Ω. If real aggregate investment is fixed exogenous as usual, then Ω endogenously adjusts to
reflect any shock to real investment. On the other hand Ω could be fixed exogenously instead, but this
has implications for the operation of Walras’ Law since real investment would then be endogenous. This
issue is addressed later in section 2.4.5.
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with variable descriptions:
Q
exp(D)
g composite product g demanded by expg
EXP (S)g supply of exports of product g by expg
The interpretation of (2.34) is that the exporter will demand exactly the same volume
of composite products from the domestic economy as it is going to supply to the foreign
sector. Inclusion of (2.34) also establishes a purchase price PQ,expg that can be compared
to the basic price of exports PEXPg . Only with costless transformation will the two be
identical. Note that neither of these prices will necessarily equal the f.o.b. export price
of product g, which is the price paid by the foreign sector (for) for exports. For those
products whose exporter receives a subsidy, the f.o.b. export price and the basic export
price will differ.24
Once the demand for composite product g has been determined, all that remains is a
decision of how much of product g to purchase from each domestic region. This takes the
same form as the domestic regions part of the source choice for household as detailed in
2.3.1. The first part of the source choice is excluded as the usual assumption is made that
imported products are not immediately exported again without any value-added from
the domestic economy. Each exporter agent expg then has a set of demand functions
analogous to (2.12) for households:
Qexp(D)g,x = Q
exp
g,x (Q
exp(D)
g , P
Q,exp
g,y |y ;σexpg ) (2.35)
The implication of this formation process for exports is that the foreign sector faces
the same f.o.b. export price for a given product g regardless of the port of export. In
this basic version of the model, there are no delivery costs involved in moving products
from their region of production to the port. This assumption will be relaxed in the next
chapter but it is done in such a way that the above implication still follows.
2.3.6 Importers
Similar to the exporter agents, the importer agents have the simple task of transforming
foreign products into imported products and selling them onwards to domestic users.
24The nominal exchange rate φ, to be introduced shortly, also has a role here. We assume the exporter’s
basic price is in domestic currency but the price paid by the foreign sector is in foreign currency. Equation
(2.45) converts the f.o.b. price into domestic currency for comparison with other domestic currency prices.
2.3. THEORETICAL STRUCTURE 43
Import duties and potentially other costs incurred in the process of importation and
delivery to market can be passed on to users by modelling this transformation.
The transformation itself is assumed costless here, so the importer agent impg for
each product g has the following demand for foreign product when it is supplying a given
amount of imported products to the domestic economy:
FORimp(D)g = IMP
(S)
g (2.36)
with variable descriptions:
FORimp(D)g foreign product g demanded by impg
IMP (S)g supply of imported product g by impg
Any import duty is included in the domestic currency (d$) purchase price paid by the
importer for foreign products, PFOR,d$,impg , and is passed on to domestic users in the basic
price of imported products P IMPg that the importer receives. With costless transformation
both of these prices are the landed duty-paid import price while the price the foreign agent
receives (the basic price of foreign products) is the c.i.f. import price.25
For convenience we introduce alternative notation for the supply of imports and their
basic price:26
Q
(S)
g,imp ≡ IMP (S)g
PQg,imp ≡ P IMPg
The basic model assumes that there is no cost to deliver an imported product from
its port of entry to the region of usage. Users therefore face the same basic price of an
imported product regardless of the port of entry. The next chapter introduces delivery
costs but this implication continues to hold.
2.3.7 Government
The activities of the public sector that are incorporated into the model are government
consumption of goods and services, subsidisation of production and exports, and taxa-
25Here again the nominal exchange rate has the role of converting the c.i.f. import price, which we
measure in foreign currency, into domestic currency for comparison to other domestic currency prices.
The currency conversion is done by equation (2.64).
26For an example of the use of the alternative notation for supply and basic price of imports, see (2.46)
and (2.59) respectively.
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tion of labour income and purchases of goods and services. These latter taxes consist of
GST, import duties, and general product taxes. Provision is also made for the inclusion
of region-specific lump-sum transfers, but transfers that are related to other model vari-
ables (such as unemployment) and corporate income tax are not modelled. Government
policy with respect to all these items is usually assumed exogenous. That is, the level
and composition of government expenditure is usually fixed (perhaps as a proportion of
absorption or GDP) along with the various tax and subsidy rates.
The modelled components of government expenditure and revenue are discussed below,
while the definition of fiscal balance will be specified later, in section 2.3.12.
The Composition of Government Consumption
The government agent gov decides on its composition of consumption in an analogous
way to how household agents choose their consumption composition. The government
agent takes the level of real government consumption expenditure as given and decides
how much of each product to purchase and then from where to source those products —
see figure 2.4. The following demand functions summarise the consumption behaviour of
the government:
Qgov(D)g = Q
gov
g (G
b$, PQ,govh |h ;σQ,gov) (2.37)
Q
gov(D)
g,dom = Q
gov
g,dom(Q
gov(D)
g , P
Q,gov
g,dom, P
Q,gov
g,imp ;σ
gov
g ) (2.38)
Q
gov(D)
g,imp = Q
gov
g,imp(Q
gov(D)
g , P
Q,gov
g,dom, P
Q,gov
g,imp ;σ
gov
g ) (2.39)
Qgov(D)g,x = Q
gov
g,x (Q
gov(D)
g,dom , P
Q,gov
g,y |y ;σgovg,dom) (2.40)
where Gb$ is real aggregate government consumption expenditure and the remainder of
the variables have meanings analogous to those of equations (2.9) - (2.12).
Exogenously specifying the level of Gb$ or its share in absorption or GDP is the
standard way of dealing with government expenditure in CGE models. It is usual not to
allow any substitution at least at the top level of the decision nest to reflect the idea that
the government is very unresponsive to price changes when considering its composition of
expenditure. It also seems reasonable that the government will be less willing than firms
to substitute between sources of products.
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Tax on Labour Income
The government is assumed to receive a fixed proportion of gross wages as income tax.
This average labour income tax rate tL places a wedge between the wage rate paid by
firms PL,btaxr and the wage rate received by households P
L,atax
r :
PL,ataxr = P
L,btax
r (1− tL) (2.41)
For a given labour income tax rate, the nominal revenue from income tax is then:
INCTAX c$ = tL ·
∑
j
∑
r
PL,btaxr · Lind(D)j,r (2.42)
As mentioned above when discussing the measurement of real aggregate investment
in section 2.3.4, real aggregates are calculated using constant prices. Real income tax
revenue is therefore defined by:
INCTAX b$ = tL ·
∑
j
∑
r
[PL,btaxr ] · Lind(D)j,r (2.43)
Import Duties and Export Subsidies
The government can receive duty on any product imported and pay subsidies for exports.
Duty is paid by importer agents and is passed on to users through the price of imported
products. That is, the basic price of imported products includes duty while the c.i.f.
import price does not. Similarly, export subsidies are received by exporter agents and
place a wedge between their basic price (the price they receive, including the subsidy)
and the f.o.b. export price paid by the foreign sector. By virtue of the duty being paid
by importers, all users indirectly pay the same ad valorem duty rate for a given product.
Similarly, products from each domestic region indirectly receive the same ad valorem
export subsidy rate.27 The equations that show the relationship between these rates
and the relevant purchase and basic prices are listed in section 2.3.10 and the defining
equations that measure duty revenue and export subsidies are given in section 2.3.12.
27In common with ORANI, the duty and export subsidy rates can be interpreted broadly as the
tariff-equivalents of import protection and export assistance respectively but for simplicity the additional
options in ORANI of specifying these in real or specific-tax form are not modelled here. See Dixon et al.
(1982, eq. 18.9 and eq. 18.13) for how these may be introduced.
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Figure 2.4: Government agent’s decision nest for consumption
Commodity Taxes
The government can in general collect commodity tax on any product from any source
purchased by any domestic user. These taxes are modelled using ad valorem commodity
tax rates that are not source-specific but are given a regional dimension for those users
that are located in regions. Thus for example households in different regions may face
different tax rates for the same product from the same source, but an industry agent pays
the same tax rate on material inputs of the same type from different sources.28 The model
includes provision for the government to pay commodity tax, to reflect the non-zero flow
28Although if one of the sources was imports, then duty could also be payable, and the commodity tax
paid is calculated using the duty-paid price.
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of tax recorded in the input-output data. However, the user has the option of forcing all
the tax rates the government faces to zero if desired by ignoring that tax flow. Exporters
do not have a regional dimension and only demand their own product so only face one
commodity tax rate each.29
Naturally the commodity tax rates are exogenous to the model and have values as-
signed during the closure phase of model implementation. As their direct effect is on
purchase prices, their implications are discussed in section 2.3.10 and the measures of
government revenue from commodity tax are listed in section 2.3.12.
Goods and Services Tax
The main commodity tax households pay is GST, so this is given separate treatment.
Unlike the general commodity tax rates, the rate of GST cannot vary across the regions
but can potentially vary across products. Provision is also made for GST to be payable
on exports. While most commodity exports are exempt, services such as those typically
purchased by tourists accrue GST revenue. The rate of GST adds to the wedge between
basic and purchaser prices for households and exporters as discussed in section 2.3.10.
The equations for measuring the government’s GST revenue are set out in section 2.3.12.
Lump-Sum Transfers
Autonomous levels of transfer (tax if negative) between the government and regional
household agents can be specified by the addition of the variable LST r to the right-hand
side of equations (2.3) and (2.5) and the appropriate adjustment made to the government
fiscal balance equation listed in section 2.3.12.30 The inclusion of these variables would
aid simulations of fiscal policy and welfare. For example, the regional employment effects
of certain lump-sum transfers could be investigated, or the lump-sum transfers required
for there to be no change in regional welfare (as measured by compensating or equivalent
variation) could be calculated, when the economy is subject to a given shock.
29As for import duties and export subsidies, the commodity tax rates can be thought of as tax-
equivalents of other policies that discourage or (if negative) encourage usage.
30The value of LST r would have to be deflated by some price index for calculations of real measures.
The lump-sum transfer is included in the set of equations listed in appendix D.
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2.3.8 Foreign Sector
The foreign sector agent for supplies each product perfectly elastically at the foreign
currency world price PFOR,f$g — the c.i.f. price. The supply is therefore determined by
the demand of the importer in equilibrium — see equation (2.51).
The foreign agent also demands exports of each product given foreign currency export
prices PEXP ,f$,forg according to the (inverse) export demand curve:
PEXP ,f$,forg =
(
EXP for(D)g
)−1/εEXPg · ψEXPg (2.44)
with variable descriptions:
EXP for(D)g demand for exports of product g by for
εEXPg (absolute value of the) elasticity of export demand for product
g
ψEXPg co-efficient reflecting the height of the export demand curve
for product g
The foreign currency export price PEXP ,f$,forg is the f.o.b. export price previously dis-
cussed in relation to the basic price of exports, the latter of which includes any export
subsidy received by the exporter. The f.o.b. price can be expressed in domestic rather
than foreign currency terms by using the equation:
PEXP ,d$,forg = φ · PEXP ,f$,forg (2.45)
where φ is the nominal exchange rate (domestic $ per foreign $). The elasticities of export
demands εEXPg and the demand curve height co-efficients ψ
EXP
g need to be exogenously
specified during the model closure process.
The option is available to the user to exclude the export demand curve for any product
for which the downward-sloping relationship is considered inappropriate from the model.
In those cases, the quantity variable is set exogenous and the corresponding height co-
efficient ψEXPg is endogenous but of no consequence to the rest of the model.
While foreign sector demand and supply have been discussed here, the definition of
the trade balance is left until section 2.3.12.
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2.3.9 Conditions for Competitive General Equilibrium
Having set out the key relationships that govern the behaviour of the agents, we now turn
to the constraints imposed on them by the assumption of competitive equilibrium. The
constraints fall into one of two groups of conditions:
1. Market clearing conditions — there is no excess demand (or supply) in any market.
2. Zero pure profit conditions — there is no excess of revenue over costs in any pro-
ductive activity.
Market Clearing
Market clearing is assumed in all markets. Total demand for each product (differenti-
ated by source s) must equal its supply, and total demand of each factor (differentiated
by region r) must equal its supply. These assumptions are embodied in the following
equations:
Q˘(S)g,s =
∑
r
Q˘hsh(D)g,s,r +
∑
p
∑
j
∑
r
Q˘
ind(p)(D)
g,s,j,r + Q˘
gov(D)
g,s + Q˘
exp(D)
g,s (2.46)
K
(S)
j,r = K
ind(D)
j,r (2.47)
L(S)r =
∑
j
L
ind(D)
j,r (2.48)
Note that equation (2.46) is indexed over the source set (s ∈ SRC ) so it covers
market clearing of imported products along with those domestically produced.31 The
above three sets of market clearing conditions therefore effectively establish basic prices
for each product type from each source (PQg,s), each type of currently installed capital
(PKj,r), and regional after-tax wage rates (P
L,btax
r ). Equation (2.46) also introduces the
notation Q˘ to signify quantities of product before they leave their point of production —
‘undelivered products’ . The difference between Q˘ and Q (‘delivered products’) is made
explicit in section 2.3.10, although the difference is only minor in this basic version of the
model. Notice also that there is no provision for idle capacity or unemployment in (2.47)
and (2.48) for simplicity. The assumption of no (involuntary) unemployment is relaxed
in chapter 4.
31This is facilitated by the equivalence of the two forms of notation for supply of imports, Q
(S)
g,imp and
IMP (S)g noted in section 2.3.6.
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The following market clearing conditions are also required for equilibrium due to the
separate specification of investment, exporting, and importing activities as discussed in
sections 2.3.4, 2.3.5, and 2.3.6:
K
new(S)
j,r = I
ind(D)
j,r (2.49)
EXP (S)g = EXP
for(D)
g (2.50)
FOR(S)g = FOR
imp(D)
g (2.51)
These equations allow the model to determine the basic prices of new capital (the con-
struction cost PK,newj,r ), exports (the subsidy-inclusive domestic currency price P
EXP
g ), and
foreign products (the c.i.f. foreign currency price PFORg ).
32 The role of the importer and
exporter agents as conduits between the domestic economy and foreign sector can now
be seen by looking at equations (2.51) and (2.36) for importing, and equations (2.50) and
(2.34) for exporting.
Zero Pure Profits in Equilibrium
Along with market clearing, competitive general equilibrium requires zero pure profits
in all production activities. These include the production of products for current usage,
the production of new capital, and the transformation processes that convert domestic
products into exports and foreign products into imports. Assumptions of zero pure profits
are specified by the following equations:
PQg,r · Q˘(S)g,r = PQ,indj,r ·Qind(D)j,r + P F,indj,r · F ind(D)j,r ∀g = j (2.52)
PK,newj,r ·Knew(S)j,r =
∑
g
P
Q,ind(K)
g,j,r ·Qind(K)(D)g,j,r (2.53)
P IMPg · IMP (S)g = PFOR,d$,impg · FORimp(D)g (2.54)
PEXPg · EXP (S)g = PQ,expg ·Qexp(D)g (2.55)
Equations (2.54) and (2.36) imply that the basic price of an imported product is equal
to the price of the foreign product paid by the importer, which includes any duty payable.
Therefore both changes in world prices and changes in duty rates are transmitted to the
32Although, the last of these is usually set exogenous, in which case equation (2.51) determines the
supply of foreign products instead. By fixing the world price, the implicit assumption is made that the
foreign sector will meet any domestic demand at that price.
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domestic economy through this channel. Similarly, equations (2.55) and (2.34) imply
that the basic price of exports is equal to the price paid by the exporter for the domestic
product, so domestic price changes are passed on to the foreign sector through this channel.
2.3.10 Purchase Price Definitions
In a sense, the definitions of purchase prices are zero profit conditions. They simply state
that the expenditure by a given agent at one level in their decision nest equals the sum of
the expenditures at the level below. There is no value gained or lost by forming composite
products or factors. This implies that the purchase price at one level is a weighted sum
of the purchase prices of the level below, where the weights are expenditure shares. For
example, for each household agent hshr there is an equation:
PQ,hshr ·Qhsh(D)r =
∑
g
PQ,hshg,r ·Qhsh(D)g,r (2.56)
This defines the purchase price of total composite product PQ,hshr as a weighted sum of
the purchase prices of each product g, PQ,hshg,r , where the sum weights are the proportions
of household expenditure that goes to each product.
The purchase prices PQ,hshg,r are in turn defined by the following set of equations:
PQ,hshg,r ·Qhsh(D)g,r =
∑
o
PQ,hshg,o,r ·Qhsh(D)g,o,r (2.57)
while the purchase price of each domestic composite product PQ,hshg,dom,r is defined by:
PQ,hshg,dom,r ·Qhsh(D)g,dom,r =
∑
x
PQ,hshg,x,r ·Qhsh(D)g,x,r (2.58)
What remains to be determined are the purchase prices PQ,hshg,x,r and P
Q,hsh
g,imp,r. It is
useful here to refer to these together as the purchase price of product g from source s
with s ∈ SRC with SRC = REG ∪ {imp} — i.e. PQ,hshg,s,r . By assuming there are no
costs involved in delivering each product from each source to the household agent in each
region, the only thing that puts a wedge between the price paid by the household and the
price received by the producer are commodity taxes (including GST). It would seem then
that we could define the purchase prices PQ,hshg,s,r as follows:
PQ,hshg,s,r = P
Q
g,s · (1 + tQ,hshg,r + tGST ,hshg ) ∀s ∈ SRC
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with variable descriptions:
tQ,hshg,r commodity tax rate faced by hshr on purchases of product g
from any source
tGST ,hshg GST rate faced by all household agents on purchases of prod-
uct g from any source
For computational reasons, rather than use equations such as the above to describe
the relationship between purchase prices and basic prices, equations analogous to (2.56),
(2.57), and (2.58) are specified:33
PQ,hshg,s,r ·Qhsh(D)g,s,r = PQg,s · (1 + tQ,hshg,r + tGST ,hshg ) · Q˘hsh(D)g,s,r (2.59)
where Q˘
hsh(D)
g,s,r can be thought of as a quantity of ‘undelivered’ products while Q
hsh(D)
g,s,r
is the ‘delivered’ version. One can think of an undelivered product being the assembled
item sitting at the factory door while a delivered product is the same item in the hands
of the user. It makes no difference to simulation results (i.e. percentage changes) if
the benchmark levels of Q
hsh(D)
g,s,r and Q˘
hsh(D)
g,s,r are equal and benchmark cost wedges are
reflected in the level differences between purchase and basic prices, or the benchmark
levels of PQ,hshg,s,r and P
Q
g,s are equal and cost wedges are reflected in the level differences
between delivered and undelivered quantities. As will be outlined in section 2.4.3, the
latter option was taken. In simulations, the quantity variables still move in unison and
cost-wedge changes open gaps between purchase and basic prices. In chapter 3, where
delivery costs are not necessarily zero, the distinction between delivered and undelivered
products becomes more meaningful.
Most purchase price definitions for the other agents follow a similar pattern to that
above with adjustments as necessary for the different decision nest structure. Only those
that do not follow immediately from the above are made explicit below. The full list of
purchase price equations can be found in appendix D.
The definition of the composite factor purchase price reflects the assumption that
industries only use factors from their own region:
P F,indj,r · F ind(D)j,r = PL,btaxr · Lind(D)j,r + PKj,r ·K ind(D)j,r (2.60)
33The equations can be written in this compact form by exploiting the equivalence of the two forms of
notation for basic prices of imports, PQg,imp and P
IMP
g noted in section 2.3.6.
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Since exporter agent expg only demands product g, and it sources this product only
from the domestic sources (i.e. the regions), its purchase price equations are:
PQ,expg ·Qexp(D)g =
∑
x
PQ,expg,x ·Qexp(D)g,x (2.61)
PQ,expg,x ·Qexp(D)g,x = PQg,x · (1 + tQ,expg + tGST ,expg ) · Q˘exp(D)g,x (2.62)
The inclusion of GST in equation (2.62) implies that the exporter pays GST on behalf
of, and passes the cost on to the foreign agent. The superscript exp is added to tGST
to indicate that exports of product g can be subject to a different GST rate from the
domestic version. tGST ,expg is essentially an effective rate: if the user wished to specify
that only half the exports of g are subject to GST, tGST ,expg can be set to half the value
of tGST ,hshg .
The only purchase price relevant for importer agent impg is P
FOR,d$,imp
g . Since the
basic price of foreign products PFORg is a foreign currency price, we define the foreign
currency purchase price first and then convert it into domestic currency using the nominal
exchange rate φ:
PFOR,f$,impg = (1 + t
FOR
g ) · PFORg (2.63)
PFOR,d$,impg = φ · PFOR,f$,impg (2.64)
where tFORg is the duty rate on imports of product g. The implication of (2.63) is that the
importer pays duty on behalf of domestic users and passes the cost on to them through
its import price (as distinct from the foreign product price).
Finally, the foreign agent for is concerned with the set of foreign currency f.o.b.
export prices PEXP ,f$,forg , as discussed in section 2.3.8. These are usually exogenously set
or determined by the export demand curve (2.44) when the respective export volume is
fixed. The relationship between the f.o.b. export price and the basic price of exports is:
PEXPg = (1− tEXPg ) · PEXP ,d$,forg (2.65)
where tEXPg is the rate of export tax on product g (negative for an export subsidy) and
PEXP ,d$,forg is converted to foreign currency by equation (2.45).
2.3.11 Numeraire
The model focuses on the real economy and as such contains no monetary theory of price
determination. The level of each price variable in the model must then be interpreted as
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that price relative to some undetermined price level — the numeraire. The usual approach
is to exogenously specify one of the price variables, so that all other prices are relative
to it. The nominal exchange rate φ is commonly used for this purpose, although other
useful candidates include the economy-wide average wage, the consumer price index, or
the GDP deflator. The standard implementation of the prototype model has the nominal
exchange rate specified as the numeraire by the equation:
φ = 1 (2.66)
2.3.12 Defining Equations for Macro Aggregates, Indices, etc.
These equations define various aggregate measures and indices that facilitate different
closure assumptions and provide useful summary measures. A number of nominal and
real measures have already been introduced in previous sections. Since the model is solved
in levels form, we have levels of base-period (benchmark equilibrium) and current-period
(new equilibrium) prices. Nominal measures value quantities at current prices while real
measures use base-period prices. The current prices are model variables while the base-
period prices are constants. To distinguish these in equations, base-period prices are
enclosed in square brackets as we have already seen a number of times above.
For brevity only the key building blocks of the aggregate measures are listed here.
For example, many variables that are New Zealand totals of regional measures are not
separately defined here. In other cases where definitions are obvious, equations explicitly
stating the definitions are omitted. All variable definitions can however be found in
appendix D.
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Household Endowment Income, Expenditure, Income, and Saving
Nominal measures of household endowment income, expenditure, income, and saving were
introduced in section 2.3.1. The real counterparts to those equations are:
ENDINC atax,b$r = [P
L,atax
r ] · TIME r +
∑
j
[PKj,r] ·K(S)j,r (2.67)
INC atax,b$r = [P
L,atax
r ] · L(S)r +
∑
j
[PKj,r] ·K(S)j,r (2.68)
SPN b$r = [P
Q,hsh
r ] ·Qhsh(D)r (2.69)
SAV atax,b$r = INC
atax,b$
r − SPN b$r (2.70)
The last of these equations can be listed more generally using v ∈ VAL:
SAV atax,vr = INC
atax,v
r − SPN vr
For v = c$ and v = b$, the above defines nominal and real measures as discussed. The
other element of v, bQ denotes current price, constant quantity measures such as:
INC atax,bQr = P
L,atax
r · [L(S)r ] +
∑
j
PKj,r · [K(S)j,r ]
Such measures are used for Laspeyres index calculations, which are discussed later. For
variables where the bQ components are not used elsewhere (such as for the above), those
components can be ignored.
National aggregates of the above measures are calculated as summations of the regional
variables — their defining equations are listed in appendix D.
Domestic Expenditure on GDP
These are the measures of aggregate household consumption, investment, and government
consumption. Real investment was defined equation (2.30). An equation defining real
government consumption expenditure cannot be included in the model because this would
cause the model to be over-identified, due to its inclusion in the demand functions of
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equation (2.37).34
Cv =
∑
r
SPN vr (2.71)
Ic$ =
∑
j
∑
r
PK,newj,r · I ind(D)j,r (2.72)
IbQ =
∑
j
∑
r
PK,newj,r · [I ind(D)j,r ] (2.73)
Gc$ =
∑
g
PQ,govg ·Qgov(D)g (2.74)
GbQ =
∑
g
PQ,govg · [Qgov(D)g ] (2.75)
The current price, constant quantity measures of these items will be useful later for
constructing expenditure price indices.
Trade Flows and the Trade Balance
Imports and exports are valued in a number of ways — in domestic and foreign currency,
in nominal and real terms, and in basic and c.i.f. or f.o.b. prices.
EXPc$,d$,bas =
∑
g
PEXPg · EXP (S)g (2.76)
EXPc$,f$,bas =
1
φ
· EXPc$,d$,bas (2.77)
EXPc$,c,fob =
∑
g
PEXP ,c,forg · EXP for(D)g (2.78)
IMPc$,c,bas =
∑
g
PFOR,c,impg · FORimp(D)g (2.79)
IMPc$,f$,cif =
∑
g
PFORg · FOR(S)g (2.80)
IMPc$,d$,cif = φ · IMPc$,f$,cif (2.81)
34Real government consumption is determined by the CES mixing function constraint in the expendi-
ture minimisation problem at the top of the government agent’s decision nest. The constraint becomes
one of the first-order conditions of the solution. This is also why nominal household expenditure is defined
in terms of the average propensity to consume rather than the product of the purchase price and quan-
tity of total composite product, analogous to the definition of real household expenditure listed above
— the expenditure constraint becomes a first-order condition to the solution of the utility maximisation
problem.
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The corresponding real measures are defined in the usual way for v = b$. The balance of
trade can therefore be measured in nominal and real terms as follows:
TRDBALv,c = EXPv,c,fob − IMPc$,c,cif (2.82)
Government Revenue and the Fiscal Balance
Measures of nominal and real income tax revenue were given in section 2.3.7. The other
components of government revenue and the fiscal balance are defined below:
DUTY c$ =
∑
g
tFORg · φ · PFORg · FORimp(D)g (2.83)
EXPSUBc$ = −
∑
g
tEXPg · PEXP ,d$,forg · EXP (S)g (2.84)
COMTAX c$ =
∑
g
∑
s
∑
p
∑
j
∑
r
(
PQg,s · tQ,hshg,r · Q˘hsh(D)g,s,r
+PQg,s · tQ,ind(p)g,j,r · Q˘ind(p)(D)g,s,j,r + PQg,s · tQ,govg · Q˘gov(D)g,s + PQg,r · tQ,expg · Q˘exp(D)g,r
)
(2.85)
GST c$ =
∑
g
∑
s
∑
r
(
PQg,s · tGST ,hshg · Q˘hsh(D)g,s,r + PQg,r · tGST ,expg · Q˘exp(D)g,r
)
(2.86)
GOVREV v = INCTAX v + DUTY v + COMTAX v + GST v − EXPSUBv (2.87)
GOVBALv = GOVREV v −Gv (2.88)
Labour Market Measures
In this basic version of the model, the only component of the labour market that is
modelled is employment. Full employment is assumed in equilibrium — unemployment
rates are fixed at zero. Without measures of population, participation rates cannot be
calculated. These items will be introduced in chapter 4 to give a richer description of the
labour market.35 At this stage, we only define the employment measures:
35In chapter 4, non-participation in the labour market is directly linked to consumption of leisure such
that participation rates may be calculated. Unemployment is then measured as the residual between the
labour force and employment. To facilitate the calculation of unemployment rates, an unemployment
variable will be added to the righthand side of (2.48).
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EMP j,r = [P
L,btax
r ] · Lind(D)j,r (2.89)
EMP j,NZ =
∑
r
EMP j,r (2.90)
EMP r =
∑
j
EMP j,r (2.91)
EMPNZ =
∑
r
EMP r (2.92)
Sets of employment shares can be calculated from these measures as necessary. The
definition of these are obvious from the notation. For example, XEMPj,r/NZ is industry j,
region r’s share of total employment, XEMPj,r/r is industry j’s share of region r’s employment,
and XEMPr/NZ is region r’s share of total employment.
Factor Incomes and Gross Value Added
A selection of wage and capital income measures are defined followed by measures of gross
value added (GVA):
WAGESw,c$j,r = P
L,w
r · Lind(D)j,r (2.93)
WAGESw,vr =
∑
j
WAGESw,vj,r (2.94)
KRENTS c$j,r = P
K
j,r ·K ind(D)j,r (2.95)
KRENTS vr =
∑
j
KRENTS vj,r (2.96)
GVAvj,r = WAGES
btax,v
j,r + KRENTS
v
j,r ∀r ∈ NZREG (2.97)
GVAvr = WAGES
btax,v
r + KRENTS
v
r ∀r ∈ NZREG (2.98)
Output, Investment, Capital Stocks, and Net Returns
Aggregate investment measures have already been defined above. Industrial and regional
output, investment, capital stocks, and net returns can be measured along similar lines
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to the factor incomes above.
Ic$j,r = P
K,new
j,r · I ind(D)j,r (2.99)
OUTPUT c$j,r = P
Q
g,r · Q˘(S)g,r ∀g = j (2.100)
KSTOCK r =
∑
j
K
(S)
j,r (2.101)
NRTRN j,r = KRENTS
c$
j,r −
δj,r
100
· PK,newj,r ·K(S)j,r (2.102)
Along with useful shares such as XOUTPUTr/NZ , these measures also facilitate the cal-
culation of average K/L ratios such as R
KSTOCK/EMP
r and average rates of return such
as:
NRORr = 100 · NRTRN r∑
j P
K,new
j,r ·K(S)j,r
(2.103)
Measures of GDP and Domestic Saving
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is measured in nominal and real terms using the three
common approaches of expenditures, incomes, and value added.
GDPEXPv = Cv + Iv +Gv + TRDBALv,d$ (2.104)
GDPINC v =
∑
r
INC atax,vr + GOVREV
v (2.105)
GDPVAv = GVAv + GOVREV v − INCTAX v (2.106)
Using the above definitions, shares of GDP components such as XGDPC/tot, X
GDP
I/tot , etc.
are defined though straightforward equations.
Aggregate domestic saving is defined as:
SAV v =
∑
r
SAV atax,vr + GOVBAL
v (2.107)
Price Indices
For the purpose of measuring average price levels, this thesis uses the Fisher price index,
defined for a given price deflator Ξ by the equation:
ΞF =
√
ΞP · ΞL
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where ΞF is the Fisher index and ΞP and ΞL are the arithmetic Paasche and Laspeyres
indices respectively.36 A well-known problem with Paasche indices is that they fail to
adequately account for substitution effects within the basket of goods over which they
index prices, and therefore under-estimate average price changes. The Laspeyres index
on the other hand over-estimates inflation so movements of the two indices can be seen
as lower and upper bounds respectively of true average price changes (IMF 2004, page
9). The Fisher index seeks to offset the biases of each of these indices by taking their
geometric average.
For example, regional consumption price deflator indices are specified as follows:
CPI Fr =
√
CPIPr · CPI Lr (2.108)
where the Paasche and Laspeyres consumption price deflators are:
CPIPr =
∑
g
PQ,hshg,r
[PQ,hshg,r ]
·XPg,r/r
CPI Lr =
∑
g
PQ,hshg,r
[PQ,hshg,r ]
·XLg,r/r
with weights:
XPg,r/r =
[PQ,hshg,r ] ·Qhsh(D)g,r∑
h[P
Q,hsh
h,r ] ·Qhsh(D)h,r
XLg,r/r =
[PQ,hshg,r ] · [Qhsh(D)g,r ]∑
h[P
Q,hsh
h,r ] · [Qhsh(D)h,r ]
It can be easily shown that the price deflator definitions above are equivalent to:
CPIPr =
∑
g P
Q,hsh
g,r ·Qhsh(D)g,r∑
g[P
Q,hsh
g,r ] ·Qhsh(D)g,r
CPI Lr =
∑
g P
Q,hsh
g,r · [Qhsh(D)g,r ]∑
g[P
Q,hsh
g,r ] · [Qhsh(D)g,r ]
36The Fisher index is an alternative to the geometric Laspeyres index, the latter being commonly
used in linearised models — see IMF (2004, page 10) for details and FEDERAL’s equation (2.73) for
an example of their usage. The use of such weighted geometric mean price indices is problematic in
a levels-form model because of non-linearity and issues such as how to construct trade price and GDP
deflator indices arise. Hence the Fisher index is a more natural choice of price index in this kind of model,
and behaves approximately the same as the geometric Laspeyres index in any case.
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We can therefore define the deflators more succinctly in terms of SPN vr (with v ∈ VAL)
as follows:37
CPIPr =
SPN c$r
SPN b$r
(2.109)
CPI Lr =
SPN bQr
[SPN c$r ]
(2.110)
All price deflator indices are calculated in this way in the model. The GDP deflator
GDPDEF for example is calculated by the set of equations:
GDPDEFP =
GDPEXPc$
GDPEXPb$
(2.111)
GDPDEFL =
GDPEXPbQ
[GDPEXPc$]
(2.112)
GDPDEFF =
√
GDPDEFP ·GDPDEFL (2.113)
Appendix D lists these along with analogous equations for price deflator indices, for:
• Expenditure components of GDP - private consumption (CPI ), investment (IPI ),
government consumption (GPI ), exports (XPI , both at basic and f.o.b. prices),
imports (MPI , both at basic and c.i.f. prices), and the trade balance (TPI )
• Industrial and regional investment (IPI j and IPI r)
• Industrial, regional, and national output (OPI j, OPI r, and OPINZ - average basic
output prices)
• Industrial, regional, and national nominal labour costs (LCI j, LCI r, and LCINZ -
average nominal wage rates before and after tax)
Real Prices
The above price indices are used to calculate regional and economy-wide average real
wage rates, and the real exchange rate:
Wwr =
LCI F,wr
CPI Fr
∀r ∈ NZREG (2.114)
ϕ = φ · MPI
F,cif
GDPDEFF
(2.115)
37The denominator of the second equation here is SPN c$r evaluated for benchmark equilibrium values,
so what v is does not matter: [SPN c$r ] = [SPN
b$
r ] = [SPN
bQ
r ].
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In the terminology of Easton (1990, p. 5), Wwr is the real income wage as opposed to the
real product wage, which would measure the real labour cost to a given industry. Such
a measure could easily be specified by dividing the labour cost index by a variable that
measures production cost — one candidate would be PQ,indj,r .
The real exchange rate measures domestic trade competitiveness and as such is a proxy
for (the reciprocal of) the terms of trade. The measure is appropriate insofar as the GDP
deflator and c.i.f. import prices capture domestic and world prices (exclusive of any tariffs
or export subsidies).
Household Welfare
Common measures of welfare changes are compensating variation (CV) and equivalent
variation (EV), as these are measurable bounds on changes in consumer surplus. The EV
is the income change required at initial prices to give a consumer the equivalent utility
change. The CV is the income change required at final prices to compensate the consumer
for a utility change (i.e. to restore their initial level of utility). Since this model is solved
in levels, these can easily be calculated using the evaluated levels of utility:38
CV r =
Ur − [Ur]
Ur
·
(
ENDINC atax,c$r − SAV atax,c$r
)
(2.116)
EV r =
Ur − [Ur]
[Ur]
·
(
[ENDINC atax,c$r ]− [SAV atax,c$r ]
)
(2.117)
38Given demand functions (in vector form) Q = f(P) · E, the indirect utility function can be written
v(P, E) = F (P) · E. Varian (1992) defines CV and EV using the expenditure function E(P, v) as:
CV = E(P, v)− E(P, [v])
EV = E([P], v)− E([P], [v])
with notation adapted for consistency here — square brackets indicate benchmark values; variables
without square brackets are the solution (final) values. Evaluated as such, we can write:
CV = E − [v]
F
= E − [v]
v/E
=
v − [v]
v
· E
EV =
v
[F ]
− [E] = v
[v]/[E]
− [E] = v − [v]
[v]
· [E]
Both the CV and EV are therefore measures of proportional utility change, and carry the same sign as
that change.
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2.4 Model Implementation
The prototype JENNIFER model is implemented in GAMS and solved for the levels of all
endogenous variables. A 25-industry, 5-region implementation is described in this section.
The three key steps involved in the model implementation are calibration, closure, and
shock. Each of these will be discussed in detail but first we express the model in compact
form and consider its dimensions.
2.4.1 Matrix Form Representation of the Whole Model
The above sections 2.3.1 - 2.3.11 have presented and discussed the core equations of the
model. The defining equations of section 2.3.12 are required for implementation but do
not significantly add to the difficulty of the computational problem to be solved. It is
essentially the number of industries and regions, and in turn the number of core equations
that determine the model size and complexity.
If J is the number of industries (and therefore products) and R is the number of regions
specified, then the number of equations in the core model are as shown in table 2.4.39 In
comparison, the defining equations summarised in section 2.3.12 only add around 5,000
equations to the model for this implementation.40
All the equations of sections 2.3.1 - 2.3.12 can be represented in matrix form as:
F(V) = 0 (2.118)
where F is a vector function of e equations
V is a vector of v variables
39The table shows the maximum number of core equations. If some industries do not produce in some
regions, or some agents do not consume every product, or do not demand each product from every source,
then the number of equations is reduced. Also, if the investment allocation is exogenously rather than
endogenously determined as discussed in section 2.3.4, the set of J ×R equations that equalise expected
net rates of return (equation (2.33)) are replaced by non-core exogenising equations.
40In general, the number of non-core equations only increases linearly in J and R while the number of
core equations grows exponentially so the latter set will come to dominate as J and/or R is increased
towards double-digits.
41Equation (2.41) is counted as a purchase price equation and equations (2.42) and (2.43) are not part
of the core model.
42Equation (2.45) is counted as a purchase price equation.
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Equation block General case J = 25, R = 5
Households 8R + 3JR + JR2 1,040
Current production 4JR + 3J2R + J2R2 25,500
Capital formation 3J2R + J2R2 25,000
Investment allocation 8JR 1,000
Exporters J + JR 150
Importers J 25
Government41 3J + JR 200
Foreign sector42 J 25
Market clearing R + 3J + 3JR 455
Zero pure profits 2J + 2JR 300
Purchase prices 2R+ 8J + 7JR+ JR2 + 6J2R+ 2J2R2 51,710
Numeraire 1 1
TOTAL 1+11R+19J+29JR+2JR2+12J2R+
4J2R2
105,406
Table 2.4: Equation Blocks
The number of model variables V exceeds the number of equations E, so some of the
variables need to be exogenously determined.43 In order to make the system square, we
add V −E equations to the system, with each new equation setting one variable equal to
a particular value. For example if the capital endowment specific to industry j in region
r, K
(S)
j,r , is to be fixed exogenously at the level determined in the base-period data, [K
(S)
j,r ],
for all industries and regions then the following J × R equations are appended to the
system:
K
(S)
j,r − [K(S)j,r ] = 0
The model can then be written as:
D(V) =
(
F(V)
E(V)
)
=
(
F(Y,X)
E(0,X)
)
= 0 (2.119)
43Matching of variables to explaining equations reveals that 3 + 2R + 8J + 3JR + 2J2R variables
remain undetermined in general, or 6,838 in the 25-industry, 5-region version (assuming investment is
endogenously allocated across all industries and regions).
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where the vector function E(V) consists of the equations that exogenously set X, the
undetermined component of V. The remaining component Y are endogenous variables
explained by F(V).
In terms of our key steps of model implementation, calibration involves fitting the
system F(V) to data, closure is the choice of which variables to assign to each of X and
Y, and a shock is the choice of levels X0 at which to fix the exogenous variables.
2.4.2 Implementing The Model In GAMS
All operations concerning the model take place within GAMS.44 The program takes input
from suitably formatted text and spreadsheet files and outputs tables formatted for direct
compilation in LATEX. A model run generally involves executing one program module to
perform the calibration and another module to perform the simulation. Multiple simula-
tions can however be run via a batch file after a single run of the calibration module. A
third program component is then executed to produce reports on a user-selected subset of
the simulations. The program code incorporates elements of object-oriented programming
to automate model coding and generation of reports; details are omitted here but avail-
able from the author upon request. In the following sections we focus on the calibration,
closure, and solution of the 25-industry, 5-region version of JENNIFER.
2.4.3 Calibrating the Model
The model is calibrated using the following procedure:
1. National input-output data is loaded and used to construct a model-consistent
economy-wide input-output data matrix
2. Regional GDP figures are used to construct a regional shares data matrix
44The official GAMS users guide, GAMS Development Corp. (2011), is available at http://www.gams.
com/dd/docs/bigdocs/GAMSUsersGuide.pdf. Other useful references for GAMS in general is the McCarl
Guide (McCarl & GAMS Development Corp. 2011) at http://www.gams.com/mccarl/mccarlhtml/ and
other materials at http://agecon2.tamu.edu/people/faculty/mccarl-bruce/. References that deal
specifically with the implementation of CGE models in GAMS include Lo¨fgren et al. (2002), Hosoe (2004),
and Keyzer (1997).
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3. The regional shares are used to disaggregate the national input-output data matrix
to obtain a multi-regional input-output (MRIO) data matrix.
4. The MRIO matrix is then used to establish the initial solution to the model — that
is, the benchmark equilibrium
5. Finally, the benchmark equilibrium and assumed elasticity parameters are used to
calibrate the agents’ demand functions
Construction Of The Economy-wide Input-output Data Matrix
A national inter-industry input-output table for 2005-6 provided by BERL is used to
establish the economy-wide data matrix for the model.45 The raw data has industrial
production disaggregated to 53 industries. For the purposes of this thesis, the table was
aggregated to 25 industries.46 The industry classification is shown in table 2.5.
A different set of industries can be specified by providing the program with a different
mapping from the raw data to model industries. This is useful for running a smaller
model when implementing new features for debugging or separating out certain industries
of interest for particular simulations.
The derived economy-wide input-output database is shown in table 2.6. Cells in this
table are expenditure flows valued at basic prices and will be referred to as IO(row,col).
The EXP column cells IO(IMP-g,EXP) are zeros due to the assumption that no imports
are immediately exported again without any value-added.47 The raw data records export
and import values at f.o.b. and c.i.f. prices respectively. Any export subsidies and import
duties should be added to IO(DOM-g, EXP) and IO(IMP-g, col) ∀col, g ∈ COM as
45The latest official input-output data at the time of writing is for 1995-6 (Statistics NZ 2001). The
BERL data is based on Statistics NZ supply and use tables for 2002-3 that were updated for 2005-6.
46In the BERL table, oil and gas was combined with petrol refining. For the purposes of simulations
in Chapter 3, these were separated into one industry for oil and gas and another for petrol using data
from the Infometrics IO table available at www.motu.org.nz/docs/IO2005-06.xls. The compilation of
the Infometrics table is documented in Stroombergen (2008). Therein, the author requests that anyone
who downloads the data send notification to info@motu.org.nz. The BERL data is essentially derived
from the same source, but with a different classification of industries.
47If the raw data did have some import flows recorded as going to exports, one way of handling this
would be to shift the flows from the imported row to the corresponding domestic row. This was not an
issue with the BERL data, however.
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No. Label Description
1 AGRI Agriculture
2 FOLO Forestry and logging
3 FISH Fishing
4 MINE Mining and quarrying
5 OIGA Oil and gas
6 PETR Refined petrol
7 FDBT Food, beverages, and tobacco
8 TWPM Textiles, wood, paper, and media
9 CHNM Chemicals and non-metallic minerals
10 METL Basic and fabricated metal
11 EQFO Equipment, furniture, and other manufacturing
12 UTIL Electricity, water, and waste services
13 CONS Construction
14 ACCR Accommodation, restaurants, and bars
15 CMIF Communications, insurance, and finance
16 PROP Real estate and equipment hire
17 RBUS Research and business services
18 GOVT Government administration
19 EDUC Education
20 HEAL Health
21 CUPE Cultural and personal services
22 OWND Ownership of owner-occupied dwellings
23 WHOL Wholesale trade
24 RETT Retail trade
25 TRAN Transport
Table 2.5: Industries
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needed so that cells record these flows at basic prices. For the purposes of this thesis
however, both of these items were assumed zero for simplicity, so no adjustments were
made.48 The original data had a separate column for inventory changes. For simplicity
this was combined with gross fixed capital formation in the INV column.49
Construction Of The Regional Shares Data Matrix
Estimates of industrial contribution to the output of five New Zealand regions were also
provided by BERL. The five regions are Auckland (AKL), Wellington (WLG), Canterbury
(CAN), Other North Island (ONI), and Other South Island(OSI).50 The raw regional data
had industries classified into 54 groups. This has been aggregated to be consistent with the
25 industries of the model. An issue that arose was that petrol refining was combined with
coal and chemical manufacturing in the raw data. This has been separated out exploiting
the assumption that domestic petrol refining only occurs in Other North Island, since it
48New Zealand has no explicit export subsidies at present, although in some cases it could be argued
that government industry assistance amounts to effective export subsidisation. Since this thesis is not
primarily concerned with trade issues, and New Zealand tariffs are very low or zero on most imports at
present, duty was not separated out from the rest of commodity taxes included in the IO(TAXES,•) row.
49In a few cases, the resulting entry in the INV column cell was a small negative number. The sign of
those cells was changed so that all investment demands are positive. This inevitably leads to the table
becoming unbalanced. In order to restore balance, the CON column was adjusted as needed. While a
RAS is the appropriate procedure for rebalancing, the required adjustment was quite small so the simpler
approach was taken. The most significant change was an increase in IO(DOM-FDBT,CON) of 3%.
50Higher levels of regional detail would be possible if regional employment data were used to further
split national industry output, but either some industry detail would have to be sacrificed or the model
streamlined to reduce the rate that its size rises with the number of regions since, at the current level
of disaggregation, the model with the extensions of chapters 3 and 4 approaches the limits of what a
standard desktop computer can handle without special regard given to memory management.
Hall & McDermott (2007) observed a broad dichotomy in the behaviour of urban vs. rural regions over
the business cycle and in later work (Hall & McDermott 2011) found it useful to aggregate their original
14 regions of analysis to the equivalent of our 5 regions for the purpose of considering the influence of
fiscal and monetary policy, and external shocks, on the regional cycles. The current level of regional
detail therefore appears sufficient in that context.
An experimental set of regional GDP figures was published in Statistics NZ (2006) for 16 industries
across 15 regions, for the years 2000-3. These figures are based on the summation of gross value added
(GVA) measured in current prices. Since the BERL data is in constant prices and for the same year as
the national IO table, it is preferred to the Statistics NZ data for our purpose here.
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is in fact only done in Northland. The data has then been used to derive the regional
shares data matrix shown in table 2.7.
This is the primary data set used to disaggregate economic activity across the regions.
Where necessary, cells in this table will be referred to as [XOUTPUTj,r/j ] to indicate that
cell (j, r) is region r’s share of the output of industry j. The square brackets are used to
indicate that these raw regional shares actually become the benchmark equilibrium values
of XOUTPUTj,r/j .
Deriving a Multi-Regional Input-Output Data Matrix
A balanced multi-regional input-output (MRIO) database of the form shown in table 2.8
is required for calibration of the model. To obtain this database we appeal to principles
of information theory.51
51The approach used is supported in principle by Batten (1982, p. 54):
“[B]y adopting a statistical or information-theoretic approach it is possible to overcome some
of [the] deficiencies in information and at the same time avoid some of the difficulties in
working with causal relations between location and trade at the multi-regional level. Certain
elements of information theory provide a consistent means of estimating interregional flows
which are minimally biased, subject to whatever flow information is available.”
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Regional Shares of Industry Output (%)
Industry
Region
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
AGRI 4.4 1.0 58.8 6.1 29.7
FOLO 5.7 1.9 63.7 4.3 24.4
FISH 9.6 1.9 32.0 2.6 53.9
MINE 8.1 1.0 49.9 9.8 31.2
OIGA 0.6 9.4 90.0 0.0 0.0
PETR 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
FDBT 20.4 3.5 39.5 9.2 27.5
TWPM 30.9 6.8 37.1 11.1 14.0
CHNM 58.9 11.7 2.3 18.2 8.9
METL 38.5 6.1 31.1 13.4 11.0
EQFO 45.5 8.0 24.1 13.9 8.6
UTIL 24.6 17.2 39.8 6.8 11.6
CONS 30.8 9.8 34.9 10.8 13.7
ACCR 28.8 10.1 30.8 10.9 19.4
CMIF 45.2 20.4 16.9 11.2 6.4
PROP 37.7 9.7 28.9 12.2 11.5
RBUS 45.1 16.0 21.6 9.8 7.5
GOVT 22.7 35.7 25.5 8.7 7.5
EDUC 33.8 11.1 31.5 10.9 12.7
HEAL 28.8 11.1 33.8 12.5 13.8
CUPE 36.2 14.4 26.3 11.0 12.2
OWND 34.5 12.0 30.0 10.7 12.8
WHOL 51.6 9.4 18.6 11.7 8.7
RETT 32.3 9.8 33.0 11.1 13.8
TRAN 42.9 9.9 21.2 13.0 13.0
Table 2.7: Regional Shares of Industry Output (%)
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We refer to cells in the MRIO table as MRIO(row, col) where row ∈ {AGRI-AKL,
AGRI-WLG, ... IMP-AGRI, IMP-FOLO, ... TAX, LAB, CAP} and col ∈ {AGRI-
AKL, AGRI-WLG, ... CON-AKL, CON-WLG, ... INV-AGRI-AKL, INV-AGRI-WLG,
... GOV, EXP}. McDougall (1999) demonstrates that biproportional allocation is a max-
imum entropy solution to the matrix-filling problem. In other words, if we have estimates
of all the row and column totals of the MRIO matrix but no other information, then an
entropy maximising solution is:
MRIO(row , col) =
MRIO(row ,TOTAL)×MRIO(TOTAL, col)
MRIO(TOTAL,TOTAL)
∀row , col (2.120)
We could then derive an initial estimate of the MRIO matrix using the regional shares and
the borders of the national IO table. To do so however would be ignoring the information
in the cells of the IO table — that the intra- and inter-regional flows from one industry
to another sum up to the value of the relevant IO cell. It is appropriate then to apply
(2.120) for each MRIO block and its corresponding single IO table cell. To see how this
is done, we will consider the blocks within each group of MRIO columns separately.
Industry Columns Since the value in IO(DOM-g,j) is the sum of product flows from
industry g in every region to industry j in every region, a straightforward estimate of the
flow sum from industry g to industry j in region r is given by:∑
x
MRIO(g−x, j−r) = [XOUTPUTj,r/j ]× IO(DOM−g, j)
The flow sum from industry g in region x to industry j can similarly be estimated:∑
r
MRIO(g−x, j−r) = [XOUTPUTg,x/g ]× IO(DOM−g, j)
Applying (2.120) yields an estimate of the flow of products from industry g in region x
to industry j in region r:
MRIO(g−x, j−r) = [XOUTPUTg,x/g ]× [XOUTPUTj,r/j ]× IO(DOM−g, j) (2.121)
The larger the presence of an industry g in a region x, and the larger the presence of an
industry j in a region r, the larger will be the flow of products between those regions as
a proportion of all flows between industry g and j.
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The calculation of (2.121) amounts to splitting the rows and columns of the do-
mestic intermediate inputs section of the IO table (the top-left quadrant) using the re-
gional shares. By estimating MRIO(IMP-g,j-r), MRIO(TAX,j-r), MRIO(LAB,j-r), and
MRIO(CAP,j-r) in a similar way, the entire IO table column for each industry j is effec-
tively split by the regional shares to become the j-r columns of the MRIO table. Note
that these latter rows are not split, so only the industry j regional shares are required:
MRIO(IMP−g, j−r) = [XOUTPUTj,r/j ]× IO(IMP−g, j) (2.122)
MRIO(TAX, j−r) = [XOUTPUTj,r/j ]× IO(TAXES, j) (2.123)
MRIO(LAB, j−r) = [XOUTPUTj,r/j ]× IO(WAGES, j) (2.124)
MRIO(CAP, j−r) = [XOUTPUTj,r/j ]× IO(PROFITS, j) (2.125)
This specification is due to simplifying assumptions in the model design. Imports for
example are not modelled bottom-up — importers receive the same price regardless of
which port products arrive at. The LAB and CAP rows do not need splitting since we
assume that labour and installed capital are only employed within the region where they
are located. The TAX row is also not split since the public sector is not divided into
central and local government in the present model.
Consumption Column A similar approach to that taken with the industry columns
is used to split the consumption column. Analogous to before we assume that the flow
from industry g in region x to private consumption is:∑
r
MRIO(g−x,CON−r) = [XOUTPUTg,x/g ]× IO(DOM−g,CON)
However, we use shares of labour demand (employment) to distribute consumption de-
mand for product g over the regions:∑
x
MRIO(g−x,CON−r) = [XLABOURr/tot ]× IO(DOM−g,CON)
such that the flow of product g from region x to private consumption in region r is
estimated as:
MRIO(g−x,CON−r) = [XOUTPUTg,x/g ]× [XLABOURr/tot ]× IO(DOM−g,CON) (2.126)
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The imports cells IO(IMP-g,CON) and tax cell IO(TAXES,CON) are similarly split using
the labour demand shares:
MRIO(IMP−g,CON−r) = [XLABOURr/tot ]× IO(IMP−g,CON) (2.127)
MRIO(TAX,CON−r) = [XLABOURr/tot ]× IO(TAXES,CON) (2.128)
The labour demand shares are calculated by:52
[XLABOURr/tot ] =
∑
j
IO(WAGES, j)∑
i IO(WAGES, i)
× [XOUTPUTj,r/j ] (2.129)
Thus the distribution of labour demand over regions depends on the distribution of labour
demand across industries and the distribution of each industry’s production across the
regions. The implication of splitting the consumption column using these employment
shares is that regions that have concentrations of labour-intensive industries, and there-
fore a relatively high labour income share in total household income, will have average
consumption propensities above the national average. The converse is that in regions
where the share of capital rents in household income is above the national average, so will
be the average propensity to save.53
Investment Column The splitting of the investment column is analogous to the above
but requires estimates of industry-by-region shares of investment. The BERL input-out
table was accompanied by data on industry capital stocks, depreciation, and estimates of
the marginal efficiency of investment capital (the βj,r parameters). A simple assumption
we can make therefore is that the industry-by-region allocation of investment follows the
industry-by-region distribution of capital stocks.:
[XI,b$j,r/tot] =
[KSTOCK j,r]
[KSTOCKNZ]
52Again, the square brackets indicate that these labour demand shares are consistent with the bench-
mark equilibrium that is established below from the MRIO matrix.
53To impose the assumption that average propensities were constant across all regions instead, the
regional labour demand shares in these calculations could be replaced by regional total income shares.
Appendix I establishes the relationship between the propensities and the distribution of consumption in
the benchmark equilibrium.
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where each industry’s capital stock is assumed to be distributed over regions in line with
their output. That is,
[XKSTOCKj,r/tot ] =
[KSTOCK j,r]
[KSTOCKNZ]
= [XOUTPUTj,r/j ]×
[KSTOCK j,NZ]
[KSTOCKNZ]
and the values [XKSTOCKj/tot ] =
[KSTOCK j,NZ]
[KSTOCKNZ]
come from the BERL data. For the 25-industry
implementation under consideration here, the industry-by-region shares of capital are
given in table 2.9.
If the user plans to specify the investment allocation exogenously during simulations
as discussed in section 2.3.4 then the above assumption is fine. However, if the user
wishes investment to be allocated endogenously to equalise expected net rates of return
in equilibrium, then the industry-by-region shares used to split the IO investment column
must be consistent with this equalisation in the benchmark equilibrium. That is, all the
equations (2.25) - (2.33) must be satisfied. The model-consistent values of [XI,b$j,r/tot] will
depend on the gross rates of return and depreciation rates along with the capital stock
levels for each industry in each region, and can only be determined numerically. How
this is done will be discussed shortly; at present assume that we have obtained values
for [XI,b$j,r/tot] that are consistent with the benchmark equilibrium. The MRIO investment
column cell values are then given by:
MRIO(g−x, INV−j−r) = [XOUTPUTg,x/g ]× [XI,b$j,r/tot]× IO(DOM−g, INV) (2.130)
and similar formulae, analogous to (2.127) and (2.128) above.
The Government and Exports Columns As the government and exporters are not
modelled bottom-up, these columns do not need to be split.54 The evaluation of the
MRIO cells for government and exports is similar to that of consumption. For example:
MRIO(g−x,GOV) = [XOUTPUTg,x/g ]× IO(DOM−g,GOV) (2.131)
MRIO(g−x,EXP) = [XOUTPUTg,x/g ]× IO(DOM−g,EXP) (2.132)
and so forth.
54If they were to be given a regional dimension, the government column could be split by regional
shares of employment in the public sector, and exports could be split if one had sufficiently detailed data
on commodity arrivals at each New Zealand port.
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Industry by Region Shares of Total Capital (%)
Industry
Region
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI NZ
AGRI 0.1 0.0 1.8 0.2 0.9 3.1
FOLO 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.3
FISH 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
MINE 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
OIGA 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.9
PETR 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
FDBT 0.5 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.7 2.4
TWPM 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.2 1.7
CHNM 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 1.1
METL 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.7
EQFO 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.3
UTIL 1.2 0.8 2.0 0.3 0.6 4.9
CONS 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.2 1.2
ACCR 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 1.1
CMIF 1.5 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.2 3.2
PROP 6.7 1.7 5.1 2.2 2.1 17.8
RBUS 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 1.4
GOVT 2.1 3.3 2.3 0.8 0.7 9.2
EDUC 1.2 0.4 1.1 0.4 0.4 3.4
HEAL 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.3 2.3
CUPE 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.3 2.4
OWND 12.0 4.2 10.5 3.7 4.5 34.8
WHOL 0.9 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 1.8
RETT 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.2 1.5
TRAN 1.3 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.4 3.0
All 32.8 13.3 30.7 10.5 12.6 100.0
Table 2.9: Industry by Region Shares of Total Capital (%)
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Making Adjustments to the MRIO Matrix
By splitting each cell of the IO table as required using regional shares, we have maximised
the entropy of each associated block of the MRIO table. For each row-split we have used
the same share across all the columns of IO(DOM-g, •), and for each column split we
have used the same share down all the rows, so the MRIO table remains balanced. This
method of deriving the MRIO table can also be thought of as maximising the entropy of
the whole matrix, subject to the condition that each block adds up to the respective IO
table cell.
We may have superior data or wish to make an assumption such that the allocation of
some IO cell values are not biproportional across the relevant blocks of cells in the MRIO
table. For instance, we may want to assume some product types are local as per the
regional extension to ORANI. This means they are products that can only be purchased
and used in the region where they are produced. The producers of local products are
therefore local industries because they only sell to their local region (and the government
and exporters). The implication is that there is no inter-regional trade in local products.
This assumption is made here for the industries listed in table 2.10.
Adjustments are required to the allocation of IO cell values over the relevant MRIO
blocks to reflect the local product assumption. For example, since (the product/industry)
EDUC is assumed local, the flows to MRIO column CON-r are specified as:55
MRIO(EDUC−x,CON−r) = [XLABOURr/tot ]× IO(DOM− EDUC,CON)× 1x=r
(2.134)
Note that the local product assumption only affects domestic product flows; the imported
variety of the product can co-exist. If there is some characteristic of the domestic variety
that suggests it is predominantly local, but imports of the foreign variety are recorded
in the IO data, then the two types must be significantly different. The elasticity of
substitution between the two ought to be fairly low to reflect this.
These kinds of adjustments inevitably disturb the balance of the MRIO matrix. It is
almost certain that the totals of the domestic product rows will no longer equal the totals
55
1 is the indicator function:
1
condition =
{
1 if condition = true
0 if condition = false
(2.133)
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Local Industries
EDUC Education
HEAL Health
CUPE Cultural and personal services
OWND Ownership of owner-occupied dwellings
WHOL Wholesale trade
RETT Retail trade
Table 2.10: Local Industries
of the respective industry columns and the MRIO will not be consistent with equilibrium.
To enforce consistency and restrict the information gain to those parts of the MRIO
table that we directly manipulate, we seek a cross-entropy solution to re-balancing the
matrix. It turns out the traditional RAS (biproportional adjustment) method is ideal for
this purpose. The RAS is commonly used to scale the rows and columns of a matrix to
conform to given row and column totals. The seminal treatment of the RAS method is
Bacharach (1970) while McDougall (1999) links the RAS to cross-entropy.
The essence of the cross-entropy method is that an objective function quantifying
the distance of a solution matrix from an initial given matrix is minimised subject to
specified constraints.56 In our case we wish to find a new MRIO matrix that has the same
row and column totals as the initial matrix (so that balance is maintained and output
shares etc. do not change), has some cell blocks specified for local products, and has the
remainder of the blocks as close to biproportional as possible (so as to minimise spurious
information gain). The task can also be framed as a RAS problem: we wish to update
the initial matrix using the same row and column totals and some newly specified cells.57
Re-balancing using RAS therefore ensures that cross-entropy is minimised.
Let the elements of an unbalanced MRIO matrix of dimension i × j be denoted Aij.
We wish to find a new balanced matrix with elements Bij as close to Aij as possible but
which has the same row totals Ai• and same column totals A•j as the original balanced
56Maximum entropy is a special case of minimum cross entropy which minimises the distance between
the solution matrix and a uniform matrix (where the data is spread evenly over the matrix cells.)
57This is quite different to how the RAS is traditionally used — to find cell values that conform to
newly specified row and column totals.
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MRIO matrix (i.e. before adjustments). The RAS method involves iteratively searching
for a set of row scaling factors Ri and a set of column scaling factors Sj such that:
Bij = Ri · Aij · Sj ∀i, j (2.135)
The solution is obtained in GAMS by a subroutine minimising the quadratic loss func-
tion:58
Loss =
∑
i
R2i +
1
R2i
+
∑
j
S2j +
1
S2j
(2.136)
subject to (2.135) and the constraints:∑
j
Bij = Ai• ∀i (2.137)∑
i
Bij = A•j ∀j (2.138)
The RAS procedure is only performed on part of the MRIO matrix — an additional
set of constraints ensure that the TAX, LAB, and CAP rows do not change because
otherwise the assumptions used to construct the MRIO in the first place may no longer
hold. For example the regional distribution of labour demand could be changed by the
RAS adjustment, in which case the consumption column split would be incorrect. The
GAMS program also outputs the sum of squared proportionate deviations:
Dev =
∑
i
∑
j
(
Bij − Aij
Aij
)2
(2.139)
For the particular implementation we are discussing here, Dev = 42.2 although this
measure is only really useful in a relative sense.
The important point about this use of biproportional adjustment is that it guaran-
tees a balanced, model-consistent MRIO matrix with minimal adjustment. Where the
RAS algorithm makes adjustments, it is only the regional allocation that is affected; the
economy-wide input-output table is not affected. The formulation of the MRIO, including
58The GAMS code is based on a posting by Rutherford (n.d.) to the GAMS-User List. Other objective
functions can be used instead to explicitly minimise the cross-entropy or the sum of squared deviations
— see Rutherford (2003) and Fofana et al. (2005) for details. The form of the objective function used
here makes the RAS adjustment explicit and probably facilitates quick convergence since it is a quadratic
(as opposed to logarithmic) function.
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the initial split of columns and rows, is consistent with the principles of information theory
— the MRIO embodies all of the available information (the IO matrix and the regional
shares data), but only that information. Any results from a model based on the MRIO
will then be based on that information, rather than on spurious information that could
be created by estimating the MRIO in a different way. In particular, the RAS method
guarantees that the ordering of the input intensities is preserved. If one industry uses a
particular product from a given region more intensively than another industry initially,
applying the RAS method will not change this ordering.59
Establishing the Benchmark Equilibrium Solution
This section describes the general procedure, having derived a balanced MRIO table as
per the above, for specifying the benchmark values for all model variables (including
exogenous variables) that are consistent with competitive general equilibrium, using the
25-industry, 5-region implementation as an example.60
Domestic Prices The model is homogenous of degree zero in prices so we are free
to choose the absolute price level. The flows in the MRIO data matrix are basic value
flows — they have basic price and quantity components. If we assume all basic prices
(the price received by the seller) are equal to one then the flows can be interpreted as
quantity flows instead. Purchase prices were defined in section 2.3.10, using equations
such as (2.59) to define purchase prices at the lowest level of agents’ decision nests. The
introduction of delivered and undelivered quantities (Q and Q˘ respectively) allows the
associated benchmark purchase prices to also be set equal to one.61 The result is that
59This is not true for cross-entropy methods in general — see McDougall (1999, proposition 5, page
10).
60Appendix N presents the MRIO matrix but the version found there incorporates elements introduced
later, in chapter 3.
61As discussed in section 2.3.10, the benchmark purchase price levels relative to those of basic prices
are immaterial to simulation results. The absolute levels of all prices are not meaningful anyway — they
are after all only relative prices (relative to the numeraire). During model development it was simpler to
initialise purchase prices at 1 — it made nominal homogeneity testing and double-checking of benchmark
product demand values easier. The use of delivered and undelivered products also lends itself to an
analogy with value-added that becomes more obvious in chapter 3 — taxes and other costs of delivery
add value to undelivered products as they move towards the purchasing agent.
82 CHAPTER 2. THE BASIC MODEL
almost all the benchmark equilibrium prices in the model are equal to one (or more
generally, the level of the numeraire). There are three important sets of prices that are
exceptions, which we now turn to.
Foreign Prices We saw in equation (2.65) that export subsidies put a wedge between
the price exporters receive and the f.o.b. price the foreign sector pays. Rather than
introduce a distinction between delivered and undelivered exports, we simply define the
base-period purchase price of export g as:62
[PEXP ,d$,forg ] =
[PEXPg ]
1− [tEXPg ]
=
1
1− [tEXPg ]
Similarly for imports, we saw in equation (2.63) that import duties put a wedge between
the price importers pay and the c.i.f. price the foreign sector receives. Rather than in-
troduce a distinction between delivered and undelivered imports, we simply define the
base-period foreign currency price of import g as:63
[PFORg ] =
[PFOR,f$,impg ]
1 + [tFORg ]
=
1
1 + [tFORg ]
For simplicity in the current implementation of JENNIFER, the export subsidy and im-
port duty rates are assumed equal to zero.
After-Tax Wage Rates We also saw in equation (2.41) that income tax separates the
gross and net wage rates received by households. It is convenient to assume gross wage
rates equal one in the base-period, which implies:
[PL,ataxr ] = 1− [tL]
In BERL’s recent study of the impact of immigration (Nana, Sanderson & Hodgson 2009),
an average direct income tax rate of 21.1% was used and we adopt this figure here.
62We already have Q˘
exp(D)
g,x and Q
exp(D)
g,x which capture the difference between product g at the factory
door and the same product in the hands of the exporter.
63We already have IMP (S)g and Q
agent(D)
g,imp which capture the difference between product g at the door
of the importer’s warehouse and the same product in the hands of agent where agent is a household or
industry agent, or the government
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Capital Rental Rates Capital construction costs [PK,newj,r ] and rental rates [P
K
j,r] should
not both be normalised to 1 because this would imply 100% gross rates of return for all
industries by equation (2.25). For each industry j we can derive the rental rates from the
BERL data:
[PKj,r] =
IO(PROFITS, j)
[KSTOCK j,NZ]
The gross rates of return will therefore be 100 × [PKj,r] when [PK,newj,r ] is normalised to
1. The calculation above implies that industry gross rates of return will not vary across
regions. The economy-wide rates of return can be found in table 2.12.
Product and Factor Demands Each value flow in the product rows of the MRIO
matrix is a basic price multiplied by an undelivered quantity, while each flow in the factor
rows is a basic (gross) price multiplied by a factor quantity. Assuming all the basic
prices equal one implies that all the cells are interpreted as quantities of either Q˘, L, or
K. Evaluating benchmark equilibrium values for product and factor demand variables is
therefore straightforward, although since the capital rental price is an exception to the
basic price equals one assumption, we divide the cell value by that price to measure capital
in the appropriate units. For current production, for example:
[Q˘
ind(Q)(D)
g,x,j,r ] = MRIO(g−x, j−r)
[Q˘
ind(Q)(D)
g,imp,j,r ] = MRIO(IMP−g, j−r)
[L
ind(D)
j,r ] = MRIO(LAB, j−r)
[K
ind(D)
j,r ] =
MRIO(CAP, j−r)
[PKj,r]
To obtain the delivered quantities, a portion of commodity tax is added on to each un-
delivered quantity. How much is added depends on the assumed commodity tax rates
— how these are determined will be discussed shortly. For given tax rates, the purchase
price equation for P
Q,ind(Q)
g,s,j,r implies that in the benchmark equilibrium:
[P
Q,ind(Q)
g,s,j,r ] · [Qind(Q)(D)g,s,j,r ] = [PQg,s] · (1 + [tQ,ind(Q)g,j,r ]) · [Q˘ind(Q)(D)g,s,j,r ]
⇒ [Qind(Q)(D)g,s,j,r ] = (1 + [tQ,ind(Q)g,j,r ]) · [Q˘ind(Q)(D)g,s,j,r ]
The purchase price definitions discussed in section 2.3.10 can similarly be used to
evaluate the composite quantities as we move up the agent’s decision nest. For example,
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the base-period values of Q
ind(Q)(D)
g,dom,j,r , Q
ind(Q)(D)
g,j,r , Q
ind(D)
j,r , and the composite factor F
ind(D)
j,r
are given by:
[Q
ind(Q)(D)
g,dom,j,r ] =
∑
x
[Q
ind(Q)(D)
g,x,j,r ]
[Q
ind(Q)(D)
g,j,r ] =
∑
o
[Q
ind(Q)(D)
g,o,j,r ]
[Q
ind(D)
j,r ] =
∑
g
[Q
ind(Q)(D)
g,j,r ]
[F
ind(D)
j,r ] = [L
ind(D)
j,r ] + [K
ind(D)
j,r ]
The base-period product demands for the other agents can be evaluated along similar
lines to the above:
[Q˘
ind(K)(D)
g,x,j,r ] = MRIO(g−x, INV−j−r)
[Q˘
ind(K)(D)
g,imp,j,r ] = MRIO(IMP−g, INV−j−r)
[Q˘hsh(D)g,x,r ] = MRIO(g−x,CON−r)
[Q˘
hsh(D)
g,imp,r] = MRIO(IMP−g,CON−r)
and so on.
Product Supplies Equilibrium requires the supply of each product from each source to
equal its demand. The MRIO matrix can be used directly to find the product supplies as
the total of row MRIO(g-x, •) equals [PQg,x] · [Q˘(S)g,x ]. Similarly, the total of row MRIO(IMP-
g, • ) equals [PQg,imp]·[Q˘(S)g,imp]. Since [PQg,s] = 1 ∀s the row totals give the benchmark values
of Q˘
(S)
g,s . Alternatively, having obtained all the product demand quantities above, we can
find values of Q˘
(S)
g,s consistent with the product market clearing equation (2.46):
[Q˘(S)g,s ] =
∑
r
[Q˘hsh(D)g,s,r ] +
∑
p
∑
j
∑
r
[Q˘
ind(p)(D)
g,s,j,r ] + [Q˘
gov(D)
g,s ] + [Q˘
exp(D)
g,s ]
The two approaches should result in the same values, so this serves as a useful check
that the MRIO is in fact consistent with equilibrium.64
64Tiny discrepancies of the order 1× 10−16 do show up due to GAMS being limited by 32-bit machine
accuracy. These do not affect the operation of the model in any material way.
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Factor Supplies The base-period factor demands and the market clearing conditions
(2.48) and (2.47) are used to calculate the benchmark factor supplies:
[L(S)r ] =
∑
j
[L
ind(D)
j,r ]
[K
(S)
j,r ] = [K
ind(D)
j,r ]
Export and Import Quantities The export agents’ demand functions (2.34) and the
market clearing equations (2.50) imply:
[EXP (S)g ] = [EXP
for(D)
g ] = [Q
exp(D)
g ]
while the import agents’ demand functions (2.36) and the market clearing equations (2.51)
imply:
[FOR(S)g ] = [FOR
imp(D)
g ] = [IMP
(S)
g ]
Investment Parameters and Quantities Of the variables in the endogenous invest-
ment allocation module (equations (2.25) - (2.32), with the addition of (2.33) for those
industries we wish to have investment allocated endogenously, and the market clearing
condition (2.49)), we have seen that the per-unit capital construction cost is normalised
to 1 and the rental rates are derived from data on gross returns (from the IO table) and
industry capital stocks. The remainder of the variables’ benchmark equilibrium values
have to be found numerically by virtue of the inclusion of (2.33) in the system. Assum-
ing for simplicity that investment is to be allocated endogenously for all industries, the
system consists of 9JR + 1 equations in 12JR + 2 unknowns where J is the number of
industries and R is the number of regions. With the values of [PKj,r], [P
K,new
j,r ], [K
(S)
j,r ],
and [Ib$] supplied by the data, 3JR + 1 unknowns are removed and the system becomes
square. All the unknowns are then solved for simultaneously in GAMS. We are specifically
interested in the net rates of return and allocation of investment that is consistent with
the endogenous allocation theory. Since we do not have data to support differences be-
tween regions in industry rental rates or depreciation rates in the benchmark equilibrium,
the numerically obtained values for [NRORj,r], [R
Knew/Kfuture
j,r ], etc. do not vary over the
regions. It is shown in appendix H that despite this, the values of [XI,b$j,r/tot] will vary over
regions for a given industry j insofar as its capital is regionally concentrated. Industry by
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region shares of total NZ capital stock ([KSTOCK j,NZ] = $470b) were shown in table 2.9
while the shares of total investment ([Ic$] = $38.3b) obtained through solving the system
of equations are found in table 2.11. Table 2.12 lists the gross rates of return and the
marginal efficiency parameter values derived from the BERL data, and the net rates of
return and investment / future capital ratios that result from solving the system using
those numbers. All the items of this latter table do not vary across regions for each given
industry. The [NRORfuturej,r ] column indicates expected net rates of return equalisation for
most industries. Those that are concerned primarily with the provision of public services
(GOVT, EDUC, and HEAL), and the housing proxy sector (OWND), are excluded from
the endogenous investment allocation equation (2.33), so their expected net rates of re-
turn are calculated consistent with investment being allocated according to their capital
shares.
Indirect Tax Rates The TAXES row of the raw input-output data includes sales taxes,
import duties, and GST. Given import duty and GST rates, duty and GST are removed
from the TAX row of the MRIO matrix to be handled separately, and what remains
is general ‘commodity tax’. This can be dealt with in a variety of ways; the simplest
approach is to pro-rate the tax over the MRIO flows of products from all sources. For
example, the tax flow in MRIO(TAX, j, r) can be split so that the tax paid by industry
j in region r on the flow of product g (summed over all sources) is:
TAX(g, j, r) = MRIO(TAX, j−r)
×
∑
x MRIO(g−x, j−r) + MRIO(IMP−g, j−r)× piindg,j∑
h
(∑
x MRIO(h−x, j−r) + MRIO(IMP−h, j−r)× piindh,j
)
where piindg,j is a pro-rating switch set by the user: pi
ind
g,j = 1 means industry j pays tax on
product g, and not if piindg,j = 0.
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Industry by Region Shares of Total Investment (%)
Industry
Region
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI NZ
AGRI 0.1 0.0 1.8 0.2 0.9 3.0
FOLO 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.3
FISH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
MINE 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.5
OIGA 0.0 0.2 1.9 0.0 0.0 2.1
PETR 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2
FDBT 0.5 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.7 2.5
TWPM 0.7 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.3 2.3
CHNM 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.1 1.7
METL 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.2 1.7
EQFO 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.3
UTIL 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.2 1.9
CONS 0.6 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.3 2.1
ACCR 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.9
CMIF 5.3 2.4 2.0 1.3 0.8 11.8
PROP 1.8 0.5 1.4 0.6 0.5 4.7
RBUS 2.4 0.8 1.1 0.5 0.4 5.3
GOVT 2.1 3.3 2.3 0.8 0.7 9.2
EDUC 1.2 0.4 1.1 0.4 0.4 3.4
HEAL 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.3 2.3
CUPE 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.3 2.2
OWND 12.0 4.2 10.5 3.7 4.5 34.8
WHOL 1.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 2.5
RETT 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.4 2.8
TRAN 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4
All 33.6 14.2 30.0 10.4 11.9 100.0
Table 2.11: Industry by Region Shares of Total Investment (%)
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Industry βj,r [GRORj,r](%) [NRORj,r](%) [NROR
future
j,r ](%) [R
Knew/Kfuture
j,r ](%)
AGRI 30.2 18.7 10.4 11.1 8.1
FOLO 92.7 34.4 25.9 11.1 9.4
FISH 21.8 12.8 4.9 11.1 4.4
MINE 10.1 35.7 21.5 11.1 19.6
OIGA 10.1 35.7 27.3 11.1 16.2
PETR 10.1 35.7 27.3 11.1 16.2
FDBT 9.1 19.4 10.6 11.1 8.3
TWPM 20.9 23.8 14.1 11.1 10.7
CHNM 16.8 30.9 22.3 11.1 12.4
METL 14.9 51.3 41.8 11.1 17.2
EQFO 30.0 26.1 19.5 11.1 8.3
UTIL 10.1 14.3 10.7 11.1 3.2
CONS 139.9 70.1 57.2 11.1 14.0
ACCR 34.1 20.0 14.5 11.1 6.3
CMIF 8.2 50.3 35.7 11.1 26.0
PROP 108.6 8.4 5.6 11.1 2.2
RBUS 11.6 79.4 64.1 11.1 27.2
GOVT 95.5 2.8 -0.7 0.0 7.8
EDUC 95.5 3.3 0.0 0.0 7.8
HEAL 95.5 16.9 12.0 0.5 7.9
CUPE 108.8 21.4 13.9 11.1 7.7
OWND 100.0 5.0 3.4 0.0 7.7
WHOL 34.1 31.9 22.5 11.1 11.3
RETT 34.1 54.5 44.0 11.1 14.1
TRAN 4.8 15.6 8.0 11.1 1.1
Table 2.12: Investment Data and Solution Values
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Other possibilities allowed for are that the tax flows are split according to specified
shares, or split to enforce certain tax rates, but for this implementation pro-rating is
used, with the piagentg,• switches set such that all domestic agents except exporters may
pay commodity tax on all products except OWND, WHOL, and RETT. Only exporters
of ACCR, CUPE, OIGA, PETR, WHOL, RETT, and TRAN pay commodity tax, and
then only on the product they export. The purpose of this assumption is to capture any
commodity tax paid by the foreign sector for these items not included in GST.
The TAX matrix is used to calculate the commodity tax rates as follows:
[tQ,hshg,r ] =
TAX(g,CON−r)
MRIO(g,CON−r) + MRIO(IMP−g,CON− r)
[t
Q,ind(Q)
g,j,r ] =
TAX(g, j, r)
MRIO(g, j−r) + MRIO(IMP−g, j−r)
[t
Q,ind(K)
g,j,r ] =
TAX(g, INV−j, r)
MRIO(g, INV−j−r) + MRIO(IMP−g, INV−j−r)
[tQ,govg ] =
TAX(g,GOV)
MRIO(g,GOV) + MRIO(IMP−g,GOV)
[tQ,expg ] =
TAX(g,EXP)
MRIO(g,EXP)
A consequence of the way these tax rates are calculated is that a given agent will pay
the same tax rate on all products. There are slight differences in the tax rates faced by
household and industry agents in different regions, but these are typically less than half
a percentage point. The levels of the tax rates are not so important – the useful aspect is
that in simulations they can be made to diverge across regions, for example if one region
has an additional tax imposed while the others do not.
All duty and export subsidy rates are set at zero for this implementation. Although
the GST rate consistent with the BERL data is 12.5%, the values of tGST ,hshg and t
GST ,exp
g
are not all set to this level. Adjustments are made to reflect that GST is not paid on
OWND, GOVT, and some components of CMIF, EDUC, HEAL, CUPE. Most exports
are exempt from GST; the primary exceptions to this are ACCR and TRAN, although
not all purchases of these are subject to GST. The GST rates in the model therefore are
effective rates, as opposed to the legislated rate of the time.65
65As no simulations were undertaken in this thesis involving changes to commodity tax or effective GST
rates, their values are not reported here for brevity. They are available from the author upon request.
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Direct Tax Rates The raw input-output data records gross payments to factors (before
income taxes are deducted). To obtain tax-paid labour income measures, we adopt the
average income tax rate used in the BERL impact of immigration report (Nana et al. 2009,
p. 61) of 21.1%. While the BERL figure would include direct tax on unearned income,
we place the tax entirely on labour income for simplicity.
Time Endowments and Leisure The idea was introduced in section 2.3.1 that the
time endowment can be measured in terms of the number of Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs)
available from the working age population. This will include those classified as unemployed
or non-labour force as well as the employed.66 Data concerning these demographic and
labour market measures will be introduced in Chapter 4. At this stage, given estimates of
the working age population for our five regions, we can convert these to numbers of FTEs.
Statistics NZ data measures employment by industry and region in terms of persons and
FTEs, so we can derive average conversion factors from persons to FTEs. The factors
vary across regions and industries but average around 1.1 persons to 1 FTE.67
Labour demand and supply are not measured in this core model in terms of FTEs,
but rather units from the IO table. For example, the total of the WAGES row of the IO
table is 70121. Since the nominal wage rate is set at 1 in the benchmark equilibrium, we
interpret the value as a quantity — 70121 units of labour demanded and supplied. A unit
of labour supply, referred to here as an IOunit, is the quantity of person-hours required
to earn $1 million (since the IO table is in these units). For consistency between these
labour measures and the time endowment, especially to facilitate equation (2.6), the time
endowment needs to be measured in IOunits. After converting the working age population
from persons to FTEs, we need to convert this to IO units. Using the Statistics NZ data on
employment FTEs and the WAGES row of the IO table, we obtain conversion factors from
IOunits to FTEs. Converting the working age population measured in FTEs to IOunits
by dividing through, the value of the time endowment for each regional household agent
is shown in table 2.13.
Having determined values of hshr’s time endowment and labour supply with consistent
66The implication of this definition therefore is that these groups are undertaking FTEs of activities
that somehow generate utility so the meaning of leisure is quite broad, including child-raising and study.
The working age population will have much more physical time than the time endowment of FTEs — on
average 138 hours per person per week — which cannot be used for any utility-enhancing activity.
67For the full list of conversion factors, see appendix J.
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Region Time Endowment
AKL 34257
WLG 11926
ONI 29047
CAN 10181
OSI 12189
NZ 97600
Table 2.13: Regional Time Endowment (IOunits)
units, we calculate the benchmark equilibrium level of leisure consumption using equation
(2.6):
[Nhsh(D)r ] = [TIME r]− [L(S)r ]
As neither the level of consumption nor the level of leisure depends on the level of
utility, we are free to choose this arbitrarily as 100 in the benchmark equilibrium.
Average Propensities to Consume and Save The average consumption propensities
are calculated as consistent with equation (2.1) while the saving propensities are according
to equation (2.2):
[APCwr ] = 100×
[SPN c$r ]
[INCw,c$r ]
∀r ∈ NZREG
[APSwr ] = 100− [APCwr ] ∀r ∈ NZREG
The resultant benchmark equilibrium values of the saving propensities are shown in table
2.14.
Export Demand Parameters The demand curves for exports of product g were spec-
ified in equation (2.44). This equation involves two parameters for each product which
need to be assigned values for the benchmark equilibrium. The first is the absolute
value of the export demand elasticity εEXPg . For this implementation of the JENNIFER
model these are all set at 4.0 except that for AGRI, which is set at 3.0. The authors of
MONASH (Dixon & Rimmer 2002) make a case for assuming elasticities of these sorts
92 CHAPTER 2. THE BASIC MODEL
Region Propensity to Save (%)
AKL 22.95
WLG 20.28
ONI 24.25
CAN 21.71
OSI 20.41
NZ 22.57
Table 2.14: Average Propensities to Save (%)
of magnitude, much lower than those used in ORANI. While lower elasticities suggest
more market power (hence the lower value for AGRI here), they also suggest difficulty in
market access due to transport costs etc. In New Zealand’s case the market access issue
is probably more significant and so reasonably low elasticities are justified although the
country has very little influence on world prices. These values are also in the range found
in the RPEP papers and Stroombergen (1986) of (negative) 2.0 to 6.0. The advantage
of being conservative in setting the export demand elasticities is that shocks should not
cause unjustifiably large changes in the composition of exports and the terms of trade,
which can lead to the model reporting unrealistic welfare effects.
The second item for which we need a benchmark equilibrium value is the coefficient
ψEXPg , the demand curve height — in model experiments it can be shocked to simulate
changes in foreign demand for domestic products. The values of this coefficient that are
consistent with (2.44) in the benchmark equilibrium are calculated by:
[ψEXPg ] =
[PEXP ,f$,forg ]
[EXP for(D)g ]
−1/εEXPg
Other Variables The remainder of the variables’ benchmark equilibrium values can be
established using the aggregate measures and indices defined in section 2.3.12 along with
the values already determined above. In the base-period, all real and nominal measures
coincide, so for example to evaluate the total base-period level of income tax received by
government, we use equation (2.42) to find:
[INCTAX v] = [tL] ·
∑
j
∑
r
[PL,btaxr ] · [Lind(D)j,r ] ∀v
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For the same reason, all the price indices CPI , IPI , etc. listed in section 2.3.12 are
equal to one in the base-period.
Calibration of the Demand Functions
Having established a benchmark solution to the model, values of the demand function
parameters that are consistent with that solution can now be determined. This is easily
done with analytical solutions for the parameters of demand functions obtained from
optimisation problems involving Leontief, Cobb-Douglas, or CES functions. For user-
specified substitution elasticities, the program calculates the coefficients according to the
formulae set out in appendix K. For example, the household product demand functions
(2.9) derived from expenditure minimisation subject to a Cobb-Douglas mixing function
are:
Qhsh(D)g,r =
Q
hsh(D)
r
vQ,hshr
·
∏
h
(
aQ,hshg,r · PQ,hshh,r
aQ,hshh,r · PQ,hshg,r
)aQ,hshh,r
The program interprets the setting σQ,hshr = 1 as specifying the above demand function
and calibrates it according to:
aQ,hshg,r =
[PQ,hshg,r ][Q
hsh(D)
g,r ]
[Q
hsh(D)
r ]
vQ,hshr = Q
hsh(D)
r ·
(∏
g
(
Qhsh(D)g,r
)aQ,hshg,r )−1
The distribution parameters (the a’s) are set equal to the expenditure shares and the scale
parameter (the v) is set to ensure the agent is on the constraint boundary. This is the
usual procedure to calibrate functions derived from Leontief or Cobb-Douglas technology.
Calibration for the general CES case is similar but more complicated since the distribution
parameters depend on the substitution elasticity.
As a double-check, the program also calibrates the functions numerically. Any failure
to do so will indicate a coding error or will be an early warning of convergence difficulties.
The method of numerical calibration follows that of solving any square system of non-
linear equations. The equation set consists of the demand functions for a given agent and
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a constraint that the distribution parameters add up to 1. This last equation effectively
determines the scale parameter.68
For the purposes of this thesis, a number of sets of elasticities were prepared based
on different behavioural assumptions. BERL has provided a set of suggested domes-
tic/imported substitution elasticities which has been adapted for the 25-industry imple-
mentation here. These elasticities have also been used, with modifications, to describe
substitutability between domestic regional versions of products. This primary set of source
substitution elasticities is shown in table 2.15. A notable feature is that the elasticities
for many of the products on the left-hand side of the table, mainly being primary and
manufactured goods, are higher than those on the right-hand side, which are primarily
service products. This reflects the idea that services tend to be more closely associated
with the location where they are produced and used. It is reasonable to assume that the
substitution elasticities between domestic varieties are higher than between the domestic
and imported varieties.69 Table 2.16 presents a suggested set of elasticities for use when
running short-run simulations. The vector of source substitution elasticities of table 2.15
are referred to there as ~Σ. The substitution elasticities between regional varieties are ~Σ,
scaled-up by a common factor. To make an assumption that the government is less willing
or able to substitute between varieties than other agents, lower scaling factors were applied
for their source choice. The remainder of the elasticities reflect the short-run assumption:
no substitution between product types is possible except by households, who have some
limited ability to substitute between them as well as between overall consumption and
leisure. Firms within industries have only limited possibilities to shift between material
and factor inputs, and between factor types. For long-run simulations, all the elastici-
ties apart from those linked to ~Σ are increased to 1.0 — i.e. Cobb-Douglas functions are
used.70
68In the case of demand functions derived from utility maximisation, the v parameters have no role
except to scale the utility function to the arbitrary level set in the benchmark equilibrium.
69See for example the comments made on this matter in Jones & Whalley (1989, p. 385).
70The non-~Σ elasticities are generally similar to those used by ORANI and the RPEP models. Dixon
et al. (1982, p. 189) cite empirical evidence for capital/labour substitution of 0.5 in the short-run and
1.0 in the long-run. Recent empirical work for New Zealand broadly supports this notion. Regressions
reported by Tipper (2011) indicate capital/labour substitution elasticities by broad industry group of
0.30 (primary), 0.55 (goods-producing), and 0.44 (services) although in the goods-producing case the
Cobb-Douglas specification could not be rejected. These regressions included a one-year lag variable and
the elasticities were termed long-run although they are closer in meaning to our short-run definition.
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Source Substitution Elasticities
Industry Elasticity
AGRI 2.2
FOLO 2.8
FISH 2.2
MINE 2.8
OIGA 0.0
PETR 4.0
FDBT 2.5
TWPM 2.9
CHNM 1.9
METL 2.8
EQFO 2.9
Industry Elasticity
UTIL 2.7
CONS 1.5
ACCR 2.0
CMIF 1.9
PROP 1.9
RBUS 1.9
GOVT 1.5
EDUC 1.5
HEAL 1.5
CUPE 1.9
OWND 0.0
WHOL 2.0
RETT 2.0
TRAN 2.0
Table 2.15: Source Substitution Elasticities
A key underlying assumption of this set of elasticities is that for a given industry
there is no variation in technology across regions except as required by adjustments to
the MRIO matrix. All the parameters of the CES functions (the a’s, v’s, and σ’s) are
identical at the sourcing levels for each industry j except for local products.71 There
is some slight variation at the product-type level due to the RAS adjustment but recall
the input intensity is preserved across industries. There is a similar lack of variation in
the demand parameters across the household agents. This uniformity reflects the infor-
mation theoretic approach whereby information gain is minimised when assumptions are
made. Simulation results are therefore driven by those transparent assumptions (and the
structure implied by the input-output table and regional shares) rather than differences
Tipper also estimated elasticities at a more disaggregated industry level, and it would be interesting to
investigate the effect of using these elasticities in our simulations. This task has been put aside for future
research.
71If g is a local product then the associated a parameter for g from region x will be 1 for industry j
from region r when x = r and zero otherwise.
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Short-run Substitution Elasticities
Households
Level Choice between... Elasticity
1 consumption & leisure 0.5
2 product types 0.5
3 domestic & imported ~Σ
4 regional sources 3
2
~Σ
Government
Level Choice between... Elasticity
1 product types 0.0
2 domestic & imported 3
4
~Σ
3 regional sources ~Σ
Exporters
Level Choice between... Elasticity
1 regional sources 3
2
~Σ
Industries - current production
Level Choice between... Elasticity
1 materials & factors 0.5
2= product types 0.0
2= labour & capital 0.5
3 domestic & imported ~Σ
4 regional sources 3
2
~Σ
Industries - capital formation
Level Choice between... Elasticity
1 product types 0.0
2 domestic & imported ~Σ
3 regional sources 3
2
~Σ
Table 2.16: Short-run Substitution Elasticities
in demand parameters generated by the application of more complex techniques such as
gravity calculations and location quotients.
2.4.4 Model Closure
We saw in section 2.4.1 that the model is closed — i.e. turned into a square system — by
adding equations that effectively constrain some variables to be equal to given numbers.
In GAMS the user specifies for which variables are such exogenising equations added
to the system. The closure choice is important because simulation results can only be
interpreted with respect to that choice. A typical short-run closure for the model is shown
in table 2.17. The closure is interpreted as short-run because the endowments of time and
capital are fixed — these cannot move between regions, nor between industries in the case
of capital, to seek out the best rate of return. The notation used in table 2.4 is used again
here — J is the number of industries and R is the number of regions in the model. The
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number of industries subject to exogenous investment allocation is potentially up to J .72
For our simulations there are only four: the GOVT, EDUC, HEAL, and OWND industries.
The rest of the items are commonly included in the standard short-run closure list of CGE
models as usually there is no modelling of the determination of tax and depreciation rates
and the levels of real investment and government consumption expenditure.73 The small
country assumption naturally leads to exogenous world prices and export demand curves,
and the comparative-static nature of the model implies saving needs to be exogenously
determined. Many variations of the closure are possible depending on the policy question.
As with ORANI, alterations to the closure are made by swaps of variables between the
exogenous and endogenous lists. The trade balance could be made exogenous, swapped
with some component of domestic absorption, for simulations where no deterioration
of the current account is desired. The level of real aggregate investment could be made
endogenous by swapping it for the economy-wide average expected rate of return Ω so that
simulations return the level of investment consistent with no change (or an exogenously
specified change) in the latter variable. The closure treatment of investment also has
implications for the determination of aggregate savings and macroeconomic balance, to
which we now turn.
72When adding the exogenous and endogenous equations together to obtain a total equation count for
the core model, J×R should be subtracted to avoid double-counting since each equation that sets XI,b$j,r/tot
exogenous replaces one equation from (2.33). Table 2.17 shows the maximum number of exogenous
variables under this closure including all J × R investment shares. This differs from the number of
unexplained variables referred to in footnote 43, which was calculated based on the assumption that all
industries were subject to endogenous investment allocation. That is, J × R variables were counted as
explained by (2.33) and therefore excluded from the calculation in footnote 43.
73Powers of taxes (1 + t) are usually set exogenous in CGE models rather than tax rates for computa-
tional reasons. Simulations often involve increasing some tax rates from zero to some positive number;
the percentage change in the tax rates are undefined in this case while the percentage change in the tax
powers are not, so it is the latter that are useful for computing model solutions. Specifying a simulation is
also easier with powers of tax since an x% increase in the power of a tax is equivalent to an x percentage
point increase in the tax rate. With the separate treatment of GST in equation (2.59), it can be seen that
only one of (1 + tQ,hshg,r ) and (1 + t
GST ,hsh
g ) can be shocked in a single simulation.In the event that both
commodity tax components needed to be shocked, either a new GST rate could be declared or equation
(2.59) could be altered to become:
PQ,hshg,s,r ·Qhsh(D)g,s,r = PQg,s · (1 + tQ,hshg,r + 1 + tGST ,hshg − 1) · Q˘hsh(D)g,s,r
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Exogenous Variables Dimension
Symbol Description General case J = 25, R = 5
K
(S)
j,r capital stocks JR 125
TIME r time endowments R 5
XI,b$j,r/tot real investment shares JR 125
PFORg c.i.f. import prices J 25
APS ataxr savings propensities R 5
δj,r depreciation rates JR 125
tL labour income tax rate 1 1
1 + tQ,agentg,• powers of commodity tax 2J
2R+JR+2J 6,245
1 + tGST ,agentg powers of GST 2J 50
1 + tFORg powers of import duty J 25
1 + tEXPg powers of export subsidy J 25
ψEXPg levels of export demands J 25
XGDP ,b$I/tot investment share of real
GDP
1 1
XGDP ,b$G/tot government consumption
share of real GDP
1 1
TOTAL 3 + 2R + 8J +
4JR + 2J2R
6,963
Table 2.17: A Short-run Closure
2.4.5 Walras’ Law and Macro Balance
When specifying the closure, or making changes to it, careful thought has to be given to
the implications of Walras’ Law. To prevent the model from being over-identified, the
equilibrium condition for the saving market was excluded from the set of market clearing
equations listed in section 2.3.9. On one side of the saving market stand the household
and government agents with funds available for lending. On the other side stand the
investor agent demanding finance for capital formation and the foreign agent demanding
finance for their trade deficit (a domestic trade surplus).74 If all the other markets are
74If the government runs a budget deficit they are on the demand side of the market, and if the foreign
sector runs a trade surplus (a domestic trade deficit) they are on the supply side.
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in equilibrium, then the equation system automatically implies that the saving market
is in equilibrium too, for any vector of equilibrium prices. Evidence that Walras’ Law is
satisfied by the JENNIFER model can be found in appendix L.
Walras’ Law can be seen as the source of the macroeconomic balancing identity
domestic saving ≡ investment + trade balance
Since Walras’ Law only applies at the current equilibrium price vector, the identity is
only satisfied for nominal measures. That is,
SAV c$ ≡ Ic$ + TRDBALc$,d$ (2.140)
Once one side of the identity is determined, the other side is determined as well.
When we make a closure assumption, we have to decide which component will adjust
to the others. The standard short run closure above, for example, implicitly assumes
that changes in the trade balance will be reflected in changes in nominal investment.
The exogenous saving propensities and components of fiscal policy lock down domestic
saving, so changes in the trade balance lead to offsetting changes in nominal investment.
With real investment also fixed, either in absolute terms or as a proportion of GDP, the
offsetting adjustments will manifest in changes in construction costs. Alternatives include
making the economy-wide average saving propensity endogenous (and locking down the
regional propensities relative to that) so that domestic private saving reflects changes in
the trade balance, or fixing the trade balance to force nominal investment to adjust to
changes in saving (perhaps accompanied by a swapping-in of Ω so that real investment
also adjusts).
Note that since Walras’ Law only holds at current equilibrium prices, the measures
of real GDP using the different measurement approaches will typically diverge since the
price movements that satisfy the identity do not flow through consistently into the deflator
indices associated with each measurement method.
2.4.6 Obtaining Solutions to the Model
There are two key approaches to solving CGE models written as a system of equations
F(V) = 0:
1. using a numerical algorithm for solving systems of ordinary differential equations
(ODEs) such as the Euler Method
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2. using a numerical algorithm for solving systems of non-linear equations such as the
Newton Method
The first method emerged from the contribution of Johansen and is mainly associated with
the Australian / CoPS / GTAP school of CGE modelling who primarily use GEMPACK
to solve their models. The main characteristic of this method is that the model is typically
written down and coded in linearised form, and the solution consists of percentage changes
in the variables. For details on this method see for example Dixon et al. (1992).
The second method comes from the American / World Bank / IFPRI school of CGE
modelers who mainly use GAMS for model solving. The models are usually expressed
and programmed in levels of variables, such that the model solution is also in the levels.
This is the method followed for solving the JENNIFER model.
Provided an initial solution V0 to the square system D(V) = 0 (equation (2.119)),
the Newton algorithm involves iterations according to:
Vn+1 = Vn − J−1n D(Vn) (2.141)
where J is the Jacobian matrix of first partial derivatives:
Jn =
∂
∂V′n
D(V)
GAMS compiles the JENNIFER model as a Constrained Non-linear System (CNS)
and computes its solution using the PATH solver. This means that bounds are put on V,
an initial solution V0 is specified, and the solver performs pivots to solve the system of
linear equations:
Jn (Vn+1 −Vn) + D(Vn) = 0 (2.142)
The solver terminates after N + 1 iterations if
Jn (Vn+1 −Vn) + D(Vn) < 
or N + 1 > Iterlim
where  is the convergence tolerance level and Iterlim is the iteration limit. The default
PATH values are  = 1×10−6 and Iterlim = 10000. PATH uses an advanced merit function
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to guide the iterations so convergence should occur well before the default iteration limit
is reached.75
Although the field of CGE modelling developed along the two delineated strands
noted above, recent years have seen some convergence in the competing schools. Jo-
hansen’s method of model-solving using a single matrix inversion was appropriate given
the level of computer technology of his time. With modern, fast computers iteration is
not so costly so accurate solutions can be easily obtained with either method. When
running simulations, the changes in variables are our primary interest rather than their
levels. GEMPACK has the advantage of providing percentage changes immediately; for
GAMS to do so, additional coding is required. The object-oriented approach used in the
coding of JENNIFER removes much of that additional burden.76 Since GEMPACK is
based on solving models with a single matrix inversion, iterative methods such as Euler
require the program to be told how to update the database at each step of the algorithm.
Recent versions of GEMPACK allow model equations to be input in levels form which
obviates the need for such updating statements. For large and complex models, GAMS
iterations require more physical memory and take longer because of the evaluation of the
structural model at each step, something which GEMPACK does not do. For that reason
however, GAMS is able to solve a wider range of model types, such as those that in-
volve non-homogeneity or discontinuities in the demand functions and those that require
optimisation of an objective function.
There is therefore no superior approach to CGE modelling — the approach depends
on the purpose of the modelling and the requirements of the user. Where flexibility and
transparency are useful, such as during model development, GAMS has a substantial
advantage. For the deployment of a large standardised model and timely production of
75See GAMS Development Corp. (2008) for details of the PATH solver. GAMS has the advantage
of double-precision accuracy so rounding errors do not accumulate as quickly as in standard 32-bit
GEMPACK (such that accuracy is only to 5-6 significant figures). Very small numbers therefore do not
create convergence problems although in economic modelling the difference between such tiny numbers
and zero are unimportant. See Centre of Policy Studies (2010) for details on numerical accuracy in GAMS
and GEMPACK.
76Essentially, the variable list was treated as a program object that different parts of the code could
interact with. Then for example, an instruction of calculating percentage changes was interacted with
the list. This meant that new variables could be added to the list during program development without
the need for additional manual inputting of code for the percentage change of each new variable.
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results, which in turn can be easily interpreted by users not involved in the programming
of the model, GEMPACK is the package of choice.77
2.5 Simulations Using the JENNIFER Model
Once the model has been calibrated by establishing a benchmark equilibrium solution and
the parameters of the demand functions, and a closure assumption has been chosen, the
model is ready for running simulations.78 A shock is applied to the exogenous variables
either by direct replacement (e.g. replacing the GST rate of 12.5% with the value 15%)
or expressing as a change or percentage change from the benchmark value. GAMS then
solves the model as discussed above using the benchmark equilibrium as the starting point
for the algorithm and calculates the changes and percentage changes of all the variables
from their benchmark equilibrium values.
The JENNIFER model is deployed in GAMS in such a way as to maximise its flexi-
bility. Each program component runs from a command line that takes items such as the
number of industries and regions, the chosen sets of elasticities, closure assumptions, and
exogenous shocks as options. New versions of the model with more or less industries and
regions can be implemented easily with the creation of two auxiliary files: one specifying
the sets (of industries, regions, etc.) and the other specifying the data (mappings from the
raw data to the model industries and regions, etc.)79 Similarly, new elasticities, closures,
and shocks can be specified by creation of small text files and referred to in the command
line when running program components. The output of each simulation is saved in a
77Some of the user-friendly aspects of GEMPACK can be emulated by applications in GAMS. Ruther-
ford’s MPSGE system is one example. (See Rutherford 1999, Paltsev 1999)
78Three different diagnostic tests can also be run at this point. They are tests for replication, conver-
gence, and nominal homogeneity. The replication test runs the model with no shock to check for system
squareness and all percentage changes should be zero (with allowance for rounding errors of the order
10−6). The convergence test perturbs the algorithm starting point but still applies no shock to check that
the same solution is obtained within its neighbourhood. Runs of the homogeneity test change the value
of the numeraire and checks that all domestic prices and current price measures change proportionately,
but there is no change in real measures or foreign prices. It was checked that the JENNIFER model
passed these tests prior to running any simulations.
79As such, files for 6-industry, 5-region and 6-industry, single-region versions were prepared during
model development.
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separate database and is portable to Microsoft Excel, Matlab, and even GEMPACK.80
The capability of GAMS to produce text files containing results is exploited to generate
report tables in LATEX mark-up ready for inclusion in documents that are typeset using
that system, such as this thesis.
2.5.1 An Illustrative Application
To demonstrate the usefulness of the JENNIFER model relative to the national models
currently in use within New Zealand, the results of a region-specific supply-side shock are
discussed in this section. The specified shock simulates the short-run effects of an unex-
pected event that causes the destruction of, or otherwise renders inoperative, a portion
of the currently installed capital stock of the Wellington region.81 It is assumed that the
Central Business District (CBD) of Wellington is the area most affected, so industries
concentrated within it are disproportionately affected — see the table below.
Shock to WLG Capital Stock
Industry % change
UTIL -1
CONS -1
ACCR -5
CMIF -10
PROP -10
RBUS -10
GOVT -15
Industry % change
EDUC -10
HEAL -10
CUPE -5
OWND -5
WHOL -1
RETT -5
TRAN -10
With the elasticities and closure as specified in tables 2.16 and 2.17 respectively, the
model is solved and the results are shown in the sim101 column of the tables found in
appendix O.
80The data is saved as a GDX, a native format to GAMS, but there are conversion tools available in
the public domain.
81The source of the shock remains unspecified. It could be imagined that it is due to a natural disaster
or terrorist attack but such events would entail many other effects which we wish to ignore here for
simplicity. The results do not take into account any effects of insurance pay-outs or government spending
in preparation for rebuilding, for example.
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The effect of the unexpected event on the region’s total capital stock is a fall of about
8%, equivalent to a loss of about 1% of the national stock (table O.1). Due to the
short-run immobility of capital, the sudden shortage of capital causes Wellington rental
rates to rise (table O.18). With limited opportunities to replace the lost capital with
labour or materials, output falls and output (basic) prices rise (tables O.6 and O.16).82
All these effects are concentrated within those industries most severely affected by the
shock. Those industries that do not lose capital see an expansion of output although not
enough to offset the output reduction in the service industries. There is an accompanying
expansion of employment in those industries (table O.10). Interestingly, employment also
expands in GOVT and the local industries (see table 2.10), and their output does not fall
by as much and output prices do not rise by as much as in CMIF, PROP, RBUS, and
TRAN. In the case of GOVT, this is because Wellington has such a large share of the
industry and it also faces no competition from imports. Similar reasoning holds for the
local industries. Agents are not able to substitute towards varieties from other regions
and imports of these services are insignificant.
The higher capital rental rates translate to higher net rates of return because construc-
tion costs are virtually unaffected by the shock (tables O.19 and O.20).83 The endogenous
investment allocation mechanism leads to an interesting, but somewhat extreme effect on
the pattern of investment: the vast majority of reallocated investment goes to the trans-
port industry in Wellington, such that investment in this industry increases more than
400% (tables O.11 and O.12). The large increases in the rates of return to the capital
of GOVT, EDUC, HEAL, and OWND should be ignored because these industries are
excluded from endogenous investment allocation. This leaves TRAN in WLG with an in-
crease in net rate of return of 29%, well above that of the industry with the next highest
increase, RBUS, whose rate of return increases 18%. That the value of βj,r for j = TRAN
is the lowest out of all industries also has a role in this producing result — see section
2.3.4 and appendix H.
The macroeconomic results are unremarkable (tables O.28 and O.29); as expected
82In all simulation results reported throughout this thesis, ‘output’ is used in the sense of ‘gross real
output’. Results for regional output, for example, correspond to OUTPUTb$r =
∑
g[P
Q
g,r] · Q˘(S)g,r .
83Looking at table 2.6, we see that the service industries subjected to the majority of the shock do not
have a very significant role in capital formation. Tables similar to O.19 and O.20 for the price of new
capital units are not given in appendix O because most of the numbers therein are zero to one decimal
place and otherwise no more than 0.2 (%).
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from a supply-side shock, GDP falls and there is an increase in the price level, but the
effects are small at the national level because the shock only directly affects one region.
There is a slight worsening of the trade balance due to the change in the pattern of
trade.84 Nationally, some substitution occurs towards the domestic variety of goods that
are otherwise key imports (table O.14), and there is a slight expansion in key exports
(table O.13), but these are more than offset by decreases in exports from those industries
disproportionately affected by the shock. Notice for example that CMIF exports falls 6%
while imports of the same increases 2%.
Those relatively benign macroeconomic effects hide a significant distributional impact
across the regions. Wellington bears the brunt of the short-run impact. While there is
virtually no change in Wellington employment (table O.10), the nominal wage rate falls
3% (table O.21). This suggests that the labour supply curve is relatively steep at the
benchmark equilibrium level of labour supply. Higher product purchase prices also erode
the real wage rate in Wellington (tables O.22 and O.23). Since the household agent is
assumed to receive capital returns only from in-region capital, the Wellington agent sees a
drop in income from both wage and profit sources (table O.24). To maintain consumption
spending as a share of nominal income, the household agent in Wellington reduces their
level of saving by 12% (table O.26).
The other regions are only affected by the shock indirectly, through their interdepen-
dence with Wellington, and through feedbacks from the macroeconomy (such as trade
effects). The higher cost of inputs from Wellington leads to higher basic prices and lower
output in the other regions (tables O.2 and O.3). The effect on other regions of lower
product demand in Wellington is offset by additional export demand for their products.
The household agents in the regions outside Wellington see a slight dip in the purchas-
ing power of their wage as lower demand for their labour manifests as lower wage rates.
Since they are assumed to not own any Wellington capital, their real income is mostly
unaffected. There is a slight decrease in their spending and increase in their saving.
The results discussed above suggest that the welfare effects of the shock are mostly
borne by the directly impacted region. Calculations of CV and EV are used to quantify
84For variables that can be negative, the percentage changes have been adjusted to properly reflect
the direction of change: when the trade balance is negative and the percentage change is also negative,
this is interpreted as the trade balance becoming more negative. The change reported in table O.28 is
equivalent to an increase in the trade deficit of $8.4 million.
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the magnitude of the welfare change for all regions (table O.27). According to those es-
timates, households in Other North Island collectively experience a loss of welfare about
half the size of those in Wellington.85 This highlights a key strength of the JENNIFER
model and more generally the bottom-up modelling approach: by taking regional linkages
into account, we are able to estimate the regional effects of shocks, and these suggest
distributional consequences that are not observable in a national model. Neither can the
indirect effects be ignored — the shock has effects beyond the borders of the region it
directly impacts upon. The nature of the distributional consequences are also suggestive:
the welfare loss rankings are Wellington (worst affected), then Other North Island, fol-
lowed by Other South Island and Auckland, and then Canterbury. These may reflect the
degree of closeness and therefore interdependence between Wellington and these regions,
at least in terms of those industries primarily affected by the shock.86
Since our results are likely to be sensitive to some of our elasticity assumptions, it is
important to check how the results change when these are altered. We saw in table 2.15
that all our assumed source elasticities were above 1.0 except for OWND and OIGA, so
specifying substitution elasticities for agents as in table 2.16 means that their responsive-
ness to price changes, relative to both imported prices and other-region prices, is higher
than that implied by Cobb-Douglas mixing functions. In order to test the implications of
assuming such responsiveness, we run the same simulation with alternative sets of elas-
ticities for agents’ source choice, progressively scaling down the elasticities. Table 2.18
shows the values of the elasticities used for sim102 and sim103, besides those of our initial
simulation, sim101, for comparison. Lower substitution elasticities can be justified on the
grounds that (1) the ability to substitute between sources may be more limited in the
short-run, and (2) higher levels of aggregation imply less commonality between varieties
of the same product, and so less substitutability.87 The results of the simulations with
the lower source substitution elasticities are reported in the tables of appendix O, in the
sim102 and sim103 columns.
85Using real spending (per household) as a welfare criterion would suggest the welfare loss was about
one quarter that of Wellington’s. Whichever criterion is used, the ranking in terms of welfare loss remains
the same.
86Closeness at this stage carries no implication of geographical proximity as this basic version of the
model has no information on the configuration of the regions.
87The source substitution elasticities were averaged from more disaggregated data, so some downward
adjustment may be appropriate to account of the loss of “sameness” when aggregating.
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Sets of Elasticities for Simulations
Agents Choice between... sim101 sim102 sim103
Households
domestic & imported ~Σ 2
3
~Σ 1
3
~Σ
regional sources 3
2
~Σ ~Σ 1
2
~Σ
Industries domestic & imported ~Σ 2
3
~Σ 1
3
~Σ
- current production regional sources 3
2
~Σ ~Σ 1
2
~Σ
Industries domestic & imported ~Σ 2
3
~Σ 1
3
~Σ
- capital formation regional sources 3
2
~Σ ~Σ 1
2
~Σ
Government
domestic & imported 3
4
~Σ 1
2
~Σ 1
4
~Σ
regional sources ~Σ 2
3
~Σ 1
3
~Σ
Exporters regional sources 3
2
~Σ ~Σ 1
2
~Σ
Table 2.18: Sets of Elasticities for Simulations
The role of the source substitution elasticities in inter-regional feedbacks is central to
understanding these results. When the elasticities are high as in sim101, agents substitute
away from the Wellington variety of CMIF, PROP, and RBUS (compare table O.6 with
tables O.7 and O.8). The goods producing industries of Wellington (AGRI – EQFO) face
lower composite factor costs (since their rental rates do not increase by much and the wage
rate falls significantly) which feeds into lower output prices and higher output. Agents
substitute towards the products of those industries further, increasing their output and
reinforcing the reallocation of Wellington labour towards those industries (table O.10).
With the lower degrees of substitution assumed in sim102 and sim103, the CMIF, PROP,
and RBUS service industries of Wellington do not see such a large fall in demand and
the goods producing industries’ demand effect is dampened. The reallocation of labour
is therefore less pronounced and the variation in output response across industries within
the region is reduced. The higher costs associated with the higher capital rental rates
come through more strongly in the industries’ output prices (table O.16).
Less source substitutability means the CMIF, PROP, and RBUS service industries in
the other regions see less of an increase in demand and therefore output and capital rental
rates do not increase by as much (tables O.17 and O.18). Although this leads to dampened
output price increases within those regions, the Wellington price effect dominates (tables
O.15 and O.16). The nominal wage rate in Wellington does not fall as much while there
are partially offsetting drops in the other regions’ wage rates (table O.21).
108 CHAPTER 2. THE BASIC MODEL
The outcome of the rental rate and wage rate differences across the simulations is
that the household agent in Wellington has higher nominal income and those of the
other regions less nominal income in sim103 than sim101. Since it is assumed that a
constant proportion of nominal income is saved, spending actually increases in Wellington
in sim103 while it falls elsewhere (even in real terms — see table O.25). This leads to
a counter-intuitive result in terms of welfare — the household agent in Wellington is
better-off and those outside the region worse-off as a result of the shock (table O.27).
The sensitivity of our simulation results, particularly with regards the welfare effects
across regions, signals the need for empirical estimation of the source substitution elas-
ticities. With a single set of elasticities we can see that distributional consequences are
significant, but to predict what those consequences would be requires a robust set of
estimates.
Two issues that could be raised with our simulation results are that the predicted
regional real wage rate differences could lead to population movements even in the short-
run, and that the treatment of the distribution services WHOL, RETT, and TRAN is
simplistic, with these industries treated just like any other. For example, no account
has been taken of the fact that destruction of capital stock of TRAN may make delivery
of Wellington products to other regions difficult. These two issues are addressed by the
model extensions presented in the following two chapters.
Chapter 3
Distribution Services
3.1 Introduction
The basic model outlined in the previous chapter contained no special treatment of dis-
tribution services such as wholesale and retail trade and transport services. The demands
for these were derived in the same way as for the other products of the model. This ap-
proach leads to unrealistic predictions from simulations that involve relative price changes
— if some product becomes more expensive relative to a distribution service then users
substitute away from that product and increase their demand for the distribution service.
A more sensible modelling setup would ensure that, when relative prices change, agents
change their demands for distribution services in the same direction as their demands for
products that are delivered using those services. Special treatment of distribution services
is especially relevant to bottom-up multi-regional models where regional prices vary. For
example, if the price of a region’s variety of a certain product rises relative to others then
the ability of agents to substitute towards other varieties is constrained by the capacity
of associated distribution services to accommodate the additional demand.
This chapter sets out enhancements to the basic model that allow for such realism in
our treatment of these services. The structure of the chapter reflects that of chapter 2:
after a discussion of the role that distribution services play and how they are modelled,
the additional equations required will be summarised followed by details of implementing
the changes to the model. Illustrative simulations using the 25-industry, 5-region version
of the model are discussed at the end of the chapter.
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3.2 Modelling Distribution Services
The role of services such as wholesaling, retailing, and transportation is of great impor-
tance in a multi-regional CGE model, since that role is essentially to facilitate distribution
of products to users who may be domiciled in a different region from the producer. In
classifying agents by region, we introduce the idea of “distance” between them and the
issue immediately arises of how distribution within a region differs from that between
regions. Our treatment must capture in some way the relationship between producer-user
distance and delivery costs. Each type of distribution service ought to be considered sep-
arately to capture their unique characteristics, but first we need to look at the way the
use of these services is recorded in the input-output table and how we can model that
usage in general.
When distribution services are used to deliver products, their cost is usually built-
in or otherwise attached to the purchase price. For this reason, they are referred to as
‘margins’ when discussing their usage for delivery, as distinct from ‘distribution services’
which refers to the set of services supplied by the distribution industries, irrespective of
their usage.
Interpreting Input-Output Value Flows Recall that the flows shown in the input-
output table in chapter 2 are valued at basic prices. Cell IO(DOM-g, CON) is the value
flow of domestically-produced product g to household consumption and equivalent to the
value received by the producer. The value of any margin service m used to deliver the
product is recorded in row IO(DOM-m, •). Agents purchased distribution services just
like any other product in chapter 2. In this chapter we link delivery transactions to
product transactions so that they can be seen as one joint purchase — hence the ‘margin’
terminology. The product rows of the input-output table then show the portion of the
value of purchases received by producers while the portion received by the distribution
services are included in the margin rows.
One Purchase, Many Transactions As consumers we are familiar with retail ser-
vices. The retailer facilitates trade between producers and consumers by bringing prod-
ucts to market. Prior to this the products may pass through many hands on the way
from the place of production (e.g. the farm or factory) to the purchaser. It is common
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for produced goods to be transferred to a wholesaler who oversees their distribution to
retailers. Transportation and insurance services are usually required for each movement
of the goods. Each pair of hands the products pass through adds a markup on to their
purchase price. Ultimately the consumer pays a price that reflects distribution markups
on top of the production or importation cost and markup (normal profits). Each purchase
is modelled in this chapter as a set of transactions: one transaction between the purchaser
and each of the producer, the wholesaler, the retailer, and the transporter. To understand
the nature of these transactions, we need to look at each type of distribution service in
turn.
Retail Trade The primary function of the retail trade is to provide a location where
products that are in a ready-to-use form can be purchased. Rational purchasers would
optimally choose to visit retail outlets nearby rather than far away if they both offer similar
products at similar retail prices. Provided there are not many purchasers nor retail outlets
close to the borders of the regions in our model, we can make the simplifying assumption
that retail services are a local product as was done in the previous chapter. The volume
of retail service demanded in a region would then be related to the volume of products
demanded within that region, regardless of the source of the products.
Wholesale Trade Wholesalers facilitate the delivery of products from producers to
retailers or directly to other producers if they are to be used as an intermediate input into
current production or capital formation. The wholesale margin is ultimately paid by the
purchaser, even though a retailer may pay the margin on behalf of the purchaser along
with the producer’s cost and markup. These are simply passed through into the retail
price. The wholesale margins recorded in the input-output table as paid by retail service
suppliers are therefore margins on their purchases of inputs into production, not the
margins on the goods they sell. Associating demands for wholesale services with demands
for products is more complicated than it was for retail. One approach is that demands
for wholesale services from a region are related to the product demands of agents in that
region analogous to the retail services. An alternative is to associate wholesale demands
with demands for products from each region by agents in all destinations. The first
approach is appropriate for wholesalers located close to purchasers while the latter is for
when they are close to producers. The model gives control of the regional configuration
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of producers, wholesalers, and purchasers to the user by allowing either of these, or a
mixture of both, to be assumed.
Transportation Including transportation as a separate margin in the model is compli-
cated by the fact that transport can be demanded for delivery of goods as well as simply
a service to be consumed (e.g. commuting to work) or used in production (e.g. business
trips). The input-output table unfortunately does not make a distinction between these
uses so the model user must make an assumption over what proportion of each flow of
transport service is for margin use and otherwise. To do so, a number of complexities
need to be taken into account. The first of these is the way that transport is measured
in the table. Purchases of transport are only recorded when they are separately invoiced.
In many cases the transport costs of delivery have been included in the wholesale margin
flows. That in turn means that wholesalers are making significant use of transport as an
input into production so only some of the transport they purchase is margin-type. For
example, the cost of delivering forklifts from the port to the wholesaler is transport mar-
gin on the forklifts purchase. When the wholesaler is contracted to deliver fresh produce
to a supermarket retailer however, the services of a trucking firm to deliver the produce
is a direct input into the wholesaler’s production. The composition of the product we call
transport here is also important. The 25-industry aggregation used in this thesis neces-
sarily combines all types of transport — road, rail, water, and air — and includes both
passenger and freight services.1 It is left to the user to set the proportion of each flow of
transport service that is for direct use as opposed to margin use. Transport margins are
handled in a similar way to wholesale margins in that demands for a region’s transport
can be associated with product demand flows from that region, or demands by agents
within that region, or a mixture of the two.
Use of Margins by Government and Exporters Since the model assumes no re-
gional dimension to government and exporters, they can be viewed as destinations that
cover all regions for our purposes. Their margin demands are dealt with in a similar way
to those of the regionally domiciled agents. The main difference is that local products
1The raw data is sufficiently detailed to separate road passenger and freight services but not for the
other transport types, and making the strong assumption that the usage of these can be split according
to the shares of passenger and freight in road transport does not seem appropriate.
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lose their meaning for the government and exporters. Exporters’ demands for retail trade
for example only depend on the source distribution of their product demand, not where
they plan to export the goods from, which is an aspect not described by the model. Note
that all margins on exports are paid by the exporter and subsequently included in the
export price that is paid by the foreign sector. Since wholesale and retail services are used
only as delivery margins, there is no export demand curve for each of these. However,
the model does include an export demand curve for transport in the case when the user
specifies a positive proportion of the flow of transport services to exporters as non-margin
usage.
Use of Margins to Deliver Imports Analogous to the exporting agents, importers
also lack a regional dimension. They are treated as a single extra source of products on top
of the domestic regions. This complicates the linking of margins to source product flows
as was suggested for wholesale and transport services above. How this issue is addressed
will be discussed in the section below detailing the model implementation enhancements.
The key extra ingredient required is an assumption on the regional distribution of imports,
to effectively disaggregate import flows top-down across regions.
Use of Margins to Deliver Services Naturally some products do not require all
types of distribution service to facilitate delivery. There are no costs involved in deliver-
ing ‘Ownership of owner-occupied dwellings’ to households, for example. Wholesale and
transport services are usually only needed to deliver physical products.2 Many service
providers supply their own retail service, so the separation of their product value (e.g. a
haircut) from their retail margin (e.g. the delivery of the haircut to the market) needs to
be done during the compilation of the input-output table. For example in the 1996 IO
table, the retail components of the accommodation, restaurants, and bars industry were
recorded in the retail trade row rather than in the relevant product row.3 For our purposes
it is presumed that this separation is carried over to the BERL 2006 table such that the
2Exceptions may arise depending on what services are aggregated under these headings in the input-
output table. For example, wholesaling of services such as passenger flights and travel insurance could
come under the banner of wholesale trade. Communication services could also be treated as margins
since they are becoming increasingly important in the delivery of many services (e.g. banking), but such
an enhancement was not investigated for this thesis.
3See Statistics NZ (2001, page 7).
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services rows only contain the value flows of service product, with the retail components
shifted to the retail trade row. In general the model user can account for these kinds
of issues by setting, for each type of margin, the subset of products which require that
margin for delivery to each given purchaser.
Imports of Margin Services Consistent with the assumption that margin services are
not exported but simply used to prepare products for export, any imports of wholesale,
retail, or transport services are treated as products for non-margin use.4
Undelivered and Delivered products The specific assumptions surrounding how a
product is delivered are captured in the model by distinguishing between ‘delivered’ and
‘undelivered’ products. In general delivered product g from source s is a package of the
undelivered product (on the factory floor or in the hands of the importer) and all the
services used in its delivery. Payment of commodity tax is also required to complete
delivery so this is an additional component of the delivered product. The model user has
control over how each product is packaged. For example it could be assumed (given a
sufficiently disaggregated IO table) that each motor vehicle purchased by households in
Wellington is in fact a package of the actual (duty-paid) imported vehicle, some wholesale
margin from Auckland, and some retail service from Wellington.
3.3 Additional Model Structure
The most significant additional structure required to introduce our modelling of margins is
a set of equations for each relevant agent that describes their demand for each distribution
service from each region required to deliver each product from source to destination.5
The product set COM is used to refer to direct (non-margin) usage of products only.
A separate set MAR is specified for the margin services, with an associated index m. Thus
‘transport’ as an element of COM is distinguished from ‘transport’ as an element of MAR.
The distribution industries remain included in IND and non-margin uses of distribution
4The input-output data indicates that imports of these only account for small proportions of total
demands anyway — 0.5% for wholesale, 15% for retail, and 12% for transport.
5Note that importing agents pay all delivery costs to port as part of the c.i.f. import prices they face
and the investment agent does not require any margins to convert new capital into investment.
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services are indexed over COM , so most of the core model structure described in chapter
2 and made explicit in appendix D generalises without alteration, although in many
cases the interpretation changes. This is because there are some alterations made to the
equilibrium conditions and purchase price definitions, discussed below.6
3.3.1 Margin Demands
Each agent’s demand equations for margins are derived from optimisation in a fashion
consistent with chapter 2. However, it is assumed that there are no opportunities for
substitution between margins of different types or margins of a given type from different
regions, so the solution is relatively straightforward. Formally, each agent minimises costs
in obtaining a certain quantity of delivered product g from source s, given that each unit
of delivered product is a Leontief combination of units of the undelivered product and
all required margin services m ∈ MAR sourced from any region(s) y ∈ REG . Using a
generalised notation, the agent’s problem is written:7
Minimise
PQg,s · (1 + tQ,agentg + tGST ,agentg ) · Q˘agent(D)g,s +
∑
m
∑
y
PQm,y ·Qagent(D)m,y,g,s
subject to:8
Qagent(D)g,s = Leontief
agent
g,s
(
Q˘agent(D)g,s , Q
agent(D)
m,y,g,s |m,y
)
with variable descriptions:
6Take the definition of the regional consumption price deflator index CPIFr for example: the purchase
price of a delivered product now includes all the delivery costs, not just commodity tax — compare
equation (3.3) with (2.59) — so changes in margin prices will have a stronger effect on CPIFr than in
chapter 2, ceteris paribus.
7The notation abstracts from the variations required to write the expressions for specific agents. For
example we would change Q
agent(D)
m,y,g,s to Q
hsh(D)
m,y,g,s,r for households and Q
ind(Q)(D)
m,y,g,s,j,r for current production
by industry j. The GST rate tGST ,agentg would typically only be non-zero for agent = hsh, and perhaps
also for agent = exp for those products usually purchased by international visitors (tourists, students,
etc.)
8The notation Leontief j
(
Aj , Bij |i∈{1,...,n}
)
is a shorthand for v ·min
(
Aj
aj
,
B1j
b1j
, ...,
Bnj
bnj
)
where the v,
aj ’s, and bij ’s are parameters.
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Q˘
agent(D)
g,s quantity of undelivered product g from source s demanded by
agent
Q
agent(D)
g,s quantity of delivered product g from source s demanded by
agent
Q
agent(D)
m,y,g,s quantity of marginm from region y required to deliver product
g from source s to agent
The demand functions derived by solving this optimisation problem are:
Q˘agent(D)g,s = a
Q˘,agent
g,s ·
Q
agent(D)
g,s
vQ,agentg,s
(3.1)
Qagent(D)m,y,g,s = a
Q,agent
m,y,g,s ·
Q
agent(D)
g,s
vQ,agentg,s
(3.2)
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) imply that margin services are required in fixed proportion
to the volume of products they are used to deliver. The parameters vQ,agentg,s and a
Q,agent
m,y,g,s
embody all the assumptions made by the user surrounding delivery costs as discussed
above — the v’s depend on the commodity tax assumptions while the a’s capture the
distribution technology. The values of these parameters are determined by calibration,
which is discussed in the next section.
The addition of these demand equations to the model amounts to attaching an extra
layer of decision nodes to the bottom of each agent’s decision nest. Just as each agent’s
demand for product g was represented as a composite of demands from each source, their
demands for each delivered product from each source is a composite of the undelivered
product and the margins. Figure 3.1 shows how a given agent’s demand for delivered
product g from source s is formulated.
3.3.2 Prices of Delivered Products
The discussion of purchase prices in section 2.3.10 continues to be relevant in this chapter.
However, the expressions that define purchase prices of delivered products, such as equa-
tion (2.59), need to be altered to account for distribution costs. Using the generalised
notation from before, the purchase price paid by agent for product g from source s is
defined by:
PQ,agentg,s ·Qagent(D)g,s = PQg,s · (1 + tQ,agentg + tGST ,agentg ) · Q˘agent(D)g,s
+
∑
m
∑
y
PQm,y ·Qagent(D)m,y,g,s (3.3)
  
 
 
 
 
 
Delivered product g {1,2,…} 
from source s {A,B,…,imp} 
Leontief mixing function 0, 
agent
sg
agent
sgQ ,

agent
sgQ ,
agent
sgQ ,,,ARETT
agent
sgQ ,,,BRETT
agent
sgQ ,,,ATRAN
agent
sgQ ,,,BTRAN
agent
sgQ ,,,AWHOL
agent
sgQ ,,,BWHOL
Transport margin from 
region y {A,B,…} 
Retail margin from 
region y {A,B,…} 
Wholesale margin from 
region y {A,B,…} 
Undelivered product g {1,2,…} 
from source s {A,B,…,imp} 
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Figure 3.1: Formation of delivered products
Note the implication that no commodity tax or GST is payable on margins. Non-
margin use of distribution services may however be subject to such taxes due to their
inclusion in the product set COM .
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3.3.3 General Equilibrium Conditions
The product market clearing equations of chapter 2 need to be altered to take into account
the margin usage of domestically-produced distribution services as introduced in this
chapter. The set of equations have to be split into those concerning the distribution
services and those that are not. For this purpose it is useful to specify a set of products
PROD that excludes the distribution services. That is, PROD = COM \MAR. We can
then write the market clearing conditions for the products g ∈ PROD as:
Q˘(S)g,s =
∑
r
Q˘hsh(D)g,s,r +
∑
p
∑
j
∑
r
Q˘
ind(p)(D)
g,s,j,r + Q˘
gov(D)
g,s + Q˘
exp(D)
g,s (3.4)
That is, identical to equation (2.46) but indexed over the restricted set. The market
clearing conditions for the domestic distribution services have two components on the
right-hand side — direct usage demands and margin demands — and can be written
compactly as:9
Q(S)m,y =
∑
agent
(
Q˘
agent(D)
h,y · 1h=m +
∑
g
∑
s
Qagent(D)m,y,g,s
)
(3.5)
It remains to specify the market clearing conditions for imported distribution services,
which are assumed to be for direct usage. The equations are analogous to equation (3.4)
and written in the compact form of (3.5):
Q
(S)
m,imp =
∑
agent
Q˘
agent(D)
h,imp · 1h=m (3.6)
The zero pure profit conditions (2.52) can similarly be divided into expressions for
margin and non-margin use of products but this is not strictly necessary. The equations
(2.52) continue to be valid for all g ∈ COM .10
9
∑
agent Q
agent(D)
• is a shorthand for
∑
r Q
hsh(D)
•,r +
∑
p
∑
j
∑
r Q
ind(p)(D)
•,j,r +Q
gov(D)
• +Q
exp(D)
• and 1
is the indicator function defined in section 2.4.3.
10The alternative, partitioned form of (2.52) is obtained by restricting g ∈ PROD and writing:
PQg,r · Q˘(S)g,r = PQ,indj,r ·Qind(D)j,r + PF,indj,r · F ind(D)j,r ∀g = j
PQm,y ·Q(S)m,y = PQ,indj,y ·Qind(D)j,y + PF,indj,y · F ind(D)j,y ∀m = j
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Equation block General case J = 25, R = 5, M = 3
Households JR + JR2 +MJR2 +MJR3 12,000
Current production J2R + J2R2 +MJ2R2 +MJ2R3 300,000
Capital formation J2R + J2R2 +MJ2R2 +MJ2R3 300,000
Exporters JR +MJR2 2,000
Government J + JR +MJR +MJR2 2,400
TOTAL J+3JR+JR2+2J2R+2J2R2+MJR+
3MJR2 +2MJ2R2 +MJR3 +2MJ2R3
616,400
Table 3.1: Additional Equations
3.4 Implementation of the Margins Modelling
To facilitate the implementation of the modelling of distribution services discussed above,
a number of changes are made to the multi-regional input-output (MRIO) matrix and
various coefficients are introduced to give the user control over how products are delivered
within and between regions.
Before describing these changes, it is useful to look at how the overall model im-
plementation is enhanced to handle the margins theory. The addition of the demand
functions (3.1) and (3.2) to the model increases the number of equations significantly.11
While they are linear and therefore do not place much extra burden on the solver, their
dimensionality does mean that computer memory gets used up rapidly as the dimension of
the model increases. The user therefore faces a trade-off between the realism the margins
modelling provides and the additional detail that would come from higher disaggregation
of industries, regions, etc. Given J industries (and products), M of which are distribution
services, and R regions, the maximum increase in the number of model equations is set
out in table 3.1 above.12
11The alterations to the market clearing, zero pure profit, and purchase price equations discussed above
make no difference to the overall number of equations.
12Trivial equations that set components of Q
agent(D)
m,y,g,s and Q˘
agent(D)
g,s equal to zero due to user assump-
tions can be dropped to reduce the size of the system if necessary. Other programming tweaks are possible
to use memory more efficiently and recent versions of GAMS have a grid computing facility to directly
control how memory is allocated to computational tasks. The 25-industry, 5-region, 3-margin implemen-
tation is close to the maximum model dimension a standard 32-bit PC can handle without resorting to
these measures. The solution time is still only a matter of minutes, however.
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Agents
Distribution Service
WHOL RETT TRAN
all ind(Q)j,r except j = WHOL 1 1 1
all ind(Q)WHOL,r 1 1 0.5
all ind(K)j,r 1 1 1
all hshr 1 1 0.1
gov 1 1 1
all expg 1 1 0.5
Table 3.2: Margin-use Proportions
3.4.1 Margin Coefficients
The onus is on the model user to inspect and alter as needed the following coefficients
which are used during and after the estimation of the MRIO matrix. The first set of
coefficients are the proportions of each agent’s demand for each distribution service m
that is for margin usage, denoted ζagentm . These coefficients are useful in addressing issues
surrounding the usage of transport by households, wholesalers, and exporters. A suggested
set of values for ζagentm , used for the 25-industry, 5-region, 3-margin implementation of
JENNIFER, is shown in table 3.2.
The suggested values imply that 50% of the usage of transport by wholesalers and
90% of the usage by households is non-margin. A large part of the service wholesalers
provide involves delivery, so they use a significant amount of transport as a direct input
into production — thus the 50/50 split of their transport usage. Households’ transport
demand is mainly for consumption — flights, public transport, etc. They are rarely
billed separately for delivery of the products they buy: it is usually part of the wholesale
margin they pay.13 This is reflected in the relatively low share of transport demand that
is assumed to be for margin use.
Setting the margin share of demand for transport by exporters less than 1 captures
the idea that some transport services are purchased by foreigners for consumption. The
definition of transport is important when choosing the appropriate proportions. A sig-
13Delivery costs could also be built into retail margins, but then the production of retail services would
need some transport and/or wholesale as direct input.
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nificant proportion of the exports of transport may be purchases by tourists, and that
transport may partly involve sightseeing, and partly involve delivery — in this case de-
livery of the tourist to the location where they can consume some other products such as
accommodation or a cultural performance. Nevertheless, the model definition of an ex-
ported physical product is the finished good, delivered to port and loaded on the boat (i.e.
Free On Board). So exporters of these face significant delivery costs, whether captured
as wholesale, retail, or transport margins. Table 3.2 shows a suggested proportion of 50%
of exporters’ usage of transport that is for delivery, so the remaining share is interpreted
as exports of transport services for consumption by non-residents.
From the above discussion it can be seen that consideration needs to be given to what
types of products each margin service delivers. While transport may be involved in the
delivery of services to tourists (actually by moving the tourists), the services demanded
by domestic residents and firms usually do not require transport, or indeed wholesale
services either. The user can control whether margin m is required to deliver product
g to each agent by adjusting the binary switch χagentm,g — a value of 1 implies that m is
required. For simplicity here we assume values of χagentm,g that do not vary across agents,
and therefore the delivery requirements can be represented as the matrix shown in table
3.3.14
The final set of margin coefficients are the γagentm coefficients, which set the proportion
of each agent’s demand for margin m that is ‘destination-type’ as opposed to ‘source-
type’. If γagentm = 1 then the agent’s demand for m depends only on the size of the flow
of products coming to the destination while γagentm = 0 implies that it depends only on
the flow size of products coming from the source. A suggested split of margin demands
into these two types is given in table 3.4. For simplicity we assume the values of γagentm
for given m are the same across all agents.15
14See table 2.5 for descriptions of products. 1 = required, blank = not required (the parameter has a
value of zero). There are in fact three exceptions to all agents having the same χagentm,g for given m and g:
only hsh agents pay retail margin on OIGA, PETR, and TRAN. These are indicated in the table with
asterisks (*).
15Sometimes there are cases where the user setting needs to be over-ridden. One such case is where a
product that is exported is not produced in all regions. Source-type margins can only be demanded from
a region if there is a non-zero product flow from that region to which it can be attached. The margins
demanded from regions which do not produce the product are forced to be destination type in this case.
For example, since refined petrol (PETR) is only produced in region ONI, the value of γexpm,PETR is fixed at
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Product
Distribution Service
WHOL RETT TRAN
AGRI 1 1 1
FOLO 1 1 1
FISH 1 1 1
MINE 1 1 1
OIGA 1 1* 1
PETR 1 1* 1
FDBT 1 1 1
TWPM 1 1 1
CHNM 1 1 1
METL 1 1 1
EQFO 1 1 1
* only for agent = hsh
Product
Distribution Service
WHOL RETT TRAN
UTIL 1
CONS 1
ACCR 1
CMIF 1
PROP 1
RBUS 1
GOVT 1
EDUC 1
HEAL 1
CUPE 1
OWND
WHOL
RETT
TRAN 1*
Table 3.3: Margins Required to Deliver Products
3.4.2 Extending The Multi-Regional Input-Output Data Matrix
The process described in chapter 2 of establishing an economy-wide input-output (IO)
matrix and splitting the rows and columns of that matrix using regional shares to obtain
an initial estimate of the MRIO matrix is applicable in this chapter as well. Before
discussing matrix adjustments to take into account our margin assumptions, two useful
extensions are made to the MRIO table to obtain a more detailed matrix, denoted MRIO′.
Usage of Distribution Services by Exporters
A consequence of our margins treatment is that distribution services are used to deliver
products to exporters. In chapter 2 we treated the flows of these services to exporters as
though they were product exports. In order to easily associate margin flows with product
one when calculating MRIO′dst(m−y,EXP− PETR) and MRIO′src(m−y,EXP− PETR) for all regions
y other than ONI.
3.4. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MARGINS MODELLING 123
Margin Proportion
WHOL 0.5
RETT 1
TRAN 0
Table 3.4: Destination-type Proportions of Margin Demands
flows to exporters in this chapter, the EXP column of table 2.8 is expanded into a set
of columns, one for each exported product, including non-margin usage of distribution
services — see table 3.5.16 We can then spread the margin flows (and commodity tax)
across those columns using our assumptions.17 For the non-distribution service products,
the expanded MRIO matrix records the flow of g from region x to the exporter of g as:
MRIO(g−x,EXP−g) = [XOUTPUTg,x/g ]× IO(DOM−g,EXP) ∀g ∈ PROD (3.7)
That is, analogous to equation (2.132) except valid only over the restricted set PROD .
Exports (i.e. non-margin usage) of a distribution service m sourced from region x is
separated from exporters’ margin usage by:
MRIO(m−x,EXP−m) = (1− ζexpm,m)× [XOUTPUTm,x/m ]× IO(DOM−m,EXP) (3.8)
To consider the margin usage of distribution service m to deliver a product g to its
corresponding exporter (expg), we first define a pro-rating share pi
exp
m,g as:
18
piexpm,g =
χexpm,g × IO(DOM−g,EXP)∑
h χ
exp
m,h × IO(DOM−h,EXP)
(3.9)
16The ‘..’ indicate data values while all other (blank) cells are zero. Since it is assumed that wholesale
and retail services are used only as margins, they are not part of the set of exported products. The
OWND industry is given an export column since it is part of the PROD set but the value of OWND
exports is zero.
17Note the implications of the ζexpm,g and χ
exp
m,g coefficients set out in tables 3.2 and 3.3. Some transport
service is exported, but it is assumed no margins are required to make the transport service available to
the export market. Taking a deeper look at the tourism sector might lead us to adding retail and other
margin requirements for the provision of transport exports.
18The symbol pi was used in chapter 2 for pro-rating tax values. In this chapter it is exclusively used
for pro-rating margin flow values.
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MRIO row/col
EXP
AGRI ... OWND TRAN
AGRI
AKL ..
...
...
OSI ..
...
. . .
OWND
AKL ..
...
...
OSI ..
WHOL
AKL .. .. .. ..
...
...
...
...
...
OSI .. .. .. ..
RETT
AKL .. .. .. ..
...
...
...
...
...
OSI .. .. .. ..
TRAN
AKL .. .. .. ..
...
...
...
...
...
OSI .. .. .. ..
IMP-AGRI
...
IMP-TRAN
TAX .. .. .. ..
LAB
CAP
Table 3.5: Export Columns of the Expanded MRIO Matrix
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piexpm,g is the share of product g in the total flow of products to exporters that need margin
m for delivery. The binary switch in the numerator ensures that if m is not required to
deliver g, piexpm,g = 0.
The usage of margin service m from region y is pro-rated over the export columns by:
MRIO(m−y,EXP−g) = ζexpm,g × piexpm,g × [XOUTPUTm,y/m ]× IO(DOM−m,EXP) (3.10)
Direct Usage, Destination- and Source-Type Margins
We know from tables 3.2 and 3.3 that all the transport usage recorded in the
MRIO(TRAN-x,EXP-TRAN) cells is direct (i.e. non-margin) and the usage in all the
other cells MRIO(TRAN-x,EXP-g) is margin. For our purposes, it is useful to shift the
margin flows in all columns of the MRIO table into rows apart from the direct flows. At
the same time the margin flows are divided into separate destination-type and source-
type rows. The product flow rows of the MRIO table (with the expanded export column
discussed above) are therefore replaced with three blocks of rows: MRIO′dir, MRIO
′
dst,
and MRIO′src as shown in table 3.6 to obtain the MRIO
′ matrix.
The row blocks of MRIO′ are derived from the MRIO table using the ζagentg coefficients
to split demands into direct and margin demands, and the γagentm coefficients to split
margin demands into destination-type and source-type as shown below.19 The reason for
this latter partition is so that they can be treated differently when making adjustments to
MRIO′ for local margins, for example, and when pro-rating the margin flows over product
flows to establish the benchmark equilibrium.
The flow of product g from region x to a given MRIO′ column, where g is a product
other than a distribution service, is simply transferred from the MRIO matrix:
MRIO′dir(g−x, col) = MRIO(g−x, col) ∀g ∈ PROD (3.11)
The non-margin usage of a distribution service m from region x is extracted from the
appropriate row of the MRIO using ζagentm :
MRIO′dir(m−x, col) = (1− ζagentm )×MRIO(m−x, col) (3.12)
The remaining usage in that MRIO row, the margin usage of distribution service m from
region y, is split between destination-type and source-type margin usage using γagentm as
19The obvious mapping of agents to columns of MRIO′ is suppressed for simplicity.
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MRIO′
Industries CON INV GOV EXP
row/col
AGRI ... TRAN AGRI ... TRAN AGRI ... TRAN
AKL...OSI AKL...OSI AKL...OSI AKL...OSI AKL...OSI
di
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u
ct
u
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ge
M
R
IO
′ di
r
AGRI
AKL .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
OSI .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
WHOL
AKL .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
OSI .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
RETT
AKL .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
OSI .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
TRAN
AKL .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
OSI .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
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WHOL
AKL .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
OSI .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
RETT
AKL .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
OSI .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
TRAN
AKL .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
OSI .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
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′ sr
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WHOL
AKL .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
OSI .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
RETT
AKL .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
OSI .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
TRAN
AKL .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
OSI .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Table 3.6: Product Flows in the Extended MRIO Matrix
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follows:20
MRIO′dst(m−y, col) = ζagentm × γagentm ×MRIO(m−y, col) (3.13)
MRIO′src(m−y, col) = ζagentm × (1− γagentm )×MRIO(m−y, col) (3.14)
Flows of distribution services into the MRIO′ export columns are calculated slightly dif-
ferently, however:
MRIO′dir(m−x,EXP−m) = MRIO(m−x,EXP−m) (3.15)
MRIO′dst(m−x,EXP−m) = MRIO′src(m−x,EXP−m) = 0 (3.16)
MRIO′dst(m−y,EXP−g) = γexpm,g ×MRIO(m−y,EXP−g) (3.17)
MRIO′src(m−y,EXP−g) = (1− γexpm,g )×MRIO(m−y,EXP−g) (3.18)
Adjusting The Extended MRIO Matrix
Rich detail regarding the usage of margins can now be added to the model by making ad-
justments to the extended MRIO matrix and applying the information-theoretic approach
discussed in chapter 2. This allows us to make significant changes to the underlying as-
sumptions surrounding margin usage without having to worry about introducing spurious
information into the model database. Two adjustments are described in this section:
adjusting for local margins, and adjusting for border margins.
Local margins These are similar to the local products of chapter 2 but distinct since
they are services used for delivery. In our implementation for this chapter, WHOL and
RETT continue to be local in nature. The interpretation in the context of these being
margins is that regionally domiciled agents only use the local variety for delivery of prod-
ucts from all sources.21 The way that local margins are pro-rated over product demands is
consistent with the way that destination-type margins will be pro-rated when we establish
the benchmark equilibrium. This is why it was suggested in table 3.4 that retail should
be treated as a destination-type margin. In general all local margins should be designated
as destination-type, and adjustments are made in the MRIO′dst block of rows to make the
20The region counters have been switched from x to y to consistently use y for the origin region of a
given margin.
21This restriction does not apply to exporters and the government, but is of little consequence since
these agents do not make significant use of WHOL and RETT.
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margin local. For example, the following makes m a local margin for the household agent
in region r:
MRIO′dst(m−y,CON−r) = 1y=r × ζhshm,r × γhshm,r ×
∑
x
MRIO(m−x,CON−r) (3.19)
These adjustments move all destination-type flows of margin m to hshr into the region r
cell out of the other regions’ cells, so that all margin m demanded by hshr is from region
r.22
Border margins In order to introduce additional costs in procuring products out-of-
region, we may wish some margin flows to be required to deliver products only when
they are crossing the receiving agent’s regional border. For our implementation here,
transport is specified as a border margin, meaning that transport (as a margin) is only
used to deliver products between regions, not within them. Then an increase in transport
costs will cause agents to substitute away from out-of-region products, ceteris paribus,
if such substitution is possible. Usage of border margins will be pro-rated over product
demands consistent with the way that source-type margins will be when we establish the
benchmark equilibrium. Thus the suggestion in table 3.4 that transport be treated as
source-type. All border margins should be designated as source-type, and adjustments
are made in the MRIO′src block of rows. For example, to specify that m is a border margin
for the household agent in region r, we first define a pro-rating share:
pihshm,y,r =
MRIO(m−y,CON−r)∑
x MRIO(m−x,CON−r)
(3.20)
The intra-region flow of m is shifted out of the relevant cell of the MRIO table and spread
proportionally over the inter-region flows using the pro-rating share as follows:
MRIO′src(m−y,CON−r) = 1y 6=r × ζhshm,r × γhshm,r
× (pihshm,y,r ×MRIO(m−r,CON−r) + MRIO(m−y,CON−r))
(3.21)
22This effectively reverses the row splitting of the IO matrix to obtain the MRIO. Making a product
local can be thought of as exempting it from the row-splitting of the IO matrix, but computationally it
is easier to split all the rows and then add back up those cases which are determined to be exemptions.
This process does create some rounding errors, and the RAS of the extended MRIO table propagates the
rounding error throughout the matrix, but the effects only appear beyond eight decimal places.
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Mixtures of margin types In general, for each margin, the user decides how much
of the margin flow to each agent is destination-type and source-type. Of the destination-
type flows, the user decides whether they are local margins or not, and of the source-type
flows, whether they are border margins or not. In our implementation of JENNIFER
with margins modelling, we assume that all retail flows are local destination-type margins
and transport margin flows are border source-type margins. Our treatment of wholesale
margins shows that mixtures of the different types are possible. According to table 3.4,
half of all wholesale margins are destination-type and therefore the other half are source-
type. Assuming that WHOL is a local margin only affects those flows allocated to the
MRIO′dst rows. This provides a setup where some wholesaling is done close to purchasers
and some is done close to producers.
3.4.3 Obtaining the Benchmark Solution
Once adjustments have been made to the extended MRIO matrix and it has been re-
balanced using the RAS algorithm, the database is consistent with the conditions for
competitive general equilibrium and is used to obtain the benchmark equilibrium val-
ues in a manner analogous to that of chapter 2. This section describes how the values of
[Q
agent(D)
m,y,g,s ] are calculated. The reader may find it useful to look through the simple numer-
ical example found in appendix M prior to or in combination with the general presentation
here. The reader is also referred to appendix N which presents the extended MRIO matrix
as derived according to the above methodology and used in our implementation of the
JENNIFER model.
Destination-type margin flows are pro-rated over all product flows while source-type
margins are spread only over product flows coming from the same region. For exposi-
tion we define these separately as [Q
(dst)agent(D)
m,y,g,s ] and [Q
(src)agent(D)
m,y,g,s ], and these add up to
[Q
agent(D)
m,y,g,s ]. That is, we determine the benchmark value of Q
agent(D)
m,y,g,s as the sum of these
two components.
Destination-type Margin Demands We first define a pro-rating share piagentm,g,s to al-
locate each agent’s demand for margin m from each region according to the relative im-
portance of their demand for product g from source s in their total demand for products
that require m for delivery:
piagentm,g,s =
χagentm,g × [Q˘agent(D)g,s ]∑
h
∑
z∈SRC χ
agent
m,h × [Q˘agent(D)h,z ]
(3.22)
130 CHAPTER 3. DISTRIBUTION SERVICES
The demand for each margin from each region is then spread over the product demands
to obtain the agent’s destination-type demand for margin m from region y, for delivery
of product g from source s:
[Q(dst)agent(D)m,y,g,s ] = pi
agent
m,g,s ×MRIO′dst(m−y, col) (3.23)
Note that the pro-rating factor piagentm,g,s does not depend on the source region y of the margin
m. This is what makes the margin demand ‘destination-type’. The value [Q˘
agent(D)
g,s ] is
the appropriate value from MRIO′ — MRIO′dir(g−x, col) for domestic product g and
MRIO′(IMP−g, col) for imported g. Any assumption that m is a local margin is already
built into the m rows of MRIO′dst. If m is local for an agent located in region r, the value
of MRIO′dst(m−y, •) will be zero for all y 6= r. Provided the agent demands some margin
m and some imported product g, some of the margin will be used to deliver the imported
product. No reference is made to the port of entry of imports, and the amount of margin
required is therefore invariant to it.
Source-type Margin Demands The basic idea of source-type margins is that some
margin service is attached to products in their region of production to facilitate their
delivery. The margin requirements then depend on where the product is coming from, not
where it is going to (which is the destination-margin case). A problem immediately arises:
how can there be source-margin requirements on imported products when importers are
treated as a single source separate to the regions? This compatibility problem between
imports and source-margins is addressed by regionalising the import flows top-down.
The import flows are distributed across regions without introducing separate importing
agents in each region. As such there is still a single economy-wide market and basic
price for each imported product. The import flow of product g is allocated to region x
using the regional import share XIMPg,x/g; these shares enter the model as coefficients so do
not add to the number of equations or variables.23 Regional share values adopted for
23The solution returns consistent regional import values but these appear nowhere else in the model.
Essentially the demand-side of the importing sector is split but the supply-side described by the importing
agents remains economy-wide. If source-type (especially border) margins are used to deliver imported
products, the purchase prices that agents in different regions face may diverge after a shock that sig-
nificantly affects the distribution industries. Nevertheless, the top-down regionalisation imposes a fixed
importing sector structure which is unresponsive to shocks. There is no regional supply-side response
by importers to shocks, even in the long-run. A similar top-down regionalisation of the exporting sector
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our implementation are shown in table 3.7.24 Pro-rating shares for source-type margin
demands used to deliver imported products can then be defined as:
pi(imp)agentm,y,g =
χagentm,g × [XIMPg,y/g]× [Q˘agent(D)g,imp ]∑
h
(
[Q˘
agent(D)
h,y ] + χ
agent
m,h × [XIMPh,y/g]× [Q˘agent(D)h,imp ]
) (3.24)
pi
(imp)agent
m,y,g captures the importance of imported product g in all products delivered from
region y to the agent using margin m. The source-margin demands that facilitate that
delivery are:
[Q
(src)agent(D)
m,y,g,imp ] = pi
(imp)agent
m,y,g ×MRIO′src(m−y, col) (3.25)
Since the rows of MRIO′src have been adjusted to account for any assumption that m is
a border margin, the value of [Q
(src)agent(D)
m,y,g,imp ] would be zero if that were the case and the
agent was located in region y. Agents located in other regions will face distribution costs
for imports that are landed in region y. The more an agent is dependent on imports from
a region other than their own, the higher the distribution costs will be that they face.
The source-margins required for delivery of domestically produced products follows
analogously:
pi(dom)agentm,y,g =
χagentm,g × [Q˘agent(D)g,y ]∑
h
(
[Q˘
agent(D)
h,y ] + χ
agent
m,h × [XIMPh,y/g]× [Q˘agent(D)h,imp ]
) (3.26)
[Q(src)agent(D)m,y,g,x ] = 1
y=x × pi(dom)agentm,y,g ×MRIO′src(m−y, col) (3.27)
would suffer from the same limitation in feedbacks to the aggregate economy.
24These are based roughly on Statistics NZ figures for cargo imports available at http://www.stats.
govt.nz/tools_and_services/tools/TableBuilder/exports-and-imports-tables.aspx. The data
indicates the overall regional distribution of cargo imports for 2006 was: AKL 59%, WLG 6%, ONI 24%,
CAN 7%, and OSI 4%. There is some variation amongst the different commodity categories, but due to
difficulties in matching the Statistics NZ classification to our product groups, accurate product-by-region
shares cannot be obtained. For example neither crude oil nor refined petrol are separately identified
in the data. The figures given here therefore set regional shares of physical products according to the
overall average, except for OIGA. For this product it was assumed the majority of imports were crude
oil imported directly to the petrol refinery. No data was available to determine the regional shares of
services imports. It was assumed that these roughly followed the regional shares of tangibles although
the urban centres probably take larger shares, hence the different allocation for service product imports.
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Regional Shares of Imports (%)
Product
Region
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
AGRI 59 6 24 7 4
FOLO 59 6 24 7 4
FISH 59 6 24 7 4
MINE 59 6 24 7 4
OIGA 10 10 70 5 5
PETR 59 6 24 7 4
FDBT 59 6 24 7 4
TWPM 59 6 24 7 4
CHNM 59 6 24 7 4
METL 59 6 24 7 4
EQFO 59 6 24 7 4
UTIL 60 10 10 10 10
CONS 60 10 10 10 10
ACCR 60 10 10 10 10
CMIF 60 10 10 10 10
PROP 60 10 10 10 10
RBUS 60 10 10 10 10
GOVT 60 10 10 10 10
EDUC 60 10 10 10 10
HEAL 60 10 10 10 10
CUPE 60 10 10 10 10
OWND 60 10 10 10 10
WHOL 60 10 10 10 10
RETT 60 10 10 10 10
TRAN 60 10 10 10 10
Table 3.7: Regional Shares of Imports (%)
As noted above, we obtain the agent’s total demand for margin m from region y
to facilitate delivery of product g from source s by adding the destination and source
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components together:
[Qagent(D)m,y,g,s ] = [Q
(dst)agent(D)
m,y,g,s ] + [Q
(src)agent(D)
m,y,g,s ] (3.28)
All other benchmark equilibrium values are obtained by analogous extension of the
material of section 2.4.3. For example, [Q
(S)
m,y] can be obtained by adding up all the margin
demands across all agents.
It can be seen from the purchase price equations (3.3) that the initial equilibrium
values of delivered and undelivered quantities are wedged apart by distribution costs and
commodity taxes. Since [PQ,agentg,s ], [P
Q
g,s], and [P
Q
m,y] are all set to one, the benchmark
equilibrium value of Q
agent(D)
g,s is evaluated as:
[Qagent(D)g,s ] = (1 + [t
Q,agent
g ] + [t
GST ,agent
g ]) · [Q˘agent(D)g,s ] +
∑
m
∑
y
[Qagent(D)m,y,g,s ] (3.29)
While the levels of the delivered and undelivered quantities may differ for this reason,
they will move in unison in simulations. That is, the percentage change in Q˘
agent(D)
g,s will
equal the percentage change in Q
agent(D)
g,s . This follows intuitively from the form of the
demand functions (3.1). Similarly Q
agent(D)
m,y,g,s will move in line with Q
agent(D)
g,s due to the
form of equation (3.2).
3.4.4 Calibration of the Demand Functions
The determination of the model parameters (the a•’s and v•’s) proceeds as set out in
section 2.4.3. For the implementation of the enhanced model of this chapter, this involves
the calibration of the demand equations (3.1) and (3.2) in addition to those of chapter 2.
It is inferred from (3.1) and (3.2) that, when aQ˘,agentg,s +
∑
m
∑
y a
Q,agent
m,y,g,s = 1,
vQ,agentg,s =
[Q
agent(D)
g,s ]
[Q˘
agent(D)
g,s ] +
∑
m
∑
y[Q
agent(D)
m,y,g,s ]
(3.30)
such that
aQ,agentm,y,g,s = [Q
agent(D)
m,y,g,s ] ·
vQ,agentg,s
[Q
agent(D)
g,s ]
(3.31)
aQ˘,agentg,s = [Q˘
agent(D)
g,s ] ·
vQ,agentg,s
[Q
agent(D)
g,s ]
(3.32)
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The vQ,agentg,s parameters capture commodity tax mark-ups and we can interpret
[Q
agent(D)
g,s ]/vQ,agentg,s as pre-tax delivered product g — the delivery margins have been at-
tached but not the commodity tax. Then aQ,agentm,y,g,s is the requirement of margin m from
region y per unit of pre-tax delivered product g from source s for delivery to the agent.25
The aQ˘,agentg,s parameter can be similarly interpreted as the part of a unit of undelivered g
required for one unit of pre-tax delivered g.26
To provide an example, the tables on page 135 show some of the calibrated values
in the parameter array aQ,hshm,y,g,s,r, namely the components for m = WHOL, RETT, and
TRAN, g = PETR, and s = (ONI, imp). They are the margin requirements per unit of
delivered refined petrol, either the domestic variety (from ONI) or the imported variety, for
delivery to the household agent in region r. The figures can be interpreted as percentages
by multiplying them by 100 — for example, domestic petrol purchased in AKL includes
12% local wholesale margin and 14% local retail margin along with 5% wholesale margin
from ONI. The tables reflect our margin assumptions: retail is a local margin; transport is
a border margin; wholesale is a mixture of local and (non-border) source-type margins.27
25To obtain ORANI-style margin requirements per unit of undelivered product bQ,agentm,y,g,s , we can simply
divide the first set of parameters by the second:
bQ,agentm,y,g,s =
[Q
agent(D)
m,y,g,s ]
[Q˘
agent(D)
g,s ]
=
aQ,agentm,y,g,s
aQ˘,agentg,s
26Note that aQ,agentg,x is an entirely separate set of parameters that captures the distribution of an agent’s
demand for product g over the domestic regions x. They govern the choice in the decision nest that is
one level higher than what we are concerned with here.
27The transport margin requirements are relatively low because of our assumption that households
only pay transport costs indirectly as part of wholesale margins.
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The parameter values are important since they control how changes in the prices of
margin services feed into agents’ purchase prices. This can be seen by considering the
linearised form of (3.3). Assuming no change in commodity tax rates, it can be shown
that:28
d PQ,agentg,s
PQ,agentg,s
=
(
a
Q˘
agent(D)
g,s
· (1 + [tQ,agentg ] + [tGST ,agentg ]) ·
d PQg,s
PQg,s
+
∑
m
∑
y
aQ,agentm,y,g,s ·
d PQm,y
PQm,y
)
(3.33)
An increase in the basic price of a margin service from a given region may cause one agent’s
product purchase price to increase by more than another. Even if both agents have the
same elasticity of substitution over products, their behavioural response will differ and
this will have flow-on effects to the economic outcome for their respective regions. For
example, looking at the table on page 135, it can be seen that the household agent in AKL
faces higher wholesale margin costs for domestic PETR than the other regions. If a shock
28The equation is linearised by firstly substituting in the demand functions (3.2) and (3.1) to obtain:
PQ,agentg,s ·Qagent(D)g,s = PQg,s · (1 + tQ,agentg + tGST ,agentg ) · aQ˘agent(D)g,s ·
Q
agent(D)
g,s
vQ,agentg,s
+
∑
m
∑
y
PQm,y · aQ,agentm,y,g,s ·
Q
agent(D)
g,s
vQ,agentg,s
or, using a shorthand
P ·Q = Pb · (1 + t) · a · Q
v
+
∑
i
Pi · ai · Q
v
Eliminating Q (i.e. Q
agent(D)
g,s ) and totally differentiating gives:
dP =
1
v
(
a · Pb · d(1 + t) + a · (1 + t) · dPb +
∑
i
ai · dPi
)
Assuming no change in the commodity tax rate and some manipulation of terms provides:
dP
P
=
(
a · Pb · (1 + t)
P
dPb
Pb
+
∑
i
ai · Pi
P
dPi
Pi
)
At the benchmark equilibrium, the linearisation implies:
dP
P
=
(
a(1 + [t]) · dPb
Pb
+
∑
i
ai · dPi
Pi
)
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causes a uniform increase in the basic price of wholesale services from all regions, the
purchase price that the AKL household agent faces for petrol will rise disproportionately
higher than that of other regions, ceteris paribus. There will be a larger fall in demand for
domestic PETR in AKL than elsewhere, even though the household agents have the same
substitution elasticities (between PETR varieties and between product types). Overall
AKL might see a larger fall in consumption spending than elsewhere due to the shock,
and this will lead to different regional output and employment outcomes.
3.4.5 Simulations with the Margins Extension
The extension described in this chapter has been overlayed on top of the core JENNIFER
model of chapter 2. Command-line options can be used to control whether the margins
modelling is imposed, or only partially implemented (e.g. just local destination-type mar-
gins). At a deeper level, the user can control the way distribution services are used by
editing the margin coefficients file.
No additions to the closure list of table 2.17 were required so this remains relevant for
short-run simulations. A long-run view is especially useful when considering the distri-
bution networks. While in the long-run we may assume capital is perfectly mobile, our
modelling implies distributive connections remain fixed. We can observe the implications
of those connections by running a given long-run simulation with and without the margins
extension activated. For this purpose, a suggested long-run closure is given in table 3.8.29
To obtain the long-run closure, capital stocks have been been removed from the ex-
ogenous variable list, replaced by the current net rates of return.30 The implication is
that capital is mobile between industries and regions. This mobility can occur either
in the form of machinery etc. being physically moved, or capital in one industry/region
being allowed to depreciate without replacement while investment builds up the stock of
another industry/region. Our concept of mobility therefore requires that it is possible to
actually shift the capital or sufficient time is allowed for the capital to shrink and grow
29As for table 2.17, the investment shares are included on the list to show the maximum possible
number of exogenous variables. If investment for all industries was endogenously determined by the
model to equalise expected net rates of return, XI,b$j,r/tot would be removed from the list and the number
of exogenous variables would fall by J ×R.
30In cases where the capital stock is zero in the benchmark equilibrium, the variable should not be
swapped because the system will not converge in most cases.
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Exogenous Variables Dimension
Symbol Description General case J = 25, R = 5
NRORj,r net rate of return on Kj,r JR 125
RW
atax
r/NZ real wage relative to national av-
erage
R− 1 4
TIMENZ aggregate time endowment 1 1
XI,b$j,r/tot real investment shares JR 125
PFORg c.i.f. import prices J 25
APS ataxr saving propensities R 5
δj,r depreciation rates JR 125
tL labour income tax rate 1 1
1 + tQ,agentg,• powers of commodity tax 2J
2R+JR+2J 6,245
1 + tGST ,agentg powers of GST 2J 50
1 + tFORg powers of import duty J 25
1 + tEXPg powers of export subsidy J 25
ψEXPg levels of export demands J 25
XGDP ,b$I/tot investment share of real GDP 1 1
XGDP ,b$G/tot government consumption share of
real GDP
1 1
TOTAL 3 + 2R + 8J +
4JR + 2J2R
6,963
Table 3.8: A Long-run Closure
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as needed.
The other closure swap in table 3.8 is that the regional time endowments have been
swapped for R− 1 relative real wage rates and the aggregate time endowment, R− 1 real
wage rates are fixed relative to the national average so that labour market adjustment is by
employment changes. The Rth relative real wage rate must be endogenous to avoid over-
identification of the system. Therefore the Rth regional time endowment is replaced by the
aggregate endowment. This implies that the aggregate stock of working-age population
is static. Here as well, mobility can either take the form of persons actually shifting
between regions, looking for better opportunities, or demographic changes — changes in
fertility, regional population age structure, etc. By closing the model in this way, labour
is assumed to be perfectly mobile between regions.
3.5 An Illustrative Application
In this section we present a selection of results from three simulations involving an identical
shock but with different assumptions concerning distribution services to highlight the
effect of those assumptions. The shock that is applied is a 100% increase in the c.i.f.
import prices of oil & gas (OIGA) and a 50% rise in the c.i.f. import price of refined petrol
(PETR), to simulate the long-run effects of a significant increase in the world price of
crude oil relative to other tradeable products. Since the model does not determine foreign
prices, any effect that the higher oil price has on import prices needs to be exogenously
specified. While it is likely a higher world oil price would feed into higher prices of many
imported products, for simplicity only the effect on oil and petrol import prices is taken
into account — hence the shock specified above.31
This shock is applied using the long-run closure set out in table 3.8 under three al-
ternative environments with respect to the distribution services. The first simulation,
sim201, provides results from the basic model of chapter 2. That is, the margins mod-
elling is switched off. In the second simulation, sim301, the margins treatment is present
but all margin demands are destination-type, with wholesale (WHOL) and retail (RETT)
31The assumption of a 50% increase in the petrol import price is made to reflect the notion that
increases in oil prices impact most strongly on petrol prices, but petrol production also involves other
inputs (capital, other chemical compounds, etc.) so petrol supply prices will rise less than one-for-one
with oil prices, ceteris paribus.
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being purely local margins. By comparing that second simulation with the third, sim401,
which has source-margins included, we can see how adding inter-regional transport costs
affects the results. Tables of results can be found in appendix P.32 For all the simulations,
substitution elasticities are assumed as in table 2.16 except that since these are long-run
simulations, the non-source substitution elasticities are assigned values of 1.0 as noted on
page 94.
Before looking at the results, it is useful to consider the role oil and petrol (both
domestic and imported) play in the domestic economy as indicated by the IO table.33
The primary user of imported oil is the petrol industry. Some domestic oil is also used
for petrol production but quality differences between New Zealand and imported crude
are such that the two varieties are not substitutes — the Marsden Point refinery was not
designed to refine the grade of oil found in New Zealand.34 The majority of oil extracted
in New Zealand is instead sent offshore (exported) for refining.35 Households are the most
32Although the results of each simulation are presented together as percentage changes from a single
benchmark equilibrium, each one actually has its own benchmark and hence the numbering sim201,
sim301, sim401 rather than sim201, sim202, sim203. However, for almost all the tables found in
appendix P, the benchmark equilibrium values are identical, so the percentage change from the ‘no
margins’ benchmark is the same as the percentage change from their own benchmark. The only exception
is the table of f.o.b. exports. Since WHOL and RETT and some of TRAN were reassigned from direct
export flows to margin flows on products to exporters, the benchmark export values are different. Table
P.7 shows how the benchmark equilibria differ. For example, the benchmark value of AGRI exports for
sim301 and sim401 are 20.1% higher than for sim201. (The baselines, bsln3 and bsln4, are replication
equilibria of the respective benchmarks.) The results in the f.o.b. exports table (P.6) therefore need to
be looked at in combination with table P.7. It can be shown that if the percentage change from A to B is
x, and from A to C is y, then the percentage change from C to B is (x− y) 100100+y or approximately x− y
for small y. Therefore, to know the (approx.) percentage changes in sim301 and sim401 from their own
benchmarks, subtract the bsln numbers from the sim numbers. For example, AGRI exports are down
approximately 1.9% and 2.0% from their own benchmarks in sim301 and sim401. When comparing to the
sim201 results, it is advisable to use the exact calculation to see the correct pattern across simulations.
The exact calculations corresponding to the approximations for AGRI exports given directly above are
-1.6 and -1.7, for example.
33Useful background information on New Zealand oil and petrol can be found at http://www.teara.
govt.nz/en/oil-and-gas (The Encyclopedia of New Zealand).
34This is why OIGA is given a source substitution elasticity of zero in table 2.15. On the other hand,
domestic and imported refined petrol are virtually identical to the user so a relatively high substitution
elasticity of four is used for PETR.
35One suspects that most of the non-export usage of domestic OIGA recorded in the IO table is in fact
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significant user of both imported and domestic petrol, followed by the transport (TRAN)
industry, and then other industries such as construction (CONS) and utilities (UTIL).
The transport industry is characterised by significant intra-industry trade but also has
important downstream links to wholesalers, households, and exporters. It is this set of
interdependencies between oil, petrol, transport, wholesaling, and final users that makes
the way delivery services are modelled important for this simulation.
According to the sim201 results, the deterioration of the terms of trade (an increase
in the real exchange rate) has a contractionary effect on the economy (tables P.18 and
P.19). All components of domestic absorption and real GDP fall. There is an improve-
ment in the trade deficit because the volume of exports falls less than that of imports.36
Output falls in all regions with a larger fall in Other North Island than elsewhere, which
is understandable since the petrol refinery is located in that region (table P.2). With
imported oil being by far the most important intermediate input for the petrol industry
(PETR), opportunities to substitute when its price rises are limited. In this long-run
scenario, substitution of factors for intermediate inputs is allowed and does occur in the
PETR industry — compare the 42% fall in imported OIGA in table P.8 with the much
smaller decreases in usage of capital and labour by PETR reported in tables P.10 and
P.12. Petrol output is nevertheless cut back and the domestic petrol price rises signif-
icantly (table P.3).37 Coincidentally, the endogenous rise in the domestic petrol price
almost matches the exogenously specified increase in the import price of petrol. While
this is to be expected with the high degree of substitutability assumed between domestic
and imported petrol, it appears that only a small amount of substitution has actually
occurred (towards domestic PETR — compare the fall in domestic output of PETR with
gas usage.
36The percentage change in the trade balance is large because the size of the deficit is small relative
to the size of the trade volumes. The real value of exports falls by $1,321m while real imports fall by
$2,064m, implying a $743m decrease in the deficit.
37One noticeable but minor effect is a very large percentage decrease in petrol exports seen in table
P.6. The input-output data records a small amount of petrol export receipts, most likely being for petrol
and diesel sent to the nearby Pacific Islands. The large fall in petrol exports is due to the rise in the
domestic petrol price, which pushes up the export price, and the sensitivity of foreign export demand to
changes in that price. If importers of New Zealand petrol face prohibitive costs in sourcing the product
from elsewhere, the assumed export price elasticity is perhaps too high. This is an empirical issue and, in
any case, for these simulations unimportant since petrol export demand is very small relative to domestic
demand.
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the fall in imported PETR). This suggests that it is mainly supply-side factors driving
the domestic petrol price rise rather than demand-side factors.
Faced with higher petrol prices from both domestic and imported sources, the trans-
port industry (TRAN) cuts output and the basic price of transport services rises (tables
P.4 and P.5). As the price of domestic petrol relative to transport still rises, and under the
model settings of sim201 where transport is treated only as a product for direct usage,
agents substitute away from petrol towards transport. Their demand for petrol falls much
more than their demand for transport, so the larger decrease in petrol output compared
to transport output is partly due to that substitution.38
In sim301, most transport usage is treated as destination-type margin, with the excep-
tions being allowances for direct usage by wholesalers, households, and exporters discussed
in section 3.4.1. Under this setting, agents can only substitute between petrol and di-
rect usage of transport when their relative price changes. The substitution away from
petrol towards transport seen in sim201 is therefore dampened in sim301. Output of
the transport industry is lower and the output price is higher. An analogous substitution
away from petrol towards retail and wholesale trade seen in sim201 is also not present
in sim301. This, coupled with the higher transport price and lower economic activity
generally (for example real GDP is slightly lower — see table P.18) causes the wholesale
and retail industries to cut output further than in sim201 as well.
Due to the substitution away from petrol being dampened in sim301, imports of petrol
and oil do not fall by as much as in sim201. However, since there are transport costs
associated with imports in sim301, imports of most other products fall further for a lower
level of total imports compared to sim201 (table P.8). Exports do not fall by as much,
so consistent with a lower terms of trade (relative to that of sim201), there is a greater
improvement in the trade deficit (table P.18).
The difference in output effects between sim201 and sim301 are reflected in the dif-
ferences in employment and capital stock changes between the two scenarios — compare
tables P.4, P.10 and P.12. Under the long-run closure, capital is mobile between industries
and regions and therefore there is a shift towards PETR in sim301 relative to sim201.
This capital shift primarily benefits the household agent of Other North Island, as does
38Petrol is of course a significant input into the production of some types of transport. The demand shift
could take the form of relatively higher usage of mass-passenger transport by households and industries
switching to non-petrol types of transport, for example.
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the employment shift, because they are the assumed owners of the PETR capital stock
and the only supplier of labour to that industry. While aggregate household income and
spending are falling in both these scenarios, and the decrease is larger in sim301, the factor
mobility favouring Other North Island causes the other regions to be disproportionately
worse off in this latter scenario compared to the former (tables P.15 and P.16).39
Generally the basic version of JENNIFER from chapter 2 understates the negative
effects of the terms of trade shock if the margins modelling used in sim301 is a better
representation of reality. If one were to rank the outcomes across industries in terms of
output and investment, there are several notable changes in rankings between sim201
and sim301 (tables P.4 and P.9). WHOL and RETT, for example, have better outcomes
for output than AGRI, FDBT, METL, CMIF, and GOVT in sim201 but in sim301 the
outcomes are worse. Similarly, PETR has an outcome for investment in sim201 worse
than that of several other industries but in sim301 the outcome is better. In terms
of output at least, the industries most affected after oil and petrol are still the mining
industry (MINE) followed by transport. The same kind of ranking applied to the regions
indicates that Other North Island remains the region with the largest fall in overall output
(table P.2).
The most significant factor in this illustrative application that causes the sim401
results to differ from those of sim301 is that it is assumed that delivery of petrol requires
some wholesale service from the product source as well as some from the destination region
in sim401. By comparing the wholesale margin requirements between the simulations
shown in the tables on page 145, it can be seen that in sim401 the wholesale industry in
Other North Island and Auckland are relatively more important for delivery of domestic
and imported petrol respectively to households across the regions.40 We might expect
this to be an additional source of variation in regional economic outcomes. The different
assumptions regarding how margins are used to deliver petrol result in purchase prices
that are mainly higher for most agents in sim401 compared to sim301. In particular,
household agents in Auckland, Wellington, and Canterbury face higher prices for petrol
— see table P.17.41 Some substitution occurs away from domestic petrol towards the
39For example, real spending in ONI is 0.1 percentage points lower in sim301 relative to sim201 while
for the other regions it is at least 0.3 percentage points lower.
40There is little difference in the retail and transport requirements between the simulations.
41Detailed simulation results, available from the author, show that the household agents of these
regions generally face higher purchase prices for the products that are important components of their
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imported variety (see tables P.2 and P.8). This mainly has implications for output and
employment in the PETR industry and other industries closely connected to it, such as
OIGA and TRAN (tables P.4 and P.12). Due to the relatively small size of the domestic
petrol industry, and partly owing to the perfect factor mobility assumption underlying
the simulations, these effects do not significantly change the results for regional household
income and macro measures such as real GDP (tables P.15 and P.18).
We have seen that a simple margins treatment of distribution services (in sim301)
and enhancements to that treatment (in sim401) changes the magnitudes of results from
an oil price shock simulation in the basic JENNIFER model (sim201), particularly those
for the petrol industry and sectors that have important forward and backward linkages to
it. The broad national and regional effects are not altered by the different treatments but
these simulations demonstrate how the margin assumptions allow the model to produce
more sensible results at a deeper level. The use of “superior data” to inform the setting of
the margin coefficients is therefore worthwhile, especially for investigations concentrating
on certain groups of industries or regions.
consumption. The same is the case for Other South Island although the effect is less pronounced. Purchase
prices in Other North Island are slightly lower owing to this being the source region for petrol. The petrol
purchase price faced by the household agent of Other South Island is slightly lower due to a fall in their
purchase price of transport — table P.3 indicates a fall in the basic price of TRAN from Other North
Island and Other South Island (the source and destination respectively of the petrol).
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Chapter 4
Labour Mobility
4.1 Introduction
The focus of this chapter is factor mobility — in particular how simulation results depend
on the assumptions made concerning inter-regional factor mobility. In the previous two
chapters, discussion of factor mobility has been restricted to that of closure assumptions
with respect to endowments. In the short-run closure shown in table 2.17, each industry-
specific, regional capital stock and each regional time endowment were fixed (exogenous),
while these were swapped for corresponding current net rates of return and regional real
wage rates (relative to the national average) for the suggested long-run closure of table
3.8. These closure options represent a stark choice between no mobility of endowments
(between regions, and between industries as well in the case of capital) and perfect mo-
bility. Capital mobility is very much a dynamic matter, and is best investigated using a
time-staged model as was done in Nana (1999). In this chapter we continue to confine
the issue to that of closure assumption so as to not depart from the comparative-static
CGE framework used thus far.
The nature of labour mobility was briefly touched on in chapter 3, in the last paragraph
of section 3.4.5. In simulations of certain shocks, such as the disaster scenario simulated
in chapter 2, labour mobility responses can significantly alter the impact of the shock.
Considering the issue of labour mobility in this context raises a number of important
questions:
• What does labour mobility mean? An increase in a region’s labour supply could
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be the result of those currently employed in the region working more hours, people
already living within the region entering the labour force, or people entering the
region to work.
• What is the effect of labour mobility? Each of the sources of regional labour supply
expansion listed above may have different effects on the region and national economy.
• What are the drivers of labour mobility? What is the role of economic factors such
as regional differences in wage rates and unemployment rates? How do we explain
persistence of these regional differences?
This chapter sets out a framework within which these questions can be investigated.
Rather than simply using the closure swap mentioned above, a more detailed treatment
of the supply side of the labour market is introduced and an algorithm is used to control
labour mobility.
4.2 Modelling Labour Mobility
The starting point for modelling the mobility of labour is the recognition that households
supply labour in response to economic incentives, and changes in these incentives may
lead them to supply more or less labour in their home region, or even shift to another
region entirely if the economic incentives are strong enough. The CGE model frame-
work is ideal for investigating the implications of this household behaviour since there are
clear interdependencies. An inflow of households into a region affects the potential labour
market outcomes of those households already residing within the region, resulting in a
behavioural change for those households.1 The nature of this feedback loop makes com-
puting a solution in a single run of the CGE model difficult. The main point of difficulty
is that the household flows and the behaviour change cannot be simultaneously deter-
mined because households are not homogenous across regions. Homogeneity of labour is
an implicit assumption in closures such as our long-run closure of chapter 3. This sort
of assumption is common and reasonable in national models with labour divided into
occupation/skill groups;2 with the individual labour force member as the unit of analysis,
1There are also reciprocating implications for outcomes in the migrants’ source region.
2See for example Philpott & Stroombergen (1986) and Philpott (1990b).
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it is reasonable to assume that in the long-run they up-skill such that they are equally
as productive as members of the occupation they wish to enter (due to excess demand at
the long-run fixed wage relativities). The average productivity level and other character-
istics of the occupation/skill group do not change due to mobility being allowed between
groups. For inter-regional labour mobility, the household is a more appropriate unit of
analysis but it is not reasonable to assume that when households move between regions
they spontaneously adopt the characteristics of the destination region’s households, for
example in terms of age-structure or labour market status. Their arrival will result in
changes to such regional average household characteristics.
This chapter describes a method of manually controlling the second part of the feed-
back loop to overcome this problem. Essentially the model is solved twice, once to obtain
the solution when there is no mobility of households between regions, and then again to
take into account the behaviour change implied by the first solution. The second solution
of the model is not a dynamically efficient equilibrium: the household behaviour change
is only partially successful in eliminating household incentives to relocate.3
Additions are made to the structure of the core JENNIFER model of chapter 2 to
facilitate two types of regional demographic and labour market changes:
• level changes: changes in the number of households, working age and non-working
age persons, employed, unemployed, and non-labour force; changes in employment
hours by industry
• composition changes: the characteristics of the average household may change. That
is, the number of working age and non-working age persons in the household may
change along with the number of employed, unemployed, and non-labour force in the
household. Changes in the labour market characteristics reflect changes in regional
unemployment and labour force participation rates.
These changes may come about due to an exogenous shock, such as imposing an in-
crease in the number of non-working age persons per household to simulate aging regional
populations. They may also be the result of endogenous behaviour change, including
movements of households between regions. For example, if a given shock caused a flow of
3The solution is also not a dynamic equilibrium due to the static nature of the model, in the sense
that there is no investment-capital link or forward-looking expectations. These items are left for future
research.
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households from a region with a high participation rate to one with a low participation
rate, we should see the participation rate of the receiving region rise ceteris paribus.
An interesting micro-foundation for partial labour mobility between regions is sug-
gested by Jones & Whalley (1989).4 They use intensity of location preference to control
the degree of labour mobility — individuals (who are otherwise homogenous) suffer a
utility penalty if they shift between regions so relative incomes have to rise sufficiently
for migration to become optimal. It is useful to have such a theoretical underpinning of
household mobility in mind here, but formal development of a micro-foundation is left for
future research. The Jones & Whalley model is also subject to the feedback problem —
they only go as far as determining the migration response, with migrants still consuming
the old-region bundle and facing old-region prices at the point of model solution.
We assume here that household mobility occurs as a response to regional real wage
rate differences. It might be desirable to have a mobility response to regional real income
differences instead, but then we would need to consider the implications of our simplifying
assumption that the residents of a region receive all the returns from capital installed in
their region. An alternative setting where households respond to regional differences in
unemployment rates instead — a “Keynesian mode” — is discussed in section 4.4.5.
4.3 Additional Model Structure
Three elements are introduced to operationalise inter-regional household mobility:
• Equations that define demographic and labour market measures, to enable their
associated variables to be solved for in model runs
• A formula for determining households’ behavioural response to real wage rate dif-
ferences across regions, post-solution
• An algorithm for re-running the model taking into account that behavioural re-
sponse.
4They argue that neither perfect mobility nor immobility are particularly useful assumptions because
perfect mobility casts doubt on measured regional effects of shocks since “regions, as such, are not
defined”, and perfect immobility allows distributional consequences to be captured, but ignores efficiency
implications of labour mobility, which are “heavily stressed in recent literature on fiscal federalism” (page
371).
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This section details the first two of these items and sets out the theoretical background for
the third — the algorithm is more fully discussed in the model implementation section.
The defining equations are fairly straightforward and notation is introduced as needed.
4.3.1 Demographic Measures
The set of demographic variables added to the model (with r ∈ NZREG , where NZREG
is the set of all domestic regions REG plus the national region NZ) are shown in table 4.1.
Other than the effect household mobility has on these items, the model lacks a description
of how they are determined. That is, they are naturally exogenous to the model. A number
of equations are required however to ensure that summation identities are satisfied in the
computed solution. The first set ensures that a region’s total population is the sum of its
working age and non-working age populations:
POP r = WAP r + NWAP r (4.1)
Other equations dictate that regional demographic measures add up to national demo-
graphic measures:
HSHNZ =
∑
r
HSH r (4.2)
POPNZ =
∑
r
POP r (4.3)
and similarly for WAPNZ and NWAPNZ. Household demographic characteristics are
defined in equations such as:
CPOPr =
POP r
HSH r
∀ r ∈ NZREG (4.4)
These measure the number of persons per household in each region. There are analogous
equations for CWAPr and C
NWAP
r . We will see later how these characteristics are useful in
determining composition effects of household mobility.5
4.3.2 Labour Market Measures
The labour market variables (with r ∈ NZREG) listed in table 4.2 are added to the
model to enrich the description of the supply side of the labour market. They also allow
5We could use the symbols R
POP/HSH
r etc. instead but C is used to remind the reader these are
[C]haracteristics.
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Symbol Description
HSH r number of households in region r
POP r population of region r
WAP r working age population of region r
NWAP r non-working age population of region r
CPOPr average number of persons per household in region r
CWAPr average number of working age persons per household in region r
CNWAPr average number of non-working age persons per household in region r
Table 4.1: Demographic Variables
Symbol Description
EMPu,j,r employment measured in u units in industry j in region r
UNEMP r unemployed persons in region r
LF r persons in the labour force in region r
NLF r persons not in the labour force in region r
CEMPu,j,r average employment in u units in industry j per household in region r
CUNEMPr average unemployed per household in region r
CNLFr average non-labour force per household in region r
URr unemployment rate in region r
LFPRr labour force participation rate in region r
Table 4.2: Labour Market Variables
household mobility to have implications for labour market outcomes. These variables are
introduced in equations that either link them to variables in the core model, or in defining
equations that ensure summation identities hold. Several elements related to our labour
market measures were incorporated in the basic model of chapter 2: the time endowment
of a region is proportional to its working age population (section 2.3.1); labour market
variables can be measured in terms of persons, full-time equivalents (FTEs), and units
consistent with the input-output data (IOunits) (section 2.4.3); employment measured in
IOunits is equivalent to before-tax wage bills (equations (2.89) - (2.92)).
For this chapter employment is measured in the three different units u ∈ UNIT =
{persons, ftes, iounits}. FTEs give a measure of labour hours while IOunits represent
real labour costs. Employment in industry j in region r is equivalent to the labour demand
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of the appropriate agent. This can be obtained from the core model as the real pre-tax
wage bill:6
EMP iounits,j,r = [P
L
pretax,r] · Ldj,r (4.5)
To obtain employment in terms of persons and FTEs, the conversion factors introduced
in chapter 2 are used:7
EMP ftes,j,r = EMP iounits,j,r · F iounits→ftesj,r (4.6)
EMPpersons,j,r = EMP ftes,j,r · F ftes→iounitsj,r (4.7)
The conversion factors are coefficients of proportionality derived from the base data and
will be further discussed in section 4.4.2. Note that the factors F a→b• are used to convert
from a to b units in multiplication and vice versa in division.
The level of unemployment is determined as a residual in the model. With the unem-
ployment rate for each region r ∈ REG included in the closure list of exogenous variables,
the regional level of unemployment is solved consistent with the definitions of the unem-
ployment rate and labour force:
URr =
UNEMP r
LF r
× 100 ∀ r ∈ NZREG (4.8)
LF r =
∑
j
EMPpersons,j,r + UNEMP r ∀ r ∈ NZREG (4.9)
Participation in the labour force can be endogenously determined within the model
via operation of the labour-leisure choice, or exogenously controlled. The modelling of the
labour-leisure choice of chapter 2 continues to be relevant here. The definition of regional
labour supply, equation (2.6), remains unchanged:
Lsr = TIME r −Ndr (4.10)
This equation is consistent with the working age population being the sum of all labour
force and non-labour force persons and that population’s time (in FTEs) being divided
between labour force and non-labour force (utility-increasing) activities (using appropriate
6This equation replaces (2.89).
7Recall, values derived from Statistics NZ data for our 25 industry, 5 region implementation are listed
in appendix J
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conversion factors). The time endowment of region r is converted from working age
persons into IOunits by:
TIME r =
WAP r
F iounits→ftesr · F ftes→personsr
(4.11)
The factors used here are averages across industries of the factors associated with em-
ployment (the F •j,r’s).
The non-labour force population of a region is similarly linked to its consumption of
leisure:
NLF r = N
d
r · F iounits→ftesr · F ftes→personsr (4.12)
Finally, the addition of defining equations for labour force participation rates facilitates
the closure swap that turns the labour-leisure choice on and off:
LFPRr =
LF r
WAP r
× 100 ∀ r ∈ NZREG (4.13)
Turning off the labour-leisure choice involves dropping the top-level demand functions of
the representative household agents (equations (2.7) and (2.8) of chapter 2) and adding
the following equation to the system:
PQ,hshr ·Qhsh(D)r + PL,ataxr ·Nhsh(D)r = ENDINC atax,c$r − SAV atax,c$r
This is simply the expenditure constraint that was used in the household agent’s utility
maximisation problem used to derive the top-level demands.8
As with the demographic measures, we require some equations to ensure the appro-
priate summation identities hold:
EMPu,j,NZ =
∑
r
EMPu,j,r (4.14)
UNEMPNZ =
∑
r
UNEMP r (4.15)
NLFNZ =
∑
r
NLF r (4.16)
8The inclusion of this equation can be thought of as replacing the equation for Q
hsh(D)
r while the
exogenous setting of LFPRr can be thought of as replacing the equation for N
hsh(D)
r .
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The labour market characteristics of households are now straightforward to define:
CEMPu,j,r =
EMPu,j,r
HSH r
∀ r ∈ NZREG (4.17)
CUNEMPr =
UNEMP r
HSH r
∀ r ∈ NZREG (4.18)
CNLFr =
NLF r
HSH r
∀ r ∈ NZREG (4.19)
4.3.3 Other Measures
The introduction of the demographic and labour market variables discussed above allow
a number of useful measures to be calculated. These include real GDP per capita, real
income per household, capital stock per household, and capital-employment ratios.9 The
last two measures are particularly useful when choosing a long-run closure, since either
could be set exogenous instead of the current net rates of return to provide a different
interpretation of the long-run.
4.3.4 Inter-regional Household Flows
Household mobility is introduced by assuming that divergence in regional real wage rates
gives households an incentive to shift between regions. To the extent that they are able,
households would respond to these incentives. If there is some trade-off in making the
choice to shift, such as a moving cost or utility penalty, households may not be perfectly
mobile even in the long-run.10 The regional return to labour is but one of a range of factors
that households consider when making stay-or-leave decisions. There may be financial as
well as social barriers to a household leaving its current region of residence. Even if these
barriers are overcome, moving to another region takes time and effort.
It is unlikely that there is a satisfactory way to model such partial mobility of house-
holds within the equation system, because there would be simultaneous feedbacks from
households to real wages at the same time that real wages affect households. The prob-
lem would be compounded by the model attempting to treat households simultaneously
9The defining equations for these are straightforward. For example, real GDP per capita is calculated
as GDPEXP
b$
POPNZ
, real income per household in r ∈ NZREG as INCw,b$HSH r , and the K/L ratios as
KSTOCK j,r
EMPftes,j,r
.
10That is, in the long-run of the model, however long that is. There is no reason to believe for example
that regional real wage differences disappear at the same speed as differences in current net rates of return
on capital.
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as different (for mobility purposes) and the same (represented by a single agent in each
region). To avoid these difficulties, the issue of household mobility is addressed once the
model has been solved. The general approach is that the model is solved for a given shock,
and then the solution is used to calculate the mobility response of households. The model
is then re-run with the shock updated to take the mobility into account.
Given solution values (in angle brackets 〈 〉) and benchmark equilibrium values (in
square brackets [ ]), the flows of households between regions due to changes in real wage
relativities are calculated by the formula:
HSH x→r
〈HSH x〉 = max
{
θx,r
100
( 〈Wr〉
〈Wx〉 −
[Wr]
[Wx]
)
, 0
}
(4.20)
where HSH x→r is the flow of households from region x to region r
Wr is the pre-tax real wage rate in region r
θx,r is a parameter that represents the sensitivity of
households in region x to changes in the real wage rate
of region r relative to their own
In words, the proportion of households that move from region x to region r equals the
product of θx,r/100 and the increase in the real wage rate of r relative to x.
11 This lends
a useful interpretation to θx,r: if θx,r = 10, a doubling of the real wage of r relative to x
ceteris paribus will cause 10% of the households in x to move to r. Further discussion of
the θx,r parameters is left until the section on model implementation.
Having obtained the household flows, the number of households is updated to take
those flows into account as follows (with ′ used to indicate updated values):
〈HSH r〉′ = 〈HSH r〉+
∑
x∈REG
(HSH x→r − HSH r→x) (4.21)
The shock to HSH r for the second run is then such that the solution value is 〈HSH r〉′:
shock = 100× 〈HSH r〉
′ − [HSH r]
[HSH r]
(4.22)
11Either pre-tax or post-tax real wage rates could be used. It is convenient to use the pre-tax rates
since they are normalised to one in the benchmark equilibrium. Post-tax rates would only need to be
used if simulations entailed direct tax rates on labour income that changed by different proportions across
regions.
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The issue arises that, if there are movements of households between regions, and if
households in different regions have different characteristics on average, the household
flows may cause those average characteristics to change. For example, if a region receives
an inflow of households from another region that has a relatively higher unemployment
rate, there is likely to be a change in the receiving region’s (and sending region’s) un-
employment rate. To account for this possibility, we assume that there is no bias in the
self-selection of households that move between regions. That is, the migration flows con-
sist of households with average characteristics of the source region.12 For our example of
differing unemployment rates across regions, the shock is adjusted so that the solution of
the second model run has:
〈UNEMP r〉′ = 〈UNEMP r〉+
∑
x∈REG
〈CUNEMPx 〉 × HSH x→r
− 〈CUNEMPr 〉 ×
∑
x∈REG
HSH r→x (4.23)
The inflow of unemployed from all other regions is added to unemployment in region r
and the outflow of unemployed is subtracted. Similar adjustments can be made to the
other demographic and labour market measures as needed.
A flow of households from one region to another causes the household characteristics
of the two to converge, ceteris paribus. If there are also household flows between those
two regions and others, the overall effect depends on the size of all the flows and the
differences in characteristics between all the regions. Specifically, if Cr−q is the difference
in a given household characteristic C between two regions r and q, the effects of household
12A simpler approach is to assume instant assimilation of incoming households to the characteristics
of the receiving region. One could make the case for a quick improvement in unemployment outcomes
for households coming from regions with higher unemployment rates. It is more difficult to argue for
immediate assimilation of other characteristics however, particularly the demographic characteristics.
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flows on Cr−q can be described by the formula:13
〈Cr−q〉′ − 〈Cr−q〉 =
∑
x∈REG
(
〈Cx−r〉HSH x→r〈HSH r〉′
− 〈Cx−q〉HSH x→q〈HSH q〉′
)
(4.24)
Regions may therefore converge or diverge in characteristics, but in general household
flows act to pull the characteristics towards the national average. This can be seen by
considering the example of the regions with the highest and lowest number of persons
per household (PPH) — any household flow will necessarily cause the PPH of the highest
PPH region to fall and the PPH of the lowest PPH region to rise.
4.4 Implementation of the Labour Mobility Modelling
The procedures required to implement the household mobility modelling discussed above
involve establishing the benchmark equilibrium values of the demographic and labour
market variables, choosing an appropriate model closure, and running the algorithm that
adjusts the shock to account for inter-regional household flows.
13This is derived from formulae such as (4.23) as follows:
〈Cr〉′〈HSH r〉′ = 〈Cr〉〈HSH r〉+
∑
x∈REG
(〈Cx〉HSH x→r − 〈Cr〉HSH r→x)
⇒ 〈Cr〉′ − 〈Cq〉′ = 〈Cr〉 〈HSH r〉〈HSH r〉′
− 〈Cq〉 〈HSH q〉〈HSH q〉′
+
∑
x∈REG
〈Cx〉
(
HSH x→r
〈HSH r〉′
− HSH x→q〈HSH q〉′
)
−
(
〈Cr〉
∑
x∈REG HSH r→x
〈HSH r〉′
− 〈Cq〉
∑
x∈REG HSH q→x
〈HSH q〉′
)
⇒ 〈Cr−q〉′ − 〈Cr−q〉 =
∑
x∈REG
〈Cx〉
(
HSH x→r
〈HSH r〉′
− HSH x→q〈HSH q〉′
)
+ 〈Cr〉
〈HSH r〉 −
∑
x∈REG HSH r→x − 〈HSH r〉′
〈HSH r〉′
− 〈Cq〉
〈HSH q〉 −
∑
x∈REG HSH q→x − 〈HSH q〉′
〈HSH q〉′
⇒ 〈Cr−q〉′ − 〈Cr−q〉 =
∑
x∈REG
〈Cx〉
(
HSH x→r
〈HSH r〉′
− HSH x→q〈HSH q〉′
)
−
(
〈Cr〉
∑
x∈REG HSH x→r
〈HSH r〉′
− 〈Cq〉
∑
x∈REG HSH x→q
〈HSH q〉′
)
This last formula simplifies to (4.24).
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Demographic and Labour Market Data (000s)
Variable
Region
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
[POP r] 1371 466 1348 540 459
[HSH r] 434 167 482 200 172
[UNEMP r] 37 13 36 11 9
[NLF r] 219 65 198 78 66
Table 4.3: Demographic and Labour Market Data (000s)
4.4.1 Labour Market and Demographic Data
Figures from publicly available census data for 2006 have been added to the model
database. The raw employment data consists of numbers of persons employed, either
full-time or part-time, by industry and region for 86 industries and 16 regions. The re-
mainder of the raw data are figures for unemployment, non-labour force, households, and
population for the 16 regions.
The labour market counts are of those 15 years and older. This means that in the data,
all persons 65 years and older that are neither employed nor unemployed are counted as
non-labour force. It is appropriate to treat at least part of these 65+’s as non-working
age rather than non-labour force, especially given the labour-leisure choice mechanism in
the model. The official non-labour force figures have therefore been reduced by a region-
specific proportion of the number of non-labour force 65+’s. For example, the figures
show that in 2006, 16% of all 65+’s in Auckland were either employed or unemployed.
We assume then that only 16% of those counted as non-labour force are actually of that
category, with the remainder being non-working age. The proportions do not differ much
over the regions. They range from 14% for Otago to 19% for Gisborne, and this reflects the
general pattern overall: North Island regions have on average slightly higher proportions
of working 65+’s than South Island regions.
The raw data is mapped to the model variables to obtain the benchmark equilibrium
values as shown in table 4.3 above and table 4.4 below.14
14These figures were obtained from the Statistics NZ website http://www.stats.govt.nz on
7/12/2010. Note that the population figures are estimates of usually-resident population based on 2006
regional boundaries. These figures differ slightly from the 2006 census night counts.
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Employed Persons (000s) — [EMPpersons,j,r]
Industry
Region
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
AGRI 8.8 4.2 69.8 18.0 26.9
FOLO 0.3 0.3 3.1 0.4 1.4
FISH 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.7
MINE 0.4 0.2 1.8 0.2 1.2
OIGA 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
PETR 0.0 0.0 6.9 0.0 0.0
FDBT 12.4 3.1 22.7 10.0 11.6
TWPM 24.9 7.1 20.7 9.9 8.0
CHNM 10.8 2.6 2.7 4.1 1.7
METL 10.3 2.0 8.2 3.4 3.0
EQFO 20.2 3.5 14.0 9.6 4.7
UTIL 2.6 1.0 3.8 1.2 1.1
CONS 45.4 15.9 50.3 19.6 18.2
ACCR 31.0 12.3 33.4 16.9 17.5
CMIF 40.4 16.6 17.2 11.2 6.3
PROP 19.1 6.0 16.1 7.6 5.7
RBUS 89.5 36.0 50.9 26.2 17.8
GOVT 20.1 22.9 22.9 8.7 6.6
EDUC 44.6 17.5 46.1 18.2 15.6
HEAL 54.5 21.5 65.0 27.8 24.0
CUPE 29.0 12.9 23.9 11.5 9.7
OWND 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
WHOL 45.5 8.9 19.4 13.5 7.6
RETT 59.2 21.9 62.9 28.2 23.9
TRAN 23.6 6.3 17.4 10.8 7.8
Employed FTEs (000s) — [EMP ftes,j,r]
Industry
Region
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
AGRI 7.7 3.7 62.3 16.1 24.3
FOLO 0.3 0.3 3.0 0.4 1.3
FISH 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.7
MINE 0.4 0.2 1.8 0.2 1.2
OIGA 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
PETR 0.0 0.0 6.5 0.0 0.0
FDBT 11.6 2.8 21.5 9.4 11.0
TWPM 23.1 6.6 19.3 9.0 7.3
CHNM 10.3 2.5 2.6 3.9 1.6
METL 9.9 1.9 7.9 3.2 2.9
EQFO 19.3 3.4 13.3 9.2 4.4
UTIL 2.4 1.0 3.6 1.2 1.0
CONS 42.9 15.1 47.7 18.6 17.3
ACCR 24.9 9.7 26.3 13.4 14.1
CMIF 37.8 15.5 15.2 10.0 5.5
PROP 17.0 5.2 14.2 6.6 5.0
RBUS 81.1 32.8 45.0 23.2 15.7
GOVT 19.3 22.0 21.8 8.3 6.1
EDUC 38.1 14.9 38.9 15.2 13.1
HEAL 47.5 18.4 55.4 23.2 19.9
CUPE 24.7 11.1 20.2 9.7 8.2
OWND 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
WHOL 42.8 8.3 18.0 12.6 7.0
RETT 49.1 18.1 52.6 23.1 19.8
TRAN 22.2 6.0 16.1 10.1 7.3
Table 4.4: Employment Data (000s)
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4.4.2 Benchmark Equilibrium Values
The figures above and the MRIO data matrix are used to obtain benchmark equilib-
rium values for all the demographic and labour market variables. Benchmark values of
EMP iounits,j,r are given by:
[EMP iounits,j,r] = MRIO(LAB, j−r) (4.25)
The conversion factors used in section 4.3.2 are calculated as follows:15
F ftes→personsj,r =
[EMPpersons,j,r]
[EMP ftes,j,r]
(4.26)
F iounits→ftesj,r =
[EMP ftes,j,r]
[EMP iounits,j,r]
(4.27)
F ftes→personsr =
∑
j∈IND [EMPpersons,j,r]∑
j∈IND [EMP ftes,j,r]
(4.28)
(4.29)
F iounits→ftesr =
∑
j∈IND [EMP ftes,j,r]∑
j∈IND [EMP iounits,j,r]
(4.30)
Although these conversion factors only have a benign role in the model, they have im-
portant economic interpretations. The F ftes→persons factors measure persons per FTE in
the base data, and so capture work intensity (inversely). A value of one implies each
employee is working full-time — one employee is one FTE — and higher values imply
more part-time workers.16 The F iounits→ftes coefficients are the reciprocal of the absolute
level of wages per FTE in the base data. This recovers information on actual industry
and regional wage differences lost when wage rates are normalised for model calibration.
A few further points should be noted concerning the use of these conversion factors.
Since they are exogenous to the model, simulations assume the economic features they
represent are independent of the introduced shock. For example, the shock makes no
difference to the work intensity in any industry. Also, the way the factors are used in
(4.11) and (4.12) imply identical convertibility for all components of the working age
population. This amounts to an assumption that, for example, as people move from
15The conversion factors thus evaluated for our 25 industry, 5 region implementation are listed in
appendix J.
16The Statistics NZ definition of one FTE is 30 hours per week i.e. 1560 hours per year.
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unemployment or non-labour force status to employment, there is no change in the full-
time/part-time mix of employees in the workforce.
The remaining elements of the demographic and labour market variables are given
benchmark values in accordance with the equations listed in section 4.3.2. For example,
[LF r] is evaluated using the data from tables 4.3 and 4.4 in equation (4.9). [URr] can
then be found using [LF r] in (4.8). The evaluation of [WAP r] requires the use of the
following identity, which is implied by the system of equations used to solve the model:17
WAP r ≡
∑
j
EMPpersons,j,r + UNEMP r + NLF r (4.31)
Establishing the benchmark equilibrium values of the demographic and labour market
variables as discussed above are the main adjustments required to calibrate this enhanced
version of the JENNIFER model. Benchmark values also need to be calculated for the
measurement-type variables listed in section 4.3.3, and this is done according to their
defining equations.
4.4.3 Model Closures
The short-run and long-run alternatives for model closure discussed in the previous chap-
ters remain relevant here. Capital stocks are fixed exogenous for a short-run closure while
current net rates of return are exogenously set for a long-run closure. However, rather
than replacing regional time endowments on the short-run exogenous list with real wage
relativities for a perfect labour mobility long-run closure as was done for the chapter 3 sim-
ulations, in this chapter they are replaced by the regional number of households (HSH r)
for both short-run and long-run simulations. This facilitates the use of the household
mobility algorithm discussed below to control labour mobility. The equations of section
4.3 link the regional number of households with regional time endowments, and thus the
model core. Given R model regions, 3R more variables than equations have been intro-
duced into the model. To complete the model closure for runs in either the short-run or
long-run mode, the following items are added to the list of exogenous variables:18
17Since it is an identity it should not be added to the system of equations. This is tedious to prove
analytically but is easily confirmed numerically. In the illustrative simulations conducted for this chapter,
discrepancies between the LHS and RHS of (4.31) were no more than 0.002%.
18There are of course many alternative sets of variables that could be used instead. For example CPOPr
instead of POPr, UNEMPr instead of URr, etc.
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• POP r – number of persons in each region r
• NWAP r – number of non-working age persons in each region r
• URr – unemployment rate in each region r
As discussed in section 4.3.2. if the labour-leisure choice is deactivated, we also need to
add the labour force participation rates LFPRr to the exogenous list.
Sometimes the user may wish to swap variables between the exogenous and endogenous
list between model runs if results from the first run are used in subsequent runs. For
example, we might wish to observe the long-run effects of a shock holding the capital-
employment ratios constant. To do so, after a baseline run with exogenous current net
rates of return, we would replace these with the regional capital-employment ratios and
shock them according to the baseline results in the simulation run.19
4.4.4 The Household Mobility Algorithm
The first step of the algorithm used to simulate household mobility effects was specified
in section 4.3.4. Once the model has been solved once, inter-regional household flows are
calculated by the mobility formula (4.20). The size of the flows depend on the values
assigned to θx,r. Recall their interpretation: if θx,r = 10 and the real wage of r relative to
x doubles ceteris paribus, 10% of the households in x will shift to r. If the θx,r values are
high enough (and/or the change in real wage relativities are large enough), a region may
end up with a negative number of households. Although not strictly necessary, a simple
rule-of-thumb might be to set values such that
∑
r θx,r ≤ 100 for each x.
The simplest assumption is that all the sensitivity parameters are equal to some value
θ. How the strength of the household mobility response affects model results can then be
investigated by running the model repeatedly with different values for θ. Alternatively,
θx,r could be assumed to vary across source region x and destination region r to look at the
implications of various asymmetries in the response of households to regional differences
in labour market outcomes, such as:
• households are more likely to move to an adjacent region than one far away
19In an industry that uses no labour (e.g. OWND), the capital-employment ratio is undefined. Options
are therefore to fix that industry’s capital stock or capital per household exogenous.
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• households are more likely to move to a region similar to their own
• households are more likely to move to urban areas than away from them.
This thesis focuses on the effects of the overall level of sensitivity θ; investigation of
asymmetries is left for future research, which could potentially include empirical work
towards estimating the parameters θx,r.
The household flows calculated from the solution to the first model run are used to
update the exogenous shock, to reflect the implied household mobility. As discussed in
section 4.3.4, the solution values of the relevant demographic and labour market variables
are adjusted and the shock required to generate those values is calculated. The compu-
tations required depend on the closure assumption (including whether the labour-leisure
choice is operating and if the model is being run in Keynesian mode) but are relatively
straightforward.20 Having computed the adjusted shock, this is then used to run the
model a second time. The solution of this run will reflect not only the direct impact
of whatever policy change is being investigated, but also the impact of any household
movements thereby induced. This enables us to observe whether the assumed sensitivity
of households to relative regional labour market conditions exacerbates or dampens the
simulated economic shock.
We have so far considered just one iteration of the algorithm; the results at this point
indicate the implications of households being mobile to a degree implied by θx,r. It is easy
to repeat the algorithm many times — the solution of one model run is used to update
the shock of the next run. Each iteration will involve smaller household flows than the
previous one as regional real wage relativities are squeezed. After enough iterations, the
algorithm will not be making any significant adjustments to the shock and the model
solution can be viewed as an equilibrium consistent with perfect mobility of households.
The size of the θx,r values will determine the number of iterations required to reach such
an equilibrium. Iterating the algorithm can be seen as manually controlling a taˆtonnement
process to obtain equilibrium.
20For example, if unemployment rates are exogenously fixed we need adjusted levels of regional employ-
ment and unemployment to update the exogenous shock. The level adjustments are found using formulae
such as (4.23) and then updated labour force levels and unemployment rates are calculated using their
definitions (equations (4.8) and (4.9)).
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4.4.5 The Keynesian Mode and Mobility
In the spirit of the Keynesian Mode of ORANI, we may wish to use a short-run model
closure where the labour market is slack — increases in labour demand are reflected in falls
in unemployment rates rather than increases in real wages. The closure swap needed to
operationalise this is the replacement in the exogenous list of the regional unemployment
rates with the real wage rates. Our mobility algorithm requires some adjustment to be
compatible with such a Keynesian mode closure. Such compatibility would come from
assuming that households respond to differences in regional unemployment rates rather
than regional real wage rates.21 We therefore model the mobility response such that
households are attracted to regions with relatively lower unemployment rates, replacing
(4.20) with:
HSH x→r
〈HSH x〉 = max
{
µx,r
100
(〈URx〉
〈URr〉 −
[URx]
[URr]
)
, 0
}
(4.32)
The µx,r parameters have a similar interpretation to the θx,r parameters except that they
concern households’ sensitivity to changes in regional unemployment rate relativities.
The household mobility algorithm proceeds as for the usual case (the ‘Classical Mode’),
although the computation of the updated shock is complicated by the fact that the unem-
ployment rates are endogenous in this mode. The main issue is how the shock on the real
wage rates should be updated. The model as it stands only allows this to be addressed
in an ad-hoc manner so there is scope for further research in this area.22
4.5 An Illustrative Application
In the period 2005-10 a significant programme of research was conducted under the aus-
pices of the Department of Labour into the impact of immigration into New Zealand on
the domestic economy. The output of the programme was synthesised into a final report
21This household mobility response to regional unemployment rate differences is made in recognition
that real wage rate differences are not the only drivers of internal migration. Poot (1984) provides an
in-depth introduction to this topic in a New Zealand context.
22A suggested approach is to shock the model in Keynesian Mode, using (4.32) to prepare a shock for a
second run, which is done in Classical Mode. The first run calculates changes in regional unemployment
rates to use for the second run, which then calculates changes in real wage rates.
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by Hodgson & Poot (2010). A component of the research was a CGE analysis, simu-
lating a number of different immigration scenarios which were then delineated in Nana
et al. (2009). With the labour market modelling and household mobility extension of this
chapter, the JENNIFER model can be used to obtain simulation results that are comple-
mentary to the outcomes of the research programme. The scenarios investigated here are
however primarily to illustrate the use of the model and are not directly comparable to
the results of Nana et al. (2009) and the wider body of research.23
The results of six simulations are presented for each of the short-run and long-run
modes of the model. The first (in each mode) is a baseline simulation of demographic
change. The following two simulations present alternative scenarios where the level of
immigration is higher than in the baseline. The first of these assumes that the immigra-
tion increase occurs entirely in Auckland (AKL), while the second divides the additional
immigrant households evenly between Canterbury (CAN) and Other South Island (OSI).
The differences between the results of these alternative scenarios (relative to the baseline)
reflect the regional and sectoral significance of the geographic distribution of immigra-
tion. For each mode, the baseline and immigration scenarios are then repeated under
assumptions of partial household mobility. A comparison of the latter three simulations
with the first three under the short-run mode illustrates the implications of a somewhat
constrained ability of resident households to move in the short-run, while the same com-
parison of simulations under the long-run mode indicates the effect of a moderate degree
of household mobility as opposed to the standard long-run perfect mobility assumption.24
The input for the baseline simulation is taken from population projections by Statistics
New Zealand.25 They include projections of regional populations by age group and number
of households from a base of 2006 out to 2031. Three different series are available: low,
medium, and high, each representing certain assumptions regarding fertility, mortality,
23This is partly due to different data being fed into the respective CGE models, differences in the
structure of the models themselves, and quite different tools such as econometric analysis being used in
other components of the research to inform the overall outcomes. All the research reports produced under
this programme are available at http://www.dol.govt.nz/research/migration/economics.asp.
24The first set of three simulations under each mode assume no household mobility. The results of these
simulations, especially those for the long-run, should be viewed as interim results only. Their primary
purpose is to generate the regional real wage relativities used in the household mobility algorithm.
25Downloaded from http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/population/estimates_and_
projections.aspx on April 1, 2011
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and migration. For our purposes, the ‘medium’ projection figures are used to obtain
baseline percentage changes from 2006 of households, total population, and non-working
age population across the five regions of the model.26 These percentage changes are shown
in table 4.5 below. The projections reveal three basic trends:
• falling household sizes across regions
• increasing share of non-working age population in total across regions
• more rapid population growth in Auckland and other urban centres than elsewhere
For our short-run baseline simulation, we use the projected percentage changes for 2016
while for the long-run baseline the 2031 figures are used. In doing so, it is not intended
to ascribe a time period to our definition of short-run and long-run; the projections are
used purely as a source of hypothetical numbers.
We will see shortly that the imbalance in baseline population growth across regions
leads to diverging economic outcomes. By comparing the results from the other simula-
tions to the baseline, we can investigate how different immigration scenarios and household
mobility assumptions affect these measured outcomes. The details of the simulations are
summarised in table 4.6. A selection of the quantitative results are given in appendices
Q and R to accompany our discussion. Further tables of results are available from the
author upon request.
4.5.1 Short-run Simulations
The main driver of the short-run simulation results is employment change resulting from
the simulated demographic change. In the baseline simulation, bsln5, the capital stock
used by each industry in each region is assumed to grow in line with their usage of labour
so that there is no change in capital intensity.27 For the rest of the short-run simulations,
the percentage changes in capital stocks are kept at their baseline levels. The implication
is that neither household mobility nor immigration shocks affect how much regional capital
is installed in the short-run.
26The definition of non-working population used here is all persons aged 0-14 and 65+.
27It does not follow however that capital intensity does not change at the regional, sectoral, or aggregate
level. The sum of the fractions do not always equal the fraction of the sums — an implication of Jensen’s
Inequality.
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Households
Region
Projected % ∆ from 2006
2011 2016 2021 2026 2031
AKL 10 21 33 44 55
WLG 7 13 19 24 28
ONI 6 12 17 21 25
CAN 7 14 20 26 31
OSI 6 10 14 17 20
Population
Region
Projected % ∆ from 2006
2011 2016 2021 2026 2031
AKL 9 17 25 34 42
WLG 5 9 11 14 16
ONI 4 7 9 11 12
CAN 6 10 14 18 21
OSI 4 6 7 8 8
Non-working Age Population
Region
Projected % ∆ from 2006
2011 2016 2021 2026 2031
AKL 8 20 32 45 59
WLG 5 14 21 29 36
ONI 5 12 20 26 33
CAN 7 17 26 35 44
OSI 5 13 22 29 35
Table 4.5: Population Projections
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bsln5: In this baseline simulation, the regions can be ranked into three groups in terms
of increase in working age population. Auckland (AKL) has the largest increase, followed
by Wellington (WLG) and Canterbury (CAN), and then Other North Island (ONI) and
Other South Island (OSI) (table Q.3). Employment and output follow the same pattern of
regional ranking (tables Q.5 and Q.7). Those industries whose production is concentrated
in Auckland see larger increases in output than others — notably CHNM, METL, and
EQFO (table Q.15). The increase in output for OWND is also relatively high since its
capital stock in each region is assumed to grow in line with the number of households.
The closure requires that aggregate real investment increases in line with real GDP.
The pattern of investment across industries depends partly on the pattern of capital
growth and partly on the changes in net rates of return — compare tables Q.14, Q.16,
and Q.20. The manufacturing industries have relatively high capital growth (due to
being concentrated in Auckland where the population growth is the highest) and therefore
receive a larger share of the expanded investment budget. The results for FISH and TRAN
are due to a rise and fall respectively in each industry’s net rate of return (averaged over
regions) and a relatively high sensitivity to those changes (the βj,r values are relatively
low).28 The regional allocation of investment reflects the bias in capital growth towards
Auckland (table Q.8).
The macroeconomic effects of the baseline demographic change include an increase in
real GDP, but this is not enough to sustain constant real GDP per capita (tables Q.21
and Q.26). This result is consistent with the predictions of simple growth models —
productivity improvements (exogenous in our model) are required to maintain constant
real GDP per capita with population growth.
28The results for EDUC in table Q.20 at first glance may appear extreme. Recall that along with GOVT,
HEAL, and OWND, this industry is excluded from endogenous investment allocation — see pages 86
and 97. Investment in EDUC in each region is therefore restricted to increase in line with aggregate
investment. The net rate of return variable adjusts as required to satisfy the system of equations but
otherwise has no bearing on the simulation results. Calibration of the model based on the investment
parameters given in table 2.12 resulted in EDUC having a low average net rate of return of 0.015%
initially — it ranged from -0.16% in Auckland to +0.17% in Other South Island. Since this number is so
close to zero, even very large percentage changes are insignificant. If the average rate of return increases
500% for example, the new rate of return would only be 0.09%, less than 0.1 percentage points higher.
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When considering the regional differences in household welfare as measured by real
disposable income, it is interesting to note that households in Other North Island are
(marginally) the worst off even though their region sees higher employment and capital
growth than Other South Island (tables Q.5, Q.6, and Q.26). The source of this effect is
that the nominal wage rate and capital rental rates in the latter region are higher (relative
to the regional consumption price index) than in the former. This finding highlights the
important role regional prices play in the model.
sim501 & sim502: To investigate the economic effects of immigration, we look at alter-
native immigration scenarios where the immigration inflows are biased towards particular
regions. In sim501, the bsln5 shock is altered so that Auckland ends up with 100,000
more households, while in sim502 Canterbury and Other South Island receive 50,000
additional households each instead. While we interpret these as due to immigration, it
should be noted that the additional households are assumed to have the same composi-
tion as those of the receiving region for simplicity. For example, in each simulation the
immigration shock has no effect on any region’s trend in average working age persons
per household — it continues to fall as in the baseline.29 More realistic results would
be obtained if the immigrant households’ composition were adjusted to match what the
typical immigrant household composition has been in NZ’s recent experience.
The additional labour supply that immigration brings to the respective regions in each
simulation boosts those regions’ employment and output above that of bsln5 (tables Q.5
and Q.7). Output in the other regions is also higher although there has been a slight fall in
their employment (due to participation rate reductions — see table Q.28) and no change
in capital on the baseline (due to assumption). Their higher output is then driven by
lower input prices and higher consumption demand, especially from the regions receiving
the immigrants.30 Notably, the primary industries (AGRI, FOLO, FISH, and MINE) and
food processing (FDBT) benefit more in terms of output and investment expansion from
29An implication is that the macro effects differ between the scenarios partly due to the differences
in assumed household composition. For example aggregate employment rises more in sim501 partly
because Auckland has higher average working age persons per household than the South Island regions.
In comparing the results, the focus should therefore be on the pattern across industries etc. rather than
aggregate effects.
30Compare the magnitudes of the percentage falls in spending per household with those of the percent-
age increases in households, for instance, in tables Q.26 and Q.1.
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immigration into the South Island than into Auckland (tables Q.15 and Q.16). Aggregate
investment is higher in these scenarios than the baseline owing to higher real GDP and
generally the allocation of that investment becomes strongly biased towards the regions
receiving the immigrants in each simulation (tables Q.21 and Q.8). The welfare measures
indicate lower real GDP per capita in each scenario and the negative effects on real
income and spending are borne entirely by households in the receiving regions — positive
and negative short-run spill-over effects to other regions broadly cancel in the absence of
inter-regional household mobility (table Q.26).
In these scenarios there is a significant divergence in regional real after-tax wage rates
(table Q.25). The immigration-receiving regions see a fall in their real wage both in
absolute terms and relative to that of the other regions. We might doubt that such
real wage differences persist even in the short-run, so our next task is to investigate the
implications of allowing a household mobility response to these differences.
bsln6: When considering the implications of household mobility for our immigration
scenarios, the appropriate baseline to use for comparisons is one that takes that mobility
into account. The shock of bsln5 is therefore adjusted for mobility and then used for
this new simulation. Since we are currently considering short-run scenarios, we assume
that households are relatively constrained in their ability to move between regions (θ is
assigned a value of 5). The bsln5 results for regional real wage rates suggest that if
mobility is allowed, the largest household flows will be out of Auckland and into Other
South Island. This is reflected in the regional pattern of household growth in bsln6
compared to bsln5 (table Q.1).31 The household flows serve to shift some of the growth in
working age population from Auckland to the other regions (table Q.3). The employment
and output effects are slightly more balanced across regions as a result (tables Q.5 and
Q.7). The household flows have also caused the regional real wage differences to be
slightly compressed (table Q.25). The allocation of investment shifts somewhat towards
Other South Island due to changes in relative capital rental rates (tables Q.8 and Q.11).32
31The size of the net household flows into a given region can be calculated using the percentage-point
difference between bsln6 and bsln5. For example, the net flow into Other South Island is 1.7%×172000 ≈
3000 while for Other North Island it is 0.4%× 482000 ≈ 2000. The percentage-point difference between
the simulations captures the size of the household flow relative to the initial regional population of
households.
32The effect of capital construction cost changes is relatively benign — see table Q.10.
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Although allowing household mobility has made very little difference to the macro effects
of this demographic change, it has shifted the regional effects on real income and spending
per household in Auckland’s favour (tables Q.21, Q.22, and Q.26).
sim601 & sim602: The demographic shocks used for the immigration scenarios sim501
and sim502 are adjusted to take into account household mobility in line with bsln6
(the assumed value of θ is still 5). Immigration into Auckland results in an outflow
of households that favours Wellington and Other South Island over the other regions
while immigration into the South Island regions induces household movements favouring
Wellington and Other North Island over Auckland (compare the percentage point differ-
ences between sim501/2 and sim601/2 across the regions in table Q.1).33 Comparing
sim601 with sim501, the region-rankings for employment and output in Other North
Island and Other South Island switch due to mobility favouring the latter over the former
(tables Q.5 and Q.7). An analogous comparison of sim602 and sim502 indicates that
Wellington and Other North Island receive most of the benefits from household mobility
in terms of output and employment. Generally the simulations that account for house-
hold mobility indicate that such mobility causes the gains in investment and output from
regionally-biased immigration to be distributed across all regions more evenly relative to
the no-mobility case (tables Q.8 and Q.7). The negative effects of the simulated immigra-
tion flows on real income and spending per household are more balanced across regions
when the scenario includes adjustments for inter-regional household mobility (table Q.26).
Discussion It is primarily the working age population component of short-run demo-
graphic change that determines the effect of immigration on regional economic activity,
33The household flows could consist of a mixture of immigrant and “native” households; since we assume
there is no difference in household characteristics between the two types the distinction is immaterial to
the results. Introducing such a distinction to the model would raise many empirical questions. Here the
question is how to determine the mix of natives and immigrants in inter-regional household flows. A
propensity to cluster in enclaves may make immigrants less sensitive to regional wage differences. On
the other hand, immigrants may be more sensitive than natives if they don’t have familial roots in any
particular region. They are also more mobile by virtue of being self-selected as immigrants. Other issues
that would need to be addressed are differences between natives and immigrants in consumption, labour
supply, and saving behaviour, and immigrants’ impact on trade and investment. Many of these issues
are discussed in the New Zealand context in Hodgson & Poot (2010).
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and this depends on whether there are household flows between regions in response to
emerging real wage differences. Without household mobility, the positive effects of immi-
gration on output, employment, and investment accrue mainly to the region(s) that receive
the bulk of the immigrants. Household mobility allows those effects to be spread more
evenly over the regions. In either case, immigration stimulates output in non-receiving
regions through price effects. Our household welfare change calculations indicate that
the immigrant-receiving regions experience most of the negative effects associated with
the immigration shock even with household mobility. One possible implication for policy
from these simulations is that immigration remains a regional issue in the short-run even
when household mobility is taken into account.
4.5.2 Long-run Simulations
These simulations are similar to those discussed above for the short-run case, but the
underlying assumptions differ in three important respects:
• the current net rates of return on capital are exogenously fixed instead of the stocks
of capital in each industry in each region
• the assumed demographic change is larger than that used in the short-run simula-
tions
• the assumed sensitivity of households to regional real wage differences is higher than
in the short-run simulations to capture the idea that households are more mobile in
the long-run
Each of these changes are made to reflect a longer time period between the base year
and the solution year. The length of the long-run is not specified but by definition is
long enough for currently installed capital to respond to changes in rental rates and
construction costs. Capital stocks are endogenously determined to ensure no change in
current rates of return.34
34Recall that in bsln5, the capital stock of each industry in each region was assumed to change in line
with employment. This restriction is not imposed for bsln7 — current net rates of return are exogenous
instead of K/L ratios. As for the short-run baseline scenarios, the capital of OWND (Ownership of
Occupied Dwellings) is assumed to grow in line with the number of households in each region. Unlike
the short-run simulations however, capital (of all industries) is not then restricted to grow at the baseline
rate for the immigration scenarios — the closure for bsln7 is maintained throughout.
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bsln7: The population change in this simulation generates a similar pattern for output
and employment over the regions as in bsln5: the outcomes are just more skewed towards
Auckland away from Other North Island and Other South Island, even to the extent that
employment has fallen in these latter two regions (tables R.7 and R.5).35 The simulation
results indicate that capital increases less than employment in Auckland but more so in
the other regions (tables R.6 and R.5). Since current rates of return are fixed and expected
rates of return are equalised, the industry results for current capital are broadly reflected
in the investment results — more capital requires more replacement investment (tables
R.14 and R.16). An interesting exception is UTIL, which has a relatively lower increase in
current capital but higher increase in investment compared to other industries. Important
factors behind this result are a relatively low depreciation rate for this industry and a
net rate of return close to the expected future rate. Overall the industry results follow a
similar pattern to that of bsln5 in terms of output and employment, although primary
and lower value-added manufacturing industries (AGRI - FDBT) see smaller increases in
these despite the higher aggregate increases (compare tables R.15 and R.13 with Q.15
and Q.13). The long-run welfare consequences as measured by percentage changes in real
GDP per capita and real income and spending per household are considerably worse in
the long-run than the short-run and indicate that Auckland becomes the worst-off region
in terms of income per household instead of least worse-off (compare table R.26 to table
Q.26).
sim701 & sim702: These immigration scenarios are analogous to those of sim501 and
sim502 except that the immigration shock is 250,000 households rather than 100,000.
As before, they either add to the population of Auckland or are divided equally between
Canterbury and Other South Island. An implication of the long-run closure used for
these scenarios is that the aggregate capital stock can change and capital can also shift
between regions.36 While capital stocks increase in each of our model regions relative to
the baseline, there has been substitution toward labour in the regions that receive the
immigration inflows and substitution toward capital in the rest (tables R.5 and R.6). As
35Falling employment in Other North Island and Other South Island reflects the projected decrease in
working age population of those regions embodied in the Statistics NZ estimates — see tables 4.5 and
R.3.
36See page 137 of chapter 3 for a description of the form that such capital mobility may take.
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in bsln7, the additional capital generates additional gross investment and the increase in
capacity allows output to expand (tables R.8 and R.7). Although the rankings of output
and investment outcomes across regions and industries are broadly similar to those of the
short-run simulations, there are some interesting exceptions. One example is Canterbury,
which has the second highest increase in output and investment in sim701 compared to
third and fourth (equal) respectively in sim501. OWND and RBUS have better output
outcomes (relative to other industries) in sim701 while METL has better and FISH
has worse investment results in sim702, all compared to the relevant short-run scenario
(sim501 and sim502). Capital growth is biased towards the immigrant-receiving regions,
with a significant component of that growth being of OWND capital stock (because it
comprises a large share of the total and increases the most — see tables R.6 and R.14).
The increase in after-tax income for the immigrant-receiving regions, however, is still such
that they see the largest fall in income per household (table R.26). There are some notable
differences between the short-run and long-run income per household results for the other
regions. For example, there is less variation in the percentage decrease of this measure
in sim701 compared to sim501 for the regions outside Auckland. In sim702, Auckland
has a better result relative to the baseline (bsln7) while it was slightly worse in sim502
compared to bsln5. Generally the regions that don’t receive immigrants are better off
in terms of income and spending per household in sim701 and sim702 compared to the
baseline. This was not the case for the short-run immigration scenarios, at least in terms
of income per household.
For each scenario, the real wage rate that prevails in each immigrant-receiving region
falls significantly while it increases relative to the baseline in the other regions (table
R.25).37 We therefore run the long-run immigration scenarios again, taking into account
households’ endogenous mobility response to these real wage differences.
bsln8: For the present long-run case, we assume a level of sensitivity to regional real
wage differences that is higher than that of the short-run simulations, to imply that
households are more mobile over this longer time frame (θ = 10). As was seen in the
short-run baseline with household mobility (bsln6), households flow out of Auckland,
and Other South Island sees the largest percentage-point increase in households (table
37Recall that Auckland is the immigrant-receiving region in sim701 while Canterbury and Other South
Island are the regions that receive the immigrant inflows in sim702.
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R.1). However, unlike in the short-run simulations, household mobility has implications
for the distribution of capital — since it is mobile here, capital has moved with labour
away from Auckland (tables R.5 and R.6). The regional outcomes for output reflect this
shift of resources; the outcome for Other South Island is significantly better (relative to
bsln7) compared to its outcome in bsln6 (relative to bsln5) — see tables Q.7 and R.7.
The regional shift of capital induced by household mobility also affects the allocation
of investment such that the percentage increases in regional investment are closer to the
national average than in bsln7 (table R.8). Labour-intensive industries whose production
is relatively concentrated in Other South Island (e.g. AGRI, FISH) have higher levels of
output and investment than in bsln7 while capital-intensive industries concentrated in
Auckland (e.g. CHNM and EQFO) have lower levels (tables R.15 and R.16). Along with
the welfare effects being more negative in the long-run than the short-run, household
mobility affects the results more in the long-run than the short-run (tables Q.26 and
R.26). For example, real income per household in Other South Island is 2.4 percentage
points lower, and in Auckland 2.1 percentage points higher in bsln8 than bsln7 while
the analogous comparison between bsln6 and bsln5 show percentage point differences
of only 0.7 for these regions.
sim801 & sim802: This final pair of simulations estimate the long-run effects of our
immigration shocks while households are partially mobile between regions (theta = 10).
The household flows out of the immigration-receiving regions favour Wellington and Other
South Island in sim801 and Wellington and Other North Island in sim802 when compared
to their no-mobility simulation counterparts, sim701 and sim702 (table R.1). This is a
similar result to that seen in sim601 and sim602.38 The moderate degree of household
mobility, combined with perfect capital mobility, leads to different regional rankings of
employment, output, and investment for sim801 (it does not appear to have this effect
for sim802). For example, Canterbury had the second-best outcome (after Auckland)
and Other South Island had the worst outcome for all of these measures in sim701 but
38A minor difference arises regarding the direction of household flows between Canterbury (CAN) and
Other South Island (OSI) when comparing sim802 with sim602: in the long-run case, the real wage rate
falls more in CAN than OSI in sim702, so there is a flow of households from CAN to OSI in sim802. On
the other hand, households flow from OSI to CAN in sim602 because the real wage falls more in OSI
than CAN in sim502 — compare tables Q.25 and R.25.
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Wellington has the second-best and Other North Island the worst outcome in sim801
(tables R.5, R.7, and R.8). As seen in the comparison to sim601 and sim602 to their
no-mobility counterparts, assuming partial household mobility (this time with capital
mobility as well) results in a balancing-out of the effects of our immigration shocks on
industrial and regional measures of economic activity and the distribution of the welfare
effects across the regions. When the percentage changes in regional and industrial output
are above the national average in the no-mobility simulations (22.6% in sim701, 20.6% in
sim702), generally the corresponding results in sim801 and sim802 are lower and when
they are below the national average, the results from the household mobility simulations
are higher. Two notable exceptions are the CONS and GOVT industries which have
higher output in both sim801 and sim802 even though they already have above-average
increases in output in sim701 and sim702 (table R.15). Similarly, when a region’s real
income or spending per household is higher than the national average in the no-mobility
simulations, it is lower in sim801 and sim802. Auckland is the only exception, with
relatively better income per household income in sim801 than sim701 even though its
result in the latter simulation was already better than the national average.
Two final points on these simulations concern the labour force participation rates
(LFPRs) and real wage rates. The most significant changes in regional LFPRs occur
in sim801 — see table R.28. The reduction in LFPR in the regions outside Auckland
is due to the shift of households from Auckland, which had a lower average LFPR in
the baseyear.39 Finally, despite the higher assumed degree of relative wage sensitivity
in these long-run immigration scenarios, regional real wage rates remain significantly
different. Out of the indirectly affected regions (those that don’t receive the immigration
shock directly), notably the real wage rate of Other North Island remains above those of
the others. Neither moving from short-run to long-run nor allowing moderate household
mobility substantially eliminates the estimated regional real wage differences (tables R.25
39The results in the table are percentage changes, so for example the 1.0% decrease in the LFPR of Other
South Island corresponds to a 0.778 percentage-point decrease. In order to capture the effect of household
mobility on LFPRs, the labour-leisure choice is turned off for these simulations. The endogenous LFPR
changes from the no-mobility simulation are included in the calculation of LFPR changes that arise from
the inter-regional household flows. Further changes in LFPRs due to changes in wages and consumption
prices cannot be obtained from the model without a further run under the appropriate closure. In short,
there is a determinacy problem with the LFPRs in a single run of the model using the household mobility
algorithm and the labour-leisure choice.
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and Q.25).
Discussion There are two main drivers of the results from these long-run simulations —
increases in regional working age population and increases in capital stocks. While capital
stocks were assumed to increase in the short-run simulations, the degree of increase was
not allowed to vary in response to changes in demographic trends. Here, population
growth stimulates capital accumulation and this is most apparent in the immigration
simulations. There is therefore a positive effect of immigration on output and investment.
To the extent that regional differences in capital growth lead to regional real wage rate
differences, the long-run perfect capital mobility assumption adds to households’ incentive
to move between regions when unbalanced demographic change causes regional wage rates
to diverge. The economic effects of inter-regional households flows are magnified when
capital is induced to flow in the same direction. Assumptions regarding the degree of
labour and capital mobility do not change some of the broad conclusions on the welfare
impact of immigration to the immigrant-receiving regions, but they are important factors
in determining the relative indirect effects on the other regions.
4.5.3 Comparison with the Department of Labour Research
Our simulation results are consistent with the conclusion of Hodgson & Poot (2010),
which is in turn consistent with other New Zealand and international empirical work, that
immigration has little effect on the aggregate real wage rate in the long-term.40 These
simulations do however offer the complementary idea that regional real wage rates can
differ significantly even in the long-run, as we have seen in table R.25. The macro level
results also mask important distributional consequences such as differences in regional
output, investment, employment, and household disposable income. Internal migration
can alleviate these somewhat if households (and perhaps capital) flow out of the directly
affected regions (thereby reducing the excess labour supply that the regional economy
has to adjust to) and into regions where the associated resources can be most efficiently
40See for example Poot & Cochrane (2005). Our short-run immigration simulations indicate a negative
effect on the real wage but in the long-run the effect is considerably less despite the higher inflow of
immigrant households — compare the results for sim601 and sim602 in table Q.22 with those of sim801
and sim802 in table R.22.
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utilised.41
The overarching conclusion of the Department of Labour research programme is that
immigration has a net benefit to the domestic economy. As already noted, our application
of JENNIFER to the question is not directly comparable to the methods used leading to
that conclusion. A simple example is that in the CGE analysis of Nana et al. (2009),
productivity and trade sector developments were built into the baseline that have not
been included here. This is probably the main reason our results predict that real GDP
per capita falls with immigration while Nana et al. find a small positive effect. The main
contribution of our simulations is to show how the regional distribution of households and
industrial production, and therefore regional prices, matter for the impact across regions
and industries.
41Our simulations predict some displacement of currently residing households by immigrant households
(recalling that our definition of immigration is simply an inflow of households where the immigrant
households are identical in characteristics to those currently residing in the destination region). There
is a competing argument and associated body of research that immigration can have the opposite effect
especially in urban areas — agglomeration economies, clustering, etc. Longhi, Nijkamp & Poot (2010)
discuss the empirical evidence on these and other determinants of the impact of immigration on regional
labour markets.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
Although New Zealand has had an active CGE modelling community since the 1980’s, a
multi-regional CGE model for the country has not been developed until now. In presenting
the prototype JENNIFER model, this thesis has demonstrated the feasibility of developing
a comprehensive model that captures the benefits of the bottom-up approach. The key
findings are set out below, followed by a discussion of ways in which the model may be
developed to maximise its full potential.
5.1 The JENNIFER Model
Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical structure of a multi-regional CGE model with bottom-
up micro-foundations and details a particular implementation of the model using New
Zealand data. This fills an important gap in the New Zealand CGE modelling literature as
none of the models in current use have a structure involving bottom-up regional modelling.
The method of implementation is also a key contribution, utilising a maximum-entropy
approach to overcome data shortages. An illustrative simulation of a natural disaster that
strikes the Wellington central business district demonstrates the strengths of the bottom-
up multi-regional approach — that the model can capture differential effects across regions
of shocks that occur at the regional level, and incorporates flow-on and feedback effects
between regions. Sensitivity testing of the substitution elasticity between domestic sources
of products reinforces the importance of empirically-estimated parameters in CGE models.
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5.2 The Geographic Nature of Distribution
An extension to the basic JENNIFER model is pursued in Chapter 3 to introduce the
modelling of distribution services. The key structural difference is that products identi-
fied as distribution services are required to facilitate movement of other products from
seller to buyer. Thus there are no opportunities to substitute away from these services
if they become relatively more expensive. To implement the additional structure, sets of
coefficients are specified to control technical possibilities in the usage of the distribution
services. These include switches that can dictate, for example, that wholesale trade is only
involved in the delivery of tangible products, that retail trade is only used by in-region
purchasers, and that transport is required for moving physical products across regional
borders or to exporters. That these assumptions can be integrated seamlessly into the
database highlights the strength of the maximum-entropy approach discussed in chapter
2. Simulations of an oil price shock show that the regional assumptions surrounding the
distribution networks can have an important bearing on simulation results even when the
shock originates at the national rather than regional level.
5.3 Partial Labour Mobility
Chapter 4 investigates the issue of labour mobility in the short-run and long-run con-
text. A module is added to the extended JENNIFER model of Chapter 3 to allow for a
continuum of labour mobility possibilities between the usual short-run, total immobility
and long-run, perfectly mobile assumptions. By varying the parameter that controls the
degree of household responsiveness to regional real wage differences, labour can be made
more mobile than capital in the short-run and less mobile than capital in the long-run.
Additional structure is required to link populations, households, and labour market com-
ponents. An important element is a link back to the endogenous labour supply theory
of the basic model. Publicly available demographic and labour market data are used to
implement the mobility module. The importance of a mobility response to relative real
wage changes is explored in an illustrative application looking at the impact of regionally-
concentrated immigration flows. The simulations suggest that population movements can
work to dissipate the welfare effects of such migration inflows.
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5.4 Future Development
CGE models should be based on as much actual data and empirically-estimated parame-
ters as possible to strengthen their predictions. The JENNIFER model is designed to take
maximum advantage of available sub-national GDP estimates and other regional data. At
present only arbitrary assumptions are used to disaggregate exports and imports top-down
by region. The use of New Zealand trade data by port would allow a more detailed de-
scription of the flows of tangible products from producing regions to ports of export, and
ports of import to users. The integration of the information contained in the Auckland
SAM prepared by Market Economics Ltd. would enable a richer model description of the
special role Auckland plays in the economy — that of a conduit between the foreign sector
and the rest of the country.
Other structural elements could be added to the model provided there was sufficient
information to support them. Particularly relevant for our multi-regional model would
be sub-models of the transport network or population to include efficient routing and
demographic trends respectively. In this regard, GAMS is particularly useful in that
it can handle different classes of model other than CGE. The output of a node-based
transport sub-model could become input into the CGE model for example. Another as-
pect that could be considered is whether modelling activity at the regional level weakens
the industrial structure micro-foundations. For higher degrees of industrial and regional
disaggregation, we may wish to replace the neo-classical assumptions with imperfect com-
petition for some industries and regions.
Yet with the existing structure there are many possibilities for improvement, partic-
ularly in the areas of elasticity estimation and investment parameters. While available
data would allow more industries and regions to receive separate treatment, labour de-
mand to be broken down into occupations, and households to be split into income groups,
these are of secondary importance to improving the quality of data presently used. In any
case, expanding the model along those lines will quickly raise implementation challenges
if computer memory constraints were reached.
It is envisaged that such challenges will recede as computational power continues to
rise. In that case however, there may be more to gain from taking the model in entirely
different directions. Explicit dynamics and intertemporal behaviour could be incorporated
into the model. This would be useful especially in further formalising inter-regional labour
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mobility and accounting for associated adjustment costs. The opportunity also exists
to exploit the ability of GAMS to solve mixed complementarity problems. This class
of problems involves optimising subject to a set of constraints, of which some may be
inequalities rather than strict equalities. Thus some kind of objective could be maximised
subject to the CGE model, potentially without needing all markets to clear. The most
obvious example of the use of such a model would be to determine an optimum tax rate
that delivers a certain outcome for employment or output across regions, or more crucially,
the optimum change in such a policy in response to a given exogenous shock.
Inevitably, the direction in which the JENNIFER model develops will be strongly
influenced by the real-world issues to which it is applied. At the time of writing, a
significant current issue that the model could be used to investigate is the economic impact
across regions of the Christchurch earthquakes of September 2010 and February 2011.
For such an application, useful enhancements would include introducing different capital
types, disaggregation of labour by occupation, separation of local and central government,
and more detailed descriptions of the insurance industry and transportation networks for
which Christchurch is an important hub. Further development of the labour mobility
module would also be useful, including extending it to take into account international
movements of households.
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Appendix A
CGE Models in the Literature
New Zealand CGE Models1
JOANNA (Wallace 1984) A comparative-static national model, solved by linearisation.
Constructed roughly at the same time as ORANI, it bears many similarities to that
model in its theoretical structure and implementation. A modern and up-to-date
version is in current use by BERL.
JULIANNE (Stroombergen 1986) A dynamic national model, solved in the levels. This
model was developed at about the same time as JOANNA, and serves well as a
natural counterpoint to it.
JOANI (Nana, Hall & Philpott 1995) A comparative static multi-regional model of NZ
and Australia, solved by linearisation. In linking JOANNA and ORANI together,
the model investigates the implications of the interdependence of the countries’
product and factor markets.
JODY (Nana 1999) A dynamic national model incorporating forward-looking behaviour
of consumers and investors, solved by linearisation. This involved adding intertem-
poral relationships to JOANNA and utilising the time-saving features of GEMPACK
to aid the solution algorithm.
GEAR (Yeoman, Kim, McDonald & Zhang 2009) The General Equilibrium of Auckland
1Along with the citations here, the reader is directed to Wells & Easton (1986) and the selection of
papers from the RPEP collection listed in appendix B.
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Region Model, a single-region model developed by Market Economics Ltd.
ORANI-NZ A New Zealand version of ORANI, operated by NZIER.
MONASH-NZ A New Zealand version of MONASH, operated by NZIER.2
NZCEM (Lennox & van Nieuwkoop 2009) The New Zealand Climate-Economy Model
developed at Landcare Research.
NZTGEM (Lennox 2010) The New Zealand Tourism General Equilibrium Model devel-
oped at LEaP.
ESSAM The Energy Substitution, Social Accounting Matrix Model developed by Info-
metrics. The model is probably derived from (or a variant of) JULIANNE, devel-
oped to include energy sector detail along with the complete set of financial flows
captured in the SAM.
Selected Single-Region Models in the International Literature
MSG3 (Johansen 1960) Widely considered to be the first CGE model. Essentially a
multi-sectoral growth model of Norway with a national input-output table used
(along with other data) to assign values to the equation coefficients. The first to
propose the method of logarithmic differentiation as a means of numerically solving
Walrasian general equilibrium models.
ORANI (Dixon, Parmenter, Sutton & Vincent 1982) A comparative-static, single-region
model of the Australian economy. Chapter 6 describes the ORES (ORANI Regional
Equation System) top-down regional extension module. While the solution method
is based on Johansen’s work, the use of GEMPACK enables the linearisation errors
inherent in the Johansen solution to be virtually eliminated.
2For a recent economic impact analysis that utilises this model, see Kaye-Blake, Schilling & Zuccollo
(2011).
3Not to be confused with the McKibbin-Sachs Global model (McKibbin & Sachs 1989, known as
MSG2) which is a multi-country dynamic general equilibrium model. Although Johansen did not name
his model as MSG, it is often referred to as such in the literature. See for example Bergman (2005, p.
1279)
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ORANI-G (Horridge 2008) A more recent, generic description of ORANI for use in
modelling courses run by the CoPS group. The model equations are expressed in
TABLO code for GEMPACK usage. Unlike in the original treatment, the model is
not introduced by way of a ‘skeletal’ version — this is the function of the MINIMAL
model.
MINIMAL (Horridge 2001) The equivalent for the generic ORANI-G model of the
miniature ORANI model set out in chapter 2 of Dixon, Parmenter, Sutton & Vin-
cent (1982). That is, a miniature version of ORANI-G, with the linearised model
equations written in TABLO code.
MONASH (Dixon & Rimmer 2002) A recursive-dynamic, single-region model of the
Australian economy, building upon ORANI. It incorporates a top-down regional
disaggregation module, also adapted from that of ORANI.
Selected Multi-Regional Models in the International Literature
ORES (Dixon, Parmenter, Sutton & Vincent 1982, ch. 6) Although not strictly speaking
a multi-regional model, instances of ORANI with this top-down regional disaggre-
gation module provides regional results. The user specifies a division of model
industries into national and local types and then various sourcing and usage as-
sumptions are made to produce local multiplier effects. Sometimes referred to as
ORANI-LMPST in the literature, since the module is based on the method used in
Leontief, Morgan, Polenske, Simpson & Tower (1965).
MRSMAE (Liew 1981) A bottom-up multi-regional CGE model based on ORANI. The
multi-regional input-output database is constructed using Leontief & Strout’s (1963)
gravity model. The main point of the model is to emphasise the strengths and
weaknesses of the bottom-up approach relative to the top-down approach taken in
ORANI’s regional extension module.
FEDERAL (Madden 1990) A bottom-up comparative-static model of Australia, solved
by linearisation. FEDERAL assumes the availability of multi-regional input-output
data and region-level fiscal data. The cited work sets out a two region implementa-
tion of FEDERAL named TASMAIN, the two regions being Tasmania and the Rest
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of Australia. An important contribution was the detailing of how one “subtracts”
a region’s (Tasmania’s) input-output flows from a national table (Australia’s) to
obtain the residual region’s flows.
FEDERAL-F (Giesecke & Madden 2003) A model based on FEDERAL with MONASH-
style dynamics. Due to FEDERAL’s emphasis on modelling national and state-level
government finances, it is particularly suited to fiscal policy questions.
MMRF (Centre of Policy Studies 2008) A multi-regional model developed around the
same time as MONASH. It eventually received MONASH-style dynamics and has
detailed modelling of greenhouse gas emissions and energy use.
TERM (Horridge, Madden & Wittwer 2005) A static multi-regional model that uses
bottom-up modelling for Australian states and then top-down modelling to obtain
results at a higher level of geographic disaggregation. Using state-level input-output
tables, the model uses a gravity formula to estimate interregional flows.
GTAP (Hertel 1997, Narayanan & Walmsley 2008) A bottom-up comparative-static
model of the world economy.
Appendix B
Selected RPEP Papers
1
JOANNA
IP 91 Wallace & Philpott (1980b) The Equation Structure of the JOANNA
Model
IP 98 Wallace & Philpott (1980a) The Equation Structure of JOANNA in
Short-Run Model
IP 127 Wallace & Philpott (1982) Economy-Wide Effects of Some Alterna-
tive Fiscal Packages - A General Equilib-
rium Analysis Using JOANNA
IP 131 Wallace, Stroombergen &
Philpott (1982)
The General Equilibrium Results of a Re-
duction in Textile Industry Protection
IP 141 Nana (1983) A (Neo)-Keynesian Version of the Short-
Run JOANNA Model
OP 73 Nana & Philpott (1983) The 38 Sector JOANNA Model
OP 86 Nana & Philpott (1985) Macroeconomic and Sectoral Implications
of the GST - A General Equilibrium Anal-
ysis Using the JOANNA Model
1This is a list of the RPEP papers reviewed during the preparation of this thesis. Philpott (2000)
provides a useful classification of a wider selection of RPEP papers. The left-hand column shows the
series number: OP = Occasional Paper, IP = Internal Paper, P = Paper
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JULIANNE
OP 59 Stroombergen & Philpott
(1982)
The Julianne Semi-Dynamic General
Equilibrium Model
OP 66 Stroombergen & Philpott
(1983a)
The Julianne Dynamic Model
IP 153 Stroombergen & Philpott
(1983b)
Julianne Model Sectoral Analysis of the
Economy to 1990
OP 82 Stroombergen & Philpott
(1985)
Dynamic General Equilibrium Modelling
of the Effects of Protection on the New
Zealand Economy 1977-84
OP 94 Philpott (1988) Julianne Model Sectoral Projections of the
Economy to 1992
JOANI
OP 92 Nana & Philpott (1988) The JOANI Two Country General Equi-
librium Model
OP 93 Philpott & Nana (1988) Quantitative Implications of Australia-
New Zealand Free Trade
JODY
P 271 Philpott (1995) Estimating the Database for a 1990 Based
JODY Model
P 272 Philpott & Nana (1995) Dynamic General Equilibrium Modelling
of World Agricultural Trade Impacts on
New Zealand - An Appraisal of a Proto-
type Model
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Other
IP 133 Stroombergen (1982) A Critique of the Johansen-Type Model
OP 87 Philpott & Stroombergen
(1986)
Analysing Flexible Labour Markets -
A General Equilibrium Approach Using
CRESH Production Functions
OP 91 Poot, Nana & Philpott
(1987)
International Migration and the New
Zealand Economy - A Trans-Tasman
Comparison
OP 98 Philpott (1990b) Labour Market Flexibility in a General
Equilibrium Analysis of Paths to Full
Employment
OP 100 Philpott (1990a) Economic Growth in New Zealand -
Models and Experience
OP 101 Easton (1990) The Real Wage Debate 1978 - 1990
OP 102 Philpott (1992a) General Equilibrium Modelling for Pol-
icy Analysis and Economic Planning
OP 105 Philpott (1992b) Real Capital Stock by SNA Production
Group 1950 - 1990
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Appendix C
List of Model Variables
This appendix lists the variables of the core model — measurement-type variables, where
the meaning is obvious from the variable name, are not included here.
Variable Description
APCwr average propensity to consume of hshr (out of w income)
APSwr average propensity to save of hshr (out of w income)
Cv aggregate private consumption expenditure (with valuation v)
CPI i consumption expenditure deflator index of type i ∈ PINDEX
CV r compensating variation for hshr
EMP• employment measures in IOunits
ENDINCw,vr w endowment income of hshr (with valuation v)
EV r equivalent variation for hshr
EXP for(D)g demand for exports of product g by for
EXP (S)g supply of exports of product g by expg
F
ind(D)
j,r demand for composite factor by indj,r
FORimp(D)g foreign product g demanded by impg
FOR(S)g supply of foreign product g by for
Gv aggregate government consumption expenditure (with valuation v)
GDPDEF i GDP deflator index of type i ∈ PINDEX
GPI i government expenditure deflator index of type i ∈ PINDEX
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Variable Description
GRORj,r gross rate of return on Kj,r
GVAv• gross value added measures (with valuation v)
I
ind(D)
j,r investment demand of indj,r
Iv aggregate investment expenditure (with valuation v)
IMP (S)g (≡ Q(S)g,imp) supply of imported product g by impg
INCw,vr w income of hshr (with valuation v)
IPI i investment expenditure deflator index of type i ∈ PINDEX
K
ind(D)
j,r demand for capital by indj,r
K futurej,r future capital stock specific to indj,r
K
new(S)
j,r new capital constructed by indj,r
K
(S)
j,r capital endowment specific to production by indj,r
L
ind(D)
j,r demand for labour by indj,r
L
(S)
r supply of labour by hshr
LCI i labour cost index of type i ∈ PINDEX
LST vr lump-sum transfers from government to hshr (with valuation v)
MPI i imports deflator index of type i ∈ PINDEX
N
hsh(D)
r quantity of leisure demanded by hshr
NRORj,r net rate of return on Kj,r
NRORfuturej,r expected net rate of return on indj,r’s capital
OPI i output price index of type i ∈ PINDEX
PEXP ,c,forg price of export product g paid by for in c currency terms (the f.o.b.
export price)
PEXPg basic price of export product g
P F,indj,r price of composite factor paid by indj,r
PFOR,c,impg price of foreign product g paid by impg in c currency terms
PFORg basic price of foreign product g (the c.i.f. foreign currency price)
P IMPg (≡ PQg,imp) basic price of imported product g
PKj,r rental rate on Kj,r paid to hshr
PK,newj,r construction cost of K
new
j,r
PL,wr w wage rate paid to hshr
PQg,r basic price of product g from region r (≡ output price for indj,r
with g = j)
P
Q,agent(p)
• price of (composite) product paid by agent (for the purpose of p if
agent = ind)
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Q
agent(p)(D)
• (composite) product demanded by agent (for the purpose of p if
agent = ind)
Q˘
agent(p)(D)
• demand for undelivered (composite) product by agent (for the pur-
pose of p if agent = ind)
Q
(S)
g,r output (supply) of product g in region r (by indj,r with g = j)
Q˘
(S)
g,s supply of undelivered product g from source s
SAV w,vr w saving of hshr (with valuation v)
SPN vr expenditure of hshr (with valuation v)
TIME r time endowment of hshr
TPI i net trade deflator index of type i ∈ PINDEX
tEXPg export tax rate on product g (negative for subsidy)
tFORg import tariff rate on foreign product g
tGST ,agentg effective rate of GST faced by agent on product g
t
Q,agent(p)
• commodity tax rate faced by agent (for the purpose of p if agent =
ind)
tL average labour income tax rate
Ur utility of hshr
Wwr real w income wage rate
XPI i exports deflator index of type i ∈ PINDEX
δj,r depreciation rate on Kj,r
φ nominal exchange rate (domestic $ per foreign $)
ϕ real exchange rate
ψEXPg co-efficient reflecting the height of the export demand curve for
product g
Ω economy-wide average expected net rate of return on capital
Ξi Price index of type i ∈ PINDEX
R
A/B
x Ratio of variable Ax to Bx
X•x,y/z Share of •x,y in •z (percent)
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Appendix D
List of Model Equations
This appendix lists all the equations of the core model. Note that the form of the equa-
tions appear slightly different to those in the main body because these are closer to the
computer-representation, while the equations in the text were simplified for clarity.
Household Demand Functions
Qhsh(D)r = Q
hsh
r (P
Q,hsh
r , P
L,atax
r ,ENDINC
atax,c$
r , SAV
atax,c$
r ;σ
hsh
r ) (D.1)
Nhsh(D)r = N
hsh
r (P
Q,hsh
r , P
L,atax
r ,ENDINC
atax,c$
r , SAV
atax,c$
r ;σ
hsh
r ) (D.2)
Qhsh(D)g,r = Q
hsh
g,r (Q
hsh(D)
r , P
Q,hsh
h,r |h ;σQ,hshr ) (D.3)
Qhsh(D)g,o,r = Q
hsh
g,o,r(Q
hsh(D)
g,r , P
Q,hsh
g,a,r |a∈ORG ;σhshg,r ) (D.4)
Qhsh(D)g,x,r = Q
hsh
g,x,r(Q
hsh(D)
g,dom,r, P
Q,hsh
g,y,r |y ;σhshg,dom,r) (D.5)
Industry Demand Functions
Q
ind(D)
j,r = Q
ind
j,r (Q
(S)
g,r , P
Q,ind
j,r , P
F,ind
j,r ;σ
ind
j,r ) (D.6)
F
ind(D)
j,r = F
ind
j,r (Q
(S)
g,r , P
Q,ind
j,r , P
F,ind
j,r ;σ
ind
j,r ) (D.7)
L
ind(D)
j,r = L
ind
j,r (F
ind(D)
j,r , P
L,btax
r , P
K
j,r;σ
F,ind
j,r ) (D.8)
K
ind(D)
j,r = K
ind
j,r (F
ind(D)
j,r , P
L,btax
r , P
K
j,r;σ
F,ind
j,r ) (D.9)
Q
ind(p)(D)
g,j,r = Q
ind(p)
g,j,r (Q
ind(D)
j,r , P
Q,ind(p)
h,j,r |h ;σQ,ind(p)j,r ) (D.10)
Q
ind(p)(D)
g,o,j,r = Q
ind(p)
g,o,j,r (Q
ind(p)(D)
g,j,r , P
Q,ind(p)
g,a,j,r |a∈ORG ;σind(p)g,j,r ) (D.11)
Q
ind(p)(D)
g,x,j,r = Q
ind(p)
g,x,j,r (Q
ind(p)(D)
g,dom,j,r , P
Q,ind(p)
g,y,j,r |y ;σind(p)g,dom,j,r) (D.12)
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Government Demand Functions
Qgov(D)g = Q
gov
g (G
b$, PQ,govh |h ;σQ,gov) (D.13)
Qgov(D)g,o = Q
gov
g,o (Q
gov(D)
g , P
Q,gov
g,a |a∈ORG ;σgovg ) (D.14)
Qgov(D)g,x = Q
gov
g,x (Q
gov(D)
g,dom , P
Q,gov
g,y |y ;σgovg,dom) (D.15)
Exporting and Importing
Qexp(D)g = EXP
(S)
g (D.16)
Qexp(D)g,x = Q
exp
g,x (Q
exp(D)
g , P
Q,exp
g,y |y ;σexpg ) (D.17)
FORimp(D)g = IMP
(S)
g (D.18)
PEXP ,f$,forg =
(
EXP for(D)g
)−1/εEXPg · ψEXPg (D.19)
Investment Allocation
GRORj,r = 100×
PKj,r
PK,newj,r
(D.20)
NRORj,r = GRORj,r − δj,r (D.21)
R
GROR/NROR
j,r =
GRORj,r
NRORj,r
(D.22)
R
Knew/Kfuture
j,r = 100×
K
new(S)
j,r
K futurej,r
(D.23)
K futurej,r =
(
1− δj,r
100
)
K
(S)
j,r +K
new(S)
j,r (D.24)
NRORfuturej,r =
(
K futurej,r
K
(S)
j,r
)−βj,r
· NRORj,r (D.25)
NRORfuturej,r = Ω ∀j ∈ ENDIND (D.26)
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Market Clearing Conditions
Q˘(S)g,s =
∑
r
Q˘hsh(D)g,s,r +
∑
p
∑
j
∑
r
Q˘
ind(p)(D)
g,s,j,r + Q˘
gov(D)
g,s + Q˘
exp(D)
g,s (D.27)
K
(S)
j,r = K
ind(D)
j,r (D.28)
L(S)r =
∑
j
L
ind(D)
j,r (D.29)
K
new(S)
j,r = I
ind(D)
j,r (D.30)
EXP (S)g = EXP
for(D)
g (D.31)
FOR(S)g = FOR
imp(D)
g (D.32)
Zero Pure Profit Conditions
PQg,r · Q˘(S)g,r = PQ,indj,r ·Qind(D)j,r + P F,indj,r · F ind(D)j,r ∀g = j (D.33)
PK,newj,r ·Knew(S)j,r =
∑
g
P
Q,ind(K)
g,j,r ·Qind(K)(D)g,j,r (D.34)
P IMPg · IMP (S)g = PFOR,d$,impg · FORimp(D)g (D.35)
PEXPg · EXP (S)g = PQ,expg ·Qexp(D)g (D.36)
Purchase Prices
PQ,hshr ·Qhsh(D)r =
∑
g
PQ,hshg,r ·Qhsh(D)g,r (D.37)
PQ,hshg,r ·Qhsh(D)g,r =
∑
o
PQ,hshg,o,r ·Qhsh(D)g,o,r (D.38)
PQ,hshg,dom,r ·Qhsh(D)g,dom,r =
∑
x
PQ,hshg,x,r ·Qhsh(D)g,x,r (D.39)
PQ,hshg,s,r ·Qhsh(D)g,s,r = PQg,s · (1 + tQ,hshg,r + tGST ,hshg ) · Q˘hsh(D)g,s,r (D.40)
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PQ,indj,r ·Qind(D)j,r =
∑
g
P
Q,ind(Q)
g,j,r ·Qind(Q)(D)g,j,r (D.41)
P F,indj,r · F ind(D)j,r = PL,btaxr · Lind(D)j,r + PKj,r ·K ind(D)j,r (D.42)
P
Q,ind(p)
g,j,r ·Qind(p)(D)g,j,r =
∑
o
P
Q,ind(p)
g,o,j,r ·Qind(p)(D)g,o,j,r (D.43)
P
Q,ind(p)
g,dom,j,r ·Qind(p)(D)g,dom,j,r =
∑
x
P
Q,ind(p)
g,x,j,r ·Qind(p)(D)g,x,j,r (D.44)
P
Q,ind(p)
g,s,j,r ·Qind(p)(D)g,s,j,r = PQg,s · (1 + tQ,ind(p)g,j,r ) · Q˘ind(p)(D)g,s,j,r (D.45)
PQ,govg ·Qgov(D)g =
∑
o
PQ,govg,o ·Qgov(D)g,o (D.46)
PQ,govg,dom ·Qgov(D)g,dom =
∑
x
PQ,govg,x ·Qgov(D)g,x (D.47)
PQ,govg,s ·Qgov(D)g,s = PQg,s · (1 + tQ,govg ) · Q˘gov(D)g,s (D.48)
PQ,expg ·Qexp(D)g =
∑
x
PQ,expg,x ·Qexp(D)g,x (D.49)
PQ,expg,x ·Qexp(D)g,x = PQg,x · (1 + tQ,expg + tGST ,expg ) · Q˘exp(D)g,x (D.50)
PEXPg = (1− tEXPg ) · PEXP ,d$,forg (D.51)
PFOR,f$,impg = (1 + t
FOR
g ) · PFORg (D.52)
PEXP ,d$,forg = φ · PEXP ,f$,forg (D.53)
PFOR,d$,impg = φ · PFOR,f$,impg (D.54)
PL,ataxr = P
L,btax
r (1− tL) (D.55)
φ = 1 (D.56)
Household Endowment Income, Expenditure, Income, and Saving
SPN c$r =
APCwr
100
· INCw,c$r ∀r ∈ NZREG (D.57)
SPN c$r = P
Q,hsh
r ·Qhsh(D)r (D.58)
SPN b$r = [P
Q,hsh
r ] ·Qhsh(D)r (D.59)
SPN bQr = P
Q,hsh
r · [Qhsh(D)r ] (D.60)
SPN vNZ =
∑
r
SPN vr (D.61)
203
INCw,vr = WAGES
w,v
r + KRENTS
v
r + LST
v
r ∀r ∈ NZREG (D.62)
SAV w,vr = INC
w,v
r − SPN vr ∀r ∈ NZREG (D.63)
APCwr = 100− APSwr ∀r ∈ NZREG (D.64)
ENDINCw,c$r = P
L,w
r · TIME r +
∑
j
PKj,r ·K(S)j,r + LST c$r (D.65)
ENDINCw,b$r = [P
L,w
r ] · TIME r +
∑
j
[PKj,r] ·K(S)j,r + LSTb$r (D.66)
ENDINCw,bQr = P
L,w
r · [TIME r] +
∑
j
PKj,r · [K(S)j,r ] + LSTbQr (D.67)
L(S)r = TIME r −Nhsh(D)r (D.68)
Domestic Expenditure on GDP
Cv =
∑
r
SPN vr (D.69)
Ic$ =
∑
j
∑
r
PK,newj,r · I ind(D)j,r (D.70)
Ib$ =
∑
j
∑
r
[PK,newj,r ] · I ind(D)j,r (D.71)
IbQ =
∑
j
∑
r
PK,newj,r · [I ind(D)j,r ] (D.72)
Gc$ =
∑
g
PQ,govg ·Qgov(D)g (D.73)
GbQ =
∑
g
PQ,govg · [Qgov(D)g ] (D.74)
Trade Flows and the Trade Balance
EXPc$,d$,bas =
∑
g
PEXPg · EXP (S)g (D.75)
EXPc$,f$,bas =
1
φ
· EXPc$,d$,bas (D.76)
EXPc$,c,fob =
∑
g
PEXP ,c,forg · EXP for(D)g (D.77)
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IMPc$,c,bas =
∑
g
PFOR,c,impg · FORimp(D)g (D.78)
IMPc$,f$,cif =
∑
g
PFORg · FOR(S)g (D.79)
IMPc$,d$,cif = φ · IMPc$,f$,cif (D.80)
EXPb$,d$,bas =
∑
g
[PEXPg ] · EXP (S)g (D.81)
EXPb$,f$,bas =
1
[φ]
· EXPc$,d$,bas (D.82)
EXPb$,c,fob =
∑
g
[PEXP ,c,forg ] · EXP for(D)g (D.83)
IMPb$,c,bas =
∑
g
[PFOR,c,impg ] · FORimp(D)g (D.84)
IMPb$,f$,cif =
∑
g
[PFORg ] · FOR(S)g (D.85)
IMPb$,d$,cif = [φ] · IMPc$,f$,cif (D.86)
TRDBALv,c = EXPv,c,fob − IMPc$,c,cif (D.87)
Government Revenue and the Fiscal Balance
INCTAX c$ = tL ·
∑
j
∑
r
PL,btaxr · Lind(D)j,r (D.88)
DUTY c$ =
∑
g
tFORg · φ · PFORg · FORimp(D)g (D.89)
EXPSUBc$ = −
∑
g
tEXPg · PEXP ,d$,forg · EXP (S)g (D.90)
COMTAX c$ =
∑
g
∑
s
∑
p
∑
j
∑
r
(
PQg,s · tQ,hshg,r · Q˘hsh(D)g,s,r
+PQg,s · tQ,ind(p)g,j,r · Q˘ind(p)(D)g,s,j,r + PQg,s · tQ,govg · Q˘gov(D)g,s + PQg,r · tQ,expg · Q˘exp(D)g,r
)
(D.91)
GST c$ =
∑
g
∑
s
∑
r
(
PQg,s · tGST ,hshg · Q˘hsh(D)g,s,r + PQg,r · tGST ,expg · Q˘exp(D)g,r
)
(D.92)
INCTAX b$ = tL ·
∑
j
∑
r
[PL,btaxr ]L
ind(D)
j,r (D.93)
205
DUTY b$ =
∑
g
tFORg · [φ] · [PFORg ] · FORimp(D)g (D.94)
EXPSUBb$ = −
∑
g
tEXPg · [PEXP ,d$,forg ] · EXP (S)g (D.95)
COMTAX b$ =
∑
g
∑
s
∑
p
∑
j
∑
r
(
[PQg,s] · tQ,hshg,r · Q˘hsh(D)g,s,r
+[PQg,s] · tQ,ind(p)g,j,r · Q˘ind(p)(D)g,s,j,r + [PQg,s] · tQ,govg · Q˘gov(D)g,s + [PQg,r] · tQ,expg · Q˘exp(D)g,r
)
(D.96)
GSTb$ =
∑
g
∑
s
∑
r
(
[PQg,s] · tGST ,hshg · Q˘hsh(D)g,s,r + [PQg,r] · tGST ,expg · Q˘exp(D)g,r
)
(D.97)
GOVREV v = INCTAX v + DUTY v + COMTAX v + GST v − EXPSUBv (D.98)
GOVBALv = GOVREV v −Gv −
∑
r
LST vr (D.99)
Labour Market Measures
EMP j,r = [P
L,btax
r ] · Lind(D)j,r (D.100)
EMP j,NZ =
∑
r
EMP j,r (D.101)
EMP r =
∑
j
EMP j,r ∀r ∈ NZREG (D.102)
Factor Incomes and Gross Value Added
WAGESw,c$j,r = P
L,w
r · Lind(D)j,r (D.103)
WAGESw,b$j,r = [P
L,w
r ] · Lind(D)j,r (D.104)
WAGESw,bQj,r = P
L,w
r · [Lind(D)j,r ] (D.105)
WAGESw,vj,NZ =
∑
r
WAGESw,vj,r (D.106)
WAGESw,vr =
∑
j
WAGESw,vj,r ∀r ∈ NZREG (D.107)
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KRENTS c$j,r = P
K
j,r ·K ind(D)j,r (D.108)
KRENTSb$j,r = [P
K
j,r] ·K ind(D)j,r (D.109)
KRENTSbQj,r = P
K
j,r · [K ind(D)j,r ] (D.110)
KRENTS vj,NZ =
∑
r
KRENTS vj,r (D.111)
KRENTS vr =
∑
j
KRENTS vj,r ∀r ∈ NZREG (D.112)
GVAvj,r = WAGES
btax,v
j,r + KRENTS
v
j,r ∀r ∈ NZREG (D.113)
GVAvr = WAGES
btax,v
r + KRENTS
v
r ∀r ∈ NZREG (D.114)
Output and Investment
Ic$j,r = P
K,new
j,r · I ind(D)j,r (D.115)
Ib$j,r = [P
K,new
j,r ] · I ind(D)j,r (D.116)
IbQj,r = P
K,new
j,r · [I ind(D)j,r ] (D.117)
Ivj,NZ =
∑
r
Ivj,r (D.118)
Ivr =
∑
j
Ivj,r ∀r ∈ NZREG (D.119)
OUTPUT c$j,r = P
Q
g,r · Q˘(S)g,r ∀g = j (D.120)
OUTPUTb$j,r = [P
Q
g,r] · Q˘(S)g,r ∀g = j (D.121)
OUTPUTbQj,r = P
Q
g,r · [Q˘(S)g,r ] ∀g = j (D.122)
OUTPUT vj,NZ =
∑
r
OUTPUT vj,r (D.123)
OUTPUT vr =
∑
j
OUTPUT vj,r ∀r ∈ NZREG (D.124)
Capital Stocks and Net Returns
KSTOCK j,r = K
(S)
j,r (D.125)
KSTOCK j,NZ =
∑
r
K
(S)
j,r (D.126)
KSTOCK r =
∑
j
K
(S)
j,r ∀r ∈ NZREG (D.127)
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NRTRN j,r = KRENTS
c$
j,r −
δj,r
100
· PK,newj,r ·K(S)j,r (D.128)
NRTRN j,NZ =
∑
r
NRTRN j,r (D.129)
NRTRN r =
∑
j
NRTRN j,r ∀r ∈ NZREG (D.130)
NRORj,NZ = 100 · NRTRN j,NZ∑
r P
K,new
j,r ·K(S)j,r
(D.131)
NRORr = 100 · NRTRN r∑
j P
K,new
j,r ·K(S)j,r
∀r ∈ NZREG (D.132)
Measures of GDP and Domestic Saving
GDPEXPv = Cv + Iv +Gv + TRDBALv,d$ (D.133)
GDPINC v =
∑
r
INC btax,vr + GOVREV
v −
∑
r
LST vr (D.134)
GDPVAv = GVAv + GOVREV v − INCTAX v (D.135)
SAV v =
∑
r
SAV atax,vr + GOVBAL
v (D.136)
Price Indices
ΞF =
√
ΞP · ΞL (D.137)
GDPDEFP =
GDPEXPc$
GDPEXPb$
(D.138)
GDPDEFL =
GDPEXPbQ
[GDPEXPc$]
(D.139)
CPIP =
Cc$
Cb$
(D.140)
CPI L =
CbQ
[Cc$]
(D.141)
IPIP =
Ic$
Ib$
(D.142)
IPI L =
IbQ
[Ic$]
(D.143)
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GPIP =
Gc$
Gb$
(D.144)
GPI L =
GbQ
[Gc$]
(D.145)
XPIP,t =
EXPc$,d$,t
EXPb$,d$,t
∀t ∈ {bas, fob} (D.146)
XPI L,t =
EXPbQ,d$,t
[EXPc$,d$,t]
∀t ∈ {bas, fob} (D.147)
MPIP,t =
IMPc$,d$,t
IMPb$,d$,t
∀t ∈ {bas, cif} (D.148)
MPI L,t =
IMPbQ,d$,t
[IMPc$,d$,t]
∀t ∈ {bas, cif} (D.149)
TPIP =
TRDBALc$,d$
TRDBALb$,d$
(D.150)
TPI L =
TRDBALbQ,d$
[TRDBALc$,d$]
(D.151)
CPIPr =
SPN c$r
SPN b$r
(D.152)
CPI Lr =
SPN bQr
[SPN c$r ]
(D.153)
IPIPr =
I c$r
I b$r
(D.154)
IPI Lr =
I bQr
[I c$r ]
(D.155)
IPIPj =
I c$j
I b$j
(D.156)
IPI Lj =
I bQj
[I c$j ]
(D.157)
OPIPr =
OUTPUT c$r
OUTPUTb$r
∀r ∈ NZREG (D.158)
OPI Lr =
OUTPUTbQr
[OUTPUT c$r ]
∀r ∈ NZREG (D.159)
OPIPj =
OUTPUT c$j,NZ
OUTPUTb$j,NZ
(D.160)
OPI Lj =
OUTPUTbQj,NZ
[OUTPUT c$j,NZ]
(D.161)
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LCIP,wr =
WAGESw,c$r
WAGESw,b$r
∀r ∈ NZREG (D.162)
LCI L,wr =
WAGESw,bQr
[WAGESw,c$r ]
∀r ∈ NZREG (D.163)
LCIP,wj =
WAGESw,c$j,NZ
WAGESw,b$j,NZ
(D.164)
LCI L,wj =
WAGESw,bQj,NZ
[WAGESw,c$j,NZ]
(D.165)
Real Prices
Wwr =
LCI F,wr
CPI Fr
∀r ∈ NZREG (D.166)
ϕ = φ · MPI
F,cif
GDPDEFF
(D.167)
Household Welfare
CV r =
Ur − [Ur]
Ur
·
(
ENDINC atax,c$r − SAV atax,c$r
)
(D.168)
EV r =
Ur − [Ur]
[Ur]
·
(
[ENDINC atax,c$r ]− [SAV atax,c$r ]
)
(D.169)
Selected Shares and Ratios
XI,b$j,r/tot = 100×
[PK,newj,r ] · I ind(D)j,r
Ib$
(D.170)
XGDP ,vC/tot = 100×
Cv
GDPEXP
(D.171)
XGDP ,vI/tot = 100×
Iv
GDPEXP
(D.172)
XGDP ,vG/tot = 100×
Gv
GDPEXP
(D.173)
XGDP ,vEXP/tot = 100×
EXPv,d$,fob
GDPEXP
(D.174)
XGDP ,vIMP/tot = 100×
IMPv,d$,cif
GDPEXP
(D.175)
RKSTOCK rEMPr =
KSTOCK r
EMP r
(D.176)
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Appendix E
Solutions to Constrained
Optimisation Problems
This appendix lists analytical solutions to the utility maximisation problem when the
objective is either Leontief, Cobb-Douglas, or Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES),
and also the expenditure minimisation problem when the constraint is any of these.
Utility Maximisation
A general form of the utility maximisation problem is:
Maximise U = f(Q1, Q2, ..., Qn) subject to
n∑
i=1
PiQi = E
CES Case
U = v ·
(
n∑
i=1
ai ·Q
σ−1
σ
i
) σ
σ−1
(0 < σ <∞ but σ 6= 1, and ∑ni=1 ai = 1)
where σ is the constant elasticity of substitution.
Solution:1
Qi =
ai
σPi
−σ∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ · E ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
1The parameter v does not affect the solution; it simply scales the utility function
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When σ = 0 or σ = 1 the demand functions derived from maximising a CES objective
are replaced by those from Leontief and Cobb-Douglas respectively as the CES function
is not defined but converges to these latter functions for those values of σ.
Leontief Case
U = v ·min
(
Q1
a1
,
Q2
a2
, ...,
Qn
an
)
(and
∑n
i=1 ai = 1)
Solution:
Qi =
ai∑n
j=1 Pjaj
· E ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
Cobb-Douglas Case
U = v ·
n∏
i=1
Qaii (and
∑n
i=1 ai = 1)
Solution:
Qi =
ai
Pi
· E ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
Expenditure Minimisation
A general form of the expenditure (cost) minimisation problem is:
Minimise
n∑
i=1
PiQi subject to Q = f(Q1, Q2, ..., Qn)
CES Case
Q = v ·
(
n∑
i=1
ai ·Q
σ−1
σ
i
) σ
σ−1
(0 < σ <∞ but σ 6= 1, and ∑ni=1 ai = 1)
where σ is the constant elasticity of substitution.
213
Solution:2
Qi =
ai
σPi
−σ(∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ
) σ
σ−1
· Q
v
∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
As above, these demand functions are replaced by those for Leontief and Cobb-Douglas
when σ = 0 and σ = 1 respectively.
Leontief Case
Q = v ·min
(
Q1
a1
,
Q2
a2
, ...,
Qn
an
)
(and
∑n
i=1 ai = 1)
Solution:
Qi = ai · Q
v
∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
Cobb-Douglas Case
Q = v ·
n∏
i=1
Qaii (and
∑n
i=1 ai = 1)
Solution:
Qi =
Q
v
·
n∏
j=1
(
ai · Pj
aj · Pi
)aj
∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
2An alternative expression is:
Qi =
Q
v
·
 n∑
j=1
aj ·
(
ai · Pj
aj · Pi
)1−σ σ1−σ ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
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Appendix F
Linearisation of Demand Functions
A result from appendix E is that the demand functions derived from the maximisation of
a CES objective function subject to an expenditure constraint are:
Qi =
ai
σPi
−σ∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ · E ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
These demand functions can be linearised as follows:
dQi
Qi
=
d(ai
σPi
−σ)
aiσPi
−σ −
d(
∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ)∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ +
dE
E
∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
⇒ dQi
Qi
= −σdPi
Pi
−
∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ d(ajσPj1−σ)
ajσPj
1−σ∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ +
dE
E
∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
⇒ dQi
Qi
= −σdPi
Pi
− (1− σ)
n∑
k=1
ak
σPk
1−σ∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ
dPk
Pk
+
dE
E
∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
⇒ dQi
Qi
= −σdPi
Pi
− (1− σ)
n∑
k=1
Pk ·Qk
E
dPk
Pk
+
dE
E
∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
Making the following substitutions,
qi =
dQi
Qi
pi =
dPi
Pi
Xk =
Pk ·Qk
E
e =
dE
E
the linearised equation can be written:
qi = −σpi − (1− σ)
n∑
k=1
Xkpk + e ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
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Some useful alternative ways of writing the linearised demand functions are:
qi = e− (σ + (1− σ)Xi)pi − (1− σ)
∑
k 6=i
Xkpk ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
and qi = e−
n∑
k=1
Xkpk − σ(pi −
n∑
k=1
Xkpk) ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
It can easily be seen that qi = e − pi in the Cobb-Douglas (σ = 1) case and qi =
e−∑nk=1Xkpk in the Leontief (σ = 0) case.
Appendix E also states that the demand functions derived from the minimisation of
expenditure subject to a CES constraint function are:
Qi =
ai
σPi
−σ(∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ
) σ
σ−1
· Q
v
∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
The demand functions can be linearised in a similar fashion to the above:
dQi
Qi
=
d(ai
σPi
−σ)
aiσPi
−σ −
d(
∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ)
σ
σ−1
(
∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ)
σ
σ−1
+
dQ
Q
∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
⇒ dQi
Qi
= −σdPi
Pi
− σ
σ − 1 ·
d(
∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ)∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ +
dQ
Q
∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
⇒ dQi
Qi
= −σdPi
Pi
− σ
σ − 1 ·
∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ d(ajσPj1−σ)
ajσPj
1−σ∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ +
dQ
Q
∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
⇒ dQi
Qi
= −σdPi
Pi
+ σ
n∑
k=1
ak
σPk
1−σ∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ
dPk
Pk
+
dQ
Q
∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
⇒ dQi
Qi
= −σdPi
Pi
+ σ
n∑
k=1
Pk ·Qk∑n
j=1 Pj ·Qj
dPk
Pk
+
dQ
Q
∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
Making the following substitutions,
qi =
dQi
Qi
pi =
dPi
Pi
Xk =
Pk ·Qk∑n
j=1 Pj ·Qj
q =
dQ
Q
the linearised equation can be written
qi = −σpi + σ
n∑
k=1
Xkpk + q ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
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Some useful alternative ways of writing the linearised demand functions are:
qi = q − σ((1−Xi)pi −
∑
k 6=i
Xkpk) ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
and qi = q − σ(pi −
n∑
k=1
Xkpk) ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
It follows that qi = q− (pi−
∑n
k=1 Xkpk) in the Cobb-Douglas (σ = 1) case and qi = q
in the Leontief (σ = 0) case.
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Appendix G
Labour Supply Functions
It was shown in appendix E that if a CES utility function with substitution elasticity σ
is maximised subject to a budget constraint, the solution is:
Qi =
ai
σPi
−σ∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ · E ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}
The solution yields a labour supply curve when one of the Qi’s is leisure and the associated
price is interpreted as the wage rate. Let leisure be Qn and the wage rate Pn. Given
endowments of time T and capital K, we can derive the labour supply L as follows:1
Let Qn = T − L and E = PnT + PKK.
Then T − L = an
σPn
−σ∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ · (PnT + PKK)
Rearranging, L =
(
1− an
σPn
1−σ∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ
)
· T −
(
an
σPn
−σ∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ
)
· PKK
If the utility function is Leontief then the labour supply function is:
L =
(
1− an Pn∑n
j=1 aj Pj
)
· T −
(
an∑n
j=1 aj Pj
)
· PKK
1For simplicity saving is ignored here. To consider its implications, the capital income PKK can be
thought of as net of saving.
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while if it is Cobb-Douglas, the labour supply function is:
L = (1− an) · T − an
Pn
· PKK
The elasticity of labour supply with respect to the wage rate depends on the magnitude
of the time endowment. We can see this by deriving the labour supply elasticity from the
function obtained using Cobb-Douglas utility:2
∂L
∂Pn
=
an
P 2n
· PKK
⇒  = ∂L
∂Pn
Pn
L
= an
PKK
PnL
= an
PKK
(1− an) · PnT − an · PKK
The value of an is calibrated to the benchmark equilibrium values (in square brackets)
as:
an =
[Pn] [Qn]
[Pn] [T ] + [PK ] [K]
It can easily be shown that the elasticity evaluated at the benchmark equilibrium is given
by:
[] =
[PK ] [K]
[Pn] [T ] + [PK ] [K]
· [T ]− [L]
[L]
The larger the magnitude of the time endowment relative to the capital stock, or the
smaller the time endowment relative to labour supply, the lower the elasticity will be in
the benchmark equilibrium. However the time endowment is measured or calculated, it
should be checked that it yields a believable labour supply elasticity.
2Deriving the labour supply elasticity in equilibrium when utility is CES or Leontief involves consid-
erably more complex and tedious algebra. Given that the proposition is proven for Cobb-Douglas utility,
it is reasonable to expect the same holds for these other functional forms.
Appendix H
Endogenous Investment Allocation
It can be shown that the set of equations given in Chapter 2 that constitute the endoge-
nous investment module reduces to an investment allocation decision given current and
(equalised) expected future net rates of return, depreciation rates, and current capital
stock levels. Starting off with the relevant set of equations from the chapter, with the
definition of real investment shares (equation (2.31)) slightly rearranged in (H.3):
I
ind(D)
j,r = K
new(S)
j,r (H.1)
Ib$ =
∑
j
∑
r
[PK,newj,r ] · I ind(D)j,r (H.2)
I
ind(D)
j,r =
1
[PK,newj,r ]
XI,b$j,r/tot
100
Ib$ (H.3)
K futurej,r =
(
1− δj,r
100
)
K
(S)
j,r +K
new(S)
j,r (H.4)
GrossRORj,r = 100×
PKj,r
PK,newj,r
(H.5)
NetRORj,r = GrossRORj,r − δj,r (H.6)
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R
GrossROR/NetROR
j,r =
GrossRORj,r
NetRORj,r
(H.7)
R
Knew/Kfuture
j,r = 100×
K
new(S)
j,r
K futurej,r
(H.8)
NetRORfuturej,r =
(
K futurej,r
K
(S)
j,r
)−βj,r
· NetRORj,r (H.9)
NetRORfuturej,r = Ω (H.10)
We substitute (H.1) into (H.2) and (H.3), (H.10) into (H.9), drop (H.8) and (H.7),
and set [PK,newj,r ] = 1 to reduce the system to:
Ib$ =
∑
j
∑
r
K
new(S)
j,r (H.11)
K
new(S)
j,r =
XI,b$j,r/tot
100
Ib$ (H.12)
K futurej,r =
(
1− δj,r
100
)
K
(S)
j,r +K
new(S)
j,r (H.13)
GrossRORj,r = 100×
PKj,r
PK,newj,r
(H.14)
NetRORj,r = GrossRORj,r − δj,r (H.15)
Ω =
(
K futurej,r
K
(S)
j,r
)−βj,r
· NetRORj,r (H.16)
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We then substitute (H.12) into (H.11) and (H.13), and (H.14) into (H.15), then rear-
range (H.16) for K futurej,r . The system is now:
100 =
∑
j
∑
r
XI,b$j,r/tot (H.17)
K futurej,r =
(
1− δj,r
100
)
K
(S)
j,r +
XI,b$j,r/tot
100
Ib$ (H.18)
NetRORj,r = 100×
PKj,r
PK,newj,r
− δj,r (H.19)
K futurej,r =
(
NetRORj,r
Ω
) 1
βj,r
K
(S)
j,r (H.20)
Eliminating K futurej,r in (H.20) using (H.18) and rearranging gives:∑
j
∑
r
XI,b$j,r/tot = 100 (H.21)
NetRORj,r = 100×
PKj,r
PK,newj,r
− δj,r (H.22)
XI,b$j,r/tot
100
=
1
Ib$
((
NetRORj,r
Ω
) 1
βj,r −
(
1− δj,r
100
))
K
(S)
j,r (H.23)
Analytically, the investment allocation problem is to find a solution to (H.23) subject to
(H.21) and the definition of NetRORj,r in (H.22). Even if NetRORj,r, βj,r, and δj,r do not
vary over regions for a given industry j, XI,b$j,r/tot will as long as K
(S)
j,r does. The larger a
region’s current capital stock, the more investment is allocated to it, ceteris paribus.
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Appendix I
Regional Consumption and
Propensities to Save
Regional propensities to consume and save relative to the national average depend on how
consumption is distributed across regions in the initial equilibrium. Using labour shares
means:
[XSPNr/tot ] = [X
LABOUR
r/tot ]
⇒ [SPN
c$
r ]
[SPN c$NZ]
=
[WAGES atax,c$r ]
[WAGES atax,c$NZ ]
⇒ [SPN
c$
r ]
[WAGES atax,c$r ]
=
[SPN c$NZ]
[WAGES atax,c$NZ ]
⇒ [SPN
c$
r ]
[INC atax,c$r ]
=
[WAGES atax,c$r ]
[INC atax,c$r ]
× [SPN
c$
NZ]
[WAGES atax,c$NZ ]
⇒ [APC
atax
r ]
100
=
[WAGES atax,c$r ]
[INC atax,c$r ]
× [SPN
c$
NZ]
[WAGES atax,c$NZ ]
⇒ [APS
atax
r ]
100
= 1− [INC
atax,c$
r ]− [KRENTS c$r ]
[INC atax,c$r ]
× [SPN
c$
NZ]
[WAGES atax,c$NZ ]
⇒ [APS
atax
r ]
100
=
[WAGES atax,c$NZ ]− [SPN c$NZ]
[WAGES atax,c$NZ ]
+
[KRENTS c$r ]
[INC atax,c$r ]
× [SPN
c$
NZ]
[WAGES atax,c$NZ ]
Therefore, the higher the share of capital rents in regional income, the higher the region’s
propensity to save.
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Appendix J
Conversion Factors
This appendix lists the factors used for converting demographic and labour market mea-
sures between persons, FTEs, and IOunits.
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Conversion Factors – FTEs → persons
Industry
Region
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
AGRI 1.1436 1.1380 1.1197 1.1210 1.1042
FOLO 1.1099 1.0785 1.0609 1.0924 1.0571
FISH 1.0787 1.1316 1.0990 1.0868 1.0813
MINE 1.0421 1.0606 1.0306 1.0450 1.0273
OIGA 1.0000 1.0000 1.0191 0.0000 0.0000
PETR 0.0000 0.0000 1.0625 0.0000 0.0000
FDBT 1.0747 1.1092 1.0559 1.0627 1.0530
TWPM 1.0759 1.0760 1.0737 1.0907 1.0921
CHNM 1.0416 1.0467 1.0328 1.0430 1.0760
METL 1.0417 1.0454 1.0435 1.0478 1.0362
EQFO 1.0473 1.0528 1.0563 1.0473 1.0518
UTIL 1.0519 1.0342 1.0518 1.0567 1.0617
CONS 1.0566 1.0543 1.0556 1.0523 1.0517
ACCR 1.2426 1.2658 1.2683 1.2623 1.2418
CMIF 1.0697 1.0713 1.1280 1.1136 1.1359
PROP 1.1222 1.1392 1.1315 1.1525 1.1441
RBUS 1.1029 1.0949 1.1311 1.1328 1.1356
GOVT 1.0441 1.0423 1.0519 1.0571 1.0696
EDUC 1.1706 1.1732 1.1837 1.2019 1.1972
HEAL 1.1474 1.1659 1.1737 1.1999 1.2064
CUPE 1.1719 1.1630 1.1850 1.1925 1.1812
OWND 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
WHOL 1.0646 1.0728 1.0780 1.0731 1.0834
RETT 1.2062 1.2097 1.1959 1.2190 1.2025
TRAN 1.0632 1.0592 1.0822 1.0669 1.0718
All 1.1128 1.1165 1.1289 1.1351 1.1339
Table J.1: Conversion Factors – FTEs → persons
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Conversion Factors – IOunits → FTEs
Industry
Region
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
AGRI 0.0421 0.0882 0.0253 0.0625 0.0196
FOLO 0.0113 0.0337 0.0104 0.0187 0.0122
FISH 0.0133 0.0579 0.0181 0.1196 0.0121
MINE 0.0295 0.1180 0.0215 0.0104 0.0236
OIGA 0.0090 0.0041 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000
PETR 0.0000 0.0000 0.1010 0.0000 0.0000
FDBT 0.0181 0.0257 0.0174 0.0330 0.0128
TWPM 0.0281 0.0361 0.0195 0.0304 0.0194
CHNM 0.0122 0.0149 0.0791 0.0149 0.0121
METL 0.0177 0.0215 0.0174 0.0167 0.0185
EQFO 0.0169 0.0167 0.0220 0.0264 0.0206
UTIL 0.0153 0.0091 0.0140 0.0265 0.0139
CONS 0.0321 0.0354 0.0315 0.0395 0.0290
ACCR 0.0492 0.0552 0.0488 0.0698 0.0414
CMIF 0.0171 0.0156 0.0185 0.0184 0.0176
PROP 0.0473 0.0565 0.0515 0.0567 0.0453
RBUS 0.0225 0.0257 0.0260 0.0294 0.0263
GOVT 0.0154 0.0112 0.0156 0.0174 0.0149
EDUC 0.0221 0.0264 0.0242 0.0271 0.0201
HEAL 0.0271 0.0272 0.0269 0.0305 0.0236
CUPE 0.0224 0.0254 0.0252 0.0290 0.0222
OWND 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
WHOL 0.0169 0.0181 0.0197 0.0221 0.0164
RETT 0.0290 0.0352 0.0304 0.0395 0.0273
TRAN 0.0154 0.0179 0.0226 0.0232 0.0166
All 0.0223 0.0226 0.0248 0.0300 0.0214
Table J.2: Conversion Factors – IOunits → FTEs
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Appendix K
Calibration of Demand Functions
The demand functions presented in appendix E are calibrated by fixing the variables at
their benchmark equilibrium values and solving for the coefficients.
Demands from Utility Maximisation
Case Demand function Calibration
Leontief Qi =
ai∑n
j=1 Pjaj
· E ai = [Qi]
[E]
(K.1)
Cobb−Douglas Qi = ai
Pi
· E ai = [Pi][Qi]
[E]
(K.2)
CES Qi =
ai
σPi
−σ∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ · E ai =
[Pi][Qi]
1/σ∑n
j=1[Pj][Qj]
1/σ
(K.3)
Demands from Expenditure Minimisation
Case Demand function Calibration
Leontief Qi = ai · Q
v
ai =
[Qi]
[Q]
(K.4)
Cobb−Douglas Qi = Q
v
·
n∏
j=1
(
ai · Pj
aj · Pi
)aj
ai =
[Pi][Qi]
[Q]
(K.5)
CES Qi =
ai
σPi
−σ(∑n
j=1 aj
σPj
1−σ
) σ
σ−1
· Q
v
ai =
[Pi][Qi]
1/σ∑n
j=1[Pj][Qj]
1/σ
(K.6)
The v coefficients are calibrated consistent with the mixing function once the ai coef-
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ficients have been determined. For example, for the Leontief case:
v =
[Q]
min
(
[Q1]
a1
, ..., [Qn]
an
)
Proofs of the above calibrating calculations use a variety of methods. The solutions
K.2 and K.4 can be found through simple rearrangement. Dixon et al. (1992, p. 92)
demonstrate K.5 using the first-order conditions of the expenditure minimisation problem.
Solutions K.1, K.3, and K.6 can only be proven through substitution. The first of these
is straight-forward but demonstrating the CES solutions requires some detailed algebra.1
Proof by substitution is as follows:
Let
V =
(
n∑
j=1
[Pj][Qj]
1/σ
)−1
Then,
Qi =
[Pi]
σ[Qi]V
σ[Pi]
−σ(∑n
j=1 [Pj]
σ[Qj]V σ[Pj]
1−σ
) σ
σ−1
· [Q]
v
⇒ Qi = [Qi]V
σ(∑n
j=1 [Pj][Qj]
) σ
σ−1
V
σ2
σ−1
·
(
n∑
k=1
ak ·Q
σ−1
σ
k
) σ
σ−1
⇒ Qi = [Qi]V
σ
1−σ(∑n
j=1 [Pj][Qj]
) σ
σ−1
·
(
n∑
k=1
[Pk][Qk]V
) σ
σ−1
⇒ Qi = [Qi]V
σ
1−σ(∑n
j=1 [Pj][Qj]
) σ
σ−1
·
(∑n
k=1 [Pk][Qk]
) σ
σ−1
V
σ
1−σ
⇒ Qi = [Qi]
That is, ai =
[Pi][Qi]
1/σ∑n
j=1[Pj ][Qj ]
1/σ is a valid calibration for any given set of prices {[P1], ..., [Pn]}.
Similar reasoning can be used for the proof of (K.3).
1The MONASH version of K.6 is found in Dixon & Rimmer (2002, eq. 12.15, p. 127).
Appendix L
Walras’ Law
This appendix demonstrates that Walras’ Law holds for the core JENNIFER model pre-
sented in Chapter 2.
First, substitution of equations (2.4), (2.3), and the household budget constraint into
equation (2.107) gives:1
SAV c$ =
∑
r
SAV atax,c$r + GOVBAL
c$
=
∑
r
INC atax,c$r −
∑
r
SPN c$r + GOVBAL
c$
=
∑
r
PL,ataxr · L(S)r +
∑
j
∑
r
PKj,r ·K(S)j,r −
∑
r
PQ,hshr ·Qhsh(D)r + GOVBALc$
Factor market clearing conditions (2.48) and (2.47) then imply:
SAV c$ =
∑
j
∑
r
PL,ataxr · Lind(D)j,r +
∑
j
∑
r
PKj,r ·K ind(D)j,r −
∑
r
PQ,hshr ·Qhsh(D)r
+ GOVBALc$
Using the zero pure profits conditions (2.52), the purchase price definition for P F,indj,r
1An identity that emerges from the household agent’s utility maximisation subject to budget constraint
is:
SPN c$r = P
Q,hsh
r ·Qhsh(D)r
This definition is listed in the ninth subsection of appendix D.
233
234 APPENDIX L. WALRAS’ LAW
(2.60), and the definition of income tax revenue (2.42) we obtain:
SAV c$ =
∑
g
∑
r
PQg,r · Q˘(S)g,r −
∑
j
∑
r
PQ,indj,r ·Qind(D)j,r − INCTAX c$
−
∑
r
PQ,hshr ·Qhsh(D)r + GOVBALc$
Substituting in the definition of government balance and using the purchase price defini-
tions to derive an expression using basic prices gives us:
SAV c$ =
∑
g
∑
r
PQg,r · Q˘(S)g,r −
∑
g
∑
s
∑
j
∑
r
PQg,s · Q˘ind(Q)(D)g,s,j,r
−
∑
g
∑
s
∑
r
PQg,s · Q˘hsh(D)g,s,r + DUTY c$ − EXPSUBc$
−
∑
g
∑
s
PQg,s · Q˘gov(D)g,s
The market clearing equations (2.46) then imply:
SAV c$ =
∑
g
∑
x
∑
j
∑
r
PQg,x · Q˘ind(K)(D)g,x,j,r +
∑
g
∑
x
PQg,x · Q˘exp(D)g,x
−
∑
g
∑
j
∑
r
PQg,imp · Q˘ind(Q)(D)g,imp,j,r −
∑
g
∑
r
PQg,imp · Q˘hsh(D)g,imp,r
−
∑
g
PQg,imp · Q˘gov(D)g,imp + DUTY c$ − EXPSUBc$
And simplifying we obtain:
SAV c$ = Ic$ + EXPc$,d$,bas − IMPc$,d$,bas + DUTY c$ − EXPSUBc$
⇒ SAV c$ = Ic$ + TRDBALc$,d$
That is, the supply of finance equals the demand for finance.
Appendix M
Margins Demands: A Worked
Example
This appendix sets out a very simple numerical example to show the effects of different
assumptions regarding margin flows.
We begin with the following information from a balanced MRIO′ database of an econ-
omy with one margin (M), two other goods (1 and 2), and three regions (A, B, and
C):
MRIO′ CON
row/col A B C
M
R
IO
′ di
r 1
A 25 25 25
B 25 25 25
C 0 0 0
2
A 40 40 40
B 0 0 0
C 10 10 10
M
R
IO
′ ds
t
M
A 4 4 4
B 4 4 4
C 4 4 4
M
R
IO
′ sr
c
M
A 0 0 0
B 0 0 0
C 0 0 0
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The margin M has been treated as destination-type but not local. Consider the margin
demands of the household agent in region A. The agent will demand M from region y to
deliver product g from region x as follows:1
M
A B C
1
A 1 1 1
B 1 1 1
C 0 0 0
2
A 8/5 8/5 8/5
B 0 0 0
C 2/5 2/5 2/5
The agent’s demand for M from each region has simply been proportionately spread
(pro-rated) over their product demands.
If M is a local margin then the relevant part of MRIO′ changes to:2
MRIO′ CON
row/col A B C
M
R
IO
′ ds
t
M
A 12 0 0
B 0 12 0
C 0 0 12
Pro-rating over the product flows then gives the following margin demands for the
household agent in region A:
M
A B C
1
A 3 0 0
B 3 0 0
C 0 0 0
2
A 24/5 0 0
B 0 0 0
C 6/5 0 0
1These are the benchmark values of Q
hsh(D)
M,y,g,s,A
2For simplicity any RAS scaling necessitated by destabilisation of the MRIO′ has been ignored.
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If the margin service M is treated as a source-type margin instead, the MRIO′ data is:
MRIO′ CON
row/col A B C
M
R
IO
′ di
r 1
A 25 25 25
B 25 25 25
C 0 0 0
2
A 40 40 40
B 0 0 0
C 10 10 10
M
R
IO
′ ds
t
M
A 0 0 0
B 0 0 0
C 0 0 0
M
R
IO
′ sr
c
M
A 4 4 4
B 4 4 4
C 4 4 4
This time, margin from region y is only used to deliver products from that region, so
to determine the amount of M demanded from region y to deliver product g from region
x, we pro-rate the agent’s demand for M from y over all product flows (to the agent) from
region x where x = y, and set the other demands equal to zero. Thus the demands of
region A’s household agent are:
M
A B C
1
A 20/13 0 0
B 0 4 0
C 0 0 0
2
A 32/13 0 0
B 0 0 0
C 0 0 4
If M is also a border margin then the source-margin rows change to:
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MRIO′ CON
row/col A B C
M
R
IO
′ sr
c
M
A 0 6 6
B 6 0 6
C 6 6 0
Then pro-rating the margin demands as source-type margins gives the following margin
demands for the household agent:
M
A B C
1
A 0 0 0
B 0 6 0
C 0 0 0
2
A 0 0 0
B 0 0 0
C 0 0 6
Appendix N
The Extended MRIO Matrix
This appendix presents the extended version of the multi-regional input-output matrix
(MRIO′) as developed in chapter 3 and subsequently used to calibrate the JENNIFER
model for the simulations of that chapter and chapter 4. As the MRIO′ matrix is very
large, it is divided into parts with each part shown in a separate table labelled as indicated
in the diagram overleaf (table N.1).
Note that table cells showing “0.00” indicate a positive number less than 0.005 while
cells that are exactly zero are left empty. Zero rows and columns of the matrix are omitted
from the tables.
An electronic copy of the MRIO′ matrix is available in the Research Archive of the Vic-
toria University of Wellington Library at http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/, along-
side the electronic copy of this thesis Two versions are provided: one is formatted for
Microsoft Office Excel 2007, and has separate sheets displaying the gross value flows, the
shares of those flows in their column total, and the shares of those flows in their row to-
tal; the other version has only the gross value flows and is formatted as comma separated
values for importing into other software. In each version, the MRIO′ matrix is presented
as a single table of values rounded to four decimal places, with row and column labels as
shown in table N.1.
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MRIO′
Industries
row/col
AGRI FOLO FISH MINE OIGA PETR
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI ONI
di
re
ct
pr
od
u
ct
u
sa
ge
M
R
IO
′ di
r
AGRI
AKL 5.37 1.26 73.72 7.58 37.23 0.60 0.19 6.55 0.43 2.51 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
WLG 1.23 0.29 16.93 1.74 8.55 0.14 0.04 1.51 0.10 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ONI 72.39 17.05 993.50 102.15 501.78 8.03 2.62 88.31 5.84 33.82 0.06 0.01 0.20 0.02 0.34 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.12
CAN 7.56 1.78 103.79 10.67 52.42 0.84 0.27 9.22 0.61 3.53 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
OSI 36.48 8.59 500.71 51.48 252.89 4.05 1.32 44.51 2.94 17.05 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.06
FOLO
AKL 0.17 0.04 2.37 0.24 1.20 1.76 0.58 19.36 1.28 7.41 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
WLG 0.06 0.01 0.79 0.08 0.40 0.59 0.19 6.47 0.43 2.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ONI 1.94 0.46 26.66 2.74 13.46 19.79 6.46 217.53 14.39 83.32 0.05 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.27 0.07 0.01 0.42 0.08 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05
CAN 0.13 0.03 1.78 0.18 0.90 1.32 0.43 14.55 0.96 5.57 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OSI 0.75 0.18 10.23 1.05 5.17 7.59 2.48 83.47 5.52 31.97 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
FISH
AKL 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 1.02 0.20 3.38 0.28 5.70 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
WLG 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.04 0.66 0.05 1.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ONI 0.02 0.00 0.29 0.03 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.04 3.37 0.66 11.23 0.91 18.93 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.07
CAN 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.05 0.92 0.08 1.56 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
OSI 0.04 0.01 0.48 0.05 0.24 0.02 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.07 5.67 1.12 18.91 1.54 31.89 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.12
MINE
AKL 0.22 0.05 3.02 0.31 1.53 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.56 0.07 3.42 0.66 2.14 0.03 0.49 4.70 0.42
WLG 0.03 0.01 0.38 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.43 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.06 0.59 0.05
ONI 1.36 0.32 18.65 1.92 9.42 0.04 0.01 0.39 0.03 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.10 3.49 0.43 21.13 4.10 13.22 0.19 3.01 29.02 2.60
CAN 0.27 0.06 3.65 0.38 1.84 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.68 0.08 4.14 0.80 2.59 0.04 0.59 5.68 0.51
OSI 0.85 0.20 11.67 1.20 5.90 0.02 0.01 0.25 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.07 2.18 0.27 13.23 2.57 8.28 0.12 1.89 18.17 1.63
OIGA
AKL 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.25 0.05 0.16 0.01 0.22 2.09 3.40
WLG 0.02 0.01 0.32 0.03 0.16 0.64 0.08 3.89 0.75 2.43 0.22 3.36 32.31 52.64
ONI 0.22 0.05 3.05 0.31 1.54 6.18 0.77 37.45 7.27 23.43 2.09 32.30 311.03 506.73
PETR ONI 10.27 2.42 140.98 14.50 71.20 5.28 1.72 58.02 3.84 22.22 2.70 0.53 8.99 0.73 15.15 2.94 0.37 17.78 3.45 11.13 79.63
FDBT
AKL 2.48 0.58 34.06 3.50 17.20 0.04 0.01 0.41 0.03 0.16 1.03 0.20 3.42 0.28 5.76 0.13 0.02 0.76 0.15 0.48 0.00 0.01 0.06 1.23
WLG 0.42 0.10 5.78 0.59 2.92 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.58 0.05 0.98 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.21
ONI 4.81 1.13 65.96 6.78 33.31 0.07 0.02 0.80 0.05 0.31 1.99 0.39 6.62 0.54 11.16 0.24 0.03 1.48 0.29 0.93 0.00 0.01 0.11 2.38
CAN 1.11 0.26 15.28 1.57 7.72 0.02 0.01 0.19 0.01 0.07 0.46 0.09 1.53 0.12 2.58 0.06 0.01 0.34 0.07 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.55
OSI 3.34 0.79 45.86 4.72 23.16 0.05 0.02 0.56 0.04 0.21 1.38 0.27 4.60 0.37 7.76 0.17 0.02 1.03 0.20 0.64 0.00 0.01 0.08 1.65
TWPM
AKL 1.58 0.37 21.75 2.24 10.99 0.39 0.13 4.27 0.28 1.63 0.07 0.01 0.25 0.02 0.42 0.08 0.01 0.47 0.09 0.30 0.01 0.10 0.92 1.52
WLG 0.35 0.08 4.82 0.50 2.43 0.09 0.03 0.94 0.06 0.36 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.20 0.34
ONI 1.90 0.45 26.14 2.69 13.20 0.47 0.15 5.13 0.34 1.96 0.09 0.02 0.30 0.02 0.50 0.09 0.01 0.57 0.11 0.36 0.01 0.11 1.10 1.83
CAN 0.57 0.13 7.84 0.81 3.96 0.14 0.05 1.54 0.10 0.59 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.15 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.33 0.55
OSI 0.72 0.17 9.88 1.02 4.99 0.18 0.06 1.94 0.13 0.74 0.03 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.19 0.04 0.00 0.22 0.04 0.13 0.00 0.04 0.42 0.69
CHNM
AKL 20.29 4.78 278.53 28.64 140.68 1.79 0.59 19.69 1.30 7.54 0.18 0.04 0.60 0.05 1.01 0.69 0.09 4.15 0.81 2.60 0.05 0.71 6.81 9.04
WLG 4.02 0.95 55.18 5.67 27.87 0.35 0.12 3.90 0.26 1.49 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.20 0.14 0.02 0.82 0.16 0.51 0.01 0.14 1.35 1.79
ONI 0.78 0.18 10.68 1.10 5.40 0.07 0.02 0.76 0.05 0.29 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.26 0.35
CAN 6.29 1.48 86.32 8.88 43.60 0.56 0.18 6.10 0.40 2.34 0.06 0.01 0.19 0.02 0.31 0.21 0.03 1.29 0.25 0.80 0.01 0.22 2.11 2.80
OSI 3.08 0.73 42.27 4.35 21.35 0.27 0.09 2.99 0.20 1.14 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.15 0.10 0.01 0.63 0.12 0.39 0.01 0.11 1.03 1.37
METL
AKL 1.93 0.46 26.55 2.73 13.41 0.79 0.26 8.65 0.57 3.31 0.23 0.04 0.75 0.06 1.27 0.27 0.03 1.61 0.31 1.01 0.01 0.14 1.33 5.42
WLG 0.31 0.07 4.24 0.44 2.14 0.13 0.04 1.38 0.09 0.53 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.20 0.04 0.01 0.26 0.05 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.87
ONI 1.56 0.37 21.45 2.21 10.83 0.64 0.21 6.99 0.46 2.68 0.18 0.04 0.61 0.05 1.02 0.22 0.03 1.30 0.25 0.82 0.01 0.11 1.07 4.38
CAN 0.67 0.16 9.23 0.95 4.66 0.27 0.09 3.01 0.20 1.15 0.08 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.44 0.09 0.01 0.56 0.11 0.35 0.00 0.05 0.46 1.88
OSI 0.55 0.13 7.57 0.78 3.83 0.22 0.07 2.47 0.16 0.94 0.06 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.36 0.08 0.01 0.46 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.04 0.38 1.55
EQFO
AKL 2.07 0.49 28.35 2.91 14.32 0.28 0.09 3.13 0.21 1.20 1.77 0.35 5.91 0.48 9.96 0.14 0.02 0.86 0.17 0.54 0.02 0.28 2.69 4.46
WLG 0.36 0.09 4.98 0.51 2.52 0.05 0.02 0.55 0.04 0.21 0.31 0.06 1.04 0.08 1.75 0.03 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.47 0.78
ONI 1.09 0.26 15.01 1.54 7.58 0.15 0.05 1.66 0.11 0.64 0.94 0.19 3.13 0.25 5.28 0.08 0.01 0.46 0.09 0.29 0.01 0.15 1.42 2.36
CAN 0.63 0.15 8.64 0.89 4.37 0.09 0.03 0.96 0.06 0.37 0.54 0.11 1.80 0.15 3.04 0.04 0.01 0.26 0.05 0.16 0.01 0.09 0.82 1.36
OSI 0.39 0.09 5.34 0.55 2.70 0.05 0.02 0.59 0.04 0.23 0.33 0.07 1.11 0.09 1.88 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.51 0.84
UTIL
AKL 2.73 0.64 37.42 3.85 18.90 0.14 0.05 1.59 0.11 0.61 0.24 0.05 0.79 0.06 1.34 0.83 0.10 5.00 0.97 3.13 0.01 0.18 1.76 9.55
WLG 1.91 0.45 26.24 2.70 13.25 0.10 0.03 1.12 0.07 0.43 0.17 0.03 0.56 0.05 0.94 0.58 0.07 3.50 0.68 2.19 0.01 0.13 1.23 6.70
ONI 4.41 1.04 60.53 6.22 30.57 0.23 0.08 2.57 0.17 0.99 0.38 0.08 1.28 0.10 2.16 1.33 0.17 8.08 1.57 5.06 0.02 0.30 2.84 15.45
CAN 0.75 0.18 10.33 1.06 5.22 0.04 0.01 0.44 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.01 0.22 0.02 0.37 0.23 0.03 1.38 0.27 0.86 0.00 0.05 0.48 2.64
OSI 1.29 0.30 17.72 1.82 8.95 0.07 0.02 0.75 0.05 0.29 0.11 0.02 0.38 0.03 0.63 0.39 0.05 2.37 0.46 1.48 0.01 0.09 0.83 4.52
CONS
AKL 1.82 0.43 24.98 2.57 12.62 0.34 0.11 3.78 0.25 1.45 0.19 0.04 0.62 0.05 1.04 2.72 0.34 16.51 3.20 10.33 0.25 3.83 36.88 4.57
WLG 0.58 0.14 7.94 0.82 4.01 0.11 0.04 1.20 0.08 0.46 0.06 0.01 0.20 0.02 0.33 0.87 0.11 5.25 1.02 3.28 0.08 1.22 11.72 1.45
ONI 2.06 0.49 28.34 2.91 14.31 0.39 0.13 4.29 0.28 1.64 0.21 0.04 0.70 0.06 1.18 3.09 0.38 18.73 3.63 11.72 0.28 4.35 41.84 5.18
CAN 0.64 0.15 8.81 0.91 4.45 0.12 0.04 1.33 0.09 0.51 0.07 0.01 0.22 0.02 0.37 0.96 0.12 5.82 1.13 3.64 0.09 1.35 13.01 1.61
OSI 0.81 0.19 11.15 1.15 5.63 0.15 0.05 1.69 0.11 0.65 0.08 0.02 0.28 0.02 0.46 1.22 0.15 7.37 1.43 4.61 0.11 1.71 16.46 2.04
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MRIO′
Industries
row/col
FDBT TWPM CHNM METL EQFO
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
di
re
ct
pr
od
u
ct
u
sa
ge
M
R
IO
′ di
r
AGRI
AKL 86.77 14.79 169.20 38.78 117.58 1.78 0.40 2.17 0.64 0.82 0.23 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02
WLG 19.93 3.40 38.87 8.91 27.01 0.41 0.09 0.50 0.15 0.19 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
ONI 1169.46 199.33 2280.45 522.64 1584.71 24.02 5.37 29.29 8.64 11.06 3.05 0.60 0.12 0.93 0.46 0.32 0.05 0.27 0.11 0.09 1.08 0.19 0.58 0.33 0.21
CAN 122.17 20.82 238.23 54.60 165.55 2.51 0.56 3.06 0.90 1.15 0.32 0.06 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.02
OSI 589.39 100.46 1149.32 263.40 798.67 12.11 2.71 14.76 4.36 5.57 1.54 0.30 0.06 0.47 0.23 0.16 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.54 0.10 0.29 0.17 0.10
FOLO
AKL 0.47 0.08 0.92 0.21 0.64 17.69 3.95 21.57 6.36 8.14 0.14 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.04
WLG 0.16 0.03 0.31 0.07 0.21 5.91 1.32 7.20 2.13 2.72 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01
ONI 5.31 0.91 10.35 2.37 7.20 198.78 44.42 242.37 71.51 91.49 1.56 0.31 0.06 0.48 0.24 0.63 0.10 0.52 0.22 0.18 2.36 0.42 1.28 0.72 0.45
CAN 0.36 0.06 0.69 0.16 0.48 13.30 2.97 16.22 4.78 6.12 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.03
OSI 2.04 0.35 3.97 0.91 2.76 76.27 17.04 93.00 27.44 35.10 0.60 0.12 0.02 0.18 0.09 0.24 0.04 0.20 0.08 0.07 0.91 0.16 0.49 0.28 0.17
FISH
AKL 10.15 1.73 19.79 4.53 13.75 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01
WLG 1.98 0.34 3.87 0.89 2.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
ONI 33.67 5.74 65.66 15.05 45.62 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.03
CAN 2.77 0.47 5.40 1.24 3.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
OSI 56.72 9.67 110.61 25.35 76.86 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.28 0.05 0.15 0.09 0.05
MINE
AKL 0.46 0.08 0.90 0.21 0.63 0.22 0.05 0.26 0.08 0.10 7.57 1.49 0.29 2.32 1.14 4.67 0.76 3.85 1.63 1.36 0.35 0.06 0.19 0.11 0.07
WLG 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.96 0.19 0.04 0.29 0.14 0.59 0.10 0.49 0.21 0.17 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
ONI 2.86 0.49 5.57 1.28 3.87 1.33 0.30 1.62 0.48 0.61 46.76 9.22 1.79 14.33 7.06 28.83 4.67 23.76 10.06 8.38 2.15 0.39 1.16 0.66 0.41
CAN 0.56 0.10 1.09 0.25 0.76 0.26 0.06 0.32 0.09 0.12 9.16 1.81 0.35 2.81 1.38 5.65 0.91 4.65 1.97 1.64 0.42 0.08 0.23 0.13 0.08
OSI 1.79 0.30 3.49 0.80 2.42 0.83 0.19 1.02 0.30 0.38 29.28 5.77 1.12 8.97 4.42 18.05 2.92 14.88 6.30 5.25 1.35 0.24 0.73 0.41 0.26
OIGA
AKL 0.11 0.02 0.21 0.05 0.14 0.18 0.04 0.22 0.07 0.08 0.37 0.07 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
WLG 1.65 0.28 3.22 0.74 2.24 2.80 0.63 3.41 1.01 1.29 5.68 1.12 0.22 1.74 0.86 0.16 0.03 0.13 0.05 0.05
ONI 15.90 2.71 31.00 7.11 21.54 26.95 6.02 32.86 9.70 12.40 54.69 10.78 2.09 16.76 8.26 1.52 0.25 1.25 0.53 0.44
PETR ONI 14.04 2.39 27.38 6.27 19.02 39.30 8.78 47.91 14.14 18.09 87.92 17.33 3.36 26.95 13.28 17.38 2.82 14.33 6.06 5.05 40.04 7.16 21.63 12.26 7.70
FDBT
AKL 111.01 18.92 216.47 49.61 150.43 20.25 4.53 24.69 7.29 9.32 14.05 2.77 0.54 4.31 2.12 1.47 0.24 1.21 0.51 0.43 5.83 1.04 3.15 1.78 1.12
WLG 18.83 3.21 36.73 8.42 25.52 3.44 0.77 4.19 1.24 1.58 2.38 0.47 0.09 0.73 0.36 0.25 0.04 0.21 0.09 0.07 0.99 0.18 0.53 0.30 0.19
ONI 214.98 36.64 419.21 96.08 291.31 39.22 8.76 47.82 14.11 18.05 27.21 5.36 1.04 8.34 4.11 2.85 0.46 2.35 0.99 0.83 11.29 2.02 6.10 3.46 2.17
CAN 49.80 8.49 97.11 22.26 67.48 9.09 2.03 11.08 3.27 4.18 6.30 1.24 0.24 1.93 0.95 0.66 0.11 0.54 0.23 0.19 2.62 0.47 1.41 0.80 0.50
OSI 149.49 25.48 291.50 66.81 202.57 27.27 6.09 33.25 9.81 12.55 18.92 3.73 0.72 5.80 2.86 1.98 0.32 1.63 0.69 0.58 7.85 1.40 4.24 2.40 1.51
TWPM
AKL 14.25 2.43 27.78 6.37 19.31 168.07 37.56 204.93 60.46 77.36 34.08 6.72 1.30 10.45 5.15 8.40 1.36 6.92 2.93 2.44 51.00 9.13 27.56 15.61 9.81
WLG 3.16 0.54 6.15 1.41 4.28 37.22 8.32 45.39 13.39 17.13 7.55 1.49 0.29 2.31 1.14 1.86 0.30 1.53 0.65 0.54 11.30 2.02 6.10 3.46 2.17
ONI 17.12 2.92 33.39 7.65 23.20 202.01 45.14 246.31 72.67 92.98 40.96 8.07 1.57 12.55 6.19 10.10 1.64 8.32 3.52 2.94 61.30 10.97 33.12 18.77 11.79
CAN 5.13 0.88 10.01 2.29 6.96 60.57 13.53 73.86 21.79 27.88 12.28 2.42 0.47 3.76 1.86 3.03 0.49 2.49 1.06 0.88 18.38 3.29 9.93 5.63 3.53
OSI 6.47 1.10 12.62 2.89 8.77 76.35 17.06 93.10 27.47 35.14 15.48 3.05 0.59 4.75 2.34 3.82 0.62 3.14 1.33 1.11 23.17 4.15 12.52 7.09 4.46
CHNM
AKL 69.18 11.79 134.90 30.92 93.74 52.35 11.70 63.83 18.83 24.09 445.08 87.73 17.01 136.41 67.22 26.71 4.33 22.01 9.32 7.77 75.15 13.45 40.60 23.01 14.45
WLG 13.71 2.34 26.73 6.13 18.57 10.37 2.32 12.65 3.73 4.77 88.18 17.38 3.37 27.03 13.32 5.29 0.86 4.36 1.85 1.54 14.89 2.66 8.04 4.56 2.86
ONI 2.65 0.45 5.17 1.19 3.60 2.01 0.45 2.45 0.72 0.92 17.07 3.37 0.65 5.23 2.58 1.02 0.17 0.84 0.36 0.30 2.88 0.52 1.56 0.88 0.55
CAN 21.44 3.65 41.80 9.58 29.05 16.22 3.62 19.78 5.84 7.47 137.93 27.19 5.27 42.27 20.83 8.28 1.34 6.82 2.89 2.41 23.29 4.17 12.58 7.13 4.48
OSI 10.50 1.79 20.47 4.69 14.22 7.94 1.77 9.69 2.86 3.66 67.54 13.31 2.58 20.70 10.20 4.05 0.66 3.34 1.41 1.18 11.40 2.04 6.16 3.49 2.19
METL
AKL 31.12 5.30 60.69 13.91 42.17 22.61 5.05 27.56 8.13 10.40 40.34 7.95 1.54 12.36 6.09 252.31 40.88 207.94 88.00 73.36 200.98 35.96 108.59 61.53 38.65
WLG 4.97 0.85 9.70 2.22 6.74 3.61 0.81 4.40 1.30 1.66 6.45 1.27 0.25 1.98 0.97 40.32 6.53 33.23 14.06 11.72 32.11 5.75 17.35 9.83 6.18
ONI 25.14 4.29 49.03 11.24 34.07 18.26 4.08 22.27 6.57 8.41 32.59 6.42 1.25 9.99 4.92 203.84 33.02 167.99 71.09 59.26 162.37 29.05 87.73 49.71 31.22
CAN 10.82 1.84 21.10 4.83 14.66 7.86 1.76 9.58 2.83 3.62 14.02 2.76 0.54 4.30 2.12 87.71 14.21 72.29 30.59 25.50 69.87 12.50 37.75 21.39 13.44
OSI 8.88 1.51 17.31 3.97 12.03 6.45 1.44 7.86 2.32 2.97 11.51 2.27 0.44 3.53 1.74 71.99 11.66 59.33 25.11 20.93 57.34 10.26 30.98 17.55 11.03
EQFO
AKL 6.04 1.03 11.78 2.70 8.18 7.04 1.57 8.58 2.53 3.24 8.60 1.70 0.33 2.64 1.30 14.15 2.29 11.66 4.93 4.11 112.10 20.06 60.56 34.32 21.56
WLG 1.06 0.18 2.07 0.47 1.44 1.24 0.28 1.51 0.45 0.57 1.51 0.30 0.06 0.46 0.23 2.49 0.40 2.05 0.87 0.72 19.70 3.53 10.64 6.03 3.79
ONI 3.20 0.55 6.24 1.43 4.33 3.73 0.83 4.55 1.34 1.72 4.56 0.90 0.17 1.40 0.69 7.49 1.21 6.17 2.61 2.18 59.36 10.62 32.07 18.17 11.42
CAN 1.84 0.31 3.59 0.82 2.50 2.15 0.48 2.62 0.77 0.99 2.62 0.52 0.10 0.80 0.40 4.31 0.70 3.55 1.50 1.25 34.18 6.12 18.47 10.46 6.57
OSI 1.14 0.19 2.22 0.51 1.54 1.33 0.30 1.62 0.48 0.61 1.62 0.32 0.06 0.50 0.24 2.67 0.43 2.20 0.93 0.78 21.13 3.78 11.42 6.47 4.06
UTIL
AKL 23.34 3.98 45.52 10.43 31.63 35.49 7.93 43.27 12.77 16.34 25.50 5.03 0.97 7.82 3.85 36.32 5.88 29.93 12.67 10.56 10.66 1.91 5.76 3.26 2.05
WLG 16.37 2.79 31.92 7.32 22.18 24.89 5.56 30.35 8.95 11.46 17.88 3.53 0.68 5.48 2.70 25.47 4.13 20.99 8.88 7.41 7.48 1.34 4.04 2.29 1.44
ONI 37.75 6.43 73.62 16.87 51.16 57.40 12.83 69.99 20.65 26.42 41.25 8.13 1.58 12.64 6.23 58.75 9.52 48.42 20.49 17.08 17.24 3.09 9.32 5.28 3.32
CAN 6.44 1.10 12.57 2.88 8.73 9.80 2.19 11.95 3.52 4.51 7.04 1.39 0.27 2.16 1.06 10.03 1.62 8.26 3.50 2.92 2.94 0.53 1.59 0.90 0.57
OSI 11.06 1.88 21.56 4.94 14.98 16.81 3.76 20.50 6.05 7.74 12.08 2.38 0.46 3.70 1.82 17.20 2.79 14.18 6.00 5.00 5.05 0.90 2.73 1.55 0.97
CONS
AKL 0.88 0.15 1.72 0.39 1.20 3.40 0.76 4.15 1.22 1.57 9.36 1.84 0.36 2.87 1.41 2.40 0.39 1.98 0.84 0.70 23.88 4.27 12.90 7.31 4.59
WLG 0.28 0.05 0.55 0.13 0.38 1.08 0.24 1.32 0.39 0.50 2.97 0.59 0.11 0.91 0.45 0.76 0.12 0.63 0.27 0.22 7.59 1.36 4.10 2.32 1.46
ONI 1.00 0.17 1.95 0.45 1.36 3.86 0.86 4.71 1.39 1.78 10.62 2.09 0.41 3.25 1.60 2.72 0.44 2.24 0.95 0.79 27.09 4.85 14.64 8.29 5.21
CAN 0.31 0.05 0.61 0.14 0.42 1.20 0.27 1.46 0.43 0.55 3.30 0.65 0.13 1.01 0.50 0.85 0.14 0.70 0.29 0.25 8.43 1.51 4.55 2.58 1.62
OSI 0.39 0.07 0.77 0.18 0.53 1.52 0.34 1.85 0.55 0.70 4.18 0.82 0.16 1.28 0.63 1.07 0.17 0.88 0.37 0.31 10.66 1.91 5.76 3.26 2.05
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AKL 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.23 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.11 1.98 0.72 2.19 0.76 1.39 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.76 0.20 0.59 0.25 0.24
WLG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.46 0.16 0.50 0.17 0.32 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.05
ONI 0.17 0.12 0.27 0.05 0.08 3.16 1.03 3.66 1.12 1.44 26.71 9.66 29.56 10.26 18.69 1.51 0.68 0.57 0.37 0.22 10.31 2.68 7.95 3.33 3.18
CAN 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.33 0.11 0.38 0.12 0.15 2.79 1.01 3.09 1.07 1.95 0.16 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.02 1.08 0.28 0.83 0.35 0.33
OSI 0.08 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.04 1.59 0.52 1.84 0.57 0.73 13.46 4.87 14.90 5.17 9.42 0.76 0.34 0.28 0.19 0.11 5.19 1.35 4.01 1.68 1.60
FOLO
AKL 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.95 0.31 1.10 0.34 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
WLG 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.10 0.37 0.11 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
ONI 0.14 0.10 0.23 0.04 0.07 10.72 3.48 12.41 3.81 4.89 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.61 0.28 0.23 0.15 0.09 0.45 0.12 0.35 0.14 0.14
CAN 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.23 0.83 0.25 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
OSI 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.03 4.11 1.34 4.76 1.46 1.87 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.23 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.13 0.06 0.05
FISH
AKL 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.41 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.03
WLG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
ONI 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.07 1.34 0.61 0.50 0.33 0.19 0.29 0.07 0.22 0.09 0.09
CAN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
OSI 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.16 0.06 0.18 0.06 0.11 2.26 1.03 0.85 0.56 0.32 0.48 0.13 0.37 0.16 0.15
MINE
AKL 1.65 1.16 2.67 0.46 0.78 2.88 0.93 3.33 1.02 1.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
WLG 0.21 0.15 0.34 0.06 0.10 0.36 0.12 0.42 0.13 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ONI 10.20 7.16 16.51 2.81 4.83 17.75 5.76 20.54 6.31 8.09 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.03
CAN 2.00 1.40 3.23 0.55 0.95 3.48 1.13 4.02 1.23 1.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
OSI 6.38 4.49 10.34 1.76 3.03 11.12 3.61 12.86 3.95 5.06 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02
OIGA
AKL 0.47 0.33 0.76 0.13 0.22 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
WLG 7.30 5.13 11.82 2.01 3.46 0.26 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.18 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
ONI 70.28 49.37 113.77 19.40 33.32 2.52 0.91 2.79 0.97 1.76 0.31 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.43 0.11 0.33 0.14 0.13
PETR ONI 24.76 17.39 40.07 6.83 11.74 123.53 40.08 142.93 43.87 56.27 2.79 1.01 3.09 1.07 1.96 6.66 3.01 2.50 1.64 0.95 4.29 1.12 3.31 1.39 1.32
FDBT
AKL 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.33 0.11 0.38 0.12 0.15 96.68 34.97 106.99 37.12 67.65 0.88 0.40 0.33 0.22 0.13 0.35 0.09 0.27 0.11 0.11
WLG 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.03 16.40 5.93 18.15 6.30 11.48 0.15 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02
ONI 0.14 0.10 0.22 0.04 0.06 0.64 0.21 0.73 0.23 0.29 187.23 67.73 207.19 71.89 131.01 1.70 0.77 0.64 0.42 0.24 0.68 0.18 0.52 0.22 0.21
CAN 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.05 0.17 0.05 0.07 43.37 15.69 47.99 16.65 30.35 0.39 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.16 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.05
OSI 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.03 0.04 0.44 0.14 0.51 0.16 0.20 130.19 47.10 144.07 49.99 91.10 1.18 0.54 0.44 0.29 0.17 0.47 0.12 0.36 0.15 0.15
TWPM
AKL 2.95 2.07 4.77 0.81 1.40 193.16 62.67 223.49 68.59 87.99 3.42 1.24 3.78 1.31 2.39 31.23 14.14 11.72 7.71 4.47 19.50 5.08 15.05 6.30 6.02
WLG 0.65 0.46 1.06 0.18 0.31 42.78 13.88 49.50 15.19 19.49 0.76 0.27 0.84 0.29 0.53 6.92 3.13 2.60 1.71 0.99 4.32 1.12 3.33 1.40 1.33
ONI 3.54 2.49 5.74 0.98 1.68 232.16 75.32 268.62 82.44 105.76 4.11 1.49 4.55 1.58 2.87 37.54 17.00 14.09 9.27 5.38 23.44 6.10 18.09 7.57 7.23
CAN 1.06 0.75 1.72 0.29 0.50 69.61 22.59 80.55 24.72 31.71 1.23 0.45 1.36 0.47 0.86 11.26 5.10 4.22 2.78 1.61 7.03 1.83 5.42 2.27 2.17
OSI 1.34 0.94 2.17 0.37 0.63 87.75 28.47 101.53 31.16 39.97 1.55 0.56 1.72 0.60 1.09 14.19 6.42 5.32 3.50 2.03 8.86 2.31 6.84 2.86 2.73
CHNM
AKL 2.30 1.62 3.73 0.64 1.09 318.97 103.49 369.07 113.27 145.30 4.04 1.46 4.47 1.55 2.82 3.73 1.69 1.40 0.92 0.53 8.30 2.16 6.40 2.68 2.56
WLG 0.46 0.32 0.74 0.13 0.22 63.20 20.50 73.12 22.44 28.79 0.80 0.29 0.89 0.31 0.56 0.74 0.33 0.28 0.18 0.11 1.64 0.43 1.27 0.53 0.51
ONI 0.09 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.04 12.24 3.97 14.16 4.35 5.57 0.15 0.06 0.17 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.32 0.08 0.25 0.10 0.10
CAN 0.71 0.50 1.15 0.20 0.34 98.85 32.07 114.37 35.10 45.03 1.25 0.45 1.38 0.48 0.88 1.16 0.52 0.43 0.29 0.17 2.57 0.67 1.98 0.83 0.79
OSI 0.35 0.25 0.57 0.10 0.17 48.40 15.70 56.00 17.19 22.05 0.61 0.22 0.68 0.24 0.43 0.57 0.26 0.21 0.14 0.08 1.26 0.33 0.97 0.41 0.39
METL
AKL 3.01 2.11 4.87 0.83 1.43 87.61 28.43 101.37 31.11 39.91 5.55 2.01 6.14 2.13 3.88 6.12 2.77 2.30 1.51 0.88 13.01 3.39 10.04 4.20 4.01
WLG 0.48 0.34 0.78 0.13 0.23 14.00 4.54 16.20 4.97 6.38 0.89 0.32 0.98 0.34 0.62 0.98 0.44 0.37 0.24 0.14 2.08 0.54 1.60 0.67 0.64
ONI 2.43 1.71 3.93 0.67 1.15 70.78 22.96 81.90 25.14 32.24 4.48 1.62 4.96 1.72 3.14 4.94 2.24 1.85 1.22 0.71 10.51 2.74 8.11 3.40 3.24
CAN 1.05 0.73 1.69 0.29 0.50 30.46 9.88 35.24 10.82 13.87 1.93 0.70 2.13 0.74 1.35 2.13 0.96 0.80 0.53 0.30 4.52 1.18 3.49 1.46 1.40
OSI 0.86 0.60 1.39 0.24 0.41 25.00 8.11 28.92 8.88 11.39 1.58 0.57 1.75 0.61 1.11 1.75 0.79 0.65 0.43 0.25 3.71 0.97 2.86 1.20 1.15
EQFO
AKL 7.79 5.47 12.61 2.15 3.69 101.15 32.82 117.03 35.92 46.08 5.40 1.95 5.97 2.07 3.78 22.89 10.37 8.59 5.65 3.28 17.64 4.59 13.62 5.70 5.45
WLG 1.37 0.96 2.22 0.38 0.65 17.78 5.77 20.57 6.31 8.10 0.95 0.34 1.05 0.36 0.66 4.02 1.82 1.51 0.99 0.58 3.10 0.81 2.39 1.00 0.96
ONI 4.13 2.90 6.68 1.14 1.96 53.57 17.38 61.98 19.02 24.40 2.86 1.03 3.16 1.10 2.00 12.12 5.49 4.55 2.99 1.74 9.34 2.43 7.21 3.02 2.88
CAN 2.37 1.67 3.84 0.66 1.13 30.84 10.01 35.68 10.95 14.05 1.64 0.60 1.82 0.63 1.15 6.98 3.16 2.62 1.72 1.00 5.38 1.40 4.15 1.74 1.66
OSI 1.47 1.03 2.38 0.41 0.70 19.07 6.19 22.06 6.77 8.69 1.02 0.37 1.13 0.39 0.71 4.32 1.95 1.62 1.07 0.62 3.33 0.87 2.57 1.07 1.03
UTIL
AKL 349.95 245.82 566.50 96.58 165.91 12.11 3.93 14.01 4.30 5.52 6.48 2.34 7.17 2.49 4.54 8.96 4.06 3.36 2.21 1.28 13.65 3.55 10.54 4.41 4.21
WLG 245.40 172.38 397.26 67.73 116.35 8.49 2.75 9.82 3.01 3.87 4.55 1.64 5.03 1.75 3.18 6.28 2.84 2.36 1.55 0.90 9.57 2.49 7.39 3.09 2.95
ONI 566.01 397.60 916.26 156.21 268.35 19.58 6.35 22.66 6.95 8.92 10.48 3.79 11.60 4.03 7.34 14.48 6.56 5.44 3.58 2.08 22.08 5.75 17.04 7.14 6.82
CAN 96.60 67.86 156.38 26.66 45.80 3.34 1.08 3.87 1.19 1.52 1.79 0.65 1.98 0.69 1.25 2.47 1.12 0.93 0.61 0.35 3.77 0.98 2.91 1.22 1.16
OSI 165.74 116.42 268.30 45.74 78.58 5.73 1.86 6.63 2.04 2.61 3.07 1.11 3.40 1.18 2.15 4.24 1.92 1.59 1.05 0.61 6.47 1.68 4.99 2.09 2.00
CONS
AKL 38.81 27.26 62.83 10.71 18.40 735.83 238.74 851.39 261.31 335.20 0.17 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.12 17.07 7.73 6.40 4.21 2.45 68.71 17.89 53.03 22.21 21.21
WLG 12.33 8.66 19.97 3.40 5.85 233.86 75.87 270.59 83.05 106.53 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 5.42 2.46 2.04 1.34 0.78 21.84 5.69 16.85 7.06 6.74
ONI 44.03 30.93 71.27 12.15 20.87 834.74 270.83 965.84 296.44 380.25 0.19 0.07 0.21 0.07 0.13 19.36 8.77 7.27 4.78 2.77 77.95 20.29 60.16 25.19 24.06
CAN 13.69 9.62 22.16 3.78 6.49 259.57 84.22 300.33 92.18 118.24 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.04 6.02 2.73 2.26 1.49 0.86 24.24 6.31 18.71 7.83 7.48
OSI 17.32 12.17 28.03 4.78 8.21 328.35 106.53 379.92 116.61 149.58 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.05 7.62 3.45 2.86 1.88 1.09 30.66 7.98 23.66 9.91 9.46
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Industries
row/col
RBUS GOVT EDUC HEAL CUPE
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
di
re
ct
pr
od
u
ct
u
sa
ge
M
R
IO
′ di
r
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AKL 2.63 0.94 1.27 0.57 0.44 0.34 0.54 0.39 0.13 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.79 0.31 0.93 0.34 0.38 0.93 0.37 0.69 0.28 0.32
WLG 0.60 0.22 0.29 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.07 0.21 0.08 0.09 0.21 0.08 0.16 0.06 0.07
ONI 35.43 12.63 17.05 7.68 5.87 4.60 7.27 5.20 1.75 1.52 0.53 0.18 0.50 0.17 0.20 10.64 4.20 12.53 4.56 5.16 12.56 4.97 9.32 3.79 4.29
CAN 3.70 1.32 1.78 0.80 0.61 0.48 0.76 0.54 0.18 0.16 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 1.11 0.44 1.31 0.48 0.54 1.31 0.52 0.97 0.40 0.45
OSI 17.86 6.36 8.59 3.87 2.96 2.32 3.66 2.62 0.88 0.77 0.27 0.09 0.25 0.09 0.10 5.36 2.12 6.32 2.30 2.60 6.33 2.51 4.70 1.91 2.16
FOLO
AKL 4.62 1.65 2.22 1.00 0.77 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
WLG 1.54 0.55 0.74 0.33 0.26 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
ONI 51.94 18.51 25.00 11.26 8.61 0.38 0.59 0.43 0.14 0.12 0.56 0.19 0.53 0.18 0.21 0.15 0.06 0.18 0.07 0.08 0.41 0.16 0.30 0.12 0.14
CAN 3.48 1.24 1.67 0.75 0.58 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
OSI 19.93 7.10 9.59 4.32 3.30 0.14 0.23 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.20 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.16 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.05
FISH
AKL 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
WLG 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ONI 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01
CAN 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OSI 0.19 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02
MINE
AKL 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.17 0.27 0.20 0.07 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.23 0.08 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.33 0.12 0.14 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
WLG 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ONI 0.47 0.17 0.22 0.10 0.08 1.07 1.69 1.21 0.41 0.35 1.49 0.50 1.41 0.48 0.57 1.72 0.68 2.03 0.74 0.83 0.18 0.07 0.13 0.05 0.06
CAN 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.33 0.24 0.08 0.07 0.29 0.10 0.28 0.09 0.11 0.34 0.13 0.40 0.14 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
OSI 0.29 0.10 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.67 1.06 0.76 0.25 0.22 0.93 0.31 0.89 0.30 0.36 1.08 0.43 1.27 0.46 0.52 0.11 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.04
OIGA
AKL 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
WLG 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.21 0.34 0.24 0.08 0.07 0.51 0.17 0.48 0.16 0.19 0.43 0.17 0.51 0.18 0.21 0.53 0.21 0.39 0.16 0.18
ONI 1.37 0.49 0.66 0.30 0.23 2.07 3.27 2.34 0.79 0.69 4.87 1.62 4.62 1.58 1.87 4.13 1.63 4.87 1.77 2.01 5.06 2.00 3.75 1.53 1.73
PETR ONI 13.66 4.87 6.57 2.96 2.26 20.61 32.59 23.32 7.83 6.84 1.35 0.45 1.28 0.44 0.52 10.82 4.27 12.75 4.64 5.25 1.40 0.55 1.04 0.42 0.48
FDBT
AKL 3.31 1.18 1.59 0.72 0.55 0.71 1.13 0.81 0.27 0.24 1.12 0.37 1.07 0.36 0.43 4.04 1.59 4.75 1.73 1.96 5.11 2.02 3.79 1.54 1.74
WLG 0.56 0.20 0.27 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.18 0.06 0.07 0.68 0.27 0.81 0.29 0.33 0.87 0.34 0.64 0.26 0.30
ONI 6.40 2.28 3.08 1.39 1.06 1.38 2.18 1.56 0.53 0.46 2.18 0.73 2.06 0.70 0.83 7.82 3.09 9.21 3.35 3.79 9.89 3.91 7.34 2.98 3.38
CAN 1.48 0.53 0.71 0.32 0.25 0.32 0.51 0.36 0.12 0.11 0.50 0.17 0.48 0.16 0.19 1.81 0.71 2.13 0.78 0.88 2.29 0.91 1.70 0.69 0.78
OSI 4.45 1.59 2.14 0.96 0.74 0.96 1.52 1.09 0.37 0.32 1.51 0.50 1.44 0.49 0.58 5.44 2.15 6.40 2.33 2.64 6.88 2.72 5.10 2.08 2.35
TWPM
AKL 128.81 45.91 62.00 27.92 21.36 7.35 11.62 8.32 2.79 2.44 11.28 3.76 10.70 3.66 4.33 8.25 3.26 9.72 3.54 4.00 22.17 8.77 16.45 6.69 7.57
WLG 28.53 10.17 13.73 6.18 4.73 1.63 2.57 1.84 0.62 0.54 2.50 0.83 2.37 0.81 0.96 1.83 0.72 2.15 0.78 0.89 4.91 1.94 3.64 1.48 1.68
ONI 154.82 55.18 74.52 33.55 25.67 8.83 13.97 10.00 3.36 2.93 13.56 4.52 12.86 4.39 5.20 9.92 3.91 11.68 4.25 4.81 26.65 10.55 19.77 8.04 9.10
CAN 46.42 16.54 22.35 10.06 7.70 2.65 4.19 3.00 1.01 0.88 4.07 1.36 3.86 1.32 1.56 2.97 1.17 3.50 1.28 1.44 7.99 3.16 5.93 2.41 2.73
OSI 58.52 20.85 28.17 12.68 9.70 3.34 5.28 3.78 1.27 1.11 5.13 1.71 4.86 1.66 1.96 3.75 1.48 4.41 1.61 1.82 10.07 3.99 7.47 3.04 3.44
CHNM
AKL 39.36 14.03 18.95 8.53 6.53 3.57 5.65 4.04 1.36 1.18 5.19 1.73 4.92 1.68 1.99 21.26 8.39 25.03 9.12 10.31 10.00 3.96 7.42 3.02 3.41
WLG 7.80 2.78 3.75 1.69 1.29 0.71 1.12 0.80 0.27 0.23 1.03 0.34 0.97 0.33 0.39 4.21 1.66 4.96 1.81 2.04 1.98 0.78 1.47 0.60 0.68
ONI 1.51 0.54 0.73 0.33 0.25 0.14 0.22 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.07 0.19 0.06 0.08 0.82 0.32 0.96 0.35 0.40 0.38 0.15 0.28 0.12 0.13
CAN 12.20 4.35 5.87 2.64 2.02 1.11 1.75 1.25 0.42 0.37 1.61 0.54 1.52 0.52 0.62 6.59 2.60 7.76 2.83 3.19 3.10 1.23 2.30 0.94 1.06
OSI 5.97 2.13 2.88 1.29 0.99 0.54 0.86 0.61 0.21 0.18 0.79 0.26 0.75 0.25 0.30 3.23 1.27 3.80 1.38 1.56 1.52 0.60 1.13 0.46 0.52
METL
AKL 18.19 6.48 8.76 3.94 3.02 3.74 5.92 4.23 1.42 1.24 3.39 1.13 3.21 1.10 1.30 1.30 0.51 1.53 0.56 0.63 1.75 0.69 1.30 0.53 0.60
WLG 2.91 1.04 1.40 0.63 0.48 0.60 0.95 0.68 0.23 0.20 0.54 0.18 0.51 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.08 0.24 0.09 0.10 0.28 0.11 0.21 0.08 0.10
ONI 14.70 5.24 7.07 3.19 2.44 3.02 4.78 3.42 1.15 1.00 2.74 0.91 2.60 0.89 1.05 1.05 0.41 1.23 0.45 0.51 1.41 0.56 1.05 0.43 0.48
CAN 6.32 2.25 3.04 1.37 1.05 1.30 2.06 1.47 0.49 0.43 1.18 0.39 1.12 0.38 0.45 0.45 0.18 0.53 0.19 0.22 0.61 0.24 0.45 0.18 0.21
OSI 5.19 1.85 2.50 1.12 0.86 1.07 1.69 1.21 0.41 0.35 0.97 0.32 0.92 0.31 0.37 0.37 0.15 0.44 0.16 0.18 0.50 0.20 0.37 0.15 0.17
EQFO
AKL 20.31 7.24 9.78 4.40 3.37 16.06 25.39 18.17 6.10 5.32 14.34 4.78 13.60 4.65 5.50 8.05 3.18 9.48 3.45 3.90 12.07 4.78 8.95 3.64 4.12
WLG 3.57 1.27 1.72 0.77 0.59 2.82 4.46 3.19 1.07 0.94 2.52 0.84 2.39 0.82 0.97 1.41 0.56 1.67 0.61 0.69 2.12 0.84 1.57 0.64 0.72
ONI 10.76 3.83 5.18 2.33 1.78 8.50 13.44 9.62 3.23 2.82 7.59 2.53 7.20 2.46 2.91 4.26 1.68 5.02 1.83 2.07 6.39 2.53 4.74 1.93 2.18
CAN 6.19 2.21 2.98 1.34 1.03 4.90 7.74 5.54 1.86 1.62 4.37 1.46 4.15 1.42 1.68 2.45 0.97 2.89 1.05 1.19 3.68 1.46 2.73 1.11 1.26
OSI 3.83 1.36 1.84 0.83 0.63 3.03 4.79 3.42 1.15 1.00 2.70 0.90 2.56 0.88 1.04 1.52 0.60 1.79 0.65 0.74 2.28 0.90 1.69 0.69 0.78
UTIL
AKL 16.83 6.00 8.10 3.65 2.79 20.84 32.94 23.58 7.92 6.91 15.81 5.27 15.00 5.12 6.06 11.73 4.63 13.81 5.03 5.69 12.70 5.02 9.42 3.83 4.33
WLG 11.80 4.21 5.68 2.56 1.96 14.61 23.10 16.53 5.55 4.85 11.09 3.70 10.52 3.59 4.25 8.23 3.25 9.69 3.53 3.99 8.90 3.52 6.60 2.69 3.04
ONI 27.23 9.70 13.11 5.90 4.51 33.70 53.28 38.13 12.81 11.18 25.58 8.53 24.26 8.29 9.81 18.97 7.49 22.34 8.14 9.20 20.53 8.13 15.23 6.19 7.01
CAN 4.65 1.66 2.24 1.01 0.77 5.75 9.09 6.51 2.19 1.91 4.37 1.46 4.14 1.41 1.67 3.24 1.28 3.81 1.39 1.57 3.50 1.39 2.60 1.06 1.20
OSI 7.97 2.84 3.84 1.73 1.32 9.87 15.60 11.17 3.75 3.27 7.49 2.50 7.11 2.43 2.87 5.56 2.19 6.54 2.38 2.69 6.01 2.38 4.46 1.81 2.05
CONS
AKL 6.74 2.40 3.24 1.46 1.12 76.53 120.99 86.60 29.08 25.38 19.53 6.52 18.53 6.33 7.49 12.67 5.00 14.92 5.43 6.14 20.73 8.20 15.38 6.25 7.08
WLG 2.14 0.76 1.03 0.46 0.35 24.32 38.45 27.52 9.24 8.07 6.21 2.07 5.89 2.01 2.38 4.03 1.59 4.74 1.73 1.95 6.59 2.61 4.89 1.99 2.25
ONI 7.64 2.72 3.68 1.66 1.27 86.82 137.25 98.24 32.99 28.79 22.16 7.39 21.02 7.18 8.50 14.37 5.67 16.92 6.16 6.97 23.52 9.31 17.45 7.10 8.03
CAN 2.38 0.85 1.14 0.51 0.39 27.00 42.68 30.55 10.26 8.95 6.89 2.30 6.54 2.23 2.64 4.47 1.76 5.26 1.92 2.17 7.31 2.89 5.43 2.21 2.50
OSI 3.01 1.07 1.45 0.65 0.50 34.15 53.99 38.64 12.98 11.32 8.72 2.91 8.27 2.82 3.34 5.65 2.23 6.66 2.42 2.74 9.25 3.66 6.86 2.79 3.16
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AKL 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 12.94 2.43 4.87 2.95 2.28 1.83 0.57 1.91 0.63 0.80 0.51 0.11 0.24 0.15 0.15 9.03 3.54 7.98 2.86 3.55
WLG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.97 0.56 1.12 0.68 0.52 0.42 0.13 0.44 0.15 0.18 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.03 2.08 0.81 1.83 0.66 0.81
ONI 0.11 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.04 174.36 32.70 65.60 39.81 30.68 24.64 7.64 25.68 8.53 10.77 6.89 1.52 3.24 1.96 1.99 121.75 47.68 107.54 38.58 47.78
CAN 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 18.21 3.42 6.85 4.16 3.21 2.57 0.80 2.68 0.89 1.13 0.72 0.16 0.34 0.20 0.21 12.72 4.98 11.23 4.03 4.99
OSI 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 87.88 16.48 33.06 20.06 15.46 12.42 3.85 12.94 4.30 5.43 3.47 0.77 1.63 0.99 1.00 61.36 24.03 54.20 19.44 24.08
FOLO
AKL 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 3.58 0.67 1.35 0.82 0.63 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.41 0.09 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.98 0.38 0.87 0.31 0.39
WLG 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.20 0.22 0.45 0.27 0.21 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.33 0.13 0.29 0.10 0.13
ONI 0.30 0.11 0.27 0.09 0.12 40.26 7.55 15.15 9.19 7.08 0.48 0.15 0.50 0.16 0.21 4.64 1.03 2.18 1.32 1.34 11.04 4.32 9.75 3.50 4.33
CAN 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 2.69 0.51 1.01 0.61 0.47 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.31 0.07 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.74 0.29 0.65 0.23 0.29
OSI 0.12 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.04 15.45 2.90 5.81 3.53 2.72 0.18 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.08 1.78 0.39 0.84 0.51 0.51 4.24 1.66 3.74 1.34 1.66
FISH
AKL 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 1.60 0.30 0.60 0.36 0.28 0.14 0.04 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.19 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.04
WLG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
ONI 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.03 5.30 0.99 1.99 1.21 0.93 0.47 0.15 0.49 0.16 0.21 0.62 0.14 0.29 0.18 0.18 0.37 0.14 0.32 0.12 0.14
CAN 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.08 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
OSI 0.12 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.04 8.93 1.67 3.36 2.04 1.57 0.80 0.25 0.83 0.28 0.35 1.04 0.23 0.49 0.30 0.30 0.62 0.24 0.55 0.20 0.24
MINE
AKL 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.55 0.10 0.21 0.13 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.37 0.08 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.43 0.17 0.38 0.14 0.17
WLG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02
ONI 0.20 0.07 0.18 0.06 0.08 3.40 0.64 1.28 0.78 0.60 0.32 0.10 0.34 0.11 0.14 2.29 0.51 1.08 0.65 0.66 2.66 1.04 2.35 0.84 1.05
CAN 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.67 0.12 0.25 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.45 0.10 0.21 0.13 0.13 0.52 0.20 0.46 0.17 0.20
OSI 0.13 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.05 2.13 0.40 0.80 0.49 0.37 0.20 0.06 0.21 0.07 0.09 1.43 0.32 0.67 0.41 0.41 1.67 0.65 1.47 0.53 0.65
OIGA
AKL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.06
WLG 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.40 0.08 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.18 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.08 0.22 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.06 2.47 0.97 2.18 0.78 0.97
ONI 0.26 0.10 0.24 0.08 0.10 3.86 0.72 1.45 0.88 0.68 1.78 0.55 1.85 0.61 0.78 2.14 0.47 1.00 0.61 0.62 23.78 9.31 21.01 7.54 9.33
PETR ONI 2.64 0.95 2.35 0.82 1.01 81.26 15.24 30.57 18.55 14.30 37.38 11.59 38.95 12.93 16.34 225.80 49.93 106.04 64.08 65.10 358.64 140.44 316.78 113.65 140.76
FDBT
AKL 0.28 0.10 0.25 0.09 0.11 67.42 12.64 25.37 15.39 11.86 30.42 9.43 31.70 10.52 13.29 0.61 0.13 0.29 0.17 0.18 523.07 204.83 462.02 165.76 205.29
WLG 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 11.44 2.14 4.30 2.61 2.01 5.16 1.60 5.38 1.79 2.26 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 88.75 34.75 78.39 28.12 34.83
ONI 0.54 0.19 0.48 0.17 0.21 130.56 24.48 49.12 29.81 22.98 58.91 18.27 61.38 20.38 25.75 1.18 0.26 0.55 0.34 0.34 1012.98 396.68 894.74 321.01 397.57
CAN 0.13 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.05 30.24 5.67 11.38 6.91 5.32 13.65 4.23 14.22 4.72 5.96 0.27 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.08 234.65 91.89 207.26 74.36 92.09
OSI 0.38 0.14 0.34 0.12 0.14 90.79 17.02 34.16 20.73 15.98 40.96 12.70 42.68 14.17 17.90 0.82 0.18 0.39 0.23 0.24 704.39 275.84 622.17 223.22 276.45
TWPM
AKL 9.86 3.54 8.79 3.07 3.77 132.36 24.82 49.80 30.22 23.29 40.65 12.61 42.36 14.06 17.77 15.58 3.44 7.32 4.42 4.49 116.91 45.78 103.26 37.05 45.88
WLG 2.18 0.78 1.95 0.68 0.83 29.31 5.50 11.03 6.69 5.16 9.00 2.79 9.38 3.11 3.93 3.45 0.76 1.62 0.98 0.99 25.89 10.14 22.87 8.21 10.16
ONI 11.85 4.26 10.56 3.69 4.53 159.08 29.83 59.85 36.32 27.99 48.86 15.15 50.91 16.90 21.35 18.72 4.14 8.79 5.31 5.40 140.51 55.02 124.11 44.53 55.15
CAN 3.55 1.28 3.17 1.11 1.36 47.70 8.94 17.95 10.89 8.39 14.65 4.54 15.27 5.07 6.40 5.61 1.24 2.64 1.59 1.62 42.13 16.50 37.22 13.35 16.54
OSI 4.48 1.61 3.99 1.40 1.71 60.13 11.28 22.62 13.73 10.58 18.47 5.73 19.24 6.39 8.07 7.08 1.56 3.32 2.01 2.04 53.11 20.80 46.91 16.83 20.84
CHNM
AKL 9.39 3.38 8.38 2.93 3.59 89.61 16.80 33.72 20.46 15.77 41.76 12.95 43.51 14.45 18.25 15.48 3.42 7.27 4.39 4.46 123.15 48.22 108.77 39.02 48.33
WLG 1.86 0.67 1.66 0.58 0.71 17.75 3.33 6.68 4.05 3.12 8.27 2.57 8.62 2.86 3.62 3.07 0.68 1.44 0.87 0.88 24.40 9.55 21.55 7.73 9.58
ONI 0.36 0.13 0.32 0.11 0.14 3.44 0.64 1.29 0.78 0.60 1.60 0.50 1.67 0.55 0.70 0.59 0.13 0.28 0.17 0.17 4.72 1.85 4.17 1.50 1.85
CAN 2.91 1.05 2.60 0.91 1.11 27.77 5.21 10.45 6.34 4.89 12.94 4.01 13.49 4.48 5.66 4.80 1.06 2.25 1.36 1.38 38.16 14.94 33.71 12.09 14.98
OSI 1.43 0.51 1.27 0.44 0.54 13.60 2.55 5.12 3.10 2.39 6.34 1.97 6.60 2.19 2.77 2.35 0.52 1.10 0.67 0.68 18.69 7.32 16.51 5.92 7.33
METL
AKL 8.75 3.15 7.81 2.73 3.35 83.13 15.59 31.28 18.98 14.63 52.99 16.43 55.22 18.33 23.16 7.65 1.69 3.59 2.17 2.21 17.45 6.83 15.41 5.53 6.85
WLG 1.40 0.50 1.25 0.44 0.53 13.28 2.49 5.00 3.03 2.34 8.47 2.63 8.82 2.93 3.70 1.22 0.27 0.57 0.35 0.35 2.79 1.09 2.46 0.88 1.09
ONI 7.07 2.54 6.31 2.20 2.70 67.16 12.59 25.27 15.33 11.82 42.81 13.28 44.61 14.81 18.71 6.18 1.37 2.90 1.75 1.78 14.10 5.52 12.45 4.47 5.53
CAN 3.04 1.09 2.71 0.95 1.16 28.90 5.42 10.87 6.60 5.09 18.42 5.71 19.20 6.37 8.05 2.66 0.59 1.25 0.75 0.77 6.07 2.38 5.36 1.92 2.38
OSI 2.50 0.90 2.23 0.78 0.95 23.72 4.45 8.92 5.42 4.17 15.12 4.69 15.76 5.23 6.61 2.18 0.48 1.02 0.62 0.63 4.98 1.95 4.40 1.58 1.95
EQFO
AKL 9.44 3.39 8.42 2.94 3.61 48.57 9.11 18.28 11.09 8.55 21.23 6.58 22.12 7.34 9.28 55.71 12.32 26.16 15.81 16.06 178.69 69.97 157.83 56.63 70.13
WLG 1.66 0.60 1.48 0.52 0.63 8.54 1.60 3.21 1.95 1.50 3.73 1.16 3.89 1.29 1.63 9.79 2.16 4.60 2.78 2.82 31.40 12.30 27.74 9.95 12.33
ONI 5.00 1.80 4.46 1.56 1.91 25.72 4.82 9.68 5.87 4.53 11.24 3.49 11.72 3.89 4.91 29.50 6.52 13.85 8.37 8.51 94.63 37.06 83.58 29.99 37.14
CAN 2.88 1.03 2.57 0.90 1.10 14.81 2.78 5.57 3.38 2.61 6.47 2.01 6.74 2.24 2.83 16.99 3.76 7.98 4.82 4.90 54.48 21.33 48.12 17.27 21.38
OSI 1.78 0.64 1.59 0.55 0.68 9.16 1.72 3.44 2.09 1.61 4.00 1.24 4.17 1.38 1.75 10.50 2.32 4.93 2.98 3.03 33.68 13.19 29.75 10.67 13.22
UTIL
AKL 13.90 5.00 12.39 4.33 5.31 34.36 6.44 12.93 7.84 6.05 28.25 8.76 29.44 9.77 12.35 6.60 1.46 3.10 1.87 1.90 177.04 69.33 156.37 56.10 69.48
WLG 9.74 3.50 8.69 3.04 3.73 24.09 4.52 9.07 5.50 4.24 19.81 6.14 20.64 6.85 8.66 4.63 1.02 2.17 1.31 1.33 124.15 48.62 109.66 39.34 48.72
ONI 22.48 8.08 20.04 7.00 8.59 55.57 10.42 20.91 12.69 9.78 45.69 14.17 47.61 15.81 19.97 10.68 2.36 5.01 3.03 3.08 286.35 112.13 252.92 90.74 112.38
CAN 3.84 1.38 3.42 1.20 1.47 9.48 1.78 3.57 2.17 1.67 7.80 2.42 8.13 2.70 3.41 1.82 0.40 0.86 0.52 0.53 48.87 19.14 43.17 15.49 19.18
OSI 6.58 2.37 5.87 2.05 2.52 16.27 3.05 6.12 3.72 2.86 13.38 4.15 13.94 4.63 5.85 3.13 0.69 1.47 0.89 0.90 83.85 32.83 74.06 26.57 32.91
CONS
AKL 89.15 32.05 79.50 27.78 34.09 4.91 0.92 1.85 1.12 0.86 4.12 1.28 4.29 1.42 1.80 10.09 2.23 4.74 2.86 2.91 18.49 7.24 16.33 5.86 7.26
WLG 28.33 10.19 25.27 8.83 10.83 1.56 0.29 0.59 0.36 0.27 1.31 0.41 1.36 0.45 0.57 3.21 0.71 1.51 0.91 0.92 5.88 2.30 5.19 1.86 2.31
ONI 101.14 36.36 90.19 31.51 38.67 5.56 1.04 2.09 1.27 0.98 4.67 1.45 4.87 1.62 2.04 11.45 2.53 5.38 3.25 3.30 20.97 8.21 18.52 6.65 8.23
CAN 31.45 11.30 28.04 9.80 12.02 1.73 0.32 0.65 0.40 0.30 1.45 0.45 1.51 0.50 0.63 3.56 0.79 1.67 1.01 1.03 6.52 2.55 5.76 2.07 2.56
OSI 39.78 14.30 35.48 12.40 15.21 2.19 0.41 0.82 0.50 0.39 1.84 0.57 1.91 0.64 0.80 4.50 1.00 2.12 1.28 1.30 8.25 3.23 7.29 2.61 3.24
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MRIO′
INV
row/col
AGRI FOLO FISH MINE OIGA PETR
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI ONI
di
re
ct
pr
od
u
ct
u
sa
ge
M
R
IO
′ di
r
AGRI
AKL 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.02
WLG 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00
ONI 0.16 0.04 2.20 0.23 1.11 0.02 0.01 0.26 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.30 0.06 0.19 0.01 0.24 2.29 0.26
CAN 0.02 0.00 0.23 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.24 0.03
OSI 0.08 0.02 1.11 0.11 0.56 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.12 1.15 0.13
FOLO
AKL 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.02
WLG 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01
ONI 0.11 0.03 1.53 0.16 0.77 0.02 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.21 0.04 0.13 0.01 0.17 1.59 0.18
CAN 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.01
OSI 0.04 0.01 0.59 0.06 0.30 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.61 0.07
FISH
AKL 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
WLG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ONI 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00
CAN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OSI 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.01
MINE
AKL 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.01
WLG 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
ONI 0.03 0.01 0.38 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.40 0.05
CAN 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.01
OSI 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.25 0.03
OIGA
AKL 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
WLG 0.03 0.01 0.37 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.39 0.04
ONI 0.26 0.06 3.59 0.37 1.81 0.04 0.01 0.43 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.48 0.09 0.30 0.02 0.39 3.73 0.42
PETR ONI 0.09 0.02 1.19 0.12 0.60 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.13 1.24 0.14
FDBT
AKL 0.03 0.01 0.48 0.05 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.50 0.06
WLG 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.01
ONI 0.07 0.02 0.93 0.10 0.47 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.97 0.11
CAN 0.02 0.00 0.22 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.23 0.03
OSI 0.05 0.01 0.65 0.07 0.33 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.68 0.08
TWPM
AKL 0.02 0.00 0.29 0.03 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.30 0.03
WLG 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.01
ONI 0.03 0.01 0.35 0.04 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.37 0.04
CAN 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.01
OSI 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.02
CHNM
AKL 0.09 0.02 1.19 0.12 0.60 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.13 1.24 0.14
WLG 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.25 0.03
ONI 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01
CAN 0.03 0.01 0.37 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.38 0.04
OSI 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.19 0.02
METL
AKL 0.13 0.03 1.85 0.19 0.93 0.02 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.25 0.05 0.16 0.01 0.20 1.92 0.22
WLG 0.02 0.01 0.30 0.03 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.31 0.03
ONI 0.11 0.03 1.49 0.15 0.75 0.02 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.20 0.04 0.13 0.01 0.16 1.55 0.18
CAN 0.05 0.01 0.64 0.07 0.32 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.67 0.08
OSI 0.04 0.01 0.53 0.05 0.27 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.55 0.06
EQFO
AKL 1.49 0.35 20.65 2.12 10.42 0.21 0.07 2.46 0.16 0.95 0.12 0.02 0.39 0.03 0.67 0.44 0.06 2.78 0.54 1.74 0.14 2.23 21.46 2.43
WLG 0.26 0.06 3.63 0.37 1.83 0.04 0.01 0.43 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.49 0.09 0.31 0.02 0.39 3.77 0.43
ONI 0.79 0.19 10.94 1.12 5.52 0.11 0.04 1.31 0.09 0.50 0.06 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.35 0.23 0.03 1.47 0.28 0.92 0.07 1.18 11.37 1.29
CAN 0.45 0.11 6.30 0.65 3.18 0.07 0.02 0.75 0.05 0.29 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.20 0.13 0.02 0.85 0.16 0.53 0.04 0.68 6.54 0.74
OSI 0.28 0.07 3.89 0.40 1.96 0.04 0.01 0.46 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.13 0.08 0.01 0.52 0.10 0.33 0.03 0.42 4.05 0.46
UTIL
AKL 0.08 0.02 1.16 0.12 0.59 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.13 1.21 0.14
WLG 0.06 0.01 0.81 0.08 0.41 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.85 0.10
ONI 0.14 0.03 1.88 0.19 0.95 0.02 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.25 0.05 0.16 0.01 0.20 1.95 0.22
CAN 0.02 0.01 0.32 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.33 0.04
OSI 0.04 0.01 0.55 0.06 0.28 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.57 0.06
CONS
AKL 6.56 1.55 90.87 9.33 45.86 0.94 0.32 10.85 0.71 4.17 0.51 0.10 1.74 0.14 2.93 1.93 0.25 12.24 2.36 7.67 0.62 9.82 94.46 10.72
WLG 2.09 0.49 28.88 2.97 14.57 0.30 0.10 3.45 0.23 1.32 0.16 0.03 0.55 0.04 0.93 0.61 0.08 3.89 0.75 2.44 0.20 3.12 30.02 3.41
ONI 7.44 1.76 103.09 10.59 52.02 1.07 0.37 12.31 0.81 4.73 0.58 0.12 1.97 0.16 3.32 2.19 0.28 13.88 2.67 8.70 0.70 11.14 107.16 12.16
CAN 2.31 0.55 32.06 3.29 16.18 0.33 0.11 3.83 0.25 1.47 0.18 0.04 0.61 0.05 1.03 0.68 0.09 4.32 0.83 2.71 0.22 3.46 33.32 3.78
OSI 2.93 0.69 40.55 4.16 20.46 0.42 0.14 4.84 0.32 1.86 0.23 0.05 0.77 0.06 1.31 0.86 0.11 5.46 1.05 3.42 0.28 4.38 42.15 4.78
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MRIO′
INV
row/col
FDBT TWPM CHNM METL EQFO
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
di
re
ct
pr
od
u
ct
u
sa
ge
M
R
IO
′ di
r
AGRI
AKL 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01
WLG 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
ONI 0.61 0.11 1.22 0.28 0.85 0.84 0.19 1.04 0.31 0.39 1.18 0.24 0.05 0.37 0.18 0.77 0.13 0.64 0.27 0.23 0.71 0.13 0.39 0.22 0.14
CAN 0.06 0.01 0.13 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01
OSI 0.31 0.05 0.61 0.14 0.43 0.43 0.10 0.53 0.15 0.20 0.60 0.12 0.02 0.19 0.09 0.39 0.06 0.32 0.14 0.11 0.36 0.07 0.20 0.11 0.07
FOLO
AKL 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
WLG 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
ONI 0.42 0.07 0.85 0.19 0.59 0.59 0.13 0.72 0.21 0.27 0.82 0.17 0.03 0.26 0.13 0.54 0.09 0.45 0.19 0.16 0.50 0.09 0.27 0.15 0.10
CAN 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
OSI 0.16 0.03 0.32 0.07 0.23 0.23 0.05 0.28 0.08 0.11 0.32 0.06 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.06 0.19 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.04
FISH
AKL 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
WLG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ONI 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
CAN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OSI 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
MINE
AKL 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
WLG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ONI 0.11 0.02 0.21 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.07 0.21 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.02
CAN 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
OSI 0.07 0.01 0.13 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02
OIGA
AKL 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
WLG 0.10 0.02 0.21 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.07 0.20 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.02
ONI 1.00 0.17 1.98 0.45 1.38 1.38 0.31 1.70 0.50 0.64 1.93 0.39 0.08 0.60 0.30 1.26 0.21 1.05 0.44 0.37 1.16 0.21 0.63 0.36 0.23
PETR ONI 0.33 0.06 0.66 0.15 0.46 0.46 0.10 0.56 0.17 0.21 0.64 0.13 0.03 0.20 0.10 0.42 0.07 0.35 0.15 0.12 0.39 0.07 0.21 0.12 0.07
FDBT
AKL 0.13 0.02 0.27 0.06 0.19 0.19 0.04 0.23 0.07 0.09 0.26 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.17 0.03 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.16 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.03
WLG 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
ONI 0.26 0.05 0.52 0.12 0.36 0.36 0.08 0.44 0.13 0.17 0.50 0.10 0.02 0.16 0.08 0.33 0.05 0.27 0.12 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.17 0.09 0.06
CAN 0.06 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01
OSI 0.18 0.03 0.36 0.08 0.25 0.25 0.06 0.31 0.09 0.12 0.35 0.07 0.01 0.11 0.05 0.23 0.04 0.19 0.08 0.07 0.21 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.04
TWPM
AKL 0.08 0.01 0.16 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.03 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02
WLG 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
ONI 0.10 0.02 0.19 0.04 0.14 0.13 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.06 0.19 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.02
CAN 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
OSI 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
CHNM
AKL 0.33 0.06 0.66 0.15 0.46 0.46 0.10 0.57 0.17 0.21 0.64 0.13 0.03 0.20 0.10 0.42 0.07 0.35 0.15 0.12 0.39 0.07 0.21 0.12 0.08
WLG 0.07 0.01 0.13 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01
ONI 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
CAN 0.10 0.02 0.20 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.07 0.20 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.02
OSI 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01
METL
AKL 0.51 0.09 1.02 0.23 0.71 0.71 0.16 0.88 0.26 0.33 0.99 0.20 0.04 0.31 0.16 0.65 0.11 0.54 0.23 0.19 0.60 0.11 0.33 0.18 0.12
WLG 0.08 0.01 0.16 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.03 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02
ONI 0.41 0.07 0.83 0.19 0.57 0.57 0.13 0.71 0.21 0.27 0.80 0.16 0.03 0.25 0.13 0.53 0.09 0.44 0.18 0.15 0.48 0.09 0.26 0.15 0.09
CAN 0.18 0.03 0.36 0.08 0.25 0.25 0.06 0.30 0.09 0.12 0.35 0.07 0.01 0.11 0.05 0.23 0.04 0.19 0.08 0.07 0.21 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.04
OSI 0.15 0.03 0.29 0.07 0.20 0.20 0.05 0.25 0.07 0.09 0.28 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.15 0.07 0.05 0.17 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.03
EQFO
AKL 5.73 1.00 11.41 2.60 7.95 7.92 1.80 9.78 2.88 3.70 11.09 2.26 0.44 3.47 1.73 7.26 1.19 6.03 2.55 2.13 6.70 1.21 3.65 2.07 1.30
WLG 1.01 0.18 2.01 0.46 1.40 1.39 0.32 1.72 0.51 0.65 1.95 0.40 0.08 0.61 0.30 1.28 0.21 1.06 0.45 0.37 1.18 0.21 0.64 0.36 0.23
ONI 3.04 0.53 6.04 1.38 4.21 4.19 0.96 5.18 1.53 1.96 5.88 1.20 0.23 1.84 0.92 3.85 0.63 3.19 1.35 1.13 3.55 0.64 1.93 1.09 0.69
CAN 1.75 0.31 3.48 0.79 2.42 2.41 0.55 2.98 0.88 1.13 3.38 0.69 0.13 1.06 0.53 2.21 0.36 1.84 0.78 0.65 2.04 0.37 1.11 0.63 0.40
OSI 1.08 0.19 2.15 0.49 1.50 1.49 0.34 1.84 0.54 0.70 2.09 0.43 0.08 0.65 0.33 1.37 0.23 1.14 0.48 0.40 1.26 0.23 0.69 0.39 0.25
UTIL
AKL 0.32 0.06 0.64 0.15 0.45 0.44 0.10 0.55 0.16 0.21 0.62 0.13 0.02 0.20 0.10 0.41 0.07 0.34 0.14 0.12 0.38 0.07 0.20 0.12 0.07
WLG 0.23 0.04 0.45 0.10 0.31 0.31 0.07 0.39 0.11 0.15 0.44 0.09 0.02 0.14 0.07 0.29 0.05 0.24 0.10 0.08 0.26 0.05 0.14 0.08 0.05
ONI 0.52 0.09 1.04 0.24 0.72 0.72 0.16 0.89 0.26 0.34 1.01 0.21 0.04 0.32 0.16 0.66 0.11 0.55 0.23 0.19 0.61 0.11 0.33 0.19 0.12
CAN 0.09 0.02 0.18 0.04 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.02
OSI 0.15 0.03 0.30 0.07 0.21 0.21 0.05 0.26 0.08 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.19 0.03 0.16 0.07 0.06 0.18 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.03
CONS
AKL 25.24 4.41 50.23 11.44 34.97 34.85 7.94 43.05 12.69 16.29 48.83 9.95 1.92 15.29 7.62 31.95 5.25 26.53 11.22 9.38 29.51 5.34 16.06 9.09 5.72
WLG 8.02 1.40 15.96 3.64 11.11 11.08 2.52 13.68 4.03 5.18 15.52 3.16 0.61 4.86 2.42 10.16 1.67 8.43 3.57 2.98 9.38 1.70 5.10 2.89 1.82
ONI 28.63 5.00 56.98 12.98 39.67 39.54 9.01 48.84 14.40 18.48 55.39 11.29 2.18 17.34 8.65 36.25 5.96 30.10 12.73 10.64 33.47 6.05 18.22 10.31 6.49
CAN 8.90 1.55 17.72 4.03 12.34 12.29 2.80 15.19 4.48 5.75 17.22 3.51 0.68 5.39 2.69 11.27 1.85 9.36 3.96 3.31 10.41 1.88 5.66 3.21 2.02
OSI 11.26 1.97 22.41 5.10 15.60 15.55 3.54 19.21 5.66 7.27 21.79 4.44 0.86 6.82 3.40 14.26 2.34 11.84 5.01 4.19 13.17 2.38 7.17 4.06 2.55
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MRIO′
INV
row/col
UTIL CONS ACCR CMIF PROP
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
di
re
ct
pr
od
u
ct
u
sa
ge
M
R
IO
′ di
r
AGRI
AKL 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.48 0.22 0.18 0.12 0.07 0.16 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.05
WLG 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
ONI 0.57 0.41 0.95 0.16 0.28 0.76 0.25 0.89 0.27 0.35 0.30 0.11 0.33 0.12 0.21 6.43 2.98 2.47 1.61 0.94 2.14 0.57 1.69 0.70 0.67
CAN 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.67 0.31 0.26 0.17 0.10 0.22 0.06 0.18 0.07 0.07
OSI 0.29 0.21 0.48 0.08 0.14 0.38 0.13 0.45 0.14 0.18 0.15 0.05 0.17 0.06 0.11 3.24 1.50 1.24 0.81 0.48 1.08 0.29 0.85 0.35 0.34
FOLO
AKL 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.40 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.04
WLG 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
ONI 0.40 0.29 0.66 0.11 0.19 0.53 0.17 0.62 0.19 0.24 0.21 0.08 0.23 0.08 0.15 4.47 2.07 1.71 1.12 0.66 1.49 0.39 1.17 0.49 0.47
CAN 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.30 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.03
OSI 0.15 0.11 0.25 0.04 0.07 0.20 0.07 0.24 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.06 1.71 0.79 0.66 0.43 0.25 0.57 0.15 0.45 0.19 0.18
FISH
AKL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
WLG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ONI 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
CAN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OSI 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.17 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02
MINE
AKL 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.18 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02
WLG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
ONI 0.10 0.07 0.17 0.03 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 1.12 0.52 0.43 0.28 0.16 0.37 0.10 0.29 0.12 0.12
CAN 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.22 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.02
OSI 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.70 0.32 0.27 0.18 0.10 0.23 0.06 0.18 0.08 0.07
OIGA
AKL 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
WLG 0.10 0.07 0.16 0.03 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 1.09 0.50 0.42 0.27 0.16 0.36 0.10 0.29 0.12 0.11
ONI 0.94 0.68 1.56 0.26 0.46 1.24 0.41 1.45 0.44 0.57 0.49 0.18 0.54 0.19 0.34 10.48 4.86 4.02 2.62 1.54 3.48 0.92 2.75 1.14 1.10
PETR ONI 0.31 0.22 0.52 0.09 0.15 0.41 0.13 0.48 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.06 0.18 0.06 0.11 3.48 1.61 1.33 0.87 0.51 1.16 0.31 0.91 0.38 0.36
FDBT
AKL 0.13 0.09 0.21 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.05 0.19 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.05 1.41 0.65 0.54 0.35 0.21 0.47 0.12 0.37 0.15 0.15
WLG 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.24 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.03
ONI 0.24 0.18 0.41 0.07 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.38 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.09 2.73 1.27 1.05 0.68 0.40 0.91 0.24 0.72 0.30 0.29
CAN 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.63 0.29 0.24 0.16 0.09 0.21 0.06 0.17 0.07 0.07
OSI 0.17 0.12 0.28 0.05 0.08 0.22 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.06 1.90 0.88 0.73 0.47 0.28 0.63 0.17 0.50 0.21 0.20
TWPM
AKL 0.08 0.06 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.86 0.40 0.33 0.21 0.13 0.28 0.08 0.22 0.09 0.09
WLG 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.19 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02
ONI 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 1.03 0.48 0.39 0.26 0.15 0.34 0.09 0.27 0.11 0.11
CAN 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.31 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.03
OSI 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.39 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.04
CHNM
AKL 0.31 0.22 0.52 0.09 0.15 0.41 0.14 0.48 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.06 0.18 0.06 0.11 3.49 1.62 1.34 0.87 0.51 1.16 0.31 0.92 0.38 0.37
WLG 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.69 0.32 0.27 0.17 0.10 0.23 0.06 0.18 0.08 0.07
ONI 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01
CAN 0.10 0.07 0.16 0.03 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 1.08 0.50 0.41 0.27 0.16 0.36 0.10 0.28 0.12 0.11
OSI 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.53 0.25 0.20 0.13 0.08 0.18 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.06
METL
AKL 0.48 0.35 0.80 0.13 0.24 0.64 0.21 0.75 0.23 0.29 0.25 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.18 5.40 2.50 2.07 1.35 0.79 1.80 0.48 1.42 0.59 0.57
WLG 0.08 0.06 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.86 0.40 0.33 0.22 0.13 0.29 0.08 0.23 0.09 0.09
ONI 0.39 0.28 0.65 0.11 0.19 0.52 0.17 0.60 0.18 0.24 0.20 0.07 0.22 0.08 0.14 4.36 2.02 1.67 1.09 0.64 1.45 0.38 1.14 0.47 0.46
CAN 0.17 0.12 0.28 0.05 0.08 0.22 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.06 1.88 0.87 0.72 0.47 0.28 0.62 0.17 0.49 0.20 0.20
OSI 0.14 0.10 0.23 0.04 0.07 0.18 0.06 0.21 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.05 1.54 0.71 0.59 0.38 0.23 0.51 0.14 0.40 0.17 0.16
EQFO
AKL 5.39 3.89 8.96 1.50 2.63 7.15 2.34 8.33 2.55 3.28 2.83 1.02 3.10 1.08 1.96 60.31 27.97 23.15 15.07 8.85 20.06 5.32 15.82 6.55 6.33
WLG 0.95 0.68 1.57 0.26 0.46 1.26 0.41 1.46 0.45 0.58 0.50 0.18 0.55 0.19 0.34 10.60 4.92 4.07 2.65 1.56 3.52 0.93 2.78 1.15 1.11
ONI 2.85 2.06 4.74 0.80 1.39 3.78 1.24 4.41 1.35 1.74 1.50 0.54 1.64 0.57 1.04 31.94 14.81 12.26 7.98 4.69 10.62 2.82 8.38 3.47 3.35
CAN 1.64 1.19 2.73 0.46 0.80 2.18 0.71 2.54 0.78 1.00 0.86 0.31 0.95 0.33 0.60 18.39 8.53 7.06 4.59 2.70 6.12 1.62 4.82 2.00 1.93
OSI 1.02 0.73 1.69 0.28 0.49 1.35 0.44 1.57 0.48 0.62 0.53 0.19 0.59 0.20 0.37 11.37 5.27 4.36 2.84 1.67 3.78 1.00 2.98 1.24 1.19
UTIL
AKL 0.30 0.22 0.50 0.08 0.15 0.40 0.13 0.47 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.06 0.17 0.06 0.11 3.39 1.57 1.30 0.85 0.50 1.13 0.30 0.89 0.37 0.36
WLG 0.21 0.15 0.35 0.06 0.10 0.28 0.09 0.33 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.08 2.38 1.10 0.91 0.59 0.35 0.79 0.21 0.62 0.26 0.25
ONI 0.49 0.35 0.81 0.14 0.24 0.65 0.21 0.76 0.23 0.30 0.26 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.18 5.48 2.54 2.10 1.37 0.80 1.82 0.48 1.44 0.60 0.57
CAN 0.08 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.94 0.43 0.36 0.23 0.14 0.31 0.08 0.25 0.10 0.10
OSI 0.14 0.10 0.24 0.04 0.07 0.19 0.06 0.22 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.05 1.60 0.74 0.62 0.40 0.24 0.53 0.14 0.42 0.17 0.17
CONS
AKL 23.71 17.11 39.41 6.61 11.55 31.45 10.28 36.66 11.21 14.44 12.47 4.47 13.66 4.77 8.64 265.43 123.09 101.87 66.31 38.95 88.26 23.40 69.64 28.84 27.85
WLG 7.54 5.44 12.52 2.10 3.67 9.99 3.27 11.65 3.56 4.59 3.96 1.42 4.34 1.52 2.75 84.36 39.12 32.38 21.07 12.38 28.05 7.44 22.13 9.17 8.85
ONI 26.90 19.40 44.71 7.50 13.11 35.67 11.66 41.59 12.71 16.38 14.15 5.07 15.50 5.41 9.80 301.11 139.63 115.56 75.22 44.18 100.13 26.55 79.00 32.72 31.60
CAN 8.36 6.03 13.90 2.33 4.08 11.09 3.63 12.93 3.95 5.09 4.40 1.58 4.82 1.68 3.05 93.63 43.42 35.93 23.39 13.74 31.13 8.26 24.57 10.18 9.82
OSI 10.58 7.63 17.59 2.95 5.16 14.03 4.59 16.36 5.00 6.44 5.56 1.99 6.10 2.13 3.85 118.44 54.93 45.46 29.59 17.38 39.39 10.44 31.08 12.87 12.43
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MRIO′
INV
row/col
RBUS GOVT EDUC HEAL CUPE
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
di
re
ct
pr
od
u
ct
u
sa
ge
M
R
IO
′ di
r
AGRI
AKL 0.21 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.19 0.30 0.22 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02
WLG 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ONI 2.85 1.04 1.41 0.63 0.49 2.52 4.06 2.90 0.97 0.85 1.39 0.47 1.33 0.46 0.54 0.80 0.32 0.96 0.35 0.40 0.97 0.40 0.72 0.30 0.34
CAN 0.30 0.11 0.15 0.07 0.05 0.26 0.42 0.30 0.10 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.04
OSI 1.44 0.52 0.71 0.32 0.24 1.27 2.05 1.46 0.49 0.43 0.70 0.24 0.67 0.23 0.27 0.40 0.16 0.49 0.18 0.20 0.49 0.20 0.36 0.15 0.17
FOLO
AKL 0.18 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.16 0.25 0.18 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02
WLG 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ONI 1.98 0.72 0.98 0.44 0.34 1.75 2.83 2.02 0.67 0.59 0.97 0.33 0.93 0.32 0.37 0.56 0.22 0.67 0.24 0.27 0.67 0.27 0.50 0.21 0.23
CAN 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.19 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
OSI 0.76 0.28 0.37 0.17 0.13 0.67 1.08 0.77 0.26 0.23 0.37 0.12 0.36 0.12 0.14 0.21 0.08 0.26 0.09 0.11 0.26 0.11 0.19 0.08 0.09
FISH
AKL 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
WLG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ONI 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
CAN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OSI 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
MINE
AKL 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
WLG 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ONI 0.50 0.18 0.24 0.11 0.08 0.44 0.71 0.51 0.17 0.15 0.24 0.08 0.23 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.17 0.06 0.07 0.17 0.07 0.13 0.05 0.06
CAN 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.14 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
OSI 0.31 0.11 0.15 0.07 0.05 0.27 0.44 0.32 0.11 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.04
OIGA
AKL 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
WLG 0.48 0.18 0.24 0.11 0.08 0.43 0.69 0.49 0.16 0.14 0.24 0.08 0.23 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.16 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.06
ONI 4.65 1.70 2.29 1.02 0.79 4.11 6.63 4.73 1.58 1.39 2.27 0.76 2.17 0.74 0.88 1.30 0.52 1.57 0.57 0.64 1.58 0.64 1.18 0.48 0.55
PETR ONI 1.54 0.56 0.76 0.34 0.26 1.36 2.20 1.57 0.52 0.46 0.75 0.25 0.72 0.25 0.29 0.43 0.17 0.52 0.19 0.21 0.52 0.21 0.39 0.16 0.18
FDBT
AKL 0.62 0.23 0.31 0.14 0.11 0.55 0.89 0.64 0.21 0.19 0.31 0.10 0.29 0.10 0.12 0.18 0.07 0.21 0.08 0.09 0.21 0.09 0.16 0.06 0.07
WLG 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
ONI 1.21 0.44 0.60 0.27 0.21 1.07 1.73 1.23 0.41 0.36 0.59 0.20 0.57 0.19 0.23 0.34 0.13 0.41 0.15 0.17 0.41 0.17 0.31 0.13 0.14
CAN 0.28 0.10 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.25 0.40 0.29 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.03
OSI 0.84 0.31 0.42 0.19 0.14 0.74 1.20 0.86 0.29 0.25 0.41 0.14 0.39 0.13 0.16 0.24 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.12 0.29 0.12 0.21 0.09 0.10
TWPM
AKL 0.38 0.14 0.19 0.08 0.06 0.34 0.54 0.39 0.13 0.11 0.19 0.06 0.18 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.04
WLG 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
ONI 0.46 0.17 0.22 0.10 0.08 0.40 0.65 0.46 0.16 0.14 0.22 0.07 0.21 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.15 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.05
CAN 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
OSI 0.17 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.25 0.18 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02
CHNM
AKL 1.55 0.56 0.76 0.34 0.26 1.37 2.21 1.57 0.53 0.46 0.76 0.25 0.72 0.25 0.29 0.43 0.17 0.52 0.19 0.21 0.53 0.21 0.39 0.16 0.18
WLG 0.31 0.11 0.15 0.07 0.05 0.27 0.44 0.31 0.10 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.04
ONI 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
CAN 0.48 0.17 0.24 0.11 0.08 0.42 0.68 0.49 0.16 0.14 0.23 0.08 0.22 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.16 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.06
OSI 0.23 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.21 0.33 0.24 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.03
METL
AKL 2.39 0.87 1.18 0.53 0.41 2.12 3.41 2.44 0.81 0.72 1.17 0.39 1.12 0.38 0.45 0.67 0.27 0.81 0.29 0.33 0.81 0.33 0.61 0.25 0.28
WLG 0.38 0.14 0.19 0.08 0.07 0.34 0.55 0.39 0.13 0.11 0.19 0.06 0.18 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.04
ONI 1.93 0.71 0.95 0.43 0.33 1.71 2.76 1.97 0.66 0.58 0.95 0.32 0.90 0.31 0.37 0.54 0.22 0.65 0.24 0.27 0.66 0.27 0.49 0.20 0.23
CAN 0.83 0.30 0.41 0.18 0.14 0.74 1.19 0.85 0.28 0.25 0.41 0.14 0.39 0.13 0.16 0.23 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.12 0.28 0.12 0.21 0.09 0.10
OSI 0.68 0.25 0.34 0.15 0.12 0.60 0.97 0.70 0.23 0.20 0.33 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.13 0.19 0.08 0.23 0.08 0.09 0.23 0.09 0.17 0.07 0.08
EQFO
AKL 26.74 9.76 13.19 5.90 4.55 23.64 38.14 27.23 9.10 8.00 13.07 4.40 12.50 4.27 5.06 7.50 2.98 9.04 3.29 3.71 9.09 3.71 6.77 2.78 3.14
WLG 4.70 1.72 2.32 1.04 0.80 4.15 6.70 4.79 1.60 1.41 2.30 0.77 2.20 0.75 0.89 1.32 0.52 1.59 0.58 0.65 1.60 0.65 1.19 0.49 0.55
ONI 14.16 5.17 6.99 3.12 2.41 12.52 20.20 14.42 4.82 4.23 6.92 2.33 6.62 2.26 2.68 3.97 1.58 4.79 1.74 1.97 4.81 1.97 3.59 1.47 1.67
CAN 8.15 2.98 4.02 1.80 1.39 7.21 11.63 8.30 2.77 2.44 3.99 1.34 3.81 1.30 1.54 2.29 0.91 2.76 1.00 1.13 2.77 1.13 2.06 0.85 0.96
OSI 5.04 1.84 2.49 1.11 0.86 4.46 7.19 5.13 1.71 1.51 2.46 0.83 2.36 0.81 0.95 1.41 0.56 1.70 0.62 0.70 1.71 0.70 1.28 0.52 0.59
UTIL
AKL 1.50 0.55 0.74 0.33 0.26 1.33 2.14 1.53 0.51 0.45 0.73 0.25 0.70 0.24 0.28 0.42 0.17 0.51 0.18 0.21 0.51 0.21 0.38 0.16 0.18
WLG 1.05 0.38 0.52 0.23 0.18 0.93 1.50 1.07 0.36 0.31 0.51 0.17 0.49 0.17 0.20 0.30 0.12 0.36 0.13 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.27 0.11 0.12
ONI 2.43 0.89 1.20 0.54 0.41 2.15 3.46 2.47 0.83 0.73 1.19 0.40 1.14 0.39 0.46 0.68 0.27 0.82 0.30 0.34 0.83 0.34 0.62 0.25 0.29
CAN 0.41 0.15 0.20 0.09 0.07 0.37 0.59 0.42 0.14 0.12 0.20 0.07 0.19 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.05
OSI 0.71 0.26 0.35 0.16 0.12 0.63 1.01 0.72 0.24 0.21 0.35 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.13 0.20 0.08 0.24 0.09 0.10 0.24 0.10 0.18 0.07 0.08
CONS
AKL 117.67 42.97 58.06 25.96 20.03 104.02 167.85 119.84 40.04 35.19 57.53 19.35 55.03 18.81 22.28 33.00 13.09 39.79 14.46 16.34 39.99 16.33 29.80 12.22 13.84
WLG 37.40 13.66 18.45 8.25 6.37 33.06 53.35 38.09 12.72 11.18 18.28 6.15 17.49 5.98 7.08 10.49 4.16 12.65 4.60 5.19 12.71 5.19 9.47 3.88 4.40
ONI 133.49 48.74 65.87 29.45 22.72 118.01 190.42 135.95 45.42 39.92 65.26 21.96 62.43 21.34 25.27 37.44 14.85 45.14 16.40 18.53 45.36 18.53 33.81 13.86 15.70
CAN 41.51 15.16 20.48 9.16 7.07 36.69 59.21 42.27 14.12 12.41 20.29 6.83 19.41 6.64 7.86 11.64 4.62 14.04 5.10 5.76 14.11 5.76 10.51 4.31 4.88
OSI 52.51 19.17 25.91 11.58 8.94 46.42 74.90 53.48 17.87 15.70 25.67 8.64 24.56 8.39 9.94 14.73 5.84 17.76 6.45 7.29 17.84 7.29 13.30 5.45 6.18
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MRIO′
INV GOV
row/col
OWND WHOL RETT TRAN
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
di
re
ct
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od
u
ct
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M
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′ di
r
AGRI
AKL 1.07 0.38 0.96 0.33 0.41 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.47
WLG 0.25 0.09 0.22 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11
ONI 14.44 5.18 12.92 4.51 5.53 1.55 0.29 0.57 0.35 0.27 1.08 0.34 1.13 0.38 0.48 0.20 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.06 6.34
CAN 1.51 0.54 1.35 0.47 0.58 0.16 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.66
OSI 7.28 2.61 6.51 2.27 2.79 0.78 0.15 0.29 0.18 0.14 0.54 0.17 0.57 0.19 0.24 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 3.19
FOLO
AKL 0.89 0.32 0.80 0.28 0.34 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
WLG 0.30 0.11 0.27 0.09 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ONI 10.04 3.60 8.98 3.14 3.85 1.08 0.20 0.40 0.25 0.19 0.75 0.23 0.79 0.26 0.33 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.03
CAN 0.67 0.24 0.60 0.21 0.26 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OSI 3.85 1.38 3.45 1.20 1.48 0.41 0.08 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.29 0.09 0.30 0.10 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
FISH
AKL 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
WLG 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ONI 0.22 0.08 0.20 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CAN 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OSI 0.38 0.14 0.34 0.12 0.14 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MINE
AKL 0.41 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.16 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
WLG 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ONI 2.51 0.90 2.25 0.79 0.96 0.27 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.19 0.06 0.20 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
CAN 0.49 0.18 0.44 0.15 0.19 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OSI 1.57 0.56 1.41 0.49 0.60 0.17 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
OIGA
AKL 0.16 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
WLG 2.45 0.88 2.19 0.76 0.94 0.26 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.18 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
ONI 23.55 8.45 21.06 7.35 9.02 2.53 0.47 0.94 0.58 0.44 1.76 0.55 1.85 0.61 0.78 0.33 0.08 0.17 0.10 0.10
PETR ONI 7.81 2.80 6.99 2.44 2.99 0.84 0.16 0.31 0.19 0.15 0.58 0.18 0.61 0.20 0.26 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.03
FDBT
AKL 3.17 1.14 2.83 0.99 1.21 0.34 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 1.70
WLG 0.54 0.19 0.48 0.17 0.21 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29
ONI 6.13 2.20 5.49 1.92 2.35 0.66 0.12 0.24 0.15 0.11 0.46 0.14 0.48 0.16 0.20 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 3.30
CAN 1.42 0.51 1.27 0.44 0.54 0.15 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.76
OSI 4.26 1.53 3.81 1.33 1.63 0.46 0.09 0.17 0.10 0.08 0.32 0.10 0.33 0.11 0.14 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 2.29
TWPM
AKL 1.92 0.69 1.72 0.60 0.74 0.21 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
WLG 0.43 0.15 0.38 0.13 0.16 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ONI 2.31 0.83 2.07 0.72 0.88 0.25 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.17 0.05 0.18 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
CAN 0.69 0.25 0.62 0.22 0.27 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
OSI 0.87 0.31 0.78 0.27 0.33 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
CHNM
AKL 7.84 2.81 7.01 2.45 3.00 0.84 0.16 0.31 0.19 0.15 0.59 0.18 0.61 0.20 0.26 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.03 56.77
WLG 1.55 0.56 1.39 0.48 0.59 0.17 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 11.25
ONI 0.30 0.11 0.27 0.09 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.18
CAN 2.43 0.87 2.17 0.76 0.93 0.26 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.18 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 17.59
OSI 1.19 0.43 1.06 0.37 0.46 0.13 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 8.61
METL
AKL 12.13 4.35 10.85 3.79 4.65 1.30 0.24 0.48 0.30 0.23 0.91 0.28 0.95 0.32 0.40 0.17 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.05
WLG 1.94 0.70 1.73 0.61 0.74 0.21 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ONI 9.80 3.52 8.77 3.06 3.75 1.05 0.20 0.39 0.24 0.18 0.73 0.23 0.77 0.26 0.32 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.04
CAN 4.22 1.51 3.77 1.32 1.62 0.45 0.08 0.17 0.10 0.08 0.32 0.10 0.33 0.11 0.14 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02
OSI 3.46 1.24 3.10 1.08 1.33 0.37 0.07 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
EQFO
AKL 135.52 48.62 121.21 42.32 51.91 14.58 2.73 5.39 3.32 2.53 10.13 3.17 10.63 3.53 4.46 1.89 0.45 0.96 0.58 0.59 1.56
WLG 23.82 8.55 21.30 7.44 9.12 2.56 0.48 0.95 0.58 0.44 1.78 0.56 1.87 0.62 0.78 0.33 0.08 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.27
ONI 71.77 25.75 64.19 22.41 27.49 7.72 1.44 2.86 1.76 1.34 5.36 1.68 5.63 1.87 2.36 1.00 0.24 0.51 0.30 0.31 0.83
CAN 41.32 14.82 36.96 12.90 15.83 4.44 0.83 1.64 1.01 0.77 3.09 0.97 3.24 1.08 1.36 0.58 0.14 0.29 0.18 0.18 0.48
OSI 25.55 9.16 22.85 7.98 9.79 2.75 0.51 1.02 0.63 0.48 1.91 0.60 2.00 0.67 0.84 0.36 0.08 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.29
UTIL
AKL 7.61 2.73 6.81 2.38 2.92 0.82 0.15 0.30 0.19 0.14 0.57 0.18 0.60 0.20 0.25 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.00
WLG 5.34 1.91 4.77 1.67 2.04 0.57 0.11 0.21 0.13 0.10 0.40 0.12 0.42 0.14 0.18 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00
ONI 12.31 4.42 11.01 3.84 4.72 1.32 0.25 0.49 0.30 0.23 0.92 0.29 0.97 0.32 0.41 0.17 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.00
CAN 2.10 0.75 1.88 0.66 0.80 0.23 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
OSI 3.60 1.29 3.22 1.13 1.38 0.39 0.07 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.27 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00
CONS
AKL 596.42 213.97 533.44 186.25 228.46 64.15 12.00 23.74 14.63 11.14 44.57 13.93 46.77 15.54 19.63 8.30 1.97 4.22 2.53 2.59 1.85
WLG 189.55 68.00 169.54 59.19 72.61 20.39 3.81 7.54 4.65 3.54 14.17 4.43 14.86 4.94 6.24 2.64 0.63 1.34 0.81 0.82 0.59
ONI 676.59 242.73 605.15 211.28 259.17 72.77 13.61 26.93 16.59 12.64 50.56 15.81 53.06 17.63 22.27 9.42 2.23 4.79 2.87 2.94 2.10
CAN 210.39 75.48 188.17 65.70 80.59 22.63 4.23 8.37 5.16 3.93 15.72 4.92 16.50 5.48 6.93 2.93 0.69 1.49 0.89 0.92 0.65
OSI 266.14 95.48 238.04 83.11 101.94 28.62 5.35 10.59 6.53 4.97 19.89 6.22 20.87 6.93 8.76 3.70 0.88 1.88 1.13 1.16 0.83
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EXP TOTAL
row/col
AGRI FOLO FISH MINE OIGA PETR FDBT TWPM CHNM METL EQFO UTIL CONS ACCR CMIF PROP RBUS GOVT EDUC HEAL CUPE TRAN
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AGRI
AKL 76.11 737.04
WLG 17.49 169.32
ONI 1025.79 9933.39
CAN 107.16 1037.69
OSI 516.98 5006.30
FOLO
AKL 40.61 168.87
WLG 13.56 56.40
ONI 456.37 1897.70
CAN 30.54 126.98
OSI 175.11 728.14
FISH
AKL 14.74 82.21
WLG 2.88 16.08
ONI 48.91 272.80
CAN 4.02 22.43
OSI 82.40 459.59
MINE
AKL 24.21 96.74
WLG 3.06 12.23
ONI 149.45 597.24
CAN 29.27 116.95
OSI 93.57 373.95
OIGA
AKL 2.65 14.98
WLG 41.08 231.84
ONI 395.51 2231.93
PETR ONI 85.87 3683.30
FDBT
AKL 2712.98 5647.61
WLG 460.29 958.18
ONI 5253.95 10937.14
CAN 1217.03 2533.49
OSI 3653.38 7605.23
TWPM
AKL 1131.68 4032.28
WLG 250.63 893.03
ONI 1360.16 4846.37
CAN 407.85 1453.20
OSI 514.10 1831.79
CHNM
AKL 1128.51 5346.09
WLG 223.59 1059.19
ONI 43.29 205.07
CAN 349.72 1656.75
OSI 171.24 811.23
METL
AKL 669.51 3116.73
WLG 106.98 498.02
ONI 540.88 2517.95
CAN 232.74 1083.45
OSI 191.02 889.24
EQFO
AKL 1701.57 4835.68
WLG 299.06 849.89
ONI 901.13 2560.91
CAN 518.82 1474.42
OSI 320.74 911.50
UTIL
AKL 14.66 3099.31
WLG 10.28 2173.38
ONI 23.72 5012.84
CAN 4.05 855.58
OSI 6.95 1467.86
CONS
AKL 64.17 9013.57
WLG 20.39 2864.64
ONI 72.79 10225.19
CAN 22.63 3179.59
OSI 28.63 4022.15
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MRIO′
Industries
row/col
AGRI FOLO FISH MINE OIGA PETR
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI ONI
di
re
ct
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od
u
ct
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M
R
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′ di
r
ACCR
AKL 0.13 0.03 1.78 0.18 0.90 0.03 0.01 0.37 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.27
WLG 0.05 0.01 0.62 0.06 0.31 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.09
ONI 0.14 0.03 1.90 0.20 0.96 0.04 0.01 0.39 0.03 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.29
CAN 0.05 0.01 0.67 0.07 0.34 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.10
OSI 0.09 0.02 1.20 0.12 0.61 0.02 0.01 0.25 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.18
CMIF
AKL 13.27 3.12 182.12 18.73 91.98 2.74 0.89 30.08 1.99 11.52 2.86 0.56 9.54 0.78 16.09 0.69 0.09 4.18 0.81 2.62 0.02 0.29 2.83 16.14
WLG 5.98 1.41 82.09 8.44 41.46 1.23 0.40 13.56 0.90 5.19 1.29 0.25 4.30 0.35 7.25 0.31 0.04 1.89 0.37 1.18 0.01 0.13 1.27 7.28
ONI 4.96 1.17 68.01 6.99 34.35 1.02 0.33 11.23 0.74 4.30 1.07 0.21 3.56 0.29 6.01 0.26 0.03 1.56 0.30 0.98 0.01 0.11 1.06 6.03
CAN 3.28 0.77 45.04 4.63 22.75 0.68 0.22 7.44 0.49 2.85 0.71 0.14 2.36 0.19 3.98 0.17 0.02 1.03 0.20 0.65 0.00 0.07 0.70 3.99
OSI 1.89 0.45 25.97 2.67 13.12 0.39 0.13 4.29 0.28 1.64 0.41 0.08 1.36 0.11 2.29 0.10 0.01 0.60 0.12 0.37 0.00 0.04 0.40 2.30
PROP
AKL 4.17 0.98 57.26 5.89 28.92 0.67 0.22 7.39 0.49 2.83 0.69 0.14 2.30 0.19 3.88 0.44 0.05 2.66 0.52 1.66 0.01 0.14 1.39 2.30
WLG 1.08 0.25 14.76 1.52 7.45 0.17 0.06 1.90 0.13 0.73 0.18 0.04 0.59 0.05 1.00 0.11 0.01 0.69 0.13 0.43 0.00 0.04 0.36 0.59
ONI 3.20 0.75 43.96 4.52 22.20 0.52 0.17 5.67 0.38 2.17 0.53 0.10 1.77 0.14 2.98 0.34 0.04 2.04 0.40 1.28 0.01 0.11 1.07 1.77
CAN 1.35 0.32 18.52 1.90 9.36 0.22 0.07 2.39 0.16 0.92 0.22 0.04 0.75 0.06 1.26 0.14 0.02 0.86 0.17 0.54 0.00 0.05 0.45 0.74
OSI 1.28 0.30 17.56 1.81 8.87 0.21 0.07 2.27 0.15 0.87 0.21 0.04 0.71 0.06 1.19 0.13 0.02 0.82 0.16 0.51 0.00 0.04 0.43 0.71
RBUS
AKL 12.68 2.98 173.98 17.89 87.87 4.22 1.38 46.45 3.07 17.79 1.83 0.36 6.11 0.50 10.30 1.02 0.13 6.18 1.20 3.87 0.04 0.61 5.90 63.26
WLG 4.50 1.06 61.75 6.35 31.19 1.50 0.49 16.48 1.09 6.31 0.65 0.13 2.17 0.18 3.65 0.36 0.05 2.19 0.43 1.37 0.01 0.22 2.10 22.45
ONI 6.09 1.43 83.53 8.59 42.19 2.03 0.66 22.30 1.48 8.54 0.88 0.17 2.93 0.24 4.94 0.49 0.06 2.97 0.58 1.86 0.02 0.29 2.83 30.37
CAN 2.77 0.65 37.99 3.91 19.19 0.92 0.30 10.14 0.67 3.88 0.40 0.08 1.33 0.11 2.25 0.22 0.03 1.35 0.26 0.84 0.01 0.13 1.29 13.81
OSI 2.10 0.49 28.78 2.96 14.54 0.70 0.23 7.68 0.51 2.94 0.30 0.06 1.01 0.08 1.70 0.17 0.02 1.02 0.20 0.64 0.01 0.10 0.98 10.47
GOVT
AKL 0.53 0.12 7.26 0.75 3.67 0.10 0.03 1.08 0.07 0.41 0.05 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.28 0.26 0.03 1.57 0.30 0.98 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.15
WLG 0.83 0.20 11.38 1.17 5.75 0.15 0.05 1.69 0.11 0.65 0.08 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.44 0.41 0.05 2.46 0.48 1.54 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.23
ONI 0.59 0.14 8.13 0.84 4.11 0.11 0.04 1.21 0.08 0.46 0.06 0.01 0.19 0.02 0.32 0.29 0.04 1.76 0.34 1.10 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.17
CAN 0.20 0.05 2.76 0.28 1.40 0.04 0.01 0.41 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.60 0.12 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.06
OSI 0.17 0.04 2.39 0.25 1.20 0.03 0.01 0.35 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.52 0.10 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05
EDUC
AKL 0.51 0.28 0.04 0.04 0.00
WLG 0.11 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.06
ONI 7.22 3.18 0.14 0.23 0.63 1.04
CAN 0.73 0.21 0.01 0.04
OSI 3.60 1.20 0.24 0.14
HEAL
AKL 2.45 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.00
WLG 0.56 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01
ONI 36.23 1.16 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.20
CAN 3.77 0.08 0.01 0.02
OSI 17.95 0.44 0.14 0.06
CUPE
AKL 3.75 0.70 0.37 0.07 0.01
WLG 0.90 0.23 0.07 0.01 0.11
ONI 45.54 6.82 1.10 0.38 0.89 1.47
CAN 5.22 0.50 0.10 0.08
OSI 23.92 2.72 1.93 0.25
OWND
AKL
WLG
ONI
CAN
OSI
TRAN
AKL
WLG
ONI
CAN
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WHOL
AKL 21.21 3.16 2.05 1.27
WLG 2.99 0.62 0.24 0.09
ONI 131.15 15.66 3.08 3.48 15.98
CAN 22.73 1.75 0.42 1.14
OSI 69.01 6.25 5.42 2.27
RETT
AKL 21.68 2.55 2.06 1.59
WLG 4.21 0.69 0.34 0.16
ONI 329.02 30.99 7.60 10.62 10.84
CAN 32.95 2.00 0.60 2.01
OSI 155.74 11.12 12.01 6.23
TRAN
AKL
WLG
CAN
OSI
so
u
rc
e-
m
ar
gi
n
s
M
R
IO
′ sr
c
WHOL
AKL 7.69 1.81 105.48 10.85 53.28 1.15 0.37 12.59 0.83 4.82 0.74 0.15 2.48 0.20 4.18 0.46 0.06 2.80 0.54 1.75 12.85
WLG 1.40 0.33 19.17 1.97 9.68 0.21 0.07 2.29 0.15 0.88 0.14 0.03 0.45 0.04 0.76 0.08 0.01 0.51 0.10 0.32 2.34
ONI 2.77 0.65 37.98 3.91 19.18 0.41 0.13 4.53 0.30 1.74 0.27 0.05 0.89 0.07 1.51 0.17 0.02 1.01 0.20 0.63 4.63
CAN 1.73 0.41 23.81 2.45 12.03 0.26 0.08 2.84 0.19 1.09 0.17 0.03 0.56 0.05 0.94 0.10 0.01 0.63 0.12 0.40 2.90
OSI 1.30 0.31 17.80 1.83 8.99 0.19 0.06 2.12 0.14 0.81 0.13 0.02 0.42 0.03 0.71 0.08 0.01 0.47 0.09 0.30 2.17
TRAN
AKL 1.70 113.55 10.57 51.95 4.64 178.51 10.69 61.94 0.46 8.92 0.66 13.63 0.69 38.33 6.73 21.73 0.27 2.97 52.31
WLG 1.71 16.99 1.58 7.77 3.35 26.71 1.60 9.27 0.55 1.34 0.10 2.04 1.31 5.74 1.01 3.25 0.00 0.44 7.83
ONI 4.44 0.66 4.11 20.20 8.71 1.80 4.16 24.08 1.44 0.18 0.26 5.30 3.40 0.27 2.62 8.45 0.01 0.10
CAN 2.28 0.34 22.63 10.36 4.47 0.92 35.58 12.35 0.74 0.09 1.78 2.72 1.74 0.14 7.64 4.33 0.01 0.05 0.59 10.43
OSI 2.36 0.35 23.43 2.18 4.62 0.96 36.83 2.21 0.76 0.10 1.84 0.14 1.80 0.14 7.91 1.39 0.01 0.06 0.61 10.79
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Industries
row/col
FDBT TWPM CHNM METL EQFO
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
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AKL 0.38 0.06 0.73 0.17 0.51 0.48 0.11 0.59 0.17 0.22 0.75 0.15 0.03 0.23 0.11 0.34 0.06 0.28 0.12 0.10 0.85 0.15 0.46 0.26 0.16
WLG 0.13 0.02 0.26 0.06 0.18 0.17 0.04 0.21 0.06 0.08 0.26 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.30 0.05 0.16 0.09 0.06
ONI 0.40 0.07 0.78 0.18 0.54 0.52 0.12 0.63 0.19 0.24 0.80 0.16 0.03 0.25 0.12 0.36 0.06 0.30 0.13 0.11 0.90 0.16 0.49 0.28 0.17
CAN 0.14 0.02 0.28 0.06 0.19 0.18 0.04 0.22 0.07 0.08 0.29 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.32 0.06 0.17 0.10 0.06
OSI 0.25 0.04 0.49 0.11 0.34 0.33 0.07 0.40 0.12 0.15 0.51 0.10 0.02 0.16 0.08 0.23 0.04 0.19 0.08 0.07 0.57 0.10 0.31 0.17 0.11
CMIF
AKL 39.97 6.81 77.95 17.86 54.17 43.97 9.82 53.61 15.82 20.24 57.37 11.31 2.19 17.58 8.66 38.74 6.28 31.93 13.51 11.26 48.52 8.68 26.22 14.85 9.33
WLG 18.02 3.07 35.14 8.05 24.42 19.82 4.43 24.16 7.13 9.12 25.86 5.10 0.99 7.92 3.91 17.46 2.83 14.39 6.09 5.08 21.87 3.91 11.82 6.70 4.21
ONI 14.93 2.54 29.11 6.67 20.23 16.42 3.67 20.02 5.91 7.56 21.42 4.22 0.82 6.57 3.24 14.47 2.34 11.92 5.05 4.21 18.12 3.24 9.79 5.55 3.48
CAN 9.88 1.68 19.28 4.42 13.39 10.87 2.43 13.26 3.91 5.00 14.19 2.80 0.54 4.35 2.14 9.58 1.55 7.90 3.34 2.79 12.00 2.15 6.48 3.67 2.31
OSI 5.70 0.97 11.12 2.55 7.72 6.27 1.40 7.65 2.26 2.89 8.18 1.61 0.31 2.51 1.24 5.52 0.90 4.55 1.93 1.61 6.92 1.24 3.74 2.12 1.33
PROP
AKL 11.28 1.92 22.00 5.04 15.29 13.46 3.01 16.41 4.84 6.19 17.08 3.37 0.65 5.24 2.58 9.12 1.48 7.52 3.18 2.65 18.80 3.36 10.16 5.76 3.62
WLG 2.91 0.50 5.67 1.30 3.94 3.47 0.78 4.23 1.25 1.60 4.40 0.87 0.17 1.35 0.66 2.35 0.38 1.94 0.82 0.68 4.85 0.87 2.62 1.48 0.93
ONI 8.66 1.48 16.89 3.87 11.74 10.33 2.31 12.60 3.72 4.76 13.12 2.59 0.50 4.02 1.98 7.00 1.13 5.77 2.44 2.04 14.44 2.58 7.80 4.42 2.78
CAN 3.65 0.62 7.12 1.63 4.94 4.35 0.97 5.31 1.57 2.00 5.53 1.09 0.21 1.69 0.83 2.95 0.48 2.43 1.03 0.86 6.08 1.09 3.29 1.86 1.17
OSI 3.46 0.59 6.75 1.55 4.69 4.13 0.92 5.03 1.48 1.90 5.24 1.03 0.20 1.61 0.79 2.80 0.45 2.31 0.98 0.81 5.77 1.03 3.12 1.77 1.11
RBUS
AKL 88.36 15.06 172.29 39.49 119.73 75.74 16.92 92.35 27.25 34.86 114.07 22.49 4.36 34.96 17.23 44.13 7.15 36.37 15.39 12.83 101.11 18.09 54.63 30.95 19.44
WLG 31.36 5.34 61.15 14.01 42.49 26.88 6.01 32.78 9.67 12.37 40.49 7.98 1.55 12.41 6.11 15.66 2.54 12.91 5.46 4.55 35.89 6.42 19.39 10.99 6.90
ONI 42.42 7.23 82.72 18.96 57.48 36.37 8.13 44.34 13.08 16.74 54.77 10.80 2.09 16.79 8.27 21.19 3.43 17.46 7.39 6.16 48.54 8.69 26.23 14.86 9.34
CAN 19.29 3.29 37.62 8.62 26.14 16.54 3.70 20.17 5.95 7.61 24.91 4.91 0.95 7.63 3.76 9.64 1.56 7.94 3.36 2.80 22.08 3.95 11.93 6.76 4.25
OSI 14.62 2.49 28.50 6.53 19.81 12.53 2.80 15.28 4.51 5.77 18.87 3.72 0.72 5.78 2.85 7.30 1.18 6.02 2.55 2.12 16.73 2.99 9.04 5.12 3.22
GOVT
AKL 0.57 0.10 1.11 0.25 0.77 1.98 0.44 2.41 0.71 0.91 3.40 0.67 0.13 1.04 0.51 0.42 0.07 0.34 0.15 0.12 1.14 0.20 0.61 0.35 0.22
WLG 0.89 0.15 1.73 0.40 1.20 3.10 0.69 3.78 1.12 1.43 5.34 1.05 0.20 1.64 0.81 0.65 0.11 0.54 0.23 0.19 1.78 0.32 0.96 0.55 0.34
ONI 0.64 0.11 1.24 0.28 0.86 2.22 0.50 2.71 0.80 1.02 3.81 0.75 0.15 1.17 0.58 0.47 0.08 0.39 0.16 0.14 1.27 0.23 0.69 0.39 0.25
CAN 0.22 0.04 0.42 0.10 0.29 0.75 0.17 0.92 0.27 0.35 1.30 0.26 0.05 0.40 0.20 0.16 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.43 0.08 0.23 0.13 0.08
OSI 0.19 0.03 0.36 0.08 0.25 0.65 0.15 0.79 0.23 0.30 1.12 0.22 0.04 0.34 0.17 0.14 0.02 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.37 0.07 0.20 0.11 0.07
EDUC
AKL 1.95 11.43 4.79 1.68 2.90
WLG 0.31 2.38 0.88 0.25 0.49
ONI 3.88 14.26 0.19 1.41 1.61
CAN 0.88 4.16 1.49 0.59 0.90
OSI 2.66 5.31 0.73 0.49 0.56
HEAL
AKL 1.19 2.37 2.73 0.87 1.75
WLG 0.20 0.52 0.52 0.14 0.31
ONI 2.51 3.10 0.11 0.78 1.02
CAN 0.58 0.93 0.91 0.33 0.58
OSI 1.71 1.15 0.43 0.27 0.36
CUPE
AKL 49.37 31.04 39.37 8.11 21.89
WLG 8.54 7.04 7.88 1.33 3.98
ONI 85.25 33.51 1.33 5.92 10.47
CAN 21.79 11.03 11.92 2.79 6.62
OSI 61.61 13.15 5.48 2.17 3.88
OWND
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AKL 123.32 118.67 60.60 93.98 146.32
WLG 12.59 15.88 7.15 9.12 15.68
ONI 108.35 65.20 1.04 34.90 35.62
CAN 41.86 32.43 14.11 24.90 34.02
OSI 78.44 25.64 4.30 12.83 13.21
RETT
AKL 59.81 27.73 39.57 15.35 67.39
WLG 8.40 5.11 6.43 2.05 9.94
ONI 128.94 37.38 1.67 13.99 40.26
CAN 28.78 10.74 13.06 5.77 22.22
OSI 83.98 13.23 6.19 4.62 13.43
TRAN
AKL
WLG
CAN
OSI
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u
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m
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c
WHOL
AKL 44.69 7.62 87.15 19.97 60.56 43.01 9.61 52.44 15.47 19.79 21.96 4.33 0.84 6.73 3.32 34.06 5.52 28.07 11.88 9.90 53.03 9.49 28.65 16.23 10.20
WLG 8.12 1.38 15.84 3.63 11.01 7.82 1.75 9.53 2.81 3.60 3.99 0.79 0.15 1.22 0.60 6.19 1.00 5.10 2.16 1.80 9.64 1.72 5.21 2.95 1.85
ONI 16.09 2.74 31.38 7.19 21.81 15.49 3.46 18.88 5.57 7.13 7.91 1.56 0.30 2.42 1.19 12.26 1.99 10.11 4.28 3.57 19.09 3.42 10.32 5.84 3.67
CAN 10.09 1.72 19.67 4.51 13.67 9.71 2.17 11.84 3.49 4.47 4.96 0.98 0.19 1.52 0.75 7.69 1.25 6.34 2.68 2.24 11.97 2.14 6.47 3.66 2.30
OSI 7.54 1.29 14.71 3.37 10.22 7.26 1.62 8.85 2.61 3.34 3.71 0.73 0.14 1.14 0.56 5.75 0.93 4.74 2.00 1.67 8.95 1.60 4.83 2.74 1.72
TRAN
AKL 22.37 292.68 60.72 184.25 21.93 136.91 36.57 46.82 31.89 7.07 51.35 25.32 7.84 45.61 17.47 14.58 10.27 35.48 18.20 11.44
WLG 30.99 43.80 9.09 27.57 23.19 20.49 5.47 7.01 38.22 1.06 7.68 3.79 11.43 6.83 2.61 2.18 13.56 5.31 2.72 1.71
ONI 80.53 8.70 23.61 71.64 60.24 8.53 14.22 18.20 99.30 12.40 19.96 9.85 29.69 3.05 6.79 5.67 35.24 3.99 7.08 4.45
CAN 41.28 4.46 58.34 36.72 30.88 4.37 27.29 9.33 50.91 6.36 1.41 5.05 15.22 1.56 9.09 2.91 18.06 2.05 7.07 2.28
OSI 42.73 4.61 60.39 12.53 31.97 4.53 28.25 7.54 52.69 6.58 1.46 10.59 15.76 1.62 9.41 3.60 18.70 2.12 7.32 3.75
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MRIO′
Industries
row/col
UTIL CONS ACCR CMIF PROP
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
di
re
ct
pr
od
u
ct
u
sa
ge
M
R
IO
′ di
r
ACCR
AKL 0.17 0.12 0.27 0.05 0.08 2.55 0.83 2.95 0.90 1.16 0.66 0.24 0.73 0.25 0.46 1.63 0.74 0.61 0.40 0.23 0.59 0.15 0.45 0.19 0.18
WLG 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.89 0.29 1.03 0.32 0.40 0.23 0.08 0.26 0.09 0.16 0.57 0.26 0.21 0.14 0.08 0.20 0.05 0.16 0.07 0.06
ONI 0.18 0.13 0.29 0.05 0.09 2.72 0.88 3.14 0.96 1.24 0.71 0.26 0.78 0.27 0.49 1.74 0.79 0.65 0.43 0.25 0.63 0.16 0.48 0.20 0.19
CAN 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.96 0.31 1.12 0.34 0.44 0.25 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.18 0.62 0.28 0.23 0.15 0.09 0.22 0.06 0.17 0.07 0.07
OSI 0.11 0.08 0.18 0.03 0.05 1.71 0.56 1.98 0.61 0.78 0.45 0.16 0.49 0.17 0.31 1.10 0.50 0.41 0.27 0.16 0.40 0.10 0.31 0.13 0.12
CMIF
AKL 18.31 12.86 29.63 5.05 8.68 73.79 23.94 85.37 26.20 33.61 16.02 5.80 17.73 6.15 11.21 1167.85 528.84 438.25 288.38 167.33 113.52 29.55 87.61 36.69 35.04
WLG 8.25 5.80 13.36 2.28 3.91 33.26 10.79 38.48 11.81 15.15 7.22 2.61 7.99 2.77 5.05 526.39 238.37 197.53 129.98 75.42 51.17 13.32 39.49 16.54 15.79
ONI 6.84 4.80 11.07 1.89 3.24 27.55 8.94 31.88 9.79 12.55 5.98 2.16 6.62 2.30 4.19 436.13 197.49 163.66 107.69 62.49 42.39 11.04 32.72 13.70 13.09
CAN 4.53 3.18 7.33 1.25 2.15 18.25 5.92 21.11 6.48 8.31 3.96 1.43 4.38 1.52 2.77 288.78 130.77 108.37 71.31 41.38 28.07 7.31 21.66 9.07 8.66
OSI 2.61 1.83 4.23 0.72 1.24 10.52 3.41 12.17 3.74 4.79 2.28 0.83 2.53 0.88 1.60 166.54 75.42 62.50 41.12 23.86 16.19 4.21 12.49 5.23 5.00
PROP
AKL 9.68 6.80 15.67 2.67 4.59 24.96 8.10 28.88 8.86 11.37 7.31 2.64 8.09 2.81 5.11 52.67 23.85 19.76 13.00 7.55 219.09 57.04 169.08 70.80 67.62
WLG 2.50 1.75 4.04 0.69 1.18 6.43 2.09 7.44 2.28 2.93 1.88 0.68 2.08 0.72 1.32 13.57 6.15 5.09 3.35 1.94 56.47 14.70 43.58 18.25 17.43
ONI 7.43 5.22 12.03 2.05 3.52 19.16 6.22 22.17 6.80 8.73 5.61 2.03 6.21 2.15 3.93 40.43 18.31 15.17 9.98 5.79 168.20 43.79 129.81 54.36 51.92
CAN 3.13 2.20 5.07 0.86 1.48 8.07 2.62 9.34 2.87 3.68 2.36 0.86 2.62 0.91 1.65 17.04 7.71 6.39 4.21 2.44 70.87 18.45 54.70 22.90 21.88
OSI 2.97 2.09 4.81 0.82 1.41 7.65 2.48 8.86 2.72 3.49 2.24 0.81 2.48 0.86 1.57 16.15 7.31 6.06 3.99 2.31 67.19 17.49 51.85 21.71 20.74
RBUS
AKL 95.50 67.09 154.60 26.36 45.28 165.21 53.60 191.16 58.67 75.26 27.47 9.94 30.39 10.55 19.22 382.48 173.20 143.53 94.45 54.80 71.52 18.62 55.20 23.11 22.08
WLG 33.90 23.81 54.87 9.35 16.07 58.64 19.02 67.85 20.82 26.71 9.75 3.53 10.79 3.74 6.82 135.75 61.47 50.94 33.52 19.45 25.38 6.61 19.59 8.20 7.84
ONI 45.85 32.21 74.23 12.65 21.74 79.32 25.74 91.78 28.17 36.13 13.19 4.77 14.59 5.06 9.23 183.64 83.16 68.91 45.35 26.31 34.34 8.94 26.50 11.10 10.60
CAN 20.85 14.65 33.76 5.76 9.89 36.08 11.71 41.74 12.81 16.43 6.00 2.17 6.64 2.30 4.20 83.52 37.82 31.34 20.62 11.97 15.62 4.07 12.05 5.05 4.82
OSI 15.80 11.10 25.58 4.36 7.49 27.33 8.87 31.62 9.71 12.45 4.54 1.64 5.03 1.74 3.18 63.27 28.65 23.74 15.62 9.07 11.83 3.08 9.13 3.82 3.65
GOVT
AKL 0.49 0.35 0.80 0.14 0.23 2.38 0.77 2.75 0.85 1.08 0.39 0.14 0.43 0.15 0.27 5.07 2.29 1.90 1.25 0.73 2.48 0.64 1.91 0.80 0.76
WLG 0.77 0.54 1.25 0.21 0.37 3.73 1.21 4.32 1.33 1.70 0.61 0.22 0.67 0.23 0.42 7.95 3.60 2.98 1.96 1.14 3.88 1.01 3.00 1.26 1.20
ONI 0.55 0.39 0.89 0.15 0.26 2.67 0.87 3.09 0.95 1.22 0.43 0.16 0.48 0.17 0.30 5.68 2.57 2.13 1.40 0.81 2.78 0.72 2.14 0.90 0.86
CAN 0.19 0.13 0.30 0.05 0.09 0.91 0.29 1.05 0.32 0.41 0.15 0.05 0.16 0.06 0.10 1.93 0.87 0.72 0.48 0.28 0.94 0.25 0.73 0.30 0.29
OSI 0.16 0.11 0.26 0.04 0.08 0.78 0.25 0.91 0.28 0.36 0.13 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.09 1.67 0.75 0.63 0.41 0.24 0.81 0.21 0.63 0.26 0.25
EDUC
AKL 7.26 11.39 0.90 16.52 6.16
WLG 4.76 3.45 0.30 6.98 1.50
ONI 12.01 13.48 1.02 6.34 4.86
CAN 2.03 4.09 0.35 4.13 2.01
OSI 3.47 5.24 0.64 2.39 1.92
HEAL
AKL 0.69 2.43 0.33 7.34 2.59
WLG 0.47 0.77 0.12 3.25 0.66
ONI 1.20 3.03 0.39 2.97 2.16
CAN 0.21 0.94 0.14 1.98 0.91
OSI 0.35 1.17 0.24 1.11 0.85
CUPE
AKL 9.02 23.18 8.03 80.69 21.23
WLG 6.43 7.63 2.95 37.09 5.61
ONI 12.93 23.75 7.87 26.81 14.51
CAN 2.46 8.13 3.05 19.68 6.78
OSI 3.94 9.72 5.17 10.65 6.03
OWND
AKL
WLG
ONI
CAN
OSI
TRAN
AKL
WLG
ONI
CAN
OSI
de
st
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at
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n
-m
ar
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n
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M
R
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t
WHOL
AKL 5.82 271.52 75.71 68.60 31.82
WLG 2.45 52.77 16.40 18.61 4.96
ONI 4.24 141.56 37.75 11.60 11.06
CAN 1.22 73.24 22.08 12.87 7.81
OSI 1.29 58.06 24.87 4.61 4.61
RETT
AKL 11.30 171.25 44.30 65.17 54.99
WLG 6.55 45.81 13.21 24.33 11.80
ONI 20.23 219.07 54.20 27.04 46.92
CAN 3.36 65.49 18.32 17.33 19.14
OSI 5.55 80.83 32.12 9.68 17.59
TRAN
AKL
WLG
CAN
OSI
so
u
rc
e-
m
ar
gi
n
s
M
R
IO
′ sr
c
WHOL
AKL 2.11 1.48 3.41 0.58 1.00 98.40 31.93 113.85 34.94 44.82 27.44 9.93 30.36 10.54 19.20 24.86 11.26 9.33 6.14 3.56 11.53 3.00 8.90 3.73 3.56
WLG 0.38 0.27 0.62 0.11 0.18 17.89 5.80 20.69 6.35 8.15 4.99 1.80 5.52 1.91 3.49 4.52 2.05 1.70 1.12 0.65 2.10 0.55 1.62 0.68 0.65
ONI 0.76 0.53 1.23 0.21 0.36 35.43 11.50 40.99 12.58 16.14 9.88 3.57 10.93 3.79 6.91 8.95 4.05 3.36 2.21 1.28 4.15 1.08 3.20 1.34 1.28
CAN 0.48 0.33 0.77 0.13 0.23 22.21 7.21 25.70 7.89 10.12 6.19 2.24 6.85 2.38 4.33 5.61 2.54 2.11 1.39 0.80 2.60 0.68 2.01 0.84 0.80
OSI 0.36 0.25 0.58 0.10 0.17 16.61 5.39 19.21 5.90 7.56 4.63 1.67 5.12 1.78 3.24 4.20 1.90 1.57 1.04 0.60 1.95 0.51 1.50 0.63 0.60
TRAN
AKL 2.38 6.27 0.97 1.66 9.86 40.24 11.18 14.35 1.09 3.80 1.19 2.18 25.95 24.59 14.65 8.51 4.19 14.22 5.39 5.15
WLG 0.80 0.94 0.14 0.25 7.18 6.02 1.67 2.15 0.71 0.57 0.18 0.33 13.53 3.68 2.19 1.27 3.80 2.13 0.81 0.77
ONI 2.08 0.92 0.38 0.65 18.66 3.84 4.35 5.58 1.84 0.42 0.46 0.85 35.16 10.09 5.70 3.31 9.89 1.63 2.10 2.00
CAN 1.06 0.47 1.25 0.33 9.57 1.97 8.02 2.86 0.95 0.22 0.76 0.43 18.03 5.17 4.90 1.70 5.07 0.84 2.83 1.03
OSI 1.10 0.49 1.29 0.20 9.90 2.04 8.30 2.31 0.98 0.22 0.78 0.25 18.66 5.35 5.07 3.02 5.25 0.87 2.93 1.11
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MRIO′
Industries
row/col
RBUS GOVT EDUC HEAL CUPE
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
di
re
ct
pr
od
u
ct
u
sa
ge
M
R
IO
′ di
r
ACCR
AKL 4.39 1.56 2.11 0.95 0.73 8.58 13.56 9.70 3.26 2.84 7.61 2.54 7.22 2.47 2.92 7.61 3.01 8.97 3.27 3.69 4.11 1.63 3.05 1.24 1.40
WLG 1.53 0.54 0.74 0.33 0.25 2.99 4.72 3.38 1.14 0.99 2.65 0.88 2.51 0.86 1.02 2.65 1.05 3.12 1.14 1.29 1.43 0.57 1.06 0.43 0.49
ONI 4.68 1.67 2.25 1.01 0.78 9.14 14.45 10.35 3.47 3.03 8.11 2.70 7.69 2.63 3.11 8.12 3.20 9.56 3.48 3.94 4.38 1.73 3.25 1.32 1.50
CAN 1.66 0.59 0.80 0.36 0.28 3.25 5.13 3.67 1.23 1.08 2.88 0.96 2.73 0.93 1.10 2.88 1.14 3.40 1.24 1.40 1.56 0.62 1.16 0.47 0.53
OSI 2.95 1.05 1.42 0.64 0.49 5.77 9.13 6.53 2.19 1.91 5.12 1.71 4.86 1.66 1.96 5.13 2.02 6.04 2.20 2.49 2.77 1.10 2.05 0.84 0.95
CMIF
AKL 304.20 108.41 146.43 65.93 50.44 82.15 129.87 92.95 31.22 27.24 40.57 13.53 38.48 13.15 15.55 63.22 24.96 74.46 27.12 30.66 131.48 52.03 97.53 39.67 44.89
WLG 137.12 48.87 66.00 29.72 22.74 37.03 58.54 41.90 14.07 12.28 18.29 6.10 17.35 5.93 7.01 28.50 11.25 33.56 12.22 13.82 59.26 23.45 43.96 17.88 20.23
ONI 113.60 40.49 54.68 24.62 18.84 30.68 48.50 34.71 11.66 10.17 15.15 5.05 14.37 4.91 5.81 23.61 9.32 27.81 10.13 11.45 49.10 19.43 36.42 14.81 16.76
CAN 75.22 26.81 36.21 16.30 12.47 20.31 32.11 22.98 7.72 6.74 10.03 3.35 9.52 3.25 3.85 15.63 6.17 18.41 6.71 7.58 32.51 12.87 24.12 9.81 11.10
OSI 43.38 15.46 20.88 9.40 7.19 11.72 18.52 13.26 4.45 3.88 5.79 1.93 5.49 1.87 2.22 9.02 3.56 10.62 3.87 4.37 18.75 7.42 13.91 5.66 6.40
PROP
AKL 93.92 33.47 45.21 20.36 15.57 40.62 64.22 45.97 15.44 13.47 10.54 3.52 10.00 3.42 4.04 26.93 10.63 31.72 11.55 13.06 48.39 19.15 35.90 14.60 16.52
WLG 24.21 8.63 11.65 5.25 4.01 10.47 16.55 11.85 3.98 3.47 2.72 0.91 2.58 0.88 1.04 6.94 2.74 8.17 2.98 3.37 12.47 4.94 9.25 3.76 4.26
ONI 72.10 25.70 34.71 15.63 11.96 31.19 49.31 35.29 11.85 10.34 8.09 2.70 7.68 2.62 3.10 20.68 8.16 24.35 8.87 10.03 37.15 14.70 27.56 11.21 12.68
CAN 30.38 10.83 14.62 6.58 5.04 13.14 20.78 14.87 4.99 4.36 3.41 1.14 3.23 1.10 1.31 8.71 3.44 10.26 3.74 4.23 15.65 6.19 11.61 4.72 5.34
OSI 28.80 10.26 13.86 6.24 4.78 12.46 19.70 14.10 4.73 4.13 3.23 1.08 3.07 1.05 1.24 8.26 3.26 9.73 3.54 4.01 14.84 5.87 11.01 4.48 5.07
RBUS
AKL 775.55 276.40 373.31 168.09 128.60 153.00 241.87 173.12 58.14 50.73 59.16 19.73 56.12 19.17 22.68 101.30 39.99 119.30 43.45 49.13 217.06 85.90 161.01 65.48 74.11
WLG 275.26 98.10 132.49 59.66 45.64 54.30 85.84 61.44 20.63 18.01 21.00 7.00 19.92 6.80 8.05 35.95 14.19 42.34 15.42 17.44 77.04 30.49 57.14 23.24 26.30
ONI 372.36 132.71 179.23 80.70 61.74 73.46 116.13 83.12 27.91 24.36 28.40 9.47 26.94 9.20 10.89 48.64 19.20 57.28 20.86 23.59 104.21 41.24 77.30 31.44 35.58
CAN 169.36 60.36 81.52 36.71 28.08 33.41 52.82 37.80 12.70 11.08 12.92 4.31 12.25 4.19 4.95 22.12 8.73 26.05 9.49 10.73 47.40 18.76 35.16 14.30 16.18
OSI 128.30 45.72 61.76 27.81 21.27 25.31 40.01 28.64 9.62 8.39 9.79 3.26 9.28 3.17 3.75 16.76 6.62 19.74 7.19 8.13 35.91 14.21 26.64 10.83 12.26
GOVT
AKL 7.35 2.62 3.54 1.59 1.22 5.12 8.09 5.79 1.94 1.70 3.93 1.31 3.73 1.27 1.51 3.44 1.36 4.05 1.48 1.67 11.13 4.40 8.26 3.36 3.80
WLG 11.53 4.11 5.55 2.50 1.91 8.03 12.69 9.08 3.05 2.66 6.16 2.05 5.84 2.00 2.36 5.39 2.13 6.35 2.31 2.62 17.46 6.91 12.95 5.27 5.96
ONI 8.24 2.94 3.97 1.79 1.37 5.74 9.07 6.49 2.18 1.90 4.40 1.47 4.18 1.43 1.69 3.86 1.52 4.54 1.65 1.87 12.48 4.94 9.26 3.76 4.26
CAN 2.80 1.00 1.35 0.61 0.46 1.95 3.08 2.21 0.74 0.65 1.50 0.50 1.42 0.48 0.57 1.31 0.52 1.54 0.56 0.64 4.24 1.68 3.15 1.28 1.45
OSI 2.42 0.86 1.16 0.52 0.40 1.68 2.66 1.90 0.64 0.56 1.29 0.43 1.22 0.42 0.50 1.13 0.45 1.33 0.48 0.55 3.66 1.45 2.71 1.10 1.25
EDUC
AKL 82.28 23.97 70.18 24.77 45.30
WLG 27.37 35.37 21.85 9.13 16.73
ONI 40.51 27.74 68.10 29.84 34.37
CAN 18.04 9.22 23.01 10.75 13.83
OSI 13.78 8.03 27.17 12.13 15.62
HEAL
AKL 19.95 26.55 7.95 213.14 15.21
WLG 6.94 40.96 2.59 82.12 5.87
ONI 10.33 32.33 8.11 270.20 12.14
CAN 4.71 11.00 2.81 99.66 5.00
OSI 3.49 9.30 3.22 109.15 5.48
CUPE
AKL 366.63 62.89 43.89 34.07 471.85
WLG 132.63 100.92 14.86 13.65 189.54
ONI 156.28 63.02 36.87 35.54 309.96
CAN 78.49 23.61 14.05 14.44 140.62
OSI 55.98 19.21 15.49 15.22 148.35
OWND
AKL
WLG
ONI
CAN
OSI
TRAN
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WHOL
AKL 55.45 35.96 36.28 47.77 15.42
WLG 11.84 34.05 7.25 11.29 3.65
ONI 12.03 18.33 15.51 25.35 5.15
CAN 9.13 10.38 8.93 15.56 3.53
OSI 4.32 5.60 6.53 10.87 2.47
RETT
AKL 200.61 25.04 17.50 49.25 12.05
WLG 58.95 32.64 4.81 16.03 3.93
ONI 106.76 31.32 18.35 64.13 9.88
CAN 46.82 10.25 6.11 22.75 3.91
OSI 34.47 8.60 6.95 24.75 4.26
TRAN
AKL
WLG
CAN
OSI
so
u
rc
e-
m
ar
gi
n
s
M
R
IO
′ sr
c
WHOL
AKL 20.10 7.16 9.67 4.36 3.33 13.03 20.60 14.75 4.95 4.32 13.15 4.39 12.47 4.26 5.04 17.31 6.83 20.39 7.42 8.40 5.59 2.21 4.14 1.69 1.91
WLG 3.65 1.30 1.76 0.79 0.61 2.37 3.74 2.68 0.90 0.79 2.39 0.80 2.27 0.77 0.92 3.15 1.24 3.71 1.35 1.53 1.02 0.40 0.75 0.31 0.35
ONI 7.24 2.58 3.48 1.57 1.20 4.69 7.42 5.31 1.78 1.56 4.73 1.58 4.49 1.53 1.81 6.23 2.46 7.34 2.67 3.02 2.01 0.80 1.49 0.61 0.69
CAN 4.54 1.62 2.18 0.98 0.75 2.94 4.65 3.33 1.12 0.98 2.97 0.99 2.82 0.96 1.14 3.91 1.54 4.60 1.68 1.89 1.26 0.50 0.94 0.38 0.43
OSI 3.39 1.21 1.63 0.73 0.56 2.20 3.48 2.49 0.84 0.73 2.22 0.74 2.10 0.72 0.85 2.92 1.15 3.44 1.25 1.42 0.94 0.37 0.70 0.28 0.32
TRAN
AKL 42.95 66.36 27.05 20.71 43.36 35.50 10.79 9.42 5.64 18.34 5.67 6.71 4.27 14.58 4.80 5.44 14.74 31.61 11.64 13.18
WLG 28.47 9.93 4.05 3.10 6.48 5.31 1.61 1.41 3.99 2.74 0.85 1.00 2.56 2.18 0.72 0.81 8.80 4.73 1.74 1.97
ONI 73.97 16.70 10.52 8.05 16.83 16.86 4.20 3.66 10.37 2.19 2.20 2.61 6.64 1.66 1.87 2.11 22.86 5.73 4.52 5.12
CAN 37.92 8.56 13.23 4.13 8.63 8.64 7.08 1.88 5.32 1.12 3.65 1.34 3.40 0.85 2.91 1.08 11.72 2.94 6.30 2.63
OSI 39.25 8.86 13.69 5.58 8.93 8.95 7.32 2.23 5.50 1.16 3.78 1.17 3.52 0.88 3.01 0.99 12.13 3.04 6.52 2.40
Extended MRIO Table — Part 2-4
256 APPENDIX N. THE EXTENDED MRIO MATRIX
MRIO′
Industries CON
row/col
OWND WHOL RETT TRAN
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
di
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AKL 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 3.88 0.73 1.46 0.89 0.68 2.67 0.83 2.78 0.92 1.17 6.98 1.54 3.28 1.98 2.01 362.98 142.14 320.61 115.03 142.46
WLG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.35 0.25 0.51 0.31 0.24 0.93 0.29 0.97 0.32 0.41 2.43 0.54 1.14 0.69 0.70 126.47 49.52 111.71 40.08 49.64
ONI 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 4.14 0.78 1.56 0.94 0.73 2.84 0.88 2.96 0.98 1.24 7.44 1.65 3.50 2.11 2.15 386.97 151.54 341.80 122.63 151.88
CAN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.47 0.28 0.55 0.34 0.26 1.01 0.31 1.05 0.35 0.44 2.64 0.58 1.24 0.75 0.76 137.46 53.83 121.41 43.56 53.95
OSI 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 2.61 0.49 0.98 0.60 0.46 1.80 0.56 1.87 0.62 0.78 4.70 1.04 2.21 1.33 1.36 244.35 95.69 215.83 77.44 95.90
CMIF
AKL 82.02 29.48 73.14 25.56 31.36 284.31 53.31 106.97 64.91 50.03 175.76 54.51 183.14 60.81 76.81 200.59 44.35 94.20 56.92 57.83 762.58 298.62 673.57 241.66 299.29
WLG 36.97 13.29 32.97 11.52 14.13 128.15 24.03 48.22 29.26 22.55 79.22 24.57 82.55 27.41 34.62 90.41 19.99 42.46 25.66 26.07 343.72 134.60 303.60 108.93 134.90
ONI 30.63 11.01 27.31 9.54 11.71 106.18 19.91 39.95 24.24 18.68 65.63 20.35 68.39 22.71 28.69 74.91 16.56 35.18 21.26 21.60 284.78 111.52 251.54 90.25 111.77
CAN 20.28 7.29 18.09 6.32 7.75 70.30 13.18 26.45 16.05 12.37 43.46 13.48 45.29 15.04 18.99 49.60 10.97 23.29 14.08 14.30 188.57 73.84 166.56 59.76 74.01
OSI 11.70 4.20 10.43 3.64 4.47 40.54 7.60 15.25 9.26 7.13 25.06 7.77 26.12 8.67 10.95 28.61 6.32 13.43 8.12 8.25 108.75 42.59 96.05 34.46 42.68
PROP
AKL 1.90 0.68 1.69 0.59 0.73 85.21 15.98 32.06 19.46 15.00 89.82 27.85 93.59 31.08 39.25 149.30 33.01 70.11 42.37 43.04 593.08 232.25 523.86 187.95 232.77
WLG 0.49 0.18 0.44 0.15 0.19 21.96 4.12 8.26 5.01 3.86 23.15 7.18 24.12 8.01 10.12 38.48 8.51 18.07 10.92 11.09 152.86 59.86 135.01 48.44 59.99
ONI 1.46 0.52 1.30 0.45 0.56 65.42 12.27 24.61 14.94 11.51 68.96 21.38 71.86 23.86 30.14 114.62 25.34 53.83 32.53 33.05 455.34 178.31 402.19 144.30 178.71
CAN 0.61 0.22 0.55 0.19 0.23 27.57 5.17 10.37 6.29 4.85 29.05 9.01 30.28 10.05 12.70 48.30 10.68 22.68 13.71 13.92 191.86 75.13 169.46 60.80 75.30
OSI 0.58 0.21 0.52 0.18 0.22 26.13 4.90 9.83 5.97 4.60 27.54 8.54 28.70 9.53 12.04 45.79 10.12 21.50 12.99 13.20 181.88 71.23 160.65 57.64 71.38
RBUS
AKL 10.32 3.71 9.20 3.21 3.94 482.71 90.52 181.61 110.21 84.94 208.85 64.77 217.63 72.26 91.28 129.40 28.61 60.77 36.72 37.31 95.40 37.36 84.26 30.23 37.44
WLG 3.66 1.32 3.27 1.14 1.40 171.32 32.13 64.46 39.12 30.15 74.12 22.99 77.24 25.65 32.40 45.92 10.15 21.57 13.03 13.24 33.86 13.26 29.91 10.73 13.29
ONI 4.95 1.78 4.42 1.54 1.89 231.76 43.46 87.20 52.91 40.78 100.27 31.10 104.49 34.69 43.82 62.13 13.74 29.17 17.63 17.91 45.80 17.94 40.46 14.51 17.98
CAN 2.25 0.81 2.01 0.70 0.86 105.41 19.77 39.66 24.07 18.55 45.60 14.14 47.52 15.78 19.93 28.26 6.25 13.27 8.02 8.15 20.83 8.16 18.40 6.60 8.18
OSI 1.71 0.61 1.52 0.53 0.65 79.85 14.97 30.04 18.23 14.05 34.55 10.71 36.00 11.95 15.10 21.41 4.73 10.05 6.07 6.17 15.78 6.18 13.94 5.00 6.19
GOVT
AKL 0.16 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.06 4.60 0.86 1.73 1.05 0.81 3.25 1.01 3.39 1.12 1.42 2.91 0.64 1.37 0.83 0.84 30.39 11.90 26.84 9.63 11.93
WLG 0.25 0.09 0.23 0.08 0.10 7.21 1.35 2.71 1.65 1.27 5.10 1.58 5.31 1.76 2.23 4.57 1.01 2.14 1.30 1.32 47.66 18.67 42.10 15.10 18.71
ONI 0.18 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.07 5.15 0.97 1.94 1.18 0.91 3.64 1.13 3.80 1.26 1.59 3.26 0.72 1.53 0.93 0.94 34.07 13.34 30.09 10.80 13.37
CAN 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 1.75 0.33 0.66 0.40 0.31 1.24 0.38 1.29 0.43 0.54 1.11 0.25 0.52 0.31 0.32 11.58 4.53 10.23 3.67 4.54
OSI 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 1.51 0.28 0.57 0.35 0.27 1.07 0.33 1.11 0.37 0.47 0.96 0.21 0.45 0.27 0.28 9.99 3.91 8.82 3.17 3.92
EDUC
AKL 0.25 15.87 4.59 10.27 423.80
WLG 0.08 2.78 1.33 2.12 154.92
ONI 0.22 6.11 4.89 4.93 382.92
CAN 0.08 3.67 1.61 2.95 135.90
OSI 0.10 2.82 2.02 2.99 167.99
HEAL
AKL 0.68 6.81 3.93 7.85 986.32
WLG 0.24 1.25 1.19 1.69 376.92
ONI 0.66 2.76 4.41 3.97 937.73
CAN 0.23 1.70 1.48 2.43 340.73
OSI 0.28 1.27 1.81 2.39 408.73
CUPE
AKL 14.92 128.54 70.33 39.19 2261.27
WLG 5.44 24.47 22.14 8.80 898.84
ONI 11.78 42.83 64.90 16.30 1768.74
CAN 4.59 28.99 24.04 10.99 707.85
OSI 5.25 20.83 28.31 10.41 817.26
OWND
AKL 4300.08
WLG 1499.51
ONI 3742.43
CAN 1329.18
OSI 1600.78
TRAN
AKL 154.65 29.00 58.19 35.31 27.21 212.73 83.30 187.90 67.41 83.49
WLG 35.62 6.68 13.40 8.13 6.27 48.99 19.19 43.27 15.53 19.23
ONI 76.47 14.34 28.77 17.46 13.46 105.19 41.19 92.91 33.33 41.28
CAN 46.73 8.76 17.58 10.67 8.22 64.28 25.17 56.77 20.37 25.23
OSI 46.97 8.81 17.67 10.72 8.27 64.61 25.30 57.07 20.48 25.36
de
st
in
at
io
n
-m
ar
gi
n
s
M
R
IO
′ ds
t
WHOL
AKL 43.47 617.21 138.52 92.18 1297.48
WLG 9.36 69.32 25.73 12.21 304.33
ONI 17.47 104.64 65.04 19.51 516.38
CAN 10.29 107.03 36.40 19.87 312.30
OSI 7.80 50.98 28.42 12.48 239.04
RETT
AKL 47.28 103.12 106.24 268.99 3552.95
WLG 14.01 15.94 27.16 49.03 1147.08
ONI 46.61 42.90 122.40 139.66 3469.67
CAN 15.86 25.35 39.58 82.20 1212.43
OSI 18.73 18.80 48.11 80.36 1444.88
TRAN
AKL
WLG
CAN
OSI
so
u
rc
e-
m
ar
gi
n
s
M
R
IO
′ sr
c
WHOL
AKL 15.75 5.66 14.05 4.91 6.02 223.68 41.94 84.16 51.07 39.36 50.20 15.57 52.31 17.37 21.94 33.41 7.39 15.69 9.48 9.63 470.21 184.13 415.32 149.01 184.54
WLG 2.86 1.03 2.55 0.89 1.09 40.66 7.62 15.30 9.28 7.15 9.12 2.83 9.51 3.16 3.99 6.07 1.34 2.85 1.72 1.75 85.47 33.47 75.49 27.08 33.54
ONI 5.67 2.04 5.06 1.77 2.17 80.54 15.10 30.30 18.39 14.17 18.08 5.61 18.84 6.25 7.90 12.03 2.66 5.65 3.41 3.47 169.30 66.30 149.54 53.65 66.45
CAN 3.56 1.28 3.17 1.11 1.36 50.49 9.47 19.00 11.53 8.88 11.33 3.51 11.81 3.92 4.95 7.54 1.67 3.54 2.14 2.17 106.14 41.56 93.75 33.63 41.66
OSI 2.66 0.96 2.37 0.83 1.02 37.75 7.08 14.20 8.62 6.64 8.47 2.63 8.83 2.93 3.70 5.64 1.25 2.65 1.60 1.63 79.35 31.07 70.09 25.15 31.14
TRAN
AKL 0.19 0.55 0.17 0.21 39.82 91.39 50.20 38.72 17.79 68.36 20.55 25.98 183.44 445.66 243.77 247.86 12.71 32.79 10.65 13.20
WLG 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.03 50.16 13.68 7.51 5.79 13.55 10.23 3.07 3.89 195.96 66.69 36.48 37.09 7.67 4.91 1.59 1.98
ONI 0.33 0.08 0.07 0.08 130.32 15.48 19.52 15.06 35.20 6.92 7.99 10.10 509.16 71.32 94.78 96.37 19.92 4.94 4.14 5.13
CAN 0.17 0.04 0.11 0.04 66.81 7.94 18.22 7.72 18.04 3.55 13.63 5.18 261.02 36.56 88.83 49.40 10.21 2.53 6.54 2.63
OSI 0.18 0.04 0.11 0.04 69.16 8.22 18.86 10.36 18.68 3.67 14.11 4.24 270.19 37.85 91.95 50.30 10.57 2.62 6.77 2.20
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MRIO′
INV
row/col
AGRI FOLO FISH MINE OIGA PETR
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI ONI
di
re
ct
pr
od
u
ct
u
sa
ge
M
R
IO
′ di
r
ACCR
AKL 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.01
WLG 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
ONI 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.01
CAN 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
OSI 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00
CMIF
AKL 0.25 0.06 3.40 0.35 1.72 0.04 0.01 0.41 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.46 0.09 0.29 0.02 0.37 3.53 0.40
WLG 0.11 0.03 1.53 0.16 0.77 0.02 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.21 0.04 0.13 0.01 0.17 1.59 0.18
ONI 0.09 0.02 1.27 0.13 0.64 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.14 1.32 0.15
CAN 0.06 0.01 0.84 0.09 0.42 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.87 0.10
OSI 0.04 0.01 0.48 0.05 0.24 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.50 0.06
PROP
AKL 0.56 0.13 7.70 0.79 3.88 0.08 0.03 0.92 0.06 0.35 0.04 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.25 0.16 0.02 1.04 0.20 0.65 0.05 0.83 8.00 0.91
WLG 0.14 0.03 1.98 0.20 1.00 0.02 0.01 0.24 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.27 0.05 0.17 0.01 0.21 2.06 0.23
ONI 0.43 0.10 5.91 0.61 2.98 0.06 0.02 0.71 0.05 0.27 0.03 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.19 0.13 0.02 0.80 0.15 0.50 0.04 0.64 6.14 0.70
CAN 0.18 0.04 2.49 0.26 1.26 0.03 0.01 0.30 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.34 0.06 0.21 0.02 0.27 2.59 0.29
OSI 0.17 0.04 2.36 0.24 1.19 0.02 0.01 0.28 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.32 0.06 0.20 0.02 0.26 2.45 0.28
RBUS
AKL 1.02 0.24 14.13 1.45 7.13 0.15 0.05 1.69 0.11 0.65 0.08 0.02 0.27 0.02 0.46 0.30 0.04 1.90 0.37 1.19 0.10 1.53 14.69 1.67
WLG 0.36 0.09 5.02 0.52 2.53 0.05 0.02 0.60 0.04 0.23 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.16 0.11 0.01 0.68 0.13 0.42 0.03 0.54 5.21 0.59
ONI 0.49 0.12 6.79 0.70 3.42 0.07 0.02 0.81 0.05 0.31 0.04 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.22 0.14 0.02 0.91 0.18 0.57 0.05 0.73 7.05 0.80
CAN 0.22 0.05 3.09 0.32 1.56 0.03 0.01 0.37 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.42 0.08 0.26 0.02 0.33 3.21 0.36
OSI 0.17 0.04 2.34 0.24 1.18 0.02 0.01 0.28 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.31 0.06 0.20 0.02 0.25 2.43 0.28
GOVT
AKL 0.02 0.01 0.33 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.34 0.04
WLG 0.04 0.01 0.52 0.05 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.54 0.06
ONI 0.03 0.01 0.37 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.38 0.04
CAN 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.01
OSI 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.01
EDUC
AKL 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
WLG 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08
ONI 0.77 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.80 0.09
CAN 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.02
OSI 0.38 0.03 0.02 0.06
HEAL
AKL 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
WLG 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
ONI 0.65 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.67 0.08
CAN 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.02
OSI 0.32 0.03 0.02 0.05
CUPE
AKL 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
WLG 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12
ONI 0.95 0.11 0.02 0.13 0.99 0.11
CAN 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.03
OSI 0.50 0.05 0.03 0.08
OWND
AKL
WLG
ONI
CAN
OSI
TRAN
AKL
WLG
ONI
CAN
OSI
de
st
in
at
io
n
-m
ar
gi
n
s
M
R
IO
′ ds
t
WHOL
AKL 2.80 0.40 0.22 0.82 0.26
WLG 0.40 0.08 0.03 0.06 2.51
ONI 17.48 2.09 0.33 2.35 18.17 2.06
CAN 3.03 0.23 0.05 0.76
OSI 9.19 0.83 0.59 1.54
RETT
AKL 1.67 0.24 0.13 0.49 0.16
WLG 0.33 0.07 0.02 0.05 2.07
ONI 25.64 3.06 0.49 3.45 26.65 3.02
CAN 2.56 0.20 0.04 0.65
OSI 12.13 1.10 0.77 2.03
TRAN
AKL
WLG
CAN
OSI
so
u
rc
e-
m
ar
gi
n
s
M
R
IO
′ sr
c
WHOL
AKL 1.01 0.24 14.06 1.44 7.09 0.15 0.05 1.68 0.11 0.64 0.08 0.02 0.27 0.02 0.45 0.30 0.04 1.89 0.36 1.19 0.10 1.52 14.61 1.66
WLG 0.18 0.04 2.55 0.26 1.29 0.03 0.01 0.30 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.34 0.07 0.22 0.02 0.28 2.66 0.30
ONI 0.37 0.09 5.06 0.52 2.55 0.05 0.02 0.60 0.04 0.23 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.16 0.11 0.01 0.68 0.13 0.43 0.03 0.55 5.26 0.60
CAN 0.23 0.05 3.17 0.33 1.60 0.03 0.01 0.38 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.43 0.08 0.27 0.02 0.34 3.30 0.37
OSI 0.17 0.04 2.37 0.24 1.20 0.02 0.01 0.28 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.32 0.06 0.20 0.02 0.26 2.47 0.28
TRAN
AKL 0.03 2.00 0.19 0.92 0.01 0.24 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.27 0.05 0.15 0.19 2.08 0.24
WLG 0.03 0.30 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.31 0.04
ONI 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.36 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.07
CAN 0.04 0.01 0.40 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.41 0.05
OSI 0.04 0.01 0.41 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.43 0.05
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MRIO′
INV
row/col
FDBT TWPM CHNM METL EQFO
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
di
re
ct
pr
od
u
ct
u
sa
ge
M
R
IO
′ di
r
ACCR
AKL 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
WLG 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ONI 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
CAN 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OSI 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
CMIF
AKL 0.94 0.16 1.88 0.43 1.31 1.30 0.30 1.61 0.47 0.61 1.83 0.37 0.07 0.57 0.29 1.20 0.20 0.99 0.42 0.35 1.10 0.20 0.60 0.34 0.21
WLG 0.43 0.07 0.85 0.19 0.59 0.59 0.13 0.73 0.21 0.27 0.82 0.17 0.03 0.26 0.13 0.54 0.09 0.45 0.19 0.16 0.50 0.09 0.27 0.15 0.10
ONI 0.35 0.06 0.70 0.16 0.49 0.49 0.11 0.60 0.18 0.23 0.68 0.14 0.03 0.21 0.11 0.45 0.07 0.37 0.16 0.13 0.41 0.07 0.22 0.13 0.08
CAN 0.23 0.04 0.46 0.11 0.32 0.32 0.07 0.40 0.12 0.15 0.45 0.09 0.02 0.14 0.07 0.30 0.05 0.25 0.10 0.09 0.27 0.05 0.15 0.08 0.05
OSI 0.13 0.02 0.27 0.06 0.19 0.19 0.04 0.23 0.07 0.09 0.26 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.17 0.03 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.16 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.03
PROP
AKL 2.14 0.37 4.26 0.97 2.96 2.95 0.67 3.65 1.08 1.38 4.14 0.84 0.16 1.29 0.65 2.71 0.45 2.25 0.95 0.79 2.50 0.45 1.36 0.77 0.48
WLG 0.55 0.10 1.10 0.25 0.76 0.76 0.17 0.94 0.28 0.36 1.07 0.22 0.04 0.33 0.17 0.70 0.11 0.58 0.25 0.20 0.64 0.12 0.35 0.20 0.12
ONI 1.64 0.29 3.27 0.74 2.27 2.27 0.52 2.80 0.83 1.06 3.18 0.65 0.13 0.99 0.50 2.08 0.34 1.73 0.73 0.61 1.92 0.35 1.04 0.59 0.37
CAN 0.69 0.12 1.38 0.31 0.96 0.96 0.22 1.18 0.35 0.45 1.34 0.27 0.05 0.42 0.21 0.88 0.14 0.73 0.31 0.26 0.81 0.15 0.44 0.25 0.16
OSI 0.66 0.11 1.30 0.30 0.91 0.91 0.21 1.12 0.33 0.42 1.27 0.26 0.05 0.40 0.20 0.83 0.14 0.69 0.29 0.24 0.77 0.14 0.42 0.24 0.15
RBUS
AKL 3.92 0.69 7.81 1.78 5.44 5.42 1.24 6.69 1.97 2.53 7.59 1.55 0.30 2.38 1.19 4.97 0.82 4.13 1.75 1.46 4.59 0.83 2.50 1.41 0.89
WLG 1.39 0.24 2.77 0.63 1.93 1.92 0.44 2.38 0.70 0.90 2.69 0.55 0.11 0.84 0.42 1.76 0.29 1.46 0.62 0.52 1.63 0.29 0.89 0.50 0.32
ONI 1.88 0.33 3.75 0.85 2.61 2.60 0.59 3.21 0.95 1.22 3.65 0.74 0.14 1.14 0.57 2.39 0.39 1.98 0.84 0.70 2.20 0.40 1.20 0.68 0.43
CAN 0.86 0.15 1.71 0.39 1.19 1.18 0.27 1.46 0.43 0.55 1.66 0.34 0.07 0.52 0.26 1.09 0.18 0.90 0.38 0.32 1.00 0.18 0.55 0.31 0.19
OSI 0.65 0.11 1.29 0.29 0.90 0.90 0.20 1.11 0.33 0.42 1.26 0.26 0.05 0.39 0.20 0.82 0.14 0.68 0.29 0.24 0.76 0.14 0.41 0.23 0.15
GOVT
AKL 0.09 0.02 0.18 0.04 0.13 0.13 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.06 0.18 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.02
WLG 0.14 0.03 0.29 0.07 0.20 0.20 0.05 0.24 0.07 0.09 0.28 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.18 0.03 0.15 0.06 0.05 0.17 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.03
ONI 0.10 0.02 0.20 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.07 0.20 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.02
CAN 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
OSI 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
EDUC
AKL 0.21 0.29 0.41 0.27 0.24
WLG 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.04
ONI 0.43 0.37 0.02 0.23 0.14
CAN 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.08
OSI 0.29 0.14 0.06 0.08 0.05
HEAL
AKL 0.17 0.23 0.32 0.21 0.20
WLG 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03
ONI 0.36 0.31 0.01 0.19 0.11
CAN 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.07
OSI 0.24 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.04
CUPE
AKL 0.30 0.41 0.58 0.38 0.35
WLG 0.05 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.06
ONI 0.53 0.45 0.02 0.28 0.17
CAN 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.11
OSI 0.38 0.18 0.08 0.10 0.06
OWND
AKL
WLG
ONI
CAN
OSI
TRAN
AKL
WLG
ONI
CAN
OSI
de
st
in
at
io
n
-m
ar
gi
n
s
M
R
IO
′ ds
t
WHOL
AKL 10.77 14.88 20.84 13.64 12.59
WLG 1.13 2.03 2.54 1.34 1.36
ONI 9.66 8.28 0.37 5.10 3.09
CAN 3.71 4.11 4.96 3.64 2.95
OSI 7.01 3.26 1.53 1.88 1.15
RETT
AKL 6.44 8.89 12.46 8.15 7.53
WLG 0.93 1.67 2.09 1.11 1.12
ONI 14.17 12.15 0.54 7.49 4.53
CAN 3.14 3.49 4.20 3.08 2.50
OSI 9.25 4.31 2.02 2.48 1.51
TRAN
AKL
WLG
CAN
OSI
so
u
rc
e-
m
ar
gi
n
s
M
R
IO
′ sr
c
WHOL
AKL 3.90 0.68 7.77 1.77 5.41 5.39 1.23 6.66 1.96 2.52 7.55 1.54 0.30 2.36 1.18 4.94 0.81 4.10 1.74 1.45 4.56 0.83 2.48 1.41 0.89
WLG 0.71 0.12 1.41 0.32 0.98 0.98 0.22 1.21 0.36 0.46 1.37 0.28 0.05 0.43 0.21 0.90 0.15 0.75 0.32 0.26 0.83 0.15 0.45 0.26 0.16
ONI 1.41 0.25 2.80 0.64 1.95 1.94 0.44 2.40 0.71 0.91 2.72 0.55 0.11 0.85 0.42 1.78 0.29 1.48 0.62 0.52 1.64 0.30 0.89 0.51 0.32
CAN 0.88 0.15 1.75 0.40 1.22 1.22 0.28 1.50 0.44 0.57 1.70 0.35 0.07 0.53 0.27 1.12 0.18 0.93 0.39 0.33 1.03 0.19 0.56 0.32 0.20
OSI 0.66 0.11 1.31 0.30 0.91 0.91 0.21 1.12 0.33 0.43 1.27 0.26 0.05 0.40 0.20 0.83 0.14 0.69 0.29 0.24 0.77 0.14 0.42 0.24 0.15
TRAN
AKL 0.08 1.11 0.23 0.70 0.15 0.95 0.25 0.33 0.19 0.04 0.30 0.15 0.10 0.58 0.22 0.19 0.10 0.35 0.18 0.11
WLG 0.11 0.17 0.03 0.10 0.16 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.22 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.15 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.02
ONI 0.30 0.03 0.09 0.27 0.41 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.58 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.38 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.35 0.04 0.07 0.04
CAN 0.15 0.02 0.22 0.14 0.21 0.03 0.19 0.06 0.30 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.19 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.18 0.02 0.07 0.02
OSI 0.16 0.02 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.20 0.05 0.31 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.20 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.19 0.02 0.07 0.04
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MRIO′
INV
row/col
UTIL CONS ACCR CMIF PROP
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
di
re
ct
pr
od
u
ct
u
sa
ge
M
R
IO
′ di
r
ACCR
AKL 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.18 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02
WLG 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
ONI 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.19 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02
CAN 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
OSI 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
CMIF
AKL 0.89 0.64 1.47 0.25 0.43 1.18 0.38 1.37 0.42 0.54 0.47 0.17 0.51 0.18 0.32 9.93 4.61 3.81 2.48 1.46 3.30 0.88 2.61 1.08 1.04
WLG 0.40 0.29 0.66 0.11 0.19 0.53 0.17 0.62 0.19 0.24 0.21 0.08 0.23 0.08 0.15 4.48 2.08 1.72 1.12 0.66 1.49 0.39 1.17 0.49 0.47
ONI 0.33 0.24 0.55 0.09 0.16 0.44 0.14 0.51 0.16 0.20 0.17 0.06 0.19 0.07 0.12 3.71 1.72 1.42 0.93 0.54 1.23 0.33 0.97 0.40 0.39
CAN 0.22 0.16 0.36 0.06 0.11 0.29 0.10 0.34 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.08 2.46 1.14 0.94 0.61 0.36 0.82 0.22 0.64 0.27 0.26
OSI 0.13 0.09 0.21 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.05 0.20 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.05 1.42 0.66 0.54 0.35 0.21 0.47 0.12 0.37 0.15 0.15
PROP
AKL 2.01 1.45 3.34 0.56 0.98 2.66 0.87 3.11 0.95 1.22 1.06 0.38 1.16 0.40 0.73 22.49 10.43 8.63 5.62 3.30 7.48 1.98 5.90 2.44 2.36
WLG 0.52 0.37 0.86 0.14 0.25 0.69 0.22 0.80 0.24 0.32 0.27 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.19 5.80 2.69 2.22 1.45 0.85 1.93 0.51 1.52 0.63 0.61
ONI 1.54 1.11 2.56 0.43 0.75 2.05 0.67 2.38 0.73 0.94 0.81 0.29 0.89 0.31 0.56 17.26 8.01 6.63 4.31 2.53 5.74 1.52 4.53 1.88 1.81
CAN 0.65 0.47 1.08 0.18 0.32 0.86 0.28 1.00 0.31 0.40 0.34 0.12 0.37 0.13 0.24 7.27 3.37 2.79 1.82 1.07 2.42 0.64 1.91 0.79 0.76
OSI 0.62 0.44 1.02 0.17 0.30 0.82 0.27 0.95 0.29 0.38 0.32 0.12 0.35 0.12 0.22 6.90 3.20 2.65 1.72 1.01 2.29 0.61 1.81 0.75 0.72
RBUS
AKL 3.69 2.66 6.13 1.03 1.80 4.89 1.60 5.70 1.74 2.25 1.94 0.70 2.12 0.74 1.34 41.28 19.14 15.84 10.31 6.06 13.73 3.64 10.83 4.49 4.33
WLG 1.31 0.94 2.18 0.36 0.64 1.74 0.57 2.02 0.62 0.80 0.69 0.25 0.75 0.26 0.48 14.65 6.79 5.62 3.66 2.15 4.87 1.29 3.84 1.59 1.54
ONI 1.77 1.28 2.94 0.49 0.86 2.35 0.77 2.74 0.84 1.08 0.93 0.33 1.02 0.36 0.64 19.82 9.19 7.61 4.95 2.91 6.59 1.75 5.20 2.15 2.08
CAN 0.81 0.58 1.34 0.22 0.39 1.07 0.35 1.24 0.38 0.49 0.42 0.15 0.46 0.16 0.29 9.01 4.18 3.46 2.25 1.32 3.00 0.79 2.36 0.98 0.95
OSI 0.61 0.44 1.01 0.17 0.30 0.81 0.26 0.94 0.29 0.37 0.32 0.11 0.35 0.12 0.22 6.83 3.17 2.62 1.71 1.00 2.27 0.60 1.79 0.74 0.72
GOVT
AKL 0.09 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.96 0.45 0.37 0.24 0.14 0.32 0.08 0.25 0.10 0.10
WLG 0.13 0.10 0.22 0.04 0.07 0.18 0.06 0.21 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.05 1.51 0.70 0.58 0.38 0.22 0.50 0.13 0.40 0.16 0.16
ONI 0.10 0.07 0.16 0.03 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 1.08 0.50 0.41 0.27 0.16 0.36 0.10 0.28 0.12 0.11
CAN 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.37 0.17 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.04
OSI 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.32 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.03
EDUC
AKL 0.20 0.26 0.10 2.20 0.73
WLG 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.95 0.18
ONI 0.33 0.31 0.12 0.87 0.59
CAN 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.56 0.24
OSI 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.33 0.23
HEAL
AKL 0.16 0.21 0.08 1.76 0.59
WLG 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.80 0.15
ONI 0.28 0.26 0.10 0.73 0.50
CAN 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.48 0.21
OSI 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.27 0.20
CUPE
AKL 0.28 0.37 0.15 3.14 1.04
WLG 0.21 0.12 0.05 1.48 0.28
ONI 0.41 0.38 0.14 1.07 0.73
CAN 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.77 0.34
OSI 0.13 0.16 0.09 0.42 0.30
OWND
AKL
WLG
ONI
CAN
OSI
TRAN
AKL
WLG
ONI
CAN
OSI
de
st
in
at
io
n
-m
ar
gi
n
s
M
R
IO
′ ds
t
WHOL
AKL 10.12 13.42 5.32 113.29 37.67
WLG 4.37 2.63 1.14 31.47 5.98
ONI 7.58 7.05 2.63 19.59 13.39
CAN 2.14 3.63 1.55 21.50 9.35
OSI 2.31 2.89 1.73 7.80 5.58
RETT
AKL 6.05 8.03 3.18 67.74 22.52
WLG 3.60 2.16 0.94 25.90 4.92
ONI 11.12 10.34 3.85 28.74 19.65
CAN 1.82 3.08 1.31 18.22 7.93
OSI 3.06 3.82 2.28 10.30 7.37
TRAN
AKL
WLG
CAN
OSI
so
u
rc
e-
m
ar
gi
n
s
M
R
IO
′ sr
c
WHOL
AKL 3.67 2.65 6.10 1.02 1.79 4.86 1.59 5.67 1.73 2.23 1.93 0.69 2.11 0.74 1.34 41.06 19.04 15.76 10.26 6.02 13.65 3.62 10.77 4.46 4.31
WLG 0.67 0.48 1.11 0.19 0.32 0.88 0.29 1.03 0.32 0.41 0.35 0.13 0.38 0.13 0.24 7.46 3.46 2.86 1.86 1.09 2.48 0.66 1.96 0.81 0.78
ONI 1.32 0.95 2.19 0.37 0.64 1.75 0.57 2.04 0.62 0.80 0.69 0.25 0.76 0.27 0.48 14.78 6.85 5.67 3.69 2.17 4.92 1.30 3.88 1.61 1.55
CAN 0.83 0.60 1.38 0.23 0.40 1.10 0.36 1.28 0.39 0.50 0.44 0.16 0.48 0.17 0.30 9.27 4.30 3.56 2.32 1.36 3.08 0.82 2.43 1.01 0.97
OSI 0.62 0.45 1.03 0.17 0.30 0.82 0.27 0.96 0.29 0.38 0.33 0.12 0.36 0.12 0.23 6.93 3.21 2.66 1.73 1.02 2.30 0.61 1.82 0.75 0.73
TRAN
AKL 0.33 0.87 0.13 0.23 0.20 0.81 0.22 0.29 0.09 0.30 0.10 0.17 2.37 2.24 1.32 0.78 0.45 1.53 0.58 0.56
WLG 0.11 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.14 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.03 1.21 0.34 0.20 0.12 0.40 0.23 0.09 0.08
ONI 0.28 0.13 0.05 0.09 0.37 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.03 0.04 0.07 3.14 0.92 0.51 0.30 1.04 0.18 0.22 0.22
CAN 0.14 0.07 0.17 0.05 0.19 0.04 0.16 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.03 1.61 0.47 0.45 0.15 0.53 0.09 0.31 0.11
OSI 0.15 0.07 0.18 0.03 0.20 0.04 0.17 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.02 1.66 0.49 0.46 0.27 0.55 0.09 0.32 0.12
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MRIO′
INV
row/col
RBUS GOVT EDUC HEAL CUPE
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
di
re
ct
pr
od
u
ct
u
sa
ge
M
R
IO
′ di
r
ACCR
AKL 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
WLG 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
ONI 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
CAN 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
OSI 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
CMIF
AKL 4.40 1.61 2.17 0.97 0.75 3.89 6.28 4.48 1.50 1.32 2.15 0.72 2.06 0.70 0.83 1.23 0.49 1.49 0.54 0.61 1.50 0.61 1.12 0.46 0.52
WLG 1.98 0.72 0.98 0.44 0.34 1.75 2.83 2.02 0.68 0.59 0.97 0.33 0.93 0.32 0.38 0.56 0.22 0.67 0.24 0.28 0.67 0.28 0.50 0.21 0.23
ONI 1.64 0.60 0.81 0.36 0.28 1.45 2.35 1.67 0.56 0.49 0.80 0.27 0.77 0.26 0.31 0.46 0.18 0.56 0.20 0.23 0.56 0.23 0.42 0.17 0.19
CAN 1.09 0.40 0.54 0.24 0.19 0.96 1.55 1.11 0.37 0.33 0.53 0.18 0.51 0.17 0.21 0.31 0.12 0.37 0.13 0.15 0.37 0.15 0.28 0.11 0.13
OSI 0.63 0.23 0.31 0.14 0.11 0.56 0.90 0.64 0.21 0.19 0.31 0.10 0.29 0.10 0.12 0.18 0.07 0.21 0.08 0.09 0.21 0.09 0.16 0.07 0.07
PROP
AKL 9.97 3.64 4.92 2.20 1.70 8.81 14.22 10.15 3.39 2.98 4.87 1.64 4.66 1.59 1.89 2.80 1.11 3.37 1.22 1.38 3.39 1.38 2.52 1.03 1.17
WLG 2.57 0.94 1.27 0.57 0.44 2.27 3.66 2.62 0.87 0.77 1.26 0.42 1.20 0.41 0.49 0.72 0.29 0.87 0.32 0.36 0.87 0.36 0.65 0.27 0.30
ONI 7.65 2.79 3.78 1.69 1.30 6.77 10.92 7.79 2.60 2.29 3.74 1.26 3.58 1.22 1.45 2.15 0.85 2.59 0.94 1.06 2.60 1.06 1.94 0.79 0.90
CAN 3.22 1.18 1.59 0.71 0.55 2.85 4.60 3.28 1.10 0.96 1.58 0.53 1.51 0.52 0.61 0.90 0.36 1.09 0.40 0.45 1.10 0.45 0.82 0.33 0.38
OSI 3.06 1.12 1.51 0.67 0.52 2.70 4.36 3.11 1.04 0.91 1.49 0.50 1.43 0.49 0.58 0.86 0.34 1.03 0.38 0.42 1.04 0.42 0.77 0.32 0.36
RBUS
AKL 18.30 6.68 9.03 4.04 3.12 16.18 26.10 18.64 6.23 5.47 8.95 3.01 8.56 2.93 3.46 5.13 2.04 6.19 2.25 2.54 6.22 2.54 4.64 1.90 2.15
WLG 6.49 2.37 3.20 1.43 1.11 5.74 9.26 6.61 2.21 1.94 3.18 1.07 3.04 1.04 1.23 1.82 0.72 2.20 0.80 0.90 2.21 0.90 1.65 0.67 0.76
ONI 8.79 3.21 4.34 1.94 1.50 7.77 12.53 8.95 2.99 2.63 4.30 1.45 4.11 1.40 1.66 2.46 0.98 2.97 1.08 1.22 2.99 1.22 2.23 0.91 1.03
CAN 4.00 1.46 1.97 0.88 0.68 3.53 5.70 4.07 1.36 1.19 1.95 0.66 1.87 0.64 0.76 1.12 0.44 1.35 0.49 0.55 1.36 0.55 1.01 0.41 0.47
OSI 3.03 1.11 1.49 0.67 0.52 2.68 4.32 3.08 1.03 0.91 1.48 0.50 1.42 0.48 0.57 0.85 0.34 1.02 0.37 0.42 1.03 0.42 0.77 0.31 0.36
GOVT
AKL 0.43 0.16 0.21 0.09 0.07 0.38 0.61 0.43 0.15 0.13 0.21 0.07 0.20 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.05
WLG 0.67 0.24 0.33 0.15 0.11 0.59 0.96 0.68 0.23 0.20 0.33 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.13 0.19 0.07 0.23 0.08 0.09 0.23 0.09 0.17 0.07 0.08
ONI 0.48 0.17 0.24 0.11 0.08 0.42 0.68 0.49 0.16 0.14 0.23 0.08 0.22 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.16 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.06
CAN 0.16 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.14 0.23 0.17 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02
OSI 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.20 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02
EDUC
AKL 0.98 0.86 0.48 0.27 0.33
WLG 0.33 1.30 0.15 0.10 0.13
ONI 0.49 1.02 0.47 0.34 0.25
CAN 0.22 0.34 0.16 0.12 0.10
OSI 0.17 0.30 0.19 0.14 0.12
HEAL
AKL 0.78 0.69 0.38 0.22 0.27
WLG 0.28 1.09 0.13 0.08 0.11
ONI 0.41 0.86 0.39 0.28 0.21
CAN 0.19 0.29 0.14 0.10 0.09
OSI 0.14 0.25 0.16 0.11 0.10
CUPE
AKL 1.39 1.23 0.68 0.39 0.47
WLG 0.52 2.02 0.23 0.16 0.20
ONI 0.61 1.26 0.58 0.42 0.31
CAN 0.30 0.47 0.22 0.17 0.14
OSI 0.22 0.38 0.24 0.18 0.15
OWND
AKL
WLG
ONI
CAN
OSI
TRAN
AKL
WLG
ONI
CAN
OSI
de
st
in
at
io
n
-m
ar
gi
n
s
M
R
IO
′ ds
t
WHOL
AKL 50.22 44.40 24.55 14.09 17.07
WLG 10.98 42.91 4.95 3.35 4.17
ONI 11.17 23.05 10.58 7.65 5.73
CAN 8.42 12.98 6.10 4.69 3.96
OSI 4.01 7.05 4.46 3.27 2.77
RETT
AKL 30.03 26.55 14.68 8.42 10.20
WLG 9.04 35.32 4.07 2.75 3.44
ONI 16.38 33.81 15.53 11.23 8.41
CAN 7.13 11.00 5.17 3.97 3.36
OSI 5.30 9.30 5.89 4.32 3.66
TRAN
AKL
WLG
CAN
OSI
so
u
rc
e-
m
ar
gi
n
s
M
R
IO
′ sr
c
WHOL
AKL 18.20 6.65 8.98 4.02 3.10 16.09 25.96 18.54 6.19 5.44 8.90 2.99 8.51 2.91 3.45 5.10 2.03 6.16 2.24 2.53 6.18 2.53 4.61 1.89 2.14
WLG 3.31 1.21 1.63 0.73 0.56 2.92 4.72 3.37 1.13 0.99 1.62 0.54 1.55 0.53 0.63 0.93 0.37 1.12 0.41 0.46 1.12 0.46 0.84 0.34 0.39
ONI 6.55 2.39 3.23 1.45 1.12 5.79 9.35 6.67 2.23 1.96 3.20 1.08 3.06 1.05 1.24 1.84 0.73 2.22 0.81 0.91 2.23 0.91 1.66 0.68 0.77
CAN 4.11 1.50 2.03 0.91 0.70 3.63 5.86 4.18 1.40 1.23 2.01 0.68 1.92 0.66 0.78 1.15 0.46 1.39 0.50 0.57 1.40 0.57 1.04 0.43 0.48
OSI 3.07 1.12 1.52 0.68 0.52 2.72 4.38 3.13 1.05 0.92 1.50 0.51 1.44 0.49 0.58 0.86 0.34 1.04 0.38 0.43 1.04 0.43 0.78 0.32 0.36
TRAN
AKL 0.83 1.28 0.52 0.40 3.23 2.64 0.80 0.70 0.37 1.21 0.38 0.44 0.25 0.88 0.29 0.33 0.31 0.66 0.24 0.28
WLG 0.54 0.19 0.08 0.06 0.47 0.40 0.12 0.11 0.26 0.18 0.06 0.07 0.15 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.18 0.10 0.04 0.04
ONI 1.39 0.32 0.20 0.16 1.23 1.26 0.31 0.27 0.68 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.39 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.47 0.12 0.09 0.11
CAN 0.71 0.16 0.25 0.08 0.63 0.64 0.53 0.14 0.35 0.07 0.24 0.09 0.20 0.05 0.17 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.13 0.06
OSI 0.74 0.17 0.26 0.11 0.65 0.67 0.54 0.16 0.36 0.08 0.25 0.08 0.21 0.05 0.18 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.14 0.05
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MRIO′
INV GOV
row/col
OWND WHOL RETT TRAN
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
di
re
ct
pr
od
u
ct
u
sa
ge
M
R
IO
′ di
r
ACCR
AKL 0.40 0.14 0.36 0.12 0.15 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
WLG 0.14 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ONI 0.42 0.15 0.38 0.13 0.16 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CAN 0.15 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OSI 0.27 0.10 0.24 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CMIF
AKL 22.32 8.01 19.96 6.97 8.55 2.40 0.45 0.89 0.55 0.42 1.67 0.52 1.75 0.58 0.73 0.31 0.07 0.16 0.09 0.10 13.33
WLG 10.06 3.61 9.00 3.14 3.85 1.08 0.20 0.40 0.25 0.19 0.75 0.24 0.79 0.26 0.33 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.04 6.01
ONI 8.33 2.99 7.45 2.60 3.19 0.90 0.17 0.33 0.20 0.16 0.62 0.19 0.65 0.22 0.27 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.04 4.98
CAN 5.52 1.98 4.94 1.72 2.11 0.59 0.11 0.22 0.14 0.10 0.41 0.13 0.43 0.14 0.18 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 3.30
OSI 3.18 1.14 2.85 0.99 1.22 0.34 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 1.90
PROP
AKL 50.52 18.13 45.19 15.78 19.35 5.43 1.02 2.01 1.24 0.94 3.78 1.18 3.96 1.32 1.66 0.70 0.17 0.36 0.21 0.22 136.69
WLG 13.02 4.67 11.65 4.07 4.99 1.40 0.26 0.52 0.32 0.24 0.97 0.30 1.02 0.34 0.43 0.18 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.06 35.23
ONI 38.79 13.92 34.69 12.11 14.86 4.17 0.78 1.54 0.95 0.72 2.90 0.91 3.04 1.01 1.28 0.54 0.13 0.27 0.16 0.17 104.94
CAN 16.34 5.86 14.62 5.10 6.26 1.76 0.33 0.65 0.40 0.31 1.22 0.38 1.28 0.43 0.54 0.23 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.07 44.22
OSI 15.49 5.56 13.86 4.84 5.94 1.67 0.31 0.62 0.38 0.29 1.16 0.36 1.22 0.40 0.51 0.22 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.07 41.92
RBUS
AKL 92.75 33.28 82.96 28.96 35.53 9.98 1.87 3.69 2.27 1.73 6.93 2.17 7.27 2.42 3.05 1.29 0.31 0.66 0.39 0.40 269.82
WLG 32.92 11.81 29.44 10.28 12.61 3.54 0.66 1.31 0.81 0.61 2.46 0.77 2.58 0.86 1.08 0.46 0.11 0.23 0.14 0.14 95.76
ONI 44.53 15.98 39.83 13.91 17.06 4.79 0.90 1.77 1.09 0.83 3.33 1.04 3.49 1.16 1.47 0.62 0.15 0.31 0.19 0.19 129.55
CAN 20.25 7.27 18.12 6.32 7.76 2.18 0.41 0.81 0.50 0.38 1.51 0.47 1.59 0.53 0.67 0.28 0.07 0.14 0.09 0.09 58.92
OSI 15.34 5.50 13.72 4.79 5.88 1.65 0.31 0.61 0.38 0.29 1.15 0.36 1.20 0.40 0.51 0.21 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.07 44.64
GOVT
AKL 2.16 0.78 1.94 0.68 0.83 0.23 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.16 0.05 0.17 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 2730.81
WLG 3.39 1.22 3.04 1.06 1.30 0.37 0.07 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 4283.09
ONI 2.43 0.87 2.17 0.76 0.93 0.26 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.18 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 3061.30
CAN 0.82 0.30 0.74 0.26 0.32 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 1040.38
OSI 0.71 0.26 0.64 0.22 0.27 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 897.72
EDUC
AKL 4.95 0.53 0.37 0.07 1754.95
WLG 1.66 0.09 0.11 0.02 535.73
ONI 4.53 0.20 0.40 0.04 1671.05
CAN 1.56 0.12 0.13 0.02 574.78
OSI 1.92 0.09 0.16 0.02 667.01
HEAL
AKL 3.96 0.43 0.30 0.06 2266.62
WLG 1.39 0.08 0.09 0.01 853.01
ONI 3.81 0.17 0.33 0.03 2862.64
CAN 1.35 0.11 0.11 0.02 1071.66
OSI 1.60 0.08 0.14 0.02 1151.31
CUPE
AKL 7.06 0.76 0.53 0.10 141.20
WLG 2.57 0.14 0.17 0.02 56.90
ONI 5.59 0.25 0.49 0.04 90.69
CAN 2.18 0.17 0.18 0.03 42.18
OSI 2.49 0.12 0.21 0.03 43.73
OWND
AKL
WLG
ONI
CAN
OSI
TRAN
AKL
WLG
ONI
CAN
OSI
de
st
in
at
io
n
-m
ar
gi
n
s
M
R
IO
′ ds
t
WHOL
AKL 254.55 27.38 19.02 3.54 75.22
WLG 54.70 3.07 3.56 0.50 8.19
ONI 102.59 4.56 8.99 0.81 12.20
CAN 60.38 4.74 5.04 0.82 12.90
OSI 45.77 2.23 3.93 0.52 5.96
RETT
AKL 152.21 16.37 11.37 2.12 101.96
WLG 45.02 2.52 2.93 0.41 25.54
ONI 150.51 6.70 13.20 1.19 115.11
CAN 51.18 4.02 4.27 0.70 37.89
OSI 60.41 2.95 5.19 0.69 45.23
TRAN
AKL
WLG
CAN
OSI
so
u
rc
e-
m
ar
gi
n
s
M
R
IO
′ sr
c
WHOL
AKL 92.25 33.10 82.51 28.81 35.34 9.92 1.86 3.67 2.26 1.72 6.89 2.16 7.23 2.40 3.04 1.28 0.30 0.65 0.39 0.40 52.78
WLG 16.77 6.02 15.00 5.24 6.42 1.80 0.34 0.67 0.41 0.31 1.25 0.39 1.31 0.44 0.55 0.23 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.07 9.59
ONI 33.22 11.92 29.71 10.37 12.72 3.57 0.67 1.32 0.81 0.62 2.48 0.78 2.60 0.87 1.09 0.46 0.11 0.23 0.14 0.14 19.01
CAN 20.82 7.47 18.62 6.50 7.98 2.24 0.42 0.83 0.51 0.39 1.56 0.49 1.63 0.54 0.69 0.29 0.07 0.15 0.09 0.09 11.91
OSI 15.57 5.59 13.92 4.86 5.96 1.67 0.31 0.62 0.38 0.29 1.16 0.36 1.22 0.41 0.51 0.22 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.07 8.91
TRAN
AKL 4.12 11.75 3.71 4.56 0.23 0.52 0.29 0.22 0.27 1.03 0.31 0.39 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.05 115.02
WLG 2.71 1.76 0.56 0.68 0.29 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.20 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 17.21
ONI 7.05 1.60 1.44 1.77 0.76 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.53 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.02 44.72
CAN 3.61 0.82 2.34 0.91 0.39 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.27 0.05 0.21 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 22.93
OSI 3.74 0.85 2.42 0.77 0.40 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.28 0.06 0.21 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 23.73
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MRIO′
EXP TOTAL
row/col
AGRI FOLO FISH MINE OIGA PETR FDBT TWPM CHNM METL EQFO UTIL CONS ACCR CMIF PROP RBUS GOVT EDUC HEAL CUPE TRAN
di
re
ct
pr
od
u
ct
u
sa
ge
M
R
IO
′ di
r
ACCR
AKL 606.50 1861.77
WLG 211.31 648.66
ONI 646.58 1984.81
CAN 229.67 705.03
OSI 408.29 1253.31
CMIF
AKL 493.74 10851.95
WLG 222.55 4891.37
ONI 184.38 4052.59
CAN 122.09 2683.43
OSI 70.41 1547.54
PROP
AKL 200.58 5143.03
WLG 51.70 1325.52
ONI 154.00 3948.56
CAN 64.89 1663.73
OSI 61.51 1577.24
RBUS
AKL 501.79 11056.05
WLG 178.09 3923.95
ONI 240.92 5308.25
CAN 109.57 2414.27
OSI 83.01 1829.01
GOVT
AKL 34.25 3059.61
WLG 53.71 4798.79
ONI 38.39 3429.89
CAN 13.05 1165.64
OSI 11.26 1005.81
EDUC
AKL 246.34 2782.24
WLG 75.20 909.81
ONI 234.56 2589.78
CAN 80.68 900.51
OSI 93.63 1046.98
HEAL
AKL 22.43 3613.39
WLG 8.44 1393.46
ONI 28.32 4239.70
CAN 10.60 1567.18
OSI 11.39 1738.26
CUPE
AKL 309.39 4260.72
WLG 124.67 1691.35
ONI 198.71 3090.21
CAN 92.42 1288.49
OSI 95.83 1433.07
OWND
AKL 4300.08
WLG 1499.51
ONI 3742.43
CAN 1329.18
OSI 1600.78
TRAN
AKL 773.02 1712.20
WLG 178.03 394.33
ONI 382.25 846.66
CAN 233.57 517.35
OSI 234.80 520.07
de
st
in
at
io
n
-m
ar
gi
n
s
M
R
IO
′ ds
t
WHOL
AKL 69.22 28.31 6.06 11.85 17.40 6.82 524.53 144.93 75.92 68.87 147.94 5292.73
WLG 7.54 3.08 0.66 1.29 1.89 0.74 57.11 15.78 8.27 7.50 16.11 962.02
ONI 11.23 4.59 0.98 1.92 2.82 0.55 85.10 23.51 12.32 11.17 24.00 1904.83
CAN 11.87 4.85 1.04 2.03 5.97 1.17 89.93 24.85 13.02 11.81 25.36 1197.49
OSI 5.48 2.24 0.48 0.94 2.76 0.54 41.55 11.48 6.01 5.46 11.72 895.27
RETT
AKL 16.08 6.58 1.41 2.75 121.89 33.68 17.64 16.00 34.38 0.55 1.92 19.39 10.08 4.91 10.26 1.38 6.71 0.75 7.54 5809.30
WLG 4.03 1.65 0.35 0.69 30.54 8.44 4.42 4.01 8.61 0.14 0.48 4.86 2.52 1.23 2.57 0.35 1.68 0.19 1.89 1765.29
ONI 18.16 7.43 1.59 3.11 137.60 38.02 19.92 18.07 38.81 0.62 2.17 21.89 11.38 5.55 11.58 1.56 7.57 0.84 8.52 5931.83
CAN 5.98 2.44 0.52 1.02 45.29 12.51 6.56 5.95 12.77 0.20 0.72 7.20 3.74 1.83 3.81 0.51 2.49 0.28 2.80 2004.55
OSI 7.13 2.92 0.62 1.22 54.06 14.94 7.83 7.10 15.25 0.24 0.85 8.60 4.47 2.18 4.55 0.61 2.97 0.33 3.35 2486.83
TRAN
AKL 2.41 2.41
WLG 0.55 0.55
CAN 3.70 0.73 4.43
OSI 3.72 0.73 4.45
so
u
rc
e-
m
ar
gi
n
s
M
R
IO
′ sr
c
WHOL
AKL 48.57 19.87 4.25 8.32 12.21 368.08 101.70 53.28 48.32 103.81 5287.89
WLG 8.83 3.61 0.77 1.51 2.22 66.90 18.48 9.68 8.78 18.87 961.14
ONI 17.49 7.15 1.53 3.00 4.40 0.86 132.53 36.62 19.18 17.40 37.38 1904.83
CAN 10.96 4.48 0.96 1.88 83.08 22.96 12.03 10.91 23.43 1190.83
OSI 8.20 3.35 0.72 1.40 62.11 17.16 8.99 8.15 17.52 890.29
TRAN
AKL 59.75 24.43 5.23 10.23 15.02 452.73 125.09 65.53 59.44 127.69 4923.92
WLG 8.94 3.66 0.78 1.53 2.25 67.75 18.72 9.81 8.89 19.11 1134.01
ONI 23.23 9.50 2.03 3.98 5.84 1.14 176.03 48.64 25.48 23.11 49.65 2436.01
CAN 11.91 4.87 1.04 2.04 90.24 24.93 13.06 11.85 25.45 1484.09
OSI 12.33 5.04 1.08 2.11 93.41 25.81 13.52 12.26 26.35 1491.88
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MRIO′
Industries
row/col
AGRI FOLO FISH MINE OIGA PETR
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI ONI
IMP-AGRI 5.45 1.28 74.81 7.69 37.78 0.51 0.17 5.62 0.37 2.15 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
IMP-FOLO 0.04 0.01 0.54 0.06 0.27 0.50 0.16 5.49 0.36 2.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-FISH 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.02 1.45 0.29 4.83 0.39 8.14 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04
IMP-MINE 0.37 0.09 5.11 0.53 2.58 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.27 0.03 1.63 0.32 1.02 0.04 0.69 6.61
IMP-OIGA 1180.04
IMP-PETR 0.13 0.03 1.82 0.19 0.92 0.11 0.04 1.20 0.08 0.46 0.53 0.10 1.77 0.14 2.98 3.59 0.45 21.77 4.22 13.62 95.04
IMP-FDBT 1.86 0.44 25.53 2.63 12.90 0.03 0.01 0.36 0.02 0.14 0.90 0.18 3.01 0.24 5.07 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.16
IMP-TWPM 1.44 0.34 19.78 2.03 9.99 0.39 0.13 4.32 0.29 1.65 0.13 0.03 0.44 0.04 0.74 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.15 1.43
IMP-CHNM 20.98 4.94 287.90 29.60 145.41 2.55 0.83 27.98 1.85 10.72 0.23 0.04 0.76 0.06 1.27 0.16 0.02 0.95 0.18 0.59 9.98
IMP-METL 1.60 0.38 21.96 2.26 11.09 0.70 0.23 7.71 0.51 2.95 0.19 0.04 0.62 0.05 1.04 0.07 0.01 0.40 0.08 0.25 3.50
IMP-EQFO 9.65 2.27 132.50 13.62 66.92 1.40 0.46 15.36 1.02 5.88 8.07 1.59 26.91 2.19 45.37 0.32 0.04 1.95 0.38 1.22 0.04 0.66 6.36 28.49
IMP-UTIL 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
IMP-CONS 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.18
IMP-ACCR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-CMIF 1.00 0.23 13.67 1.41 6.90 0.22 0.07 2.37 0.16 0.91 0.14 0.03 0.46 0.04 0.78 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.06 1.58
IMP-PROP 0.66 0.15 9.00 0.92 4.54 0.30 0.10 3.34 0.22 1.28 0.30 0.06 1.01 0.08 1.70 0.05 0.01 0.33 0.06 0.20 0.70
IMP-RBUS 2.18 0.51 29.94 3.08 15.12 0.98 0.32 10.82 0.72 4.14 0.30 0.06 1.00 0.08 1.69 0.05 0.01 0.28 0.06 0.18 7.03
IMP-EDUC 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-HEAL 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-CUPE 0.03 0.01 0.44 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
IMP-WHOL 0.18 0.04 2.44 0.25 1.23 0.09 0.03 1.04 0.07 0.40 0.03 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.19 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.37
IMP-RETT 6.16 1.45 84.58 8.70 42.72 0.46 0.15 5.06 0.33 1.94 0.48 0.09 1.58 0.13 2.67 0.14 0.02 0.82 0.16 0.51 1.75
IMP-TRAN 0.39 0.09 5.31 0.55 2.68 0.83 0.27 9.14 0.60 3.50 0.42 0.08 1.38 0.11 2.33 0.31 0.04 1.86 0.36 1.16 7.85
TAX 20.49 4.71 276.18 28.85 139.19 1.12 0.37 12.57 0.84 4.82 0.08 0.02 0.25 0.02 0.43 2.63 0.33 16.22 3.18 10.15 0.69 10.74 103.37 1049.00
LAB 182.89 42.02 2464.88 257.49 1242.27 25.42 8.49 285.66 19.11 109.60 10.07 1.97 33.41 2.75 56.29 13.27 1.68 81.93 16.04 51.30 0.67 10.37 99.83 64.11
CAP 117.15 26.91 1578.86 164.93 795.73 26.36 8.80 296.23 19.82 113.66 11.87 2.32 39.40 3.24 66.37 25.31 3.20 156.27 30.60 97.85 9.59 148.41 1428.70 162.07
TOTAL 737.04 169.32 9933.39 1037.69 5006.30 168.87 56.40 1897.70 126.98 728.14 82.21 16.08 272.80 22.43 459.59 96.74 12.23 597.24 116.95 373.95 14.98 231.84 2231.93 3683.30
Extended MRIO Table — Part 3-1
MRIO′
Industries
row/col
FDBT TWPM CHNM METL EQFO
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
IMP-AGRI 39.95 6.81 77.90 17.85 54.13 2.96 0.66 3.61 1.06 1.36 0.28 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01
IMP-FOLO 0.08 0.01 0.17 0.04 0.11 3.49 0.78 4.26 1.26 1.61 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01
IMP-FISH 17.77 3.03 34.64 7.94 24.07 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02
IMP-MINE 0.65 0.11 1.27 0.29 0.88 0.40 0.09 0.49 0.14 0.18 14.23 2.81 0.54 4.36 2.15 9.32 1.51 7.68 3.25 2.71 0.70 0.13 0.38 0.22 0.14
IMP-OIGA
IMP-PETR 14.12 2.41 27.54 6.31 19.14 29.26 6.54 35.67 10.53 13.47 58.73 11.58 2.24 18.00 8.87 7.86 1.27 6.48 2.74 2.28 9.29 1.66 5.02 2.84 1.79
IMP-FDBT 60.48 10.31 117.93 27.03 81.95 4.06 0.91 4.96 1.46 1.87 5.77 1.14 0.22 1.77 0.87 0.36 0.06 0.29 0.12 0.10 1.59 0.28 0.86 0.49 0.30
IMP-TWPM 14.05 2.40 27.40 6.28 19.04 272.04 60.79 331.70 97.87 125.21 42.29 8.34 1.62 12.96 6.39 4.95 0.80 4.08 1.72 1.44 53.36 9.55 28.83 16.34 10.26
IMP-CHNM 101.54 17.31 198.01 45.38 137.60 67.31 15.04 82.07 24.21 30.98 682.68 134.57 26.09 209.23 103.11 18.98 3.08 15.65 6.62 5.52 87.64 15.68 47.35 26.83 16.85
IMP-METL 29.81 5.08 58.13 13.32 40.39 17.82 3.98 21.73 6.41 8.20 286.82 56.54 10.96 87.91 43.32 293.04 47.48 241.51 102.20 85.20 265.82 47.56 143.62 81.37 51.12
IMP-EQFO 30.04 5.12 58.58 13.42 40.71 35.08 7.84 42.77 12.62 16.15 56.26 11.09 2.15 17.24 8.50 48.46 7.85 39.94 16.90 14.09 434.37 77.72 234.68 132.97 83.53
IMP-UTIL 0.05 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
IMP-CONS 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.02
IMP-ACCR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-CMIF 2.39 0.41 4.66 1.07 3.24 3.48 0.78 4.24 1.25 1.60 6.41 1.26 0.25 1.97 0.97 0.59 0.10 0.48 0.20 0.17 3.80 0.68 2.05 1.16 0.73
IMP-PROP 2.34 0.40 4.56 1.04 3.17 2.80 0.62 3.41 1.01 1.29 5.35 1.05 0.20 1.64 0.81 0.89 0.14 0.74 0.31 0.26 3.02 0.54 1.63 0.93 0.58
IMP-RBUS 16.95 2.89 33.06 7.58 22.97 14.87 3.32 18.14 5.35 6.85 31.85 6.28 1.22 9.76 4.81 5.21 0.84 4.30 1.82 1.52 17.37 3.11 9.39 5.32 3.34
IMP-EDUC 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-HEAL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-CUPE 0.31 0.05 0.60 0.14 0.42 0.27 0.06 0.33 0.10 0.12 0.63 0.12 0.02 0.19 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.20 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.04
IMP-WHOL 0.61 0.10 1.18 0.27 0.82 1.62 0.36 1.98 0.58 0.75 1.78 0.35 0.07 0.55 0.27 1.52 0.25 1.25 0.53 0.44 1.64 0.29 0.89 0.50 0.32
IMP-RETT 10.57 1.80 20.61 4.72 14.32 5.67 1.27 6.91 2.04 2.61 13.61 2.68 0.52 4.17 2.06 1.93 0.31 1.59 0.67 0.56 12.87 2.30 6.95 3.94 2.47
IMP-TRAN 10.35 1.76 20.17 4.62 14.02 12.38 2.77 15.09 4.45 5.70 20.82 4.10 0.80 6.38 3.14 3.53 0.57 2.91 1.23 1.03 6.45 1.15 3.49 1.98 1.24
TAX 327.80 55.62 634.82 147.05 441.43 23.90 5.29 28.73 8.61 10.86 51.32 10.17 1.97 15.90 7.79 19.42 3.10 15.69 6.75 5.54 16.73 2.94 8.86 5.10 3.15
LAB 638.60 108.35 1236.72 286.47 859.96 824.51 182.60 990.97 297.14 374.56 847.08 167.83 32.49 262.51 128.54 557.60 89.10 450.47 193.83 159.09 1141.78 200.67 604.67 348.13 215.22
CAP 454.57 77.12 880.32 203.92 612.14 590.95 130.88 710.25 212.97 268.46 903.01 178.91 34.64 279.84 137.03 672.86 107.52 543.60 233.90 191.98 698.61 122.78 369.98 213.01 131.68
TOTAL 5647.6 958.2 10937.1 2533.5 7605.2 4032.3 893.0 4846.4 1453.2 1831.8 5346.1 1059.2 205.1 1656.8 811.2 3116.7 498.0 2518.0 1083.5 889.2 4835.7 849.9 2560.9 1474.4 911.5
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MRIO′
Industries
row/col
UTIL CONS ACCR CMIF PROP
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
IMP-AGRI 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.08 4.97 1.80 5.50 1.91 3.48 0.17 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.02 1.15 0.30 0.88 0.37 0.35
IMP-FOLO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
IMP-FISH 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.67 0.30 0.25 0.17 0.10 0.13 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.04
IMP-MINE 1.65 1.16 2.67 0.45 0.78 3.45 1.12 3.99 1.22 1.57 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
IMP-OIGA
IMP-PETR 36.36 25.54 58.86 10.03 17.24 9.24 3.00 10.70 3.28 4.21 0.29 0.11 0.33 0.11 0.21 2.32 1.05 0.87 0.57 0.33 0.56 0.15 0.43 0.18 0.17
IMP-FDBT 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.05 0.18 0.06 0.07 44.89 16.24 49.68 17.24 31.41 0.60 0.27 0.22 0.15 0.09 0.22 0.06 0.17 0.07 0.07
IMP-TWPM 1.49 1.05 2.41 0.41 0.71 43.83 14.22 50.71 15.56 19.97 3.38 1.22 3.74 1.30 2.37 26.82 12.15 10.07 6.62 3.84 22.58 5.88 17.43 7.30 6.97
IMP-CHNM 1.88 1.32 3.04 0.52 0.89 204.41 66.32 236.52 72.59 93.12 8.61 3.11 9.53 3.31 6.02 6.38 2.89 2.40 1.58 0.91 8.15 2.12 6.29 2.63 2.52
IMP-METL 1.87 1.32 3.03 0.52 0.89 112.62 36.54 130.30 39.99 51.30 5.34 1.93 5.91 2.05 3.73 5.35 2.42 2.01 1.32 0.77 9.36 2.44 7.23 3.03 2.89
IMP-EQFO 23.73 16.67 38.41 6.55 11.25 353.19 114.59 408.66 125.43 160.89 21.11 7.64 23.36 8.11 14.77 177.01 80.16 66.42 43.71 25.36 48.32 12.58 37.29 15.62 14.92
IMP-UTIL 0.67 0.47 1.09 0.19 0.32 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
IMP-CONS 0.12 0.08 0.19 0.03 0.06 2.38 0.77 2.75 0.84 1.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.29 0.08 0.22 0.09 0.09
IMP-ACCR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-CMIF 0.67 0.47 1.08 0.18 0.32 4.58 1.49 5.30 1.63 2.09 0.97 0.35 1.07 0.37 0.68 57.96 26.25 21.75 14.31 8.30 5.77 1.50 4.45 1.86 1.78
IMP-PROP 1.15 0.81 1.86 0.32 0.54 2.25 0.73 2.61 0.80 1.03 0.74 0.27 0.82 0.28 0.52 7.43 3.36 2.79 1.83 1.06 12.19 3.17 9.41 3.94 3.76
IMP-RBUS 7.18 5.05 11.63 1.98 3.41 19.81 6.43 22.92 7.04 9.02 6.77 2.45 7.49 2.60 4.74 76.23 34.52 28.61 18.82 10.92 13.02 3.39 10.05 4.21 4.02
IMP-EDUC 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
IMP-HEAL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-CUPE 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.07 1.01 0.46 0.38 0.25 0.15 0.16 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.05
IMP-WHOL 0.14 0.10 0.23 0.04 0.07 1.43 0.46 1.65 0.51 0.65 0.24 0.09 0.26 0.09 0.17 0.74 0.33 0.28 0.18 0.11 0.16 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.05
IMP-RETT 2.00 1.41 3.24 0.55 0.95 33.01 10.71 38.19 11.72 15.04 7.00 2.53 7.75 2.69 4.90 24.22 10.97 9.09 5.98 3.47 15.33 3.99 11.83 4.95 4.73
IMP-TRAN 0.32 0.22 0.51 0.09 0.15 1.67 0.54 1.94 0.59 0.76 0.74 0.27 0.82 0.28 0.52 12.60 5.70 4.73 3.11 1.81 2.68 0.70 2.07 0.87 0.83
TAX 15.89 11.14 25.69 4.39 7.52 108.52 34.49 123.11 38.28 48.43 43.47 15.14 46.34 16.46 29.26 548.49 247.22 204.83 135.63 78.22 385.64 99.39 296.08 124.75 118.27
LAB 158.88 111.41 256.97 43.86 75.25 1336.42 424.73 1516.06 471.43 596.35 506.36 176.42 539.83 191.75 340.88 2206.00 994.33 823.82 545.49 314.59 359.99 92.78 276.38 116.45 110.40
CAP 808.70 567.09 1307.99 223.24 383.01 1202.98 382.33 1364.69 424.36 536.81 303.62 105.78 323.68 114.98 204.39 3438.66 1549.93 1284.15 850.30 490.37 2634.79 679.07 2022.86 852.34 808.03
TOTAL 3099.3 2173.4 5012.8 855.6 1467.9 9013.6 2864.6 10225.2 3179.6 4022.2 1861.8 648.7 1984.8 705.0 1253.3 10852.0 4891.4 4052.6 2683.4 1547.5 5143.0 1325.5 3948.6 1663.7 1577.2
Extended MRIO Table — Part 3-3
MRIO′
Industries
row/col
RBUS GOVT EDUC HEAL CUPE
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
IMP-AGRI 1.81 0.65 0.87 0.39 0.30 0.31 0.49 0.35 0.12 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 2.11 0.83 2.48 0.90 1.02 2.02 0.80 1.50 0.61 0.69
IMP-FOLO 1.09 0.39 0.53 0.24 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
IMP-FISH 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
IMP-MINE 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.22 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.36 0.12 0.34 0.12 0.14 0.69 0.27 0.81 0.29 0.33 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.03
IMP-OIGA
IMP-PETR 15.05 5.36 7.24 3.26 2.49 12.94 20.46 14.64 4.92 4.29 3.72 1.24 3.53 1.21 1.43 6.33 2.50 7.45 2.71 3.07 0.83 0.33 0.62 0.25 0.29
IMP-FDBT 1.04 0.37 0.50 0.23 0.17 0.19 0.31 0.22 0.07 0.06 0.25 0.08 0.23 0.08 0.09 4.86 1.92 5.72 2.08 2.36 4.60 1.82 3.41 1.39 1.57
IMP-TWPM 103.23 36.79 49.69 22.37 17.12 6.60 10.43 7.46 2.51 2.19 8.94 2.98 8.48 2.90 3.43 10.60 4.18 12.48 4.55 5.14 28.83 11.41 21.39 8.70 9.84
IMP-CHNM 55.41 19.75 26.67 12.01 9.19 4.35 6.88 4.93 1.65 1.44 6.17 2.06 5.85 2.00 2.37 49.46 19.52 58.25 21.21 23.99 21.90 8.66 16.24 6.61 7.48
IMP-METL 14.21 5.06 6.84 3.08 2.36 2.56 4.05 2.90 0.97 0.85 2.55 0.85 2.42 0.83 0.98 1.70 0.67 2.01 0.73 0.83 2.78 1.10 2.06 0.84 0.95
IMP-EQFO 120.76 43.04 58.13 26.17 20.02 58.88 93.09 66.63 22.38 19.53 59.87 19.97 56.79 19.40 22.95 60.45 23.87 71.19 25.93 29.32 90.08 35.65 66.82 27.18 30.76
IMP-UTIL 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02
IMP-CONS 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.20 0.32 0.23 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.05
IMP-ACCR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-CMIF 22.21 7.92 10.69 4.81 3.68 4.30 6.79 4.86 1.63 1.43 2.64 0.88 2.51 0.86 1.01 6.87 2.71 8.09 2.95 3.33 13.61 5.38 10.09 4.10 4.65
IMP-PROP 17.67 6.30 8.50 3.83 2.93 5.10 8.07 5.77 1.94 1.69 1.71 0.57 1.63 0.56 0.66 6.01 2.37 7.08 2.58 2.92 10.87 4.30 8.07 3.28 3.71
IMP-RBUS 201.52 71.82 97.00 43.68 33.41 20.60 32.56 23.30 7.83 6.83 9.97 3.33 9.46 3.23 3.82 27.88 11.01 32.83 11.96 13.52 66.87 26.46 49.60 20.17 22.83
IMP-EDUC 0.34 0.12 0.17 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.21 0.07 0.20 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.06 0.17 0.06 0.07 0.22 0.09 0.16 0.07 0.07
IMP-HEAL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-CUPE 3.66 1.30 1.76 0.79 0.61 0.24 0.38 0.27 0.09 0.08 0.33 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.13 0.21 0.08 0.25 0.09 0.10 7.05 2.79 5.23 2.13 2.41
IMP-WHOL 1.16 0.41 0.56 0.25 0.19 0.32 0.51 0.36 0.12 0.11 0.27 0.09 0.26 0.09 0.10 0.43 0.17 0.51 0.18 0.21 0.54 0.21 0.40 0.16 0.18
IMP-RETT 64.72 23.07 31.15 14.03 10.73 7.04 11.13 7.97 2.68 2.34 5.06 1.69 4.80 1.64 1.94 22.28 8.80 26.24 9.56 10.81 24.04 9.51 17.83 7.25 8.21
IMP-TRAN 23.78 8.47 11.45 5.15 3.94 4.26 6.73 4.82 1.62 1.41 1.48 0.49 1.40 0.48 0.57 1.75 0.69 2.07 0.75 0.85 8.41 3.33 6.24 2.54 2.87
TAX 47.41 16.83 22.76 10.35 7.84 33.20 52.08 37.22 12.65 10.92 17.96 5.87 16.72 5.81 6.76 6.35 2.45 7.45 2.75 3.06 132.58 52.63 96.16 40.09 44.59
LAB 3604.15 1279.17 1730.43 787.03 596.24 1250.63 1961.54 1401.99 476.46 411.13 1728.89 565.36 1609.29 559.58 650.60 1752.31 675.76 2056.04 760.00 842.97 1102.87 437.80 799.89 333.52 370.94
CAP 2281.06 809.58 1095.19 498.11 377.36 279.99 439.15 313.88 106.67 92.04 181.94 59.49 169.35 58.89 68.46 526.43 203.01 617.68 228.32 253.25 858.24 340.69 622.47 259.54 288.67
TOTAL 11056.1 3924.0 5308.3 2414.3 1829.0 3059.6 4798.8 3429.9 1165.6 1005.8 2782.2 909.8 2589.8 900.5 1047.0 3613.4 1393.5 4239.7 1567.2 1738.3 4260.7 1691.4 3090.2 1288.5 1433.1
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MRIO′
Industries CON
row/col
OWND WHOL RETT TRAN
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
IMP-AGRI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.68 1.25 2.51 1.52 1.18 4.23 1.31 4.41 1.46 1.85 0.31 0.07 0.15 0.09 0.09 76.57 29.99 67.64 24.27 30.05
IMP-FOLO 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.09 0.18 0.11 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.44 0.17 0.38 0.14 0.17
IMP-FISH 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 2.61 0.49 0.98 0.60 0.46 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.11 0.24 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.17 0.07 0.15 0.05 0.07
IMP-MINE 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.62 0.12 0.23 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.46 0.10 0.22 0.13 0.13 1.42 0.56 1.25 0.45 0.56
IMP-OIGA
IMP-PETR 1.27 0.46 1.13 0.40 0.49 57.21 10.73 21.52 13.06 10.07 2.89 0.90 3.01 1.00 1.26 91.49 20.23 42.96 25.96 26.38 92.83 36.35 81.99 29.42 36.43
IMP-FDBT 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.03 13.85 2.60 5.21 3.16 2.44 11.22 3.48 11.69 3.88 4.90 0.21 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.06 726.21 284.38 641.44 230.13 285.02
IMP-TWPM 9.57 3.44 8.53 2.98 3.66 120.76 22.64 45.44 27.57 21.25 56.48 17.52 58.86 19.54 24.69 10.80 2.39 5.07 3.06 3.11 710.17 278.10 627.27 225.05 278.72
IMP-CHNM 12.39 4.45 11.05 3.86 4.74 102.31 19.18 38.49 23.36 18.00 83.54 25.91 87.05 28.90 36.51 11.69 2.58 5.49 3.32 3.37 378.14 148.08 334.00 119.83 148.41
IMP-METL 7.34 2.64 6.55 2.29 2.81 87.86 16.47 33.05 20.06 15.46 49.43 15.33 51.51 17.10 21.60 5.80 1.28 2.73 1.65 1.67 29.23 11.45 25.82 9.26 11.47
IMP-EQFO 15.96 5.74 14.23 4.97 6.10 175.61 32.93 66.07 40.09 30.90 107.03 33.19 111.53 37.03 46.78 239.53 52.96 112.49 67.97 69.06 1350.73 528.94 1193.06 428.04 530.12
IMP-UTIL 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.20 0.47 1.06 0.38 0.47
IMP-CONS 0.46 0.17 0.41 0.14 0.18 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.04
IMP-ACCR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.14 0.32 0.11 0.14
IMP-CMIF 5.37 1.93 4.79 1.67 2.05 13.48 2.53 5.07 3.08 2.37 9.30 2.88 9.69 3.22 4.07 10.54 2.33 4.95 2.99 3.04 216.68 84.85 191.39 68.67 85.04
IMP-PROP 0.91 0.33 0.81 0.28 0.35 8.28 1.55 3.12 1.89 1.46 5.21 1.62 5.43 1.80 2.28 53.39 11.80 25.07 15.15 15.39 30.26 11.85 26.73 9.59 11.88
IMP-RBUS 2.06 0.74 1.84 0.64 0.79 78.16 14.66 29.41 17.85 13.75 49.70 15.41 51.79 17.20 21.72 20.65 4.56 9.70 5.86 5.95 33.13 12.97 29.26 10.50 13.00
IMP-EDUC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 4.92 1.93 4.35 1.56 1.93
IMP-HEAL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.12 0.28 0.10 0.12
IMP-CUPE 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 1.21 0.23 0.45 0.28 0.21 0.79 0.25 0.83 0.27 0.35 0.28 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.08 29.11 11.40 25.71 9.23 11.43
IMP-WHOL 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 4.10 0.77 1.54 0.94 0.72 1.24 0.38 1.29 0.43 0.54 3.63 0.80 1.70 1.03 1.05 11.57 4.53 10.22 3.67 4.54
IMP-RETT 1.11 0.40 0.99 0.35 0.42 13.31 2.50 5.01 3.04 2.34 21.03 6.52 21.92 7.28 9.19 59.24 13.10 27.82 16.81 17.08 624.96 244.73 552.01 198.05 245.28
IMP-TRAN 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.03 39.43 7.39 14.83 9.00 6.94 11.51 3.57 12.00 3.98 5.03 106.89 23.63 50.20 30.33 30.82 472.17 184.90 417.05 149.63 185.31
TAX 615.74 214.72 535.89 190.33 229.22 160.35 29.15 57.73 36.19 27.06 52.56 15.97 53.67 18.14 22.50 223.30 51.43 110.42 67.47 67.82 925.69 298.99 777.01 289.86 331.07
LAB 2528.05 459.51 910.25 570.65 426.63 1694.67 514.96 1730.42 584.76 725.45 1443.12 332.36 713.61 436.05 438.33
CAP 2836.05 988.98 2468.27 876.64 1055.77 1365.67 248.23 491.72 308.27 230.47 1278.51 388.50 1305.47 441.16 547.30 937.13 215.83 463.40 283.16 284.64
TOTAL 4300.1 1499.5 3742.4 1329.2 1600.8 10580.6 1923.2 3809.7 2388.3 1785.6 5809.3 1765.3 5931.8 2004.6 2486.8 6638.5 1528.9 3282.7 2005.9 2016.4 29845.9 10988.5 25822.3 9433.0 11331.8
Extended MRIO Table — Part 3-5
MRIO′
INV
row/col
AGRI FOLO FISH MINE OIGA PETR
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI ONI
IMP-AGRI 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.02
IMP-FOLO 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.19 0.02
IMP-FISH 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00
IMP-MINE 0.04 0.01 0.56 0.06 0.28 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.58 0.07
IMP-OIGA 0.63 0.15 8.67 0.89 4.37 0.09 0.03 1.03 0.07 0.40 0.05 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.28 0.18 0.02 1.17 0.22 0.73 0.06 0.94 9.01 1.02
IMP-PETR 0.26 0.06 3.67 0.38 1.85 0.04 0.01 0.44 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.49 0.10 0.31 0.02 0.40 3.81 0.43
IMP-FDBT 0.02 0.00 0.25 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.26 0.03
IMP-TWPM 0.05 0.01 0.64 0.07 0.32 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.66 0.08
IMP-CHNM 0.18 0.04 2.46 0.25 1.24 0.03 0.01 0.29 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.33 0.06 0.21 0.02 0.27 2.55 0.29
IMP-METL 0.17 0.04 2.33 0.24 1.18 0.02 0.01 0.28 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.31 0.06 0.20 0.02 0.25 2.42 0.27
IMP-EQFO 9.73 2.30 134.77 13.84 68.01 1.39 0.48 16.09 1.06 6.18 0.75 0.15 2.57 0.21 4.34 2.86 0.37 18.15 3.49 11.38 0.91 14.57 140.09 15.89
IMP-UTIL 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
IMP-CONS 0.03 0.01 0.40 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.42 0.05
IMP-ACCR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-CMIF 0.02 0.01 0.34 0.04 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.36 0.04
IMP-PROP 0.02 0.01 0.34 0.04 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.36 0.04
IMP-RBUS 0.16 0.04 2.23 0.23 1.13 0.02 0.01 0.27 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.30 0.06 0.19 0.02 0.24 2.32 0.26
IMP-EDUC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-HEAL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-CUPE 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
IMP-WHOL 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.02
IMP-RETT 0.20 0.05 2.78 0.29 1.40 0.03 0.01 0.33 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.37 0.07 0.23 0.02 0.30 2.89 0.33
IMP-TRAN 0.04 0.01 0.50 0.05 0.25 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.52 0.06
TAX 1.26 0.29 16.98 1.77 8.56 0.18 0.06 2.03 0.14 0.78 0.10 0.02 0.32 0.03 0.55 0.37 0.05 2.29 0.45 1.43 0.12 1.83 17.65 2.00
LAB
CAP
TOTAL 50.61 11.63 682.14 71.26 343.79 7.25 2.42 81.43 5.45 31.25 3.93 0.77 13.02 1.07 21.94 14.88 1.88 91.86 17.99 57.52 4.76 73.65 709.07 80.43
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MRIO′
INV
row/col
FDBT TWPM CHNM METL EQFO
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
IMP-AGRI 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
IMP-FOLO 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01
IMP-FISH 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
IMP-MINE 0.15 0.03 0.31 0.07 0.21 0.21 0.05 0.26 0.08 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.20 0.03 0.16 0.07 0.06 0.18 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.04
IMP-OIGA 2.41 0.42 4.79 1.09 3.34 3.32 0.76 4.11 1.21 1.55 4.66 0.95 0.18 1.46 0.73 3.05 0.50 2.53 1.07 0.89 2.81 0.51 1.53 0.87 0.55
IMP-PETR 1.02 0.18 2.03 0.46 1.41 1.41 0.32 1.74 0.51 0.66 1.97 0.40 0.08 0.62 0.31 1.29 0.21 1.07 0.45 0.38 1.19 0.22 0.65 0.37 0.23
IMP-FDBT 0.07 0.01 0.14 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02
IMP-TWPM 0.18 0.03 0.35 0.08 0.25 0.24 0.06 0.30 0.09 0.11 0.34 0.07 0.01 0.11 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.19 0.08 0.07 0.21 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.04
IMP-CHNM 0.68 0.12 1.36 0.31 0.95 0.94 0.21 1.16 0.34 0.44 1.32 0.27 0.05 0.41 0.21 0.86 0.14 0.72 0.30 0.25 0.80 0.14 0.43 0.25 0.15
IMP-METL 0.65 0.11 1.29 0.29 0.90 0.89 0.20 1.10 0.33 0.42 1.25 0.26 0.05 0.39 0.20 0.82 0.13 0.68 0.29 0.24 0.76 0.14 0.41 0.23 0.15
IMP-EQFO 37.43 6.53 74.49 16.96 51.86 51.69 11.78 63.85 18.82 24.16 72.41 14.76 2.85 22.67 11.31 47.39 7.79 39.35 16.64 13.91 43.76 7.91 23.82 13.48 8.49
IMP-UTIL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-CONS 0.11 0.02 0.22 0.05 0.16 0.15 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.07 0.22 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.14 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.03
IMP-ACCR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-CMIF 0.10 0.02 0.19 0.04 0.13 0.13 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.06 0.19 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.02
IMP-PROP 0.10 0.02 0.19 0.04 0.13 0.13 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.06 0.18 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.02
IMP-RBUS 0.62 0.11 1.23 0.28 0.86 0.86 0.20 1.06 0.31 0.40 1.20 0.24 0.05 0.38 0.19 0.78 0.13 0.65 0.28 0.23 0.72 0.13 0.39 0.22 0.14
IMP-EDUC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-HEAL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-CUPE 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-WHOL 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
IMP-RETT 0.77 0.13 1.54 0.35 1.07 1.07 0.24 1.32 0.39 0.50 1.50 0.30 0.06 0.47 0.23 0.98 0.16 0.81 0.34 0.29 0.90 0.16 0.49 0.28 0.18
IMP-TRAN 0.14 0.02 0.28 0.06 0.19 0.19 0.04 0.24 0.07 0.09 0.27 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.18 0.03 0.15 0.06 0.05 0.16 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.03
TAX 4.85 0.82 9.39 2.17 6.53 6.69 1.48 8.04 2.41 3.04 9.38 1.86 0.36 2.91 1.42 6.14 0.98 4.96 2.13 1.75 5.67 1.00 3.00 1.73 1.07
LAB
CAP
TOTAL 194.70 33.03 377.05 87.34 262.18 268.88 59.55 323.16 96.90 122.15 376.66 74.63 14.45 116.73 57.16 246.51 39.39 199.15 85.69 70.33 227.63 40.01 120.55 69.40 42.91
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MRIO′
INV
row/col
UTIL CONS ACCR CMIF PROP
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
IMP-AGRI 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.40 0.19 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.04
IMP-FOLO 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.52 0.24 0.20 0.13 0.08 0.17 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.05
IMP-FISH 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
IMP-MINE 0.15 0.11 0.24 0.04 0.07 0.19 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.05 1.63 0.76 0.63 0.41 0.24 0.54 0.14 0.43 0.18 0.17
IMP-OIGA 2.26 1.63 3.76 0.63 1.10 3.00 0.98 3.50 1.07 1.38 1.19 0.43 1.30 0.46 0.82 25.32 11.74 9.72 6.33 3.72 8.42 2.23 6.64 2.75 2.66
IMP-PETR 0.96 0.69 1.59 0.27 0.47 1.27 0.42 1.48 0.45 0.58 0.50 0.18 0.55 0.19 0.35 10.72 4.97 4.11 2.68 1.57 3.56 0.94 2.81 1.16 1.12
IMP-FDBT 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.74 0.34 0.28 0.18 0.11 0.24 0.06 0.19 0.08 0.08
IMP-TWPM 0.17 0.12 0.28 0.05 0.08 0.22 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.06 1.87 0.86 0.72 0.47 0.27 0.62 0.16 0.49 0.20 0.20
IMP-CHNM 0.64 0.46 1.07 0.18 0.31 0.85 0.28 0.99 0.30 0.39 0.34 0.12 0.37 0.13 0.23 7.17 3.33 2.75 1.79 1.05 2.39 0.63 1.88 0.78 0.75
IMP-METL 0.61 0.44 1.01 0.17 0.30 0.81 0.26 0.94 0.29 0.37 0.32 0.11 0.35 0.12 0.22 6.80 3.15 2.61 1.70 1.00 2.26 0.60 1.78 0.74 0.71
IMP-EQFO 35.16 25.37 58.45 9.81 17.14 46.64 15.25 54.37 16.62 21.41 18.49 6.63 20.26 7.08 12.81 393.66 182.55 151.08 98.34 57.76 130.90 34.71 103.28 42.78 41.31
IMP-UTIL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-CONS 0.11 0.08 0.18 0.03 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 1.18 0.55 0.45 0.29 0.17 0.39 0.10 0.31 0.13 0.12
IMP-ACCR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-CMIF 0.09 0.06 0.15 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 1.01 0.47 0.39 0.25 0.15 0.33 0.09 0.26 0.11 0.11
IMP-PROP 0.09 0.06 0.15 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 1.00 0.46 0.38 0.25 0.15 0.33 0.09 0.26 0.11 0.10
IMP-RBUS 0.58 0.42 0.97 0.16 0.28 0.77 0.25 0.90 0.28 0.35 0.31 0.11 0.34 0.12 0.21 6.52 3.02 2.50 1.63 0.96 2.17 0.57 1.71 0.71 0.68
IMP-EDUC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-HEAL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-CUPE 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
IMP-WHOL 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.38 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.04
IMP-RETT 0.73 0.52 1.21 0.20 0.35 0.96 0.31 1.12 0.34 0.44 0.38 0.14 0.42 0.15 0.26 8.13 3.77 3.12 2.03 1.19 2.70 0.72 2.13 0.88 0.85
IMP-TRAN 0.13 0.09 0.22 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.05 1.46 0.68 0.56 0.37 0.21 0.49 0.13 0.38 0.16 0.15
TAX 4.55 3.19 7.36 1.26 2.16 6.04 1.92 6.85 2.13 2.69 2.39 0.83 2.55 0.91 1.61 50.97 22.98 19.04 12.60 7.27 16.95 4.37 13.01 5.48 5.20
LAB
CAP
TOTAL 182.91 128.26 295.83 50.49 86.63 242.59 77.10 275.20 85.58 108.25 96.20 33.52 102.56 36.43 64.76 2047.65 922.95 764.68 506.34 292.01 680.89 175.49 522.75 220.26 208.81
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MRIO′
INV
row/col
RBUS GOVT EDUC HEAL CUPE
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
IMP-AGRI 0.18 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.16 0.25 0.18 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02
IMP-FOLO 0.23 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.20 0.33 0.24 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.03
IMP-FISH 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
IMP-MINE 0.72 0.26 0.36 0.16 0.12 0.64 1.03 0.74 0.25 0.22 0.35 0.12 0.34 0.12 0.14 0.20 0.08 0.24 0.09 0.10 0.25 0.10 0.18 0.07 0.08
IMP-OIGA 11.23 4.10 5.54 2.48 1.91 9.92 16.01 11.43 3.82 3.36 5.49 1.85 5.25 1.79 2.13 3.15 1.25 3.80 1.38 1.56 3.81 1.56 2.84 1.17 1.32
IMP-PETR 4.75 1.73 2.34 1.05 0.81 4.20 6.78 4.84 1.62 1.42 2.32 0.78 2.22 0.76 0.90 1.33 0.53 1.61 0.58 0.66 1.61 0.66 1.20 0.49 0.56
IMP-FDBT 0.33 0.12 0.16 0.07 0.06 0.29 0.47 0.33 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.04
IMP-TWPM 0.83 0.30 0.41 0.18 0.14 0.73 1.18 0.84 0.28 0.25 0.40 0.14 0.39 0.13 0.16 0.23 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.11 0.28 0.11 0.21 0.09 0.10
IMP-CHNM 3.18 1.16 1.57 0.70 0.54 2.81 4.54 3.24 1.08 0.95 1.55 0.52 1.49 0.51 0.60 0.89 0.35 1.08 0.39 0.44 1.08 0.44 0.81 0.33 0.37
IMP-METL 3.02 1.10 1.49 0.67 0.51 2.67 4.30 3.07 1.03 0.90 1.47 0.50 1.41 0.48 0.57 0.85 0.34 1.02 0.37 0.42 1.02 0.42 0.76 0.31 0.35
IMP-EQFO 174.52 63.72 86.11 38.50 29.71 154.27 248.94 177.73 59.38 52.18 85.32 28.70 81.62 27.90 33.04 48.94 19.42 59.02 21.45 24.23 59.30 24.22 44.20 18.12 20.52
IMP-UTIL 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-CONS 0.52 0.19 0.26 0.12 0.09 0.46 0.75 0.53 0.18 0.16 0.26 0.09 0.24 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.06 0.18 0.06 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.13 0.05 0.06
IMP-ACCR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-CMIF 0.45 0.16 0.22 0.10 0.08 0.39 0.64 0.45 0.15 0.13 0.22 0.07 0.21 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.05
IMP-PROP 0.44 0.16 0.22 0.10 0.08 0.39 0.63 0.45 0.15 0.13 0.22 0.07 0.21 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.05
IMP-RBUS 2.89 1.06 1.43 0.64 0.49 2.56 4.12 2.94 0.98 0.86 1.41 0.48 1.35 0.46 0.55 0.81 0.32 0.98 0.36 0.40 0.98 0.40 0.73 0.30 0.34
IMP-EDUC 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-HEAL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-CUPE 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-WHOL 0.17 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.24 0.17 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02
IMP-RETT 3.60 1.32 1.78 0.80 0.61 3.19 5.14 3.67 1.23 1.08 1.76 0.59 1.69 0.58 0.68 1.01 0.40 1.22 0.44 0.50 1.22 0.50 0.91 0.37 0.42
IMP-TRAN 0.65 0.24 0.32 0.14 0.11 0.57 0.92 0.66 0.22 0.19 0.32 0.11 0.30 0.10 0.12 0.18 0.07 0.22 0.08 0.09 0.22 0.09 0.16 0.07 0.08
TAX 22.60 8.02 10.85 4.93 3.74 19.98 31.33 22.39 7.61 6.57 11.05 3.61 10.28 3.58 4.16 6.34 2.44 7.44 2.75 3.05 7.68 3.05 5.57 2.32 2.58
LAB
CAP
TOTAL 907.79 322.19 435.85 198.23 150.18 802.47 1258.63 899.59 305.72 263.80 443.79 145.12 413.09 143.64 167.00 254.59 98.18 298.72 110.42 122.47 308.48 122.45 223.73 93.29 103.76
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MRIO′
INV GOV
row/col
OWND WHOL RETT TRAN
AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI AKL WLG ONI CAN OSI
IMP-AGRI 0.91 0.32 0.81 0.28 0.35 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.39
IMP-FOLO 1.17 0.42 1.05 0.37 0.45 0.13 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
IMP-FISH 0.22 0.08 0.20 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-MINE 3.66 1.31 3.27 1.14 1.40 0.39 0.07 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.27 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02
IMP-OIGA 56.90 20.41 50.89 17.77 21.79 6.12 1.14 2.26 1.40 1.06 4.25 1.33 4.46 1.48 1.87 0.79 0.19 0.40 0.24 0.25
IMP-PETR 24.08 8.64 21.54 7.52 9.22 2.59 0.48 0.96 0.59 0.45 1.80 0.56 1.89 0.63 0.79 0.34 0.08 0.17 0.10 0.10
IMP-FDBT 1.65 0.59 1.48 0.52 0.63 0.18 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 2.62
IMP-TWPM 4.19 1.50 3.75 1.31 1.61 0.45 0.08 0.17 0.10 0.08 0.31 0.10 0.33 0.11 0.14 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03
IMP-CHNM 16.12 5.78 14.42 5.03 6.17 1.73 0.32 0.64 0.40 0.30 1.20 0.38 1.26 0.42 0.53 0.22 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.07 163.85
IMP-METL 15.28 5.48 13.67 4.77 5.85 1.64 0.31 0.61 0.37 0.29 1.14 0.36 1.20 0.40 0.50 0.21 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.07
IMP-EQFO 884.54 317.34 791.14 276.22 338.82 95.13 17.79 35.20 21.69 16.52 66.10 20.67 69.37 23.04 29.12 12.31 2.92 6.26 3.76 3.85 14.20
IMP-UTIL 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-CONS 2.65 0.95 2.37 0.83 1.02 0.29 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.20 0.06 0.21 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00
IMP-ACCR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IMP-CMIF 2.26 0.81 2.02 0.71 0.87 0.24 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.17 0.05 0.18 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.64
IMP-PROP 2.25 0.81 2.01 0.70 0.86 0.24 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.17 0.05 0.18 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 2.78
IMP-RBUS 14.65 5.26 13.10 4.58 5.61 1.58 0.29 0.58 0.36 0.27 1.09 0.34 1.15 0.38 0.48 0.20 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.06 56.32
IMP-EDUC 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.20
IMP-HEAL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.29
IMP-CUPE 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.64
IMP-WHOL 0.86 0.31 0.77 0.27 0.33 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.08
IMP-RETT 18.27 6.55 16.34 5.70 7.00 1.96 0.37 0.73 0.45 0.34 1.37 0.43 1.43 0.48 0.60 0.25 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.08 46.60
IMP-TRAN 3.28 1.18 2.94 1.03 1.26 0.35 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.06 0.25 0.08 0.26 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 4.95
TAX 114.54 39.94 99.68 35.40 42.64 12.32 2.24 4.44 2.78 2.08 8.56 2.60 8.74 2.95 3.66 1.59 0.37 0.79 0.48 0.48 671.39
LAB
CAP
TOTAL 4601.02 1604.45 4004.35 1422.21 1712.81 494.85 89.94 178.18 111.70 83.51 343.84 104.48 351.09 118.64 147.19 64.04 14.75 31.67 19.35 19.45 28661.00
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MRIO′
EXP TOTAL
row/col
AGRI FOLO FISH MINE OIGA PETR FDBT TWPM CHNM METL EQFO UTIL CONS ACCR CMIF PROP RBUS GOVT EDUC HEAL CUPE TRAN
IMP-AGRI 646.71
IMP-FOLO 37.01
IMP-FISH 114.67
IMP-MINE 135.06
IMP-OIGA 1661.73
IMP-PETR 1580.41
IMP-FDBT 2821.32
IMP-TWPM 4509.62
IMP-CHNM 5762.42
IMP-METL 3182.49
IMP-EQFO 17649.05
IMP-UTIL 9.73
IMP-CONS 36.37
IMP-ACCR 1.17
IMP-CMIF 1139.02
IMP-PROP 513.75
IMP-RBUS 2132.11
IMP-EDUC 29.73
IMP-HEAL 2.57
IMP-CUPE 137.71
IMP-WHOL 103.67
IMP-RETT 3153.53
IMP-TRAN 2137.10
TAX 66.23 13.02 182.83 71.39 156.62 14561.32
LAB 70120.64
CAP 65203.32
TOTAL 2110.46 866.25 185.10 362.39 585.67 115.14 16078.09 4432.65 2318.80 2106.17 4525.50 61.42 214.77 2347.12 1125.36 548.37 1146.17 155.07 751.84 83.57 916.50 1958.29 517029.32
Extended MRIO Table — Part 3-11
Appendix O
Simulation Results — Disaster
Scenario
This appendix provides the results for the illustrative simulations discussed in chapter 2.
Regional Capital Stocks
Region Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AKL 154208 0.0 0.0 0.0
WLG 62648 -8.2 -8.2 -8.2
ONI 144170 0.0 0.0 0.0
CAN 49536 0.0 0.0 0.0
OSI 59263 0.0 0.0 0.0
NZ 469826 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1
Table O.1: Regional Capital Stocks
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Regional Output
Region Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AKL 106148 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
WLG 36082 -2.6 -2.5 -2.1
ONI 100332 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
CAN 33657 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
OSI 43428 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
NZ 319647 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Table O.2: Regional Output
Regional Output Price Index
Region
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AKL 0.2 0.2 0.1
WLG 1.4 1.9 3.3
ONI 0.0 0.0 0.0
CAN 0.1 0.1 0.0
OSI 0.0 0.0 0.0
NZ 0.2 0.3 0.4
Table O.3: Regional Output Price Index
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Industry Capital Stocks
Industry Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AGRI 14374 0.0 0.0 0.0
FOLO 1351 0.0 0.0 0.0
FISH 962 0.0 0.0 0.0
MINE 878 0.0 0.0 0.0
OIGA 4450 0.0 0.0 0.0
PETR 455 0.0 0.0 0.0
FDBT 11491 0.0 0.0 0.0
TWPM 8052 0.0 0.0 0.0
CHNM 4959 0.0 0.0 0.0
METL 3412 0.0 0.0 0.0
EQFO 5892 0.0 0.0 0.0
UTIL 23050 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
CONS 5578 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
ACCR 5251 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
CMIF 15121 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0
PROP 83623 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
RBUS 6376 -1.6 -1.6 -1.6
GOVT 43300 -5.3 -5.3 -5.3
EDUC 16100 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1
HEAL 10847 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1
CUPE 11086 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7
OWND 163680 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6
WHOL 8281 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
RETT 7265 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
TRAN 13992 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
All 469826 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1
Table O.4: Industry Capital Stocks
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Industrial Output
Industry Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AGRI 16884 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
FOLO 2978 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
FISH 853 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
MINE 1197 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
OIGA 2479 0.0 0.0 0.0
PETR 3683 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
FDBT 27682 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
TWPM 13057 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
CHNM 9078 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
METL 8105 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
EQFO 10632 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
UTIL 12609 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
CONS 29305 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
ACCR 6454 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
CMIF 24027 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
PROP 13658 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7
RBUS 24532 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6
GOVT 13460 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5
EDUC 8229 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
HEAL 12552 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
CUPE 11764 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
OWND 12472 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
WHOL 20487 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
RETT 17998 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
TRAN 15472 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7
All 319647 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Table O.5: Industrial Output
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Output By Industry — Region WLG
Industry Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AGRI 169 1.1 0.5 -0.4
FOLO 56 0.6 0.2 -0.5
FISH 16 0.4 0.1 -0.4
MINE 12 0.5 0.2 -0.3
OIGA 232 0.0 0.0 0.0
PETR 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FDBT 958 0.7 0.3 -0.2
TWPM 893 1.1 0.5 -0.4
CHNM 1059 0.6 0.2 -0.4
METL 498 0.8 0.4 -0.3
EQFO 850 1.4 0.7 -0.4
UTIL 2173 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8
CONS 2865 -0.1 -0.4 -0.7
ACCR 649 -1.4 -1.6 -1.8
CMIF 4891 -6.4 -5.9 -5.0
PROP 1326 -8.4 -8.0 -7.0
RBUS 3924 -4.7 -4.4 -3.8
GOVT 4799 -2.1 -1.9 -1.7
EDUC 910 -0.1 -0.6 -0.8
HEAL 1393 -2.1 -1.9 -1.5
CUPE 1691 -1.9 -1.5 -0.6
OWND 1500 -3.7 -3.5 -2.9
WHOL 1923 -0.6 -0.4 0.3
RETT 1765 -1.8 -1.5 -0.4
TRAN 1529 -4.3 -4.0 -3.3
All 36082 -2.6 -2.5 -2.1
Table O.6: Output By Industry — Region WLG
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Output By Industry — Region AKL
Industry Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AGRI 737 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2
FOLO 169 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
FISH 82 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
MINE 97 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
OIGA 15 0.0 0.0 0.0
PETR 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FDBT 5648 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
TWPM 4032 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2
CHNM 5346 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2
METL 3117 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
EQFO 4836 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
UTIL 3099 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2
CONS 9014 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4
ACCR 1862 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
CMIF 10852 0.4 0.3 0.1
PROP 5143 0.1 0.0 -0.1
RBUS 11056 0.1 0.1 0.0
GOVT 3060 0.4 0.3 0.2
EDUC 2782 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3
HEAL 3613 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3
CUPE 4261 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5
OWND 4300 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
WHOL 10581 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
RETT 5809 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4
TRAN 6639 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5
All 106148 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
Table O.7: Output By Industry — Region AKL
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Output By Industry — Region CAN
Industry Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AGRI 1038 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
FOLO 127 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
FISH 22 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
MINE 117 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
OIGA 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PETR 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FDBT 2533 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
TWPM 1453 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2
CHNM 1657 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
METL 1083 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
EQFO 1474 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
UTIL 856 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2
CONS 3180 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4
ACCR 705 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
CMIF 2683 0.4 0.3 0.1
PROP 1664 0.1 0.0 -0.1
RBUS 2414 0.1 0.1 0.0
GOVT 1166 0.4 0.3 0.2
EDUC 901 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
HEAL 1567 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3
CUPE 1288 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5
OWND 1329 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
WHOL 2388 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
RETT 2005 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
TRAN 2006 -0.3 -0.3 -0.5
All 33657 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
Table O.8: Output By Industry — Region CAN
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Industry Employment (Full-Time Equivalents)
Industry Baseyear (000s)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AGRI 114 0.0 0.0 0.1
FOLO 5 0.0 0.0 0.0
FISH 2 0.0 0.0 0.1
MINE 4 0.1 0.1 0.1
OIGA 0 0.2 0.1 0.1
PETR 6 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
FDBT 56 0.1 0.1 0.2
TWPM 65 0.1 0.0 0.0
CHNM 21 0.1 0.0 -0.1
METL 26 0.1 0.0 0.0
EQFO 50 0.1 0.1 0.1
UTIL 9 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
CONS 142 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
ACCR 88 0.0 0.0 0.0
CMIF 84 0.2 0.2 0.2
PROP 48 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
RBUS 198 0.0 0.0 0.0
GOVT 77 0.6 0.5 0.4
EDUC 120 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
HEAL 164 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
CUPE 74 0.0 0.0 -0.1
OWND 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
WHOL 89 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
RETT 163 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
TRAN 62 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
All 1668 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table O.9: Industry Employment
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Employment By Industry — Region WLG (FTEs)
Industry Baseyear (000s)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AGRI 4 2.6 1.5 -0.4
FOLO 0 2.2 1.3 -0.5
FISH 0 2.1 1.2 -0.4
MINE 0 2.1 1.3 -0.3
OIGA 0 1.3 0.9 0.0
PETR 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FDBT 3 2.3 1.4 -0.2
TWPM 7 2.6 1.6 -0.4
CHNM 3 2.1 1.3 -0.4
METL 2 2.3 1.5 -0.4
EQFO 3 2.9 1.7 -0.4
UTIL 1 0.8 0.4 -0.7
CONS 15 1.4 0.7 -0.6
ACCR 10 0.4 0.0 -1.0
CMIF 16 -3.1 -2.7 -2.0
PROP 5 -5.1 -4.5 -3.2
RBUS 33 -2.1 -1.9 -1.8
GOVT 22 0.5 0.5 0.1
EDUC 15 1.3 0.6 0.0
HEAL 18 0.3 0.3 0.4
CUPE 11 0.2 0.5 1.1
OWND 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
WHOL 8 0.8 0.7 0.6
RETT 18 0.3 0.5 1.1
TRAN 6 -2.0 -1.8 -1.9
All 200 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5
Table O.10: Employment By Industry — Region WLG
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Industrial Investment
Industry Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AGRI 1159 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
FOLO 128 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
FISH 41 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8
MINE 184 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6
OIGA 787 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7
PETR 80 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0
FDBT 954 -1.3 -1.3 -1.2
TWPM 871 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6
CHNM 640 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7
METL 641 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
EQFO 500 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4
UTIL 744 -4.2 -4.2 -3.9
CONS 789 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
ACCR 333 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
CMIF 4534 0.0 0.1 0.2
PROP 1808 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
RBUS 2014 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8
GOVT 3530 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
EDUC 1313 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
HEAL 884 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
CUPE 852 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7
OWND 13345 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
WHOL 958 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
RETT 1065 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
TRAN 149 18.9 17.1 13.4
All 38305 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Table O.11: Industrial Investment
279
Investment By Industry — Region WLG
Industry Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AGRI 12 1.1 0.2 -0.9
FOLO 2 0.1 0.0 -0.2
FISH 1 1.4 -0.5 -2.8
MINE 2 0.4 -0.1 -0.9
OIGA 74 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7
PETR 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FDBT 33 2.3 0.2 -2.1
TWPM 60 1.1 0.2 -1.0
CHNM 75 0.3 -0.2 -0.8
METL 39 0.4 0.0 -0.6
EQFO 40 1.1 0.3 -0.7
UTIL 128 -1.3 -1.3 -0.8
CONS 77 -0.9 -1.0 -1.0
ACCR 34 -0.5 -0.6 -0.4
CMIF 923 -3.5 -2.5 -0.4
PROP 175 -6.1 -4.9 -2.2
RBUS 322 -5.4 -5.0 -4.1
GOVT 1259 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
EDUC 145 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
HEAL 98 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
CUPE 122 -3.8 -3.6 -3.0
OWND 1604 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
WHOL 90 -1.0 -0.8 0.0
RETT 104 -3.3 -3.0 -2.1
TRAN 15 407.7 443.0 507.2
All 5434 -0.4 -0.1 0.6
Table O.12: Investment By Industry — Region WLG
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F.O.B. Exports
Product
Baseyear % ∆ on Baseyear
(NZ$m) sim101 sim102 sim103
AGRI 1757 0.1 0.1 0.2
FOLO 721 0.0 0.0 0.0
FISH 154 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5
MINE 302 0.3 0.4 0.4
OIGA 475 1.2 1.2 1.2
PETR 93 0.2 0.2 0.1
FDBT 13384 0.0 0.0 0.1
TWPM 3690 0.3 0.3 0.3
CHNM 1930 0.3 0.3 0.2
METL 1753 0.3 0.4 0.4
EQFO 3767 0.3 0.3 0.3
UTIL 60 1.1 0.9 0.4
CONS 209 0.7 0.7 0.5
ACCR 2252 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3
CMIF 1093 -5.9 -6.4 -7.3
PROP 533 -3.6 -3.9 -4.5
RBUS 1114 -2.2 -2.5 -3.1
GOVT 151 -3.1 -3.7 -5.3
EDUC 730 0.5 0.4 0.2
HEAL 81 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8
CUPE 879 -1.0 -1.2 -1.8
OWND 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
WHOL 3226 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
RETT 1076 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6
TRAN 3859 -1.2 -1.3 -1.5
All 43290 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5
Table O.13: F.O.B. Exports
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C.I.F. Imports
Product
Baseyear % ∆ on Baseyear
(NZ$m) sim101 sim102 sim103
AGRI 647 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2
FOLO 37 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
FISH 115 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
MINE 135 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4
OIGA 1662 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
PETR 1580 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4
FDBT 2821 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2
TWPM 4510 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3
CHNM 5762 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3
METL 3182 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
EQFO 17649 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
UTIL 10 -1.0 -0.7 -0.4
CONS 36 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5
ACCR 1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
CMIF 1139 1.9 1.2 0.3
PROP 514 1.1 0.6 0.1
RBUS 2132 0.5 0.2 0.0
GOVT 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
EDUC 30 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3
HEAL 3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3
CUPE 138 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
OWND 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
WHOL 104 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
RETT 3154 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
TRAN 2137 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
All 47497 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Table O.14: C.I.F. Imports
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Industry Output Price Index
Industry
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AGRI 0.0 0.0 -0.1
FOLO 0.0 0.0 0.0
FISH 0.1 0.1 0.1
MINE -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
OIGA -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
PETR 0.0 0.0 0.0
FDBT 0.0 0.0 0.0
TWPM -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
CHNM -0.1 -0.1 0.0
METL -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
EQFO -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
UTIL -0.3 -0.2 -0.1
CONS -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
ACCR 0.0 0.0 0.1
CMIF 1.5 1.7 1.9
PROP 0.9 1.0 1.2
RBUS 0.6 0.6 0.8
GOVT 0.8 1.0 1.4
EDUC -0.1 -0.1 0.0
HEAL 0.1 0.2 0.2
CUPE 0.2 0.3 0.4
OWND 0.6 0.7 0.8
WHOL 0.0 0.1 0.1
RETT 0.1 0.2 0.2
TRAN 0.3 0.3 0.4
All 0.2 0.3 0.4
Table O.15: Industry Output Price Index
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Output Prices — Region WLG
Industry
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AGRI -0.4 -0.3 0.2
FOLO -0.2 -0.2 0.1
FISH -0.1 0.0 0.3
MINE -0.2 -0.2 0.0
OIGA -0.6 -0.5 -0.2
PETR 0.0 0.0 0.0
FDBT -0.2 -0.2 0.1
TWPM -0.4 -0.3 0.1
CHNM -0.3 -0.3 0.1
METL -0.3 -0.3 0.0
EQFO -0.4 -0.3 0.1
UTIL -0.2 -0.1 0.2
CONS -0.3 -0.2 0.3
ACCR 0.4 0.7 1.6
CMIF 3.5 4.4 6.4
PROP 3.8 5.1 8.3
RBUS 2.1 2.7 4.3
GOVT 1.8 2.4 3.8
EDUC -0.6 0.0 1.8
HEAL 1.4 2.1 4.0
CUPE 1.0 1.6 3.4
OWND 5.7 6.8 9.9
WHOL -0.6 -0.2 0.9
RETT 0.9 1.5 3.3
TRAN 1.6 2.0 3.1
All 1.4 1.9 3.3
Output Prices — Region ONI
Industry
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AGRI 0.0 0.0 -0.1
FOLO 0.0 0.0 0.0
FISH 0.1 0.1 0.1
MINE -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
OIGA -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
PETR 0.0 0.0 0.0
FDBT 0.0 0.0 0.0
TWPM -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
CHNM -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
METL -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
EQFO 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
UTIL -0.3 -0.3 -0.2
CONS -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
ACCR 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
CMIF 1.0 1.0 0.8
PROP 0.6 0.6 0.4
RBUS 0.3 0.2 0.1
GOVT 0.2 0.1 0.1
EDUC -0.1 -0.2 -0.3
HEAL -0.1 -0.1 -0.3
CUPE 0.1 0.0 -0.1
OWND -0.2 -0.3 -0.5
WHOL 0.1 0.1 0.0
RETT 0.0 0.0 -0.1
TRAN 0.2 0.1 0.1
All 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table O.16: Output Prices — Region WLG and ONI
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Industry Capital Rents Index
Industry
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AGRI -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
FOLO -0.5 -0.5 -0.6
FISH -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
MINE -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
OIGA -0.3 -0.4 -0.4
PETR -0.7 -0.7 -0.7
FDBT -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
TWPM -0.4 -0.4 -0.5
CHNM -0.4 -0.5 -0.5
METL -0.3 -0.4 -0.4
EQFO -0.2 -0.3 -0.3
UTIL -0.6 -0.6 -0.4
CONS -0.8 -0.8 -0.8
ACCR 0.6 0.6 0.7
CMIF 3.8 4.0 4.4
PROP 1.4 1.5 1.7
RBUS 2.7 2.8 3.0
GOVT 12.6 12.9 13.4
EDUC 1.7 1.7 1.8
HEAL 1.8 1.8 1.9
CUPE 0.8 0.8 1.0
OWND 0.8 0.8 1.0
WHOL -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
RETT 0.4 0.4 0.5
TRAN 1.0 1.0 1.1
All 1.1 1.2 1.3
Table O.17: Industry Capital Rents Index
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Capital Rental Rates — Region WLG
Industry
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AGRI 1.8 0.6 -0.7
FOLO 1.1 0.2 -0.8
FISH 0.7 0.0 -0.6
MINE 0.7 0.2 -0.6
OIGA -0.7 -0.6 -0.3
PETR 0.0 0.0 0.0
FDBT 1.2 0.4 -0.4
TWPM 1.8 0.7 -0.8
CHNM 0.8 0.1 -0.6
METL 1.3 0.5 -0.6
EQFO 2.4 1.0 -0.6
UTIL 0.3 0.4 0.7
CONS 1.4 1.0 0.8
ACCR 8.1 8.1 8.7
CMIF 12.0 14.1 18.6
PROP 7.5 9.9 15.8
RBUS 14.5 16.0 19.2
GOVT 35.2 36.3 38.8
EDUC 22.4 22.0 23.6
HEAL 20.1 21.2 24.6
CUPE 7.7 9.2 13.3
OWND 8.5 10.3 14.9
WHOL 0.3 1.0 3.4
RETT 7.7 9.2 13.5
TRAN 14.7 16.2 18.9
All 9.6 10.8 13.8
Capital Rental Rates — Region ONI
Industry
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AGRI -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
FOLO -0.5 -0.5 -0.6
FISH -0.5 -0.4 -0.4
MINE -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
OIGA -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
PETR -0.7 -0.7 -0.7
FDBT -0.3 -0.2 -0.1
TWPM -0.5 -0.5 -0.4
CHNM -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
METL -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
EQFO -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
UTIL -0.8 -0.7 -0.6
CONS -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
ACCR -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
CMIF 1.9 1.6 0.9
PROP 0.8 0.7 0.3
RBUS 0.7 0.5 0.1
GOVT 1.2 0.9 0.5
EDUC -0.7 -0.7 -0.8
HEAL -0.4 -0.5 -0.8
CUPE -0.5 -0.6 -1.1
OWND -0.5 -0.6 -1.0
WHOL -0.6 -0.7 -0.9
RETT -0.5 -0.6 -1.0
TRAN -0.3 -0.5 -0.8
All -0.1 -0.2 -0.4
Table O.18: Capital Rental Rates — Regions WLG and ONI
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Industry Average Net Rates of Return
Industry Baseyear (%)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AGRI 10.4 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7
FOLO 25.9 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8
FISH 4.9 -1.1 -1.2 -1.1
MINE 21.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7
OIGA 27.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5
PETR 27.3 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0
FDBT 10.6 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
TWPM 14.1 -0.7 -0.7 -0.9
CHNM 22.3 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8
METL 41.8 -0.4 -0.4 -0.6
EQFO 19.5 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5
UTIL 10.7 -0.8 -0.8 -0.6
CONS 57.2 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
ACCR 14.5 0.8 0.8 0.8
CMIF 35.7 5.3 5.5 5.9
PROP 5.6 2.1 2.2 2.4
RBUS 64.1 3.2 3.3 3.5
GOVT -0.7 47.2 47.9 49.6
EDUC 0.0 139.0 137.9 138.2
HEAL 12.0 2.4 2.4 2.5
CUPE 13.9 1.2 1.2 1.4
OWND 3.4 1.1 1.2 1.3
WHOL 22.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7
RETT 44.0 0.4 0.5 0.5
TRAN 8.0 1.9 1.9 1.8
All 9.4 2.0 2.1 2.2
Table O.19: Industry Average Net Rates of Return
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Current Net Rates of Return — Region WLG
Industry Baseyear (%)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AGRI 10.4 3.4 1.1 -1.6
FOLO 25.9 1.5 0.3 -1.3
FISH 4.9 1.9 0.1 -2.1
MINE 21.5 1.3 0.3 -1.3
OIGA 27.3 -0.9 -0.8 -0.6
PETR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FDBT 10.6 2.3 0.7 -1.0
TWPM 14.1 3.1 1.1 -1.6
CHNM 22.3 1.1 0.1 -1.1
METL 41.8 1.6 0.6 -1.0
EQFO 19.5 3.2 1.3 -1.1
UTIL 10.7 0.5 0.5 0.6
CONS 57.2 1.8 1.2 0.8
ACCR 14.5 11.2 11.1 11.7
CMIF 35.7 17.0 19.9 26.0
PROP 5.6 11.4 14.9 23.4
RBUS 64.1 18.0 19.7 23.5
GOVT -0.7 138.3 142.4 151.1
EDUC 0.0 1926.4 1886.1 2002.7
HEAL 12.0 28.2 29.8 34.3
CUPE 13.9 11.8 14.0 20.1
OWND 3.4 12.6 15.0 21.6
WHOL 22.5 0.5 1.3 4.6
RETT 44.0 9.6 11.3 16.4
TRAN 8.0 28.8 31.5 36.4
Table O.20: Current Net Rates of Return — Region WLG
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Regional Nominal After-Tax Wage
Region
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AKL -0.1 -0.1 -0.4
WLG -3.3 -2.4 0.1
ONI -0.2 -0.3 -0.6
CAN -0.1 -0.2 -0.5
OSI -0.3 -0.4 -0.6
Table O.21: Regional Nominal After-Tax Wage
Regional Consumer Price Index
Region
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AKL 0.2 0.2 0.1
WLG 1.0 1.4 2.3
ONI 0.1 0.1 0.1
CAN 0.2 0.2 0.1
OSI 0.1 0.1 0.1
Table O.22: Regional Consumer Price Index
Regional Real After-Tax Wage
Region
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AKL -0.2 -0.3 -0.6
WLG -4.3 -3.7 -2.1
ONI -0.4 -0.5 -0.7
CAN -0.3 -0.4 -0.6
OSI -0.4 -0.5 -0.7
Table O.23: Regional Real After-Tax Wage
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Household Real Disposable Income
Region Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AKL 41312 0.0 0.0 0.0
WLG 14759 -3.6 -3.7 -3.8
ONI 36391 0.0 0.0 0.0
CAN 12853 0.0 0.0 0.0
OSI 15213 0.0 0.0 0.0
NZ 120529 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Table O.24: Household Real Disposable Income
Household Real Spending
Region Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AKL 31830 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4
WLG 11765 -1.6 -0.9 0.7
ONI 27565 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5
CAN 10063 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5
OSI 12108 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6
NZ 93331 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3
Table O.25: Household Real Spending
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Household Real Saving (After-Tax)
Region Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
AKL 9483 0.4 0.7 1.5
WLG 2994 -11.7 -14.3 -21.2
ONI 8826 1.0 1.2 1.8
CAN 2790 0.7 1.0 1.8
OSI 3105 1.3 1.6 2.3
NZ 27198 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8
Table O.26: Household Real Saving (After-Tax)
Compensating Variation
Region
∆ in Income ($m)
sim101 sim102 sim103
AKL -39.0 -66.8 -144.3
WLG -171.9 -91.7 117.5
ONI -86.1 -107.6 -159.5
CAN -18.7 -27.3 -50.3
OSI -39.9 -49.5 -72.3
Equivalent Variation
Region
∆ in Income ($m)
sim101 sim102 sim103
AKL -38.9 -66.8 -144.3
WLG -171.2 -90.9 115.2
ONI -86.1 -107.5 -159.6
CAN -18.7 -27.3 -50.3
OSI -39.9 -49.4 -72.3
Table O.27: CV and EV Measures
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Real Macro Measures
Variable Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
GDP (Expenditure) 156090 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
GDP (Income) 156090 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Private Consumption 93331 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3
Investment 38305 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Government Consumption 28661 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
F.O.B. Exports 43290 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5
C.I.F. Imports 47497 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Trade Balance -4207 -0.2 -0.5 -1.3
Government Balance 6900 0.5 0.5 0.6
Domestic Private Saving 27198 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8
Domestic Saving 34098 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5
Table O.28: Macro Measures
Economy-wide Price Measures
Variable
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim101 sim102 sim103
GDP Deflator 0.2 0.3 0.4
Consumer Price Index 0.3 0.3 0.4
Investment Price Index 0.0 0.0 0.1
Government Price Index 0.4 0.5 0.7
Export Price Index (F.O.B.) 0.1 0.1 0.1
Import Price Index (C.I.F.) 0.0 0.0 0.0
Trade Price Index -0.8 -0.9 -1.2
Real Exchange Rate -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
Nominal After-Tax Wage -0.6 -0.5 -0.4
Real After-Tax Wage -0.8 -0.8 -0.8
Capital Rents Index 1.1 1.2 1.3
Output Price Index 0.2 0.3 0.4
Current Net Rate of Return (Average) 2.0 2.1 2.2
Expected Future Net Rate of Return 0.5 0.6 0.6
Table O.29: Economy-wide Price Measures
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Appendix P
Simulation Results — Oil Price Rise
Scenario
This appendix provides the results for the illustrative simulations discussed in chapter 3.
Regional Capital Stocks
Region Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim201 sim301 sim401
AKL 154208 -2.7 -3.0 -2.9
WLG 62648 -3.3 -3.4 -3.4
ONI 144170 -3.4 -3.4 -3.5
CAN 49536 -2.9 -3.1 -3.0
OSI 59263 -2.9 -3.0 -3.0
NZ 469826 -3.0 -3.2 -3.2
Table P.1: Regional Capital Stocks
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Industrial Output
Industry Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim201 sim301 sim401
AGRI 16884 -2.8 -2.9 -2.8
FOLO 2978 -5.3 -5.2 -5.0
FISH 853 -5.3 -5.1 -5.1
MINE 1197 -9.7 -8.9 -8.9
OIGA 2479 -18.9 -16.7 -17.5
PETR 3683 -33.9 -28.7 -32.0
FDBT 27682 -2.9 -2.9 -2.8
TWPM 13057 -3.8 -3.8 -3.8
CHNM 9078 -4.7 -4.5 -4.5
METL 8105 -3.2 -3.3 -3.3
EQFO 10632 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2
UTIL 12609 -4.8 -4.9 -4.9
CONS 29305 -2.4 -2.4 -2.4
ACCR 6454 -1.8 -1.7 -1.7
CMIF 24027 -2.6 -2.9 -2.8
PROP 13658 -3.7 -3.9 -3.8
RBUS 24532 -2.0 -2.1 -2.1
GOVT 13460 -2.9 -3.0 -3.0
EDUC 8229 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1
HEAL 12552 -2.3 -2.4 -2.4
CUPE 11764 -2.2 -2.4 -2.4
OWND 12472 -1.2 -1.3 -1.3
WHOL 20487 -2.6 -4.4 -4.3
RETT 17998 -2.6 -3.4 -3.4
TRAN 15472 -6.0 -6.8 -6.2
All 319647 -3.4 -3.6 -3.6
Table P.4: Industrial Output
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Industry Output Price Index
Industry
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim201 sim301 sim401
AGRI 0.6 0.5 0.5
FOLO 2.0 2.0 1.9
FISH 2.1 2.0 2.0
MINE 3.9 4.0 3.9
OIGA 1.6 1.5 1.5
PETR 47.1 48.0 47.9
FDBT 0.6 0.5 0.5
TWPM 1.0 0.9 0.9
CHNM 1.5 1.5 1.5
METL 0.7 0.6 0.6
EQFO 0.3 0.2 0.2
UTIL 2.4 2.3 2.3
CONS 1.0 0.9 0.9
ACCR 0.0 -0.2 -0.2
CMIF 0.2 0.0 0.1
PROP 1.1 1.0 1.0
RBUS -0.2 -0.4 -0.4
GOVT -0.2 -0.4 -0.4
EDUC -1.3 -1.6 -1.5
HEAL -0.7 -1.0 -0.9
CUPE -0.2 -0.4 -0.3
OWND -1.5 -1.8 -1.7
WHOL 0.5 0.4 0.4
RETT 0.2 0.0 0.0
TRAN 2.2 2.4 2.4
All 0.9 0.8 0.8
Table P.5: Industry Output Price Index
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F.O.B. Exports
Product
Baseyear % ∆ on Baseyear
(NZ$m) sim201 sim301 sim401
AGRI 1757 -1.8 18.2 18.1
FOLO 721 -7.5 11.9 12.1
FISH 154 -7.8 11.7 11.8
MINE 302 -14.1 4.9 5.1
OIGA 475 -6.1 16.4 16.3
PETR 93 -78.6 -69.2 -69.0
FDBT 13384 -2.5 17.4 17.3
TWPM 3690 -3.9 15.8 15.8
CHNM 1930 -5.8 13.8 13.7
METL 1753 -2.9 16.9 16.8
EQFO 3767 -1.4 18.5 18.4
UTIL 60 -8.9 -5.7 -5.8
CONS 209 -3.9 -0.5 -0.6
ACCR 2252 0.1 11.0 10.9
CMIF 1093 -0.8 2.8 2.7
PROP 533 -4.3 -1.1 -1.1
RBUS 1114 1.0 4.7 4.6
GOVT 151 0.9 4.6 4.5
EDUC 730 5.3 9.5 9.3
HEAL 81 3.0 6.9 6.8
CUPE 879 0.7 11.6 11.5
OWND 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
WHOL 3226 -2.1 -100.0 -100.0
RETT 1076 -0.6 -100.0 -100.0
TRAN 3859 -8.5 -51.3 -51.1
All 43290 -3.1 -2.7 -2.7
Table P.6: F.O.B. Exports
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F.O.B. Exports
Commodity
Baseyear % ∆ on Baseyear
(NZ$m) bsln3 bsln4
AGRI 1757 20.1 20.1
FOLO 721 20.1 20.1
FISH 154 20.1 20.1
MINE 302 20.1 20.1
OIGA 475 23.4 23.4
PETR 93 23.4 23.4
FDBT 13384 20.1 20.1
TWPM 3690 20.1 20.1
CHNM 1930 20.1 20.1
METL 1753 20.1 20.1
EQFO 3767 20.1 20.1
UTIL 60 2.9 2.9
CONS 209 2.9 2.9
ACCR 2252 10.1 10.1
CMIF 1093 2.9 2.9
PROP 533 2.9 2.9
RBUS 1114 2.9 2.9
GOVT 151 2.9 2.9
EDUC 730 2.9 2.9
HEAL 81 2.9 2.9
CUPE 879 10.1 10.1
OWND 0 0.0 0.0
WHOL 3226 -100.0 -100.0
RETT 1076 -100.0 -100.0
TRAN 3859 -46.3 -46.3
All 43290 0.0 0.0
Table P.7: F.O.B. Exports — benchmark differences
300 APPENDIX P. SIMULATION RESULTS — OIL PRICE RISE SCENARIO
C.I.F. Imports
Product
Baseyear % ∆ on Baseyear
(NZ$m) sim201 sim301 sim401
AGRI 647 -1.8 -2.5 -2.6
FOLO 37 1.0 -0.2 -0.7
FISH 115 -0.3 -1.0 -1.3
MINE 135 2.4 1.4 1.3
OIGA 1662 -42.0 -36.3 -38.6
PETR 1580 -37.3 -30.3 -26.9
FDBT 2821 -1.8 -2.6 -2.6
TWPM 4510 -1.6 -2.4 -2.4
CHNM 5762 -1.8 -2.4 -2.4
METL 3182 -1.5 -2.1 -2.1
EQFO 17649 -1.6 -2.1 -2.1
UTIL 10 1.3 0.7 0.7
CONS 36 -0.8 -1.0 -1.0
ACCR 1 -2.7 -3.2 -3.2
CMIF 1139 -2.4 -2.9 -2.9
PROP 514 -1.9 -2.5 -2.3
RBUS 2132 -2.6 -3.1 -3.1
GOVT 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
EDUC 30 -3.3 -3.7 -3.6
HEAL 3 -3.2 -3.6 -3.5
CUPE 138 -2.8 -3.3 -3.2
OWND 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
WHOL 104 -2.0 -2.9 -2.8
RETT 3154 -2.4 -2.9 -2.8
TRAN 2137 -1.3 -2.4 -2.3
All 47497 -4.3 -4.5 -4.4
Table P.8: C.I.F. Imports
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Industrial Investment
Industry Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim201 sim301 sim401
AGRI 1159 -2.7 -2.8 -2.7
FOLO 128 -4.9 -4.7 -4.6
FISH 41 -1.9 -1.4 -1.4
MINE 184 -6.4 -5.3 -5.4
OIGA 787 -17.5 -15.2 -16.0
PETR 80 -2.7 5.9 0.9
FDBT 954 0.1 0.4 0.4
TWPM 871 -3.2 -3.2 -3.1
CHNM 640 -3.4 -3.2 -3.2
METL 641 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1
EQFO 500 -2.4 -2.4 -2.4
UTIL 744 5.3 6.0 5.9
CONS 789 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1
ACCR 333 -2.1 -2.1 -2.1
CMIF 4534 -2.7 -3.0 -2.9
PROP 1808 -3.0 -3.2 -3.2
RBUS 2014 -3.0 -3.2 -3.2
GOVT 3530 -2.7 -2.8 -2.8
EDUC 1313 -2.7 -2.8 -2.8
HEAL 884 -2.7 -2.8 -2.8
CUPE 852 -3.8 -4.1 -4.1
OWND 13345 -2.7 -2.8 -2.8
WHOL 958 -3.0 -4.9 -4.7
RETT 1065 -3.6 -4.5 -4.4
TRAN 149 51.8 55.1 56.0
All 38305 -2.7 -2.8 -2.8
Table P.9: Industrial Investment
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Industry Capital Stocks
Industry Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim201 sim301 sim401
AGRI 14374 -4.0 -4.3 -4.1
FOLO 1351 -5.3 -5.1 -5.0
FISH 962 -5.1 -5.0 -5.0
MINE 878 -8.0 -7.0 -7.1
OIGA 4450 -19.1 -17.0 -17.8
PETR 455 -4.7 3.6 -1.2
FDBT 11491 -4.1 -4.2 -4.1
TWPM 8052 -4.6 -4.7 -4.7
CHNM 4959 -5.0 -4.8 -4.8
METL 3412 -4.3 -4.4 -4.4
EQFO 5892 -3.7 -3.8 -3.8
UTIL 23050 -4.4 -4.5 -4.5
CONS 5578 -3.3 -3.3 -3.3
ACCR 5251 -3.6 -3.7 -3.7
CMIF 15121 -4.2 -4.6 -4.5
PROP 83623 -4.4 -4.7 -4.6
RBUS 6376 -4.0 -4.3 -4.3
GOVT 43300 -4.9 -5.1 -5.1
EDUC 16100 -4.2 -4.4 -4.4
HEAL 10847 -4.8 -5.1 -5.1
CUPE 11086 -4.2 -4.5 -4.5
OWND 163680 0.0 0.0 0.0
WHOL 8281 -3.8 -5.7 -5.6
RETT 7265 -4.2 -5.2 -5.1
TRAN 13992 -5.7 -6.3 -5.7
All 469826 -3.0 -3.2 -3.2
Table P.10: Industry Capital Stocks
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Industry Capital Rents Index
Industry
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim201 sim301 sim401
AGRI 1.9 1.9 1.9
FOLO 1.9 1.9 1.9
FISH 1.9 1.9 1.9
MINE 1.9 1.9 1.9
OIGA 1.9 1.9 1.9
PETR 1.9 1.9 1.9
FDBT 1.9 1.9 1.9
TWPM 1.9 1.8 1.9
CHNM 1.8 1.8 1.9
METL 1.9 1.8 1.9
EQFO 1.9 1.8 1.9
UTIL 1.9 1.8 1.9
CONS 1.9 1.8 1.9
ACCR 1.9 1.8 1.9
CMIF 1.9 1.8 1.9
PROP 1.9 1.8 1.9
RBUS 1.9 1.8 1.9
GOVT 1.9 1.8 1.9
EDUC 1.9 1.8 1.9
HEAL 1.9 1.8 1.9
CUPE 1.9 1.8 1.9
OWND -2.7 -3.1 -3.0
WHOL 1.9 1.8 1.9
RETT 1.9 1.8 1.9
TRAN 1.9 1.8 1.9
All 1.3 1.2 1.2
Table P.11: Industry Capital Rents Index
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Industry Employment (Full-Time Equivalents)
Industry Baseyear (000s)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim201 sim301 sim401
AGRI 114 0.4 0.5 0.5
FOLO 5 -0.9 -0.4 -0.4
FISH 2 -0.8 -0.3 -0.3
MINE 4 -3.8 -2.4 -2.5
OIGA 0 -15.4 -12.8 -13.7
PETR 6 -0.2 8.8 3.7
FDBT 56 0.3 0.6 0.6
TWPM 65 -0.3 0.0 0.0
CHNM 21 -0.7 -0.1 -0.2
METL 26 0.1 0.3 0.2
EQFO 50 0.7 1.0 1.0
UTIL 9 0.0 0.2 0.2
CONS 142 1.1 1.5 1.5
ACCR 88 0.8 1.1 1.1
CMIF 84 0.1 0.1 0.1
PROP 48 -0.1 0.1 0.1
RBUS 198 0.4 0.4 0.4
GOVT 77 -0.6 -0.4 -0.5
EDUC 120 0.2 0.3 0.3
HEAL 164 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4
CUPE 74 0.2 0.2 0.2
OWND 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
WHOL 89 0.5 -1.1 -1.0
RETT 163 0.1 -0.5 -0.5
TRAN 62 -1.4 -1.6 -1.2
All 1668 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table P.12: Industry Employment
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Regional Employment (Full-Time Equivalents)
Region Baseyear (000s)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim201 sim301 sim401
AKL 533 0.2 0.0 0.1
WLG 200 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
ONI 514 0.0 0.1 0.0
CAN 227 0.1 0.0 0.1
OSI 195 0.0 0.1 0.2
NZ 1668 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table P.13: Regional Employment
Compensating Variation
Region
∆ in Income ($m)
sim201 sim301 sim401
AKL -972.9 -1113.5 -1081.3
WLG -418.3 -450.8 -446.0
ONI -1101.4 -1120.4 -1150.1
CAN -318.1 -353.6 -346.1
OSI -394.5 -423.0 -409.3
Equivalent Variation
Region
∆ in Income ($m)
sim201 sim301 sim401
AKL -971.8 -1113.8 -1081.1
WLG -417.2 -450.2 -445.2
ONI -1100.1 -1120.3 -1150.1
CAN -317.4 -353.2 -345.7
OSI -393.5 -422.4 -408.7
Table P.14: CV and EV Measures
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Household Real Disposable Income
Region Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim201 sim301 sim401
AKL 41312 -1.9 -2.2 -2.1
WLG 14759 -2.2 -2.3 -2.3
ONI 36391 -2.7 -2.7 -2.8
CAN 12853 -1.9 -2.1 -2.1
OSI 15213 -2.0 -2.1 -2.0
NZ 120529 -2.2 -2.3 -2.3
Table P.15: Household Real Disposable Income
Household Real Spending
Region Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim201 sim301 sim401
AKL 31830 -3.1 -3.5 -3.4
WLG 11765 -3.5 -3.8 -3.7
ONI 27565 -3.9 -4.0 -4.1
CAN 10063 -3.2 -3.5 -3.4
OSI 12108 -3.2 -3.5 -3.4
NZ 93331 -3.4 -3.7 -3.6
Table P.16: Household Real Spending
Purchase Prices — Commodity PETR
Region
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim201 sim301 sim401
AKL 47.6 33.0 34.9
WLG 47.6 36.8 37.2
ONI 47.6 36.7 36.6
CAN 47.6 34.5 35.5
OSI 47.6 36.9 36.8
Table P.17: Household Purchase Prices — Commodity PETR
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Real Macro Measures
Variable Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim201 sim301 sim401
GDP (Expenditure) 156090 -2.7 -2.8 -2.8
GDP (Income) 156090 -2.4 -2.5 -2.5
Private Consumption 93331 -3.4 -3.7 -3.6
Investment 38305 -2.7 -2.8 -2.8
Government Consumption 28661 -2.7 -2.8 -2.8
F.O.B. Exports 43290 -3.1 -2.7 -2.7
C.I.F. Imports 47497 -4.3 -4.5 -4.4
Trade Balance -4207 17.7 23.0 21.8
Government Balance 6900 -4.4 -3.9 -4.3
Domestic Private Saving 27198 1.9 2.4 2.3
Domestic Saving 34098 0.7 1.1 1.0
Table P.18: Macro Measures
Economy-wide Price Measures
Variable
% ∆ on Baseyear
sim201 sim301 sim401
GDP Deflator -0.3 -0.4 -0.4
Consumer Price Index 0.7 0.6 0.7
Investment Price Index 1.9 1.8 1.9
Government Price Index -0.5 -0.7 -0.7
Export Price Index (F.O.B.) 0.8 0.7 0.7
Import Price Index (C.I.F.) 4.2 4.4 4.3
Trade Price Index 41.0 45.7 45.1
Real Exchange Rate 4.4 4.8 4.7
Nominal After-Tax Wage -2.6 -3.0 -2.9
Real After-Tax Wage -3.2 -3.6 -3.5
Capital Rents Index 1.3 1.2 1.2
Output Price Index 0.9 0.8 0.8
Current Net Rate of Return (Average) -2.0 -2.1 -2.1
Expected Future Net Rate of Return -3.3 -3.5 -3.5
Table P.19: Economy-wide Price Measures
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Appendix Q
Simulation Results — Short-Run
Immigration Scenarios
This appendix provides the short-run results for the illustrative simulations discussed in
chapter 4.
Number of Households
Region Baseyear (000s)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL 434 21.0 44.1 21.0 19.4 34.2 21.7
WLG 167 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.5 18.7 18.4
ONI 482 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.4 14.4 14.2
CAN 200 14.0 14.0 39.0 14.5 18.9 33.4
OSI 172 10.0 10.0 39.1 11.7 17.2 32.6
NZ 1454 14.8 21.7 21.7 14.8 21.7 21.7
Table Q.1: Number of Households
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Total Population
Region Baseyear (000s)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL 1371 17.0 39.3 17.0 15.5 29.7 17.5
WLG 466 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.6 15.2 14.1
ONI 1348 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.5 9.6 9.1
CAN 540 10.0 10.0 34.1 10.6 15.6 28.8
OSI 459 6.0 6.0 34.0 7.9 14.1 27.7
NZ 4184 10.8 18.1 17.0 10.8 18.1 17.0
Table Q.2: Total Population
Working-Age Population
Region Baseyear (000s)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL 849 15.2 37.1 15.2 13.6 27.7 15.6
WLG 301 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.8 12.1 11.2
ONI 814 3.7 3.7 3.7 4.2 6.3 5.8
CAN 347 6.1 6.1 29.4 6.7 11.4 24.2
OSI 296 2.2 2.2 29.2 3.9 9.8 23.1
NZ 2607 7.9 15.0 14.0 7.9 15.0 14.0
Table Q.3: Working-Age Population
Non-Working Age Population
Region Baseyear (000s)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL 522 20.0 42.9 20.0 18.4 33.1 20.4
WLG 165 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.7 20.9 19.5
ONI 534 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.5 14.5 14.0
CAN 193 17.0 17.0 42.7 17.7 23.1 36.9
OSI 163 13.0 13.0 42.9 15.1 21.9 36.2
NZ 1577 15.6 23.1 21.8 15.6 23.1 21.8
Table Q.4: Non-Working Age Population
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Regional Employment (Full-Time Equivalents)
Region Baseyear (000s)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL 533 15.8 38.6 15.5 14.3 29.1 16.1
WLG 200 6.2 6.0 6.0 6.8 11.6 10.9
ONI 514 3.4 3.1 3.2 3.9 5.7 5.4
CAN 227 6.0 5.8 30.0 6.6 10.8 24.8
OSI 195 1.8 1.6 29.7 3.5 8.8 23.6
NZ 1668 7.9 15.0 14.2 7.9 14.9 14.2
Table Q.5: Regional Employment
Regional Capital Stocks
Region Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL 154208 18.4 18.4 18.4 18.4 18.4 18.4
WLG 62648 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5
ONI 144170 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
CAN 49536 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7
OSI 59263 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3
NZ 469826 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5
Table Q.6: Regional Capital Stocks
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Regional Output
Region Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL 106148 14.2 23.0 14.6 13.6 19.8 14.8
WLG 36082 6.6 7.1 6.9 6.8 9.3 8.9
ONI 100332 4.5 5.1 4.9 4.7 6.1 5.8
CAN 33657 6.4 7.0 15.8 6.7 9.0 14.1
OSI 43428 3.1 3.6 13.8 3.8 6.6 11.8
NZ 319647 8.0 11.3 10.7 7.9 11.4 10.8
Table Q.7: Regional Output
Regional Investment
Region Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL 12867 9.5 16.1 10.7 9.1 14.3 10.9
WLG 5434 7.6 9.4 9.2 7.7 10.7 10.3
ONI 11490 7.6 9.3 8.8 7.7 9.9 9.5
CAN 3974 7.7 8.9 14.7 7.8 10.5 13.7
OSI 4540 7.5 8.9 16.3 8.1 11.3 15.0
NZ 38305 8.2 11.5 11.0 8.2 11.7 11.2
Table Q.8: Regional Investment
Regional Output Price Index
Region
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL -4.7 -7.6 -3.8 -4.4 -6.3 -4.0
WLG -1.7 -1.3 -0.6 -1.8 -2.3 -1.9
ONI -0.5 0.3 0.2 -0.6 -0.3 -0.3
CAN -1.6 -1.2 -4.6 -1.6 -2.0 -4.0
OSI 0.0 0.6 -3.6 -0.3 -0.7 -2.9
NZ -2.1 -2.8 -2.3 -2.1 -2.8 -2.5
Table Q.9: Regional Output Price Index
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Regional Investment Price Index
Region
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL -1.6 -2.6 -1.7 -1.6 -2.4 -1.8
WLG -1.4 -1.9 -1.4 -1.3 -1.9 -1.6
ONI -1.3 -1.8 -1.3 -1.3 -1.8 -1.5
CAN -1.4 -1.9 -1.9 -1.3 -1.9 -1.9
OSI -1.2 -1.8 -1.8 -1.3 -1.8 -1.8
Table Q.10: Regional Investment Price Index
Regional Capital Rents Index
Region
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL -9.0 1.4 -6.9 -9.6 -1.8 -6.8
WLG -2.5 -0.6 -0.1 -2.2 2.2 2.0
ONI -0.2 2.5 1.9 0.0 3.6 2.9
CAN -2.4 -0.5 10.6 -2.2 2.1 8.3
OSI 1.0 3.4 16.9 1.9 7.3 14.1
NZ -3.7 1.5 1.2 -3.7 1.8 1.3
Table Q.11: Regional Capital Rents Index
Regional Average Net Rates of Return
Region Baseyear (%)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL 10.1 -11.8 4.8 -8.8 -12.7 -0.2 -8.4
WLG 8.2 -3.6 0.2 0.1 -3.2 4.4 3.6
ONI 9.5 -0.2 4.4 2.8 0.0 6.1 4.6
CAN 9.5 -3.6 0.0 16.3 -3.2 3.9 13.0
OSI 9.0 1.5 5.9 26.2 2.9 11.8 22.0
NZ 9.4 -4.9 4.0 2.4 -4.9 4.2 2.7
Table Q.12: Regional Average Net Rates of Return
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Industry Employment (Full-Time Equivalents)
Industry Baseyear (000s)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AGRI 114 5.4 8.3 14.3 5.9 10.9 13.9
FOLO 5 5.6 8.1 13.5 6.1 10.9 13.5
FISH 2 4.8 6.9 17.7 5.5 10.7 16.3
MINE 4 6.3 9.5 14.1 6.7 11.7 13.8
OIGA 0 5.4 7.0 6.5 5.8 9.0 8.4
PETR 6 5.9 7.0 7.3 6.3 9.2 9.0
FDBT 56 5.7 10.5 15.1 6.0 12.3 14.6
TWPM 65 9.4 18.7 15.5 9.2 17.7 15.7
CHNM 21 9.7 20.3 15.7 9.4 18.5 15.8
METL 26 9.9 19.1 15.3 9.7 17.9 15.5
EQFO 50 10.3 21.2 17.8 10.1 19.7 17.7
UTIL 9 7.9 16.6 15.9 7.9 17.0 16.1
CONS 142 8.3 15.2 14.5 8.3 15.3 14.6
ACCR 88 7.1 14.1 15.3 7.2 14.7 15.0
CMIF 84 8.6 18.0 13.5 8.4 16.7 13.9
PROP 48 8.0 16.4 14.2 7.9 16.0 14.4
RBUS 198 8.3 16.6 13.6 8.1 15.8 13.9
GOVT 77 8.2 14.3 13.5 8.2 14.3 13.6
EDUC 120 8.1 15.4 14.0 8.1 15.1 14.1
HEAL 164 8.1 14.3 13.6 8.1 14.2 13.6
CUPE 74 8.0 15.3 13.9 7.9 15.2 14.1
OWND 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
WHOL 89 8.5 17.2 13.8 8.3 16.0 13.8
RETT 163 7.4 13.6 13.6 7.4 13.9 13.6
TRAN 62 8.1 16.0 15.1 8.0 15.8 14.9
All 1668 7.9 15.0 14.2 7.9 14.9 14.2
Table Q.13: Industry Employment
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Industry Capital Stocks
Industry Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AGRI 14374 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
FOLO 1351 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4
FISH 962 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3
MINE 878 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8
OIGA 4450 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4
PETR 455 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9
FDBT 11491 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3
TWPM 8052 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2
CHNM 4959 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8
METL 3412 9.9 9.9 9.9 9.9 9.9 9.9
EQFO 5892 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5
UTIL 23050 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6
CONS 5578 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2
ACCR 5251 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
CMIF 15121 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7
PROP 83623 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3
RBUS 6376 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9
GOVT 43300 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1
EDUC 16100 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2
HEAL 10847 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1
CUPE 11086 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2
OWND 163680 15.2 15.2 15.2 15.2 15.2 15.2
WHOL 8281 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7
RETT 7265 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4
TRAN 13992 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6
All 469826 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5
Table Q.14: Industry Capital Stocks
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Industrial Output
Industry Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AGRI 16884 5.2 6.9 9.3 5.4 8.2 9.3
FOLO 2978 6.3 8.5 8.9 6.4 9.2 9.2
FISH 853 5.2 6.9 9.6 5.4 8.2 9.4
MINE 1197 6.4 7.9 8.5 6.5 8.4 8.6
OIGA 2479 5.6 6.0 5.9 5.6 6.2 6.1
PETR 3683 6.7 8.3 8.2 6.8 8.6 8.5
FDBT 27682 5.4 7.6 9.8 5.7 8.8 9.8
TWPM 13057 8.0 11.8 10.7 8.0 11.8 11.0
CHNM 9078 9.5 14.1 12.0 9.4 13.5 12.1
METL 8105 9.5 13.2 11.5 9.4 12.9 11.7
EQFO 10632 10.8 17.1 13.7 10.5 16.2 14.0
UTIL 12609 7.6 10.6 10.0 7.6 10.7 10.1
CONS 29305 8.1 11.4 10.8 8.1 11.5 10.9
ACCR 6454 6.8 10.4 10.8 6.9 10.9 10.9
CMIF 24027 8.4 11.8 10.3 8.3 11.6 10.5
PROP 13658 8.2 10.0 9.5 8.1 10.0 9.6
RBUS 24532 8.5 12.9 10.9 8.4 12.5 11.2
GOVT 13460 8.2 11.8 11.0 8.2 11.8 11.2
EDUC 8229 8.2 13.9 12.5 8.1 13.6 12.6
HEAL 12552 8.1 11.8 11.2 8.1 11.9 11.3
CUPE 11764 8.0 11.8 10.6 8.0 11.7 10.8
OWND 12472 12.5 13.6 13.3 12.5 13.6 13.4
WHOL 20487 8.0 11.8 10.6 8.0 11.6 10.7
RETT 17998 7.4 10.5 10.1 7.4 10.6 10.2
TRAN 15472 8.2 12.3 11.1 8.1 12.1 11.2
All 319647 8.0 11.3 10.7 7.9 11.4 10.8
Table Q.15: Industrial Output
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Industrial Investment
Industry Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AGRI 1159 7.0 7.9 9.1 7.2 8.9 9.4
FOLO 128 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.1
FISH 41 12.3 16.8 26.0 13.3 22.0 26.1
MINE 184 8.5 9.1 9.3 8.5 9.5 9.5
OIGA 787 8.5 8.4 8.2 8.6 8.5 8.4
PETR 80 9.3 9.0 9.4 9.4 9.5 9.7
FDBT 954 9.5 13.1 19.8 10.2 17.2 20.1
TWPM 871 8.5 11.2 9.6 8.4 11.2 10.1
CHNM 640 9.2 12.0 10.0 9.1 11.4 10.2
METL 641 9.9 11.1 9.9 9.8 10.8 10.1
EQFO 500 10.9 14.5 11.6 10.7 13.8 11.9
UTIL 744 12.5 36.4 33.3 12.4 36.5 33.3
CONS 789 8.3 8.4 8.3 8.3 8.4 8.3
ACCR 333 7.5 8.9 9.2 7.6 9.4 9.3
CMIF 4534 7.9 9.3 8.9 7.9 9.3 9.0
PROP 1808 8.1 10.3 9.7 8.1 10.3 9.8
RBUS 2014 8.5 8.9 8.8 8.5 8.9 8.8
GOVT 3530 8.2 11.5 11.0 8.2 11.7 11.2
EDUC 1313 8.2 11.5 11.0 8.2 11.7 11.2
HEAL 884 8.2 11.5 11.0 8.2 11.7 11.2
CUPE 852 8.1 8.6 8.4 8.1 8.6 8.4
OWND 13345 8.2 11.5 11.0 8.2 11.7 11.2
WHOL 958 8.2 8.5 8.6 8.2 8.6 8.6
RETT 1065 7.6 7.8 7.9 7.7 7.8 7.9
TRAN 149 -23.7 121.6 68.8 -27.6 115.5 77.6
All 38305 8.2 11.5 11.0 8.2 11.7 11.2
Table Q.16: Industrial Investment
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Industry Output Price Index
Industry
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AGRI -0.1 0.5 -1.8 -0.4 -0.6 -1.8
FOLO -0.6 -0.3 -1.4 -0.7 -0.9 -1.4
FISH -0.6 -0.5 -1.6 -0.7 -0.9 -1.4
MINE -0.4 0.6 -0.6 -0.5 0.1 -0.6
OIGA 0.8 3.9 3.2 0.7 3.8 3.2
PETR -0.1 0.6 0.7 -0.1 0.6 0.6
FDBT -0.7 -0.7 -2.0 -0.8 -1.3 -1.9
TWPM -1.4 -2.1 -2.0 -1.5 -2.2 -2.1
CHNM -2.4 -3.5 -2.5 -2.3 -3.1 -2.5
METL -1.9 -2.2 -1.9 -1.9 -2.1 -1.9
EQFO -2.1 -3.5 -2.5 -2.1 -3.2 -2.6
UTIL -1.4 2.4 2.3 -1.4 2.4 2.1
CONS -1.6 -2.4 -2.0 -1.6 -2.4 -2.2
ACCR -1.3 -2.2 -2.7 -1.4 -2.5 -2.7
CMIF -3.0 -3.8 -1.9 -2.8 -3.3 -2.3
PROP -2.3 0.5 0.5 -2.3 0.7 0.5
RBUS -2.7 -5.5 -2.9 -2.6 -4.9 -3.3
GOVT -1.8 -3.5 -2.6 -1.8 -4.4 -3.7
EDUC -2.0 -6.1 -5.1 -2.0 -6.3 -5.5
HEAL -1.6 -4.1 -4.3 -1.7 -4.7 -4.6
CUPE -2.2 -3.5 -2.6 -2.1 -3.5 -2.9
OWND -10.1 -7.4 -7.3 -10.1 -7.2 -7.4
WHOL -2.5 -5.2 -3.1 -2.4 -4.6 -3.3
RETT -1.8 -2.8 -2.4 -1.8 -3.0 -2.6
TRAN -2.2 -3.6 -2.7 -2.1 -3.3 -2.8
All -2.1 -2.8 -2.3 -2.1 -2.8 -2.5
Table Q.17: Industry Output Price Index
319
Industry Investment Price Index
Industry
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AGRI -1.3 -1.8 -1.5 -1.3 -1.8 -1.6
FOLO -1.3 -1.8 -1.5 -1.3 -1.8 -1.6
FISH -1.3 -1.9 -1.6 -1.3 -1.9 -1.7
MINE -1.3 -1.9 -1.6 -1.3 -1.9 -1.7
OIGA -1.3 -1.8 -1.3 -1.3 -1.8 -1.5
PETR -1.3 -1.8 -1.3 -1.3 -1.8 -1.5
FDBT -1.3 -2.0 -1.6 -1.3 -1.9 -1.7
TWPM -1.4 -2.1 -1.6 -1.4 -2.0 -1.7
CHNM -1.5 -2.3 -1.7 -1.5 -2.2 -1.8
METL -1.4 -2.2 -1.6 -1.4 -2.1 -1.7
EQFO -1.5 -2.2 -1.6 -1.4 -2.1 -1.7
UTIL -1.4 -2.0 -1.5 -1.3 -2.0 -1.7
CONS -1.4 -2.1 -1.6 -1.4 -2.0 -1.7
ACCR -1.4 -2.1 -1.6 -1.4 -2.0 -1.7
CMIF -1.5 -2.2 -1.6 -1.4 -2.1 -1.7
PROP -1.4 -2.1 -1.6 -1.4 -2.1 -1.7
RBUS -1.5 -2.2 -1.6 -1.4 -2.1 -1.7
GOVT -1.4 -2.0 -1.5 -1.4 -2.0 -1.7
EDUC -1.4 -2.1 -1.6 -1.4 -2.0 -1.7
HEAL -1.4 -2.1 -1.6 -1.4 -2.0 -1.7
CUPE -1.4 -2.1 -1.6 -1.4 -2.1 -1.7
OWND -1.4 -2.1 -1.6 -1.4 -2.0 -1.7
WHOL -1.5 -2.3 -1.6 -1.4 -2.1 -1.7
RETT -1.4 -2.1 -1.6 -1.4 -2.0 -1.7
TRAN -1.3 -2.2 -1.7 -1.2 -2.0 -1.7
Table Q.18: Industry Investment Price Index
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Industry Capital Rents Index
Industry
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AGRI 1.3 5.2 7.8 1.5 6.7 7.7
FOLO 1.1 5.6 5.6 1.2 6.4 6.0
FISH 1.1 4.4 8.9 1.5 6.7 8.7
MINE 0.8 4.5 4.7 0.9 5.1 4.9
OIGA 1.2 5.1 4.3 1.2 5.3 4.5
PETR 1.5 5.2 5.2 1.6 5.9 5.5
FDBT -0.4 3.5 7.0 0.0 5.4 6.9
TWPM -1.7 4.1 3.2 -1.7 4.4 3.5
CHNM -4.5 2.3 0.0 -4.7 1.8 0.1
METL -2.5 3.5 1.4 -2.6 3.2 1.7
EQFO -3.2 6.3 2.1 -3.4 5.2 2.5
UTIL -1.3 8.2 7.0 -1.3 8.4 7.0
CONS -1.7 3.4 2.9 -1.7 3.6 3.0
ACCR -1.5 3.8 5.1 -1.3 4.7 5.0
CMIF -3.4 1.6 1.3 -3.4 1.9 1.3
PROP -2.4 3.8 2.8 -2.5 4.0 3.0
RBUS -3.3 1.1 1.4 -3.2 1.5 1.4
GOVT -1.6 2.8 3.0 -1.6 2.2 2.1
EDUC -2.0 3.0 2.8 -2.0 3.0 2.7
HEAL -1.6 2.2 1.5 -1.6 2.0 1.4
CUPE -2.3 2.9 2.1 -2.3 3.0 2.2
OWND -14.2 -9.9 -10.1 -14.2 -9.7 -10.2
WHOL -3.6 0.3 0.5 -3.6 0.7 0.5
RETT -1.8 2.7 2.5 -1.8 2.9 2.5
TRAN -2.8 3.0 2.1 -2.9 3.1 2.2
All -3.7 1.5 1.2 -3.7 1.8 1.3
Table Q.19: Industry Capital Rents Index
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Industry Average Net Rates of Return
Industry Baseyear (%)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AGRI 10.4 4.6 12.9 16.8 5.0 15.7 16.9
FOLO 25.9 3.2 10.1 9.4 3.3 11.1 10.1
FISH 4.9 6.2 16.9 27.7 7.3 22.8 27.4
MINE 21.5 3.5 10.8 10.4 3.5 11.7 10.9
OIGA 27.3 3.3 9.2 7.4 3.3 9.5 8.0
PETR 27.3 3.7 9.3 8.6 3.8 10.2 9.3
FDBT 10.6 1.6 10.2 15.6 2.2 13.7 15.6
TWPM 14.1 -0.8 11.0 7.7 -0.9 11.0 8.4
CHNM 22.3 -4.3 6.7 2.1 -4.7 5.6 2.5
METL 41.8 -1.5 7.2 3.4 -1.7 6.5 4.0
EQFO 19.5 -2.6 12.0 4.6 -3.0 10.0 5.2
UTIL 10.7 0.0 13.7 11.4 -0.1 13.9 11.6
CONS 57.2 -0.5 6.9 5.4 -0.5 7.0 5.7
ACCR 14.5 -0.3 8.4 8.9 -0.2 9.4 9.1
CMIF 35.7 -3.0 5.6 3.8 -3.0 5.7 4.1
PROP 5.6 -1.8 8.9 6.4 -1.9 9.0 6.9
RBUS 64.1 -2.4 4.5 3.3 -2.4 4.5 3.5
GOVT -0.7 -1.1 19.5 17.3 -1.4 16.9 14.7
EDUC 0.0 -62.0 465.9 362.7 -64.3 438.7 363.2
HEAL 12.0 -0.4 6.2 4.1 -0.5 5.7 4.2
CUPE 13.9 -1.5 7.8 5.5 -1.6 7.8 5.9
OWND 3.4 -19.2 -11.8 -12.9 -19.2 -11.6 -12.8
WHOL 22.5 -3.2 3.7 2.9 -3.2 4.1 3.1
RETT 44.0 -0.6 6.0 5.1 -0.6 6.2 5.2
TRAN 8.0 -2.9 10.3 7.1 -3.1 10.2 7.6
All 9.4 -4.9 4.0 2.4 -4.9 4.2 2.7
Table Q.20: Industry Average Net Rates of Return
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Real Macro Measures
Variable Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
GDP (Expenditure) 156090 8.2 11.5 11.0 8.2 11.7 11.2
GDP (Income) 156090 8.4 12.2 11.4 8.3 12.0 11.5
Private Consumption 93331 8.0 10.8 10.4 8.0 10.9 10.5
Investment 38305 8.2 11.5 11.0 8.2 11.7 11.2
Government Consumption 28661 8.2 11.5 11.0 8.2 11.7 11.2
F.O.B. Exports 43290 6.3 9.9 9.4 6.3 10.3 9.7
C.I.F. Imports 47497 6.1 8.7 8.4 6.1 8.8 8.4
Trade Balance -4207 -4.3 4.4 1.9 -4.2 6.6 4.4
Government Balance 6900 5.3 17.0 14.5 5.3 15.9 14.3
Domestic Private Saving 27198 10.3 16.3 14.4 10.3 15.4 14.4
Domestic Saving 34098 9.3 16.4 14.4 9.2 15.5 14.4
Table Q.21: Macro Measures
Economy-wide Price Measures
Variable
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
GDP Deflator -2.7 -3.5 -3.1 -2.7 -3.6 -3.3
Consumer Price Index -2.6 -2.7 -2.4 -2.6 -2.7 -2.5
Investment Price Index -1.4 -2.1 -1.6 -1.4 -2.0 -1.7
Government Price Index -1.8 -4.1 -3.5 -1.8 -4.6 -4.1
Export Price Index (F.O.B.) -1.5 -2.3 -2.2 -1.5 -2.4 -2.3
Import Price Index (C.I.F.) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Trade Price Index 15.8 25.8 24.3 15.9 27.2 25.4
Real Exchange Rate 2.7 3.6 3.2 2.7 3.8 3.4
Nominal After-Tax Wage -2.1 -8.7 -7.5 -2.1 -9.1 -8.0
Real After-Tax Wage 0.5 -6.1 -5.2 0.5 -6.6 -5.6
Capital Rents Index -3.7 1.5 1.2 -3.7 1.8 1.3
Output Price Index -2.1 -2.8 -2.3 -2.1 -2.8 -2.5
Current Net Rate of Return (Average) -4.9 4.0 2.4 -4.9 4.2 2.7
Expected Future Net Rate of Return -1.6 4.2 2.9 -1.7 4.3 3.1
Table Q.22: Economy-wide Price Measures
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Regional Nominal After-Tax Wage
Region
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL -7.5 -26.8 -6.2 -5.9 -19.3 -6.9
WLG -1.0 -0.2 0.4 -1.6 -6.7 -5.7
ONI 1.5 3.1 2.4 0.8 -0.4 -0.4
CAN -0.7 0.3 -23.3 -1.4 -5.6 -19.2
OSI 2.7 4.2 -24.6 0.5 -4.8 -19.7
Table Q.23: Regional Nominal After-Tax Wage
Regional Consumer Price Index
Region
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL -3.9 -4.9 -3.3 -3.8 -4.4 -3.4
WLG -2.2 -2.0 -1.6 -2.3 -2.3 -2.1
ONI -1.8 -1.3 -1.3 -1.9 -1.5 -1.5
CAN -2.4 -2.0 -3.2 -2.4 -2.3 -3.1
OSI -1.5 -1.0 -2.5 -1.6 -1.5 -2.3
Table Q.24: Regional Consumer Price Index
Regional Real After-Tax Wage
Region
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL -3.7 -23.0 -2.9 -2.1 -15.6 -3.6
WLG 1.3 1.8 2.0 0.7 -4.5 -3.7
ONI 3.4 4.4 3.8 2.8 1.1 1.2
CAN 1.7 2.4 -20.8 1.0 -3.3 -16.6
OSI 4.2 5.2 -22.7 2.1 -3.4 -17.8
Table Q.25: Regional Real After-Tax Wage
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Real GDP Per Capita
Region Baseyear ($)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
NZ 37306 -2.3 -5.6 -5.1 -2.3 -5.4 -5.0
Real Disposable Income Per Household
Region Baseyear ($)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL 95271 -3.7 -11.9 -3.8 -3.0 -8.7 -4.2
WLG 88394 -5.8 -5.9 -5.9 -6.0 -8.1 -8.2
ONI 75572 -7.3 -7.4 -7.4 -7.5 -8.3 -8.3
CAN 64292 -6.7 -6.7 -15.4 -6.9 -8.6 -13.7
OSI 88548 -7.2 -7.3 -17.1 -7.9 -10.0 -15.2
NZ 82902 -5.5 -8.0 -8.5 -5.5 -8.1 -8.5
Real Spending Per Household
Region Baseyear ($)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL 73403 -8.1 -19.1 -7.1 -7.2 -14.2 -7.6
WLG 70464 -5.3 -4.4 -4.2 -5.7 -8.0 -7.9
ONI 57243 -5.0 -3.6 -4.2 -5.3 -5.2 -5.5
CAN 50335 -6.0 -5.0 -18.6 -6.3 -7.9 -15.9
OSI 70474 -4.1 -2.8 -19.4 -5.3 -7.4 -16.2
NZ 64195 -5.9 -9.0 -9.3 -5.9 -8.9 -9.2
Real Saving Per Household
Region Baseyear ($)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL 21868 11.1 12.2 7.1 10.8 10.0 7.1
WLG 17930 -7.4 -11.7 -12.3 -7.2 -8.7 -9.5
ONI 18329 -14.3 -19.2 -17.3 -14.1 -17.9 -16.8
CAN 13957 -9.0 -13.1 -4.0 -8.8 -11.2 -5.7
OSI 18074 -19.1 -24.6 -8.2 -18.1 -20.1 -11.2
NZ 18707 -3.9 -4.4 -6.0 -4.0 -5.2 -6.0
Table Q.26: Welfare Measures
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Unemployment
Region Baseyear (000s)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL 37 15.8 38.6 15.5 14.3 29.1 15.7
WLG 13 6.2 6.0 6.0 6.8 12.2 9.9
ONI 36 3.4 3.1 3.2 3.9 5.7 4.8
CAN 11 6.0 5.8 30.0 6.9 13.3 24.8
OSI 9 1.8 1.6 29.7 4.3 12.3 23.6
NZ 106 8.2 16.0 13.0 8.2 16.0 13.0
Table Q.27: Unemployment
Labour Force Participation Rate
Region Baseyear (%)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL 74.2 0.6 1.1 0.3 0.6 1.1 0.4
WLG 78.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.4 -0.3
ONI 75.7 -0.3 -0.6 -0.5 -0.3 -0.6 -0.4
CAN 77.5 0.0 -0.3 0.5 -0.1 -0.4 0.5
OSI 77.8 -0.3 -0.6 0.4 -0.4 -0.8 0.4
NZ 76.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1
Table Q.28: Labour Force Participation Rate
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Compensating Variation
Region
∆ in Income ($m)
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL 4266.0 6767.1 4738.4 4095.6 5952.3 4779.1
WLG 926.7 1074.1 1098.4 953.5 1323.9 1282.7
ONI 1986.9 2484.4 2296.7 2030.3 2735.6 2538.3
CAN 815.6 947.3 1673.6 838.8 1152.5 1520.8
OSI 727.2 919.0 1894.7 810.5 1267.2 1688.1
Equivalent Variation
Region
∆ in Income ($m)
bsln5 sim501 sim502 bsln6 sim601 sim602
AKL 4471.1 7439.7 4926.6 4274.4 6409.7 4982.0
WLG 946.2 1092.5 1113.1 974.6 1364.1 1317.3
ONI 2012.8 2499.0 2312.4 2059.7 2773.2 2573.0
CAN 833.2 963.3 1788.6 857.9 1186.0 1611.0
OSI 733.4 921.0 2015.3 820.8 1292.8 1776.9
Table Q.29: CV and EV Measures
Appendix R
Simulation Results — Long-Run
Immigration Scenarios
This appendix provides the long-run results for the illustrative simulations discussed in
chapter 4.
Number of Households
Region Baseyear (000s)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL 434 55.0 112.7 55.0 43.6 75.5 51.0
WLG 167 28.0 28.0 28.0 32.8 48.8 45.3
ONI 482 25.0 25.0 25.0 28.1 34.1 32.8
CAN 200 31.0 31.0 93.5 32.9 45.6 78.0
OSI 172 20.0 20.0 92.8 33.2 51.1 82.2
NZ 1454 34.5 51.7 51.7 34.5 51.7 51.7
Table R.1: Number of Households
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Total Population
Region Baseyear (000s)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL 1371 42.0 94.8 42.0 31.6 60.7 38.2
WLG 466 16.0 16.0 16.0 21.1 37.7 32.2
ONI 1348 12.0 12.0 12.0 15.1 21.4 19.3
CAN 540 21.0 21.0 78.8 23.4 37.0 64.4
OSI 459 8.0 8.0 73.5 21.8 41.2 64.0
NZ 4184 23.0 40.3 37.6 23.0 40.3 37.6
Table R.2: Total Population
Working-Age Population
Region Baseyear (000s)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL 849 31.5 80.5 31.5 21.9 48.9 28.0
WLG 301 5.0 5.0 5.0 9.5 24.3 19.3
ONI 814 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 1.2 7.2 5.1
CAN 347 8.2 8.2 59.8 10.4 22.5 47.0
OSI 296 -6.8 -6.8 49.6 5.4 22.6 41.5
NZ 2607 10.6 26.5 23.9 10.6 26.5 23.9
Table R.3: Working-Age Population
Non-Working Age Population
Region Baseyear (000s)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL 522 59.0 118.1 59.0 47.3 80.0 54.7
WLG 165 36.0 36.0 36.0 42.2 62.2 55.6
ONI 534 33.0 33.0 33.0 36.3 43.1 40.9
CAN 193 44.0 44.0 112.7 46.9 63.1 95.7
OSI 163 35.0 35.0 116.9 51.7 75.0 105.0
NZ 1577 43.5 63.0 60.3 43.5 63.0 60.3
Table R.4: Non-Working Age Population
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Regional Employment (Full-Time Equivalents)
Region Baseyear (000s)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL 533 31.6 80.7 31.6 22.0 49.1 28.1
WLG 200 5.0 5.1 5.0 9.3 23.2 19.0
ONI 514 -1.8 -1.8 -1.9 1.2 7.0 5.1
CAN 227 8.2 8.2 59.9 10.1 21.5 47.1
OSI 195 -6.9 -6.9 49.7 4.7 20.9 41.6
NZ 1668 10.5 26.1 24.1 10.4 26.0 24.1
Table R.5: Regional Employment
Regional Capital Stocks
Region Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL 154208 28.4 60.6 33.3 23.1 44.0 31.5
WLG 62648 14.5 20.7 19.8 16.5 30.0 27.2
ONI 144170 12.8 18.5 17.4 14.2 23.2 21.2
CAN 49536 16.5 22.1 50.0 17.4 29.4 43.1
OSI 59263 10.2 15.6 48.7 16.7 31.3 44.0
NZ 469826 18.2 32.6 30.3 18.1 32.6 30.6
Table R.6: Regional Capital Stocks
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Regional Output
Region Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL 106148 18.7 44.4 24.2 14.8 33.0 23.0
WLG 36082 7.6 13.5 12.6 9.6 22.5 19.5
ONI 100332 4.7 10.8 9.6 6.0 15.3 13.1
CAN 33657 8.9 14.8 36.2 9.8 21.5 31.4
OSI 43428 2.0 7.6 31.6 7.4 21.1 28.7
NZ 319647 9.8 22.2 20.6 9.9 23.4 21.2
Table R.7: Regional Output
Regional Investment
Region Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL 12867 13.4 30.1 23.1 12.3 27.8 23.2
WLG 5434 9.8 20.5 19.6 10.5 24.3 22.0
ONI 11490 9.0 19.8 18.4 9.6 22.3 20.0
CAN 3974 10.2 20.7 26.7 10.7 24.1 25.7
OSI 4540 8.1 18.7 25.5 10.1 24.3 25.1
NZ 38305 10.6 23.3 21.8 10.8 24.9 22.6
Table R.8: Regional Investment
Regional Output Price Index
Region
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL -5.9 -11.9 -5.4 -4.3 -8.2 -5.0
WLG -1.5 -1.6 -0.7 -2.2 -4.6 -3.6
ONI -0.2 -0.3 0.0 -0.7 -1.8 -1.4
CAN -2.0 -2.2 -9.0 -2.2 -4.2 -7.6
OSI 0.8 0.7 -7.5 -1.3 -4.0 -6.7
NZ -2.4 -4.7 -4.0 -2.3 -4.9 -4.3
Table R.9: Regional Output Price Index
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Regional Investment Price Index
Region
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL -1.8 -4.0 -2.7 -1.6 -3.6 -2.8
WLG -1.4 -3.1 -2.3 -1.3 -3.2 -2.6
ONI -1.3 -3.0 -2.2 -1.2 -3.0 -2.5
CAN -1.5 -3.1 -3.0 -1.4 -3.2 -3.0
OSI -1.2 -2.9 -2.8 -1.3 -3.2 -2.9
Table R.10: Regional Investment Price Index
Regional Capital Rents Index
Region
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL -5.6 -9.7 -5.7 -4.7 -7.5 -5.6
WLG -3.6 -4.4 -3.7 -3.8 -5.8 -5.2
ONI -3.3 -4.1 -3.5 -3.5 -4.7 -4.2
CAN -3.8 -4.6 -8.1 -3.9 -5.6 -7.3
OSI -3.1 -3.8 -8.3 -4.1 -6.1 -7.8
NZ -4.2 -6.3 -5.4 -4.0 -6.1 -5.6
Table R.11: Regional Capital Rents Index
Regional Average Net Rates of Return
Region Baseyear (%)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL 10.1 -13.4 -20.7 -10.9 -10.9 -14.1 -9.9
WLG 8.2 -7.6 -5.9 -5.6 -8.3 -8.8 -8.6
ONI 9.5 -7.0 -4.3 -4.7 -7.7 -5.9 -6.2
CAN 9.5 -8.3 -5.9 -17.7 -8.6 -8.3 -14.9
OSI 9.0 -6.3 -3.6 -18.9 -9.4 -10.0 -16.9
NZ 9.4 -9.3 -10.8 -10.4 -9.1 -9.9 -10.2
Table R.12: Regional Average Net Rates of Return
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Industry Employment (Full-Time Equivalents)
Industry Baseyear (000s)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AGRI 114 1.4 5.5 19.3 4.5 14.9 19.6
FOLO 5 0.8 4.9 17.9 4.6 15.8 19.4
FISH 2 0.7 4.1 26.7 5.2 17.1 25.3
MINE 4 2.6 10.0 21.0 6.1 19.3 21.8
OIGA 0 1.3 3.9 3.0 3.7 12.0 9.6
PETR 6 0.5 3.0 3.4 3.1 11.4 9.6
FDBT 56 4.9 14.1 22.8 6.8 19.7 22.3
TWPM 65 12.8 33.4 25.9 11.6 29.1 25.5
CHNM 21 16.0 38.9 29.0 13.6 32.6 27.7
METL 26 13.3 35.2 26.2 11.9 30.2 25.7
EQFO 50 14.8 38.1 30.7 12.9 32.0 28.9
UTIL 9 8.8 21.9 21.9 9.4 24.0 22.7
CONS 142 11.3 26.9 25.6 11.6 28.1 26.2
ACCR 88 8.7 22.7 24.7 9.2 24.2 24.2
CMIF 84 14.3 35.2 24.6 12.6 30.4 24.9
PROP 48 11.2 27.5 23.9 10.9 26.9 24.1
RBUS 198 13.3 33.8 25.0 12.1 29.6 25.1
GOVT 77 10.8 24.6 22.1 11.2 26.5 23.9
EDUC 120 11.4 28.0 24.4 11.1 27.0 24.5
HEAL 164 10.7 25.8 24.9 10.8 26.1 24.7
CUPE 74 11.1 27.6 23.9 10.8 26.9 24.3
OWND 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
WHOL 89 12.9 31.3 24.2 11.5 27.4 23.5
RETT 163 9.2 22.5 22.5 9.6 24.1 22.8
TRAN 62 10.4 25.6 24.6 10.0 25.1 23.8
All 1668 10.5 26.1 24.1 10.4 26.0 24.1
Table R.13: Industry Employment
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Industry Capital Stocks
Industry Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AGRI 14374 5.7 14.0 15.5 6.6 17.4 16.4
FOLO 1351 6.9 16.6 16.0 7.4 19.0 17.1
FISH 962 5.6 14.2 16.8 6.7 18.1 17.4
MINE 878 7.8 18.4 17.9 8.2 20.5 18.6
OIGA 4450 7.8 17.9 16.1 7.9 19.2 17.0
PETR 455 8.2 19.2 17.8 8.6 21.2 19.0
FDBT 11491 6.1 15.0 16.3 6.9 18.1 17.0
TWPM 8052 8.8 20.8 18.5 8.8 21.8 19.2
CHNM 4959 10.1 23.4 19.9 9.7 23.2 20.2
METL 3412 10.1 23.7 19.9 9.7 23.7 20.5
EQFO 5892 11.6 27.3 21.5 10.8 25.9 21.9
UTIL 23050 8.7 20.1 18.7 8.9 21.4 19.2
CONS 5578 10.2 22.6 21.1 10.4 24.1 21.8
ACCR 5251 7.6 18.1 17.7 8.0 20.0 18.3
CMIF 15121 9.0 20.7 18.7 9.0 21.6 19.2
PROP 83623 9.0 20.5 18.9 9.0 21.6 19.4
RBUS 6376 9.4 21.5 19.2 9.3 22.3 19.7
GOVT 43300 10.1 22.4 20.6 10.1 22.7 20.6
EDUC 16100 9.9 22.2 20.1 9.8 22.6 20.3
HEAL 10847 9.8 21.9 20.2 9.8 22.4 20.3
CUPE 11086 9.1 20.8 18.8 9.0 21.6 19.3
OWND 163680 35.7 55.6 51.7 35.2 53.5 51.7
WHOL 8281 7.6 17.5 16.9 7.9 18.9 17.3
RETT 7265 8.3 19.2 18.0 8.5 20.3 18.4
TRAN 13992 8.0 18.7 17.5 8.1 19.7 17.8
All 469826 18.2 32.6 30.3 18.1 32.6 30.6
Table R.14: Industry Capital Stocks
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Industrial Output
Industry Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AGRI 16884 3.6 10.0 15.9 5.6 16.3 16.9
FOLO 2978 5.9 14.7 16.2 7.0 18.7 17.5
FISH 853 4.6 12.6 18.0 6.5 18.0 18.4
MINE 1197 7.0 17.0 18.5 7.9 20.4 19.3
OIGA 2479 7.4 17.1 15.4 7.7 18.9 16.7
PETR 3683 7.4 17.2 16.2 7.8 19.3 17.4
FDBT 27682 4.8 12.8 17.0 6.4 17.8 17.8
TWPM 13057 8.9 21.6 19.4 9.0 22.6 20.1
CHNM 9078 11.3 26.0 21.5 10.4 24.7 21.3
METL 8105 10.7 25.6 21.0 10.1 24.8 21.4
EQFO 10632 12.8 30.8 23.2 11.5 27.8 23.2
UTIL 12609 8.8 20.4 18.8 9.0 21.9 19.6
CONS 29305 10.5 23.3 21.9 10.7 25.0 22.7
ACCR 6454 7.4 18.2 19.4 8.2 21.1 20.0
CMIF 24027 10.5 24.4 20.1 10.1 24.2 20.8
PROP 13658 9.3 21.4 19.5 9.3 22.4 20.0
RBUS 24532 11.4 26.9 21.2 10.7 25.7 21.8
GOVT 13460 10.5 23.0 20.7 10.7 24.8 22.1
EDUC 8229 11.1 26.5 23.1 10.9 26.0 23.2
HEAL 12552 10.1 23.3 22.4 10.3 24.4 22.6
CUPE 11764 10.0 23.5 20.4 9.9 23.8 21.0
OWND 12472 26.0 42.5 39.6 25.8 42.1 40.0
WHOL 20487 9.2 21.3 19.0 9.0 21.6 19.2
RETT 17998 8.7 20.4 19.2 8.9 21.7 19.7
TRAN 15472 9.0 21.0 19.3 8.9 21.6 19.4
All 319647 9.8 22.2 20.6 9.9 23.4 21.2
Table R.15: Industrial Output
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Industrial Investment
Industry Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AGRI 1159 6.8 16.0 17.6 7.8 19.6 18.5
FOLO 128 7.2 17.2 16.6 7.8 19.6 17.7
FISH 41 8.6 19.1 22.1 9.9 23.7 22.9
MINE 184 9.3 20.8 20.4 9.7 23.2 21.3
OIGA 787 9.6 20.9 19.2 9.8 22.6 20.2
PETR 80 10.0 22.2 20.9 10.5 24.6 22.2
FDBT 954 9.9 21.2 22.9 10.9 25.2 24.0
TWPM 871 10.1 23.0 20.8 10.2 24.3 21.7
CHNM 640 11.6 25.8 22.4 11.2 25.9 22.8
METL 641 11.2 25.7 21.9 10.9 25.9 22.6
EQFO 500 12.8 29.3 23.6 12.0 28.2 24.1
UTIL 744 17.8 35.1 34.4 18.4 38.3 35.7
CONS 789 10.4 22.8 21.4 10.6 24.4 22.1
ACCR 333 9.0 20.3 20.0 9.5 22.6 20.8
CMIF 4534 10.4 23.0 21.1 10.5 24.2 21.7
PROP 1808 10.2 22.6 21.1 10.4 23.9 21.7
RBUS 2014 10.3 23.1 20.8 10.3 24.0 21.5
GOVT 3530 10.6 23.3 21.8 10.8 24.9 22.6
EDUC 1313 10.6 23.3 21.8 10.8 24.9 22.6
HEAL 884 10.6 23.3 21.8 10.8 24.9 22.6
CUPE 852 9.4 21.4 19.4 9.4 22.3 19.9
OWND 13345 10.6 23.3 21.8 10.8 24.9 22.6
WHOL 958 8.4 18.8 18.2 8.7 20.3 18.7
RETT 1065 8.9 20.2 19.0 9.1 21.4 19.5
TRAN 149 62.0 107.5 110.5 64.9 119.8 115.2
All 38305 10.6 23.3 21.8 10.8 24.9 22.6
Table R.16: Industrial Investment
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Industry Output Price Index
Industry
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AGRI 0.7 0.6 -2.6 -0.4 -2.2 -3.0
FOLO -0.4 -1.4 -2.5 -0.9 -2.9 -2.9
FISH -0.4 -1.6 -3.5 -1.0 -3.1 -3.5
MINE -0.7 -1.9 -3.0 -1.1 -3.1 -3.2
OIGA -1.0 -2.4 -1.7 -1.0 -2.8 -2.2
PETR -0.6 -1.4 -0.9 -0.6 -1.5 -1.1
FDBT -0.2 -1.2 -3.1 -0.9 -3.0 -3.3
TWPM -1.5 -3.6 -3.2 -1.5 -3.8 -3.4
CHNM -2.6 -5.5 -3.9 -2.1 -4.6 -3.7
METL -2.0 -4.5 -3.4 -1.8 -4.1 -3.4
EQFO -2.5 -5.6 -3.7 -2.1 -4.7 -3.7
UTIL -1.6 -3.5 -2.5 -1.5 -3.7 -3.0
CONS -1.7 -3.8 -3.1 -1.6 -4.0 -3.4
ACCR -1.1 -2.9 -3.8 -1.5 -4.0 -4.0
CMIF -2.9 -6.1 -3.7 -2.4 -5.4 -4.0
PROP -1.8 -4.1 -3.0 -1.7 -3.9 -3.2
RBUS -3.2 -6.9 -4.0 -2.6 -5.8 -4.3
GOVT -1.7 -3.3 -2.3 -1.9 -4.8 -3.8
EDUC -2.3 -5.2 -4.4 -2.3 -5.6 -4.8
HEAL -1.6 -3.6 -3.9 -1.8 -4.6 -4.4
CUPE -2.3 -5.0 -3.7 -2.1 -5.0 -4.0
OWND -14.8 -17.4 -16.7 -14.6 -17.2 -16.9
WHOL -3.0 -6.4 -4.2 -2.5 -5.5 -4.3
RETT -1.8 -4.0 -3.5 -1.8 -4.4 -3.8
TRAN -2.4 -5.2 -4.0 -2.1 -4.9 -4.0
All -2.4 -4.7 -4.0 -2.3 -4.9 -4.3
Table R.17: Industry Output Price Index
337
Industry Investment Price Index
Industry
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AGRI -1.3 -3.0 -2.5 -1.3 -3.1 -2.7
FOLO -1.3 -3.1 -2.4 -1.3 -3.1 -2.6
FISH -1.3 -3.1 -2.6 -1.3 -3.2 -2.7
MINE -1.4 -3.1 -2.5 -1.3 -3.2 -2.7
OIGA -1.3 -3.0 -2.2 -1.3 -3.1 -2.5
PETR -1.3 -3.0 -2.2 -1.2 -3.0 -2.5
FDBT -1.4 -3.2 -2.6 -1.3 -3.2 -2.7
TWPM -1.5 -3.4 -2.6 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
CHNM -1.7 -3.6 -2.7 -1.5 -3.5 -2.8
METL -1.5 -3.4 -2.6 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
EQFO -1.6 -3.5 -2.6 -1.4 -3.4 -2.8
UTIL -1.5 -3.3 -2.5 -1.4 -3.2 -2.7
CONS -1.5 -3.3 -2.5 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
ACCR -1.5 -3.3 -2.6 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
CMIF -1.6 -3.5 -2.6 -1.4 -3.4 -2.7
PROP -1.5 -3.4 -2.6 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
RBUS -1.6 -3.5 -2.6 -1.4 -3.4 -2.7
GOVT -1.5 -3.3 -2.5 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
EDUC -1.5 -3.4 -2.6 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
HEAL -1.5 -3.3 -2.5 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
CUPE -1.5 -3.4 -2.6 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
OWND -1.5 -3.4 -2.6 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
WHOL -1.6 -3.6 -2.6 -1.4 -3.4 -2.8
RETT -1.5 -3.3 -2.6 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
TRAN -1.6 -3.5 -2.6 -1.4 -3.4 -2.8
Table R.18: Industry Investment Price Index
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Industry Capital Rents Index
Industry
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AGRI -1.3 -3.0 -2.5 -1.3 -3.1 -2.7
FOLO -1.3 -3.1 -2.4 -1.3 -3.1 -2.6
FISH -1.3 -3.1 -2.6 -1.3 -3.2 -2.7
MINE -1.4 -3.1 -2.5 -1.3 -3.2 -2.7
OIGA -1.3 -3.0 -2.2 -1.3 -3.1 -2.5
PETR -1.3 -3.0 -2.2 -1.2 -3.0 -2.5
FDBT -1.4 -3.2 -2.6 -1.3 -3.2 -2.7
TWPM -1.5 -3.4 -2.6 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
CHNM -1.7 -3.6 -2.7 -1.5 -3.5 -2.8
METL -1.5 -3.4 -2.6 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
EQFO -1.6 -3.5 -2.6 -1.4 -3.4 -2.8
UTIL -1.5 -3.3 -2.5 -1.4 -3.2 -2.7
CONS -1.5 -3.3 -2.5 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
ACCR -1.5 -3.3 -2.6 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
CMIF -1.6 -3.5 -2.6 -1.4 -3.4 -2.7
PROP -1.5 -3.4 -2.6 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
RBUS -1.6 -3.5 -2.6 -1.4 -3.4 -2.7
GOVT -1.5 -3.3 -2.5 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
EDUC -1.5 -3.4 -2.6 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
HEAL -1.5 -3.3 -2.6 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
CUPE -1.5 -3.4 -2.6 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
OWND -20.7 -23.5 -22.9 -20.5 -23.2 -23.2
WHOL -1.6 -3.6 -2.6 -1.4 -3.4 -2.8
RETT -1.5 -3.3 -2.6 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
TRAN -1.6 -3.5 -2.6 -1.4 -3.4 -2.8
All -4.2 -6.3 -5.4 -4.0 -6.1 -5.6
Table R.19: Industry Capital Rents Index
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Industry Average Net Rates of Return
Industry Baseyear (%)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AGRI 10.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FOLO 25.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FISH 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MINE 21.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OIGA 27.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PETR 27.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
FDBT 10.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TWPM 14.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CHNM 22.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
METL 41.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
EQFO 19.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
UTIL 10.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CONS 57.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ACCR 14.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CMIF 35.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PROP 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
RBUS 64.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GOVT -0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
EDUC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
HEAL 12.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CUPE 13.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OWND 3.4 -29.1 -33.2 -31.9 -28.6 -30.8 -31.5
WHOL 22.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
RETT 44.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TRAN 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All 9.4 -9.3 -10.8 -10.4 -9.1 -9.9 -10.2
Table R.20: Industry Average Net Rates of Return
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Real Macro Measures
Variable Baseyear ($m)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
GDP (Expenditure) 156090 10.6 23.3 21.8 10.8 24.9 22.6
GDP (Income) 156090 11.1 25.4 22.7 11.1 25.5 23.1
Private Consumption 93331 10.9 22.9 21.6 11.1 24.2 22.1
Investment 38305 10.6 23.3 21.8 10.8 24.9 22.6
Government Consumption 28661 10.6 23.3 21.8 10.8 24.9 22.6
F.O.B. Exports 43290 6.3 16.0 15.0 6.6 17.7 15.8
C.I.F. Imports 47497 7.2 15.9 15.2 7.4 17.0 15.6
Trade Balance -4207 -16.8 -14.8 -17.6 -16.0 -9.3 -13.2
Government Balance 6900 5.2 23.2 17.4 4.7 19.0 16.5
Domestic Private Saving 27198 13.9 36.7 28.8 13.0 32.4 28.5
Domestic Saving 34098 12.2 34.0 26.5 11.3 29.7 26.1
Table R.21: Macro Measures
Economy-wide Price Measures
Variable
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
GDP Deflator -3.1 -5.6 -5.0 -3.1 -6.0 -5.4
Consumer Price Index -3.3 -5.3 -4.8 -3.3 -5.4 -5.0
Investment Price Index -1.5 -3.4 -2.5 -1.4 -3.3 -2.7
Government Price Index -1.7 -3.7 -3.3 -1.9 -4.8 -4.1
Export Price Index (F.O.B.) -1.5 -3.6 -3.5 -1.6 -4.0 -3.6
Import Price Index (C.I.F.) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Trade Price Index 14.8 37.6 35.3 15.6 43.0 37.8
Real Exchange Rate 3.2 6.0 5.3 3.2 6.4 5.7
Nominal After-Tax Wage -2.6 -6.0 -5.3 -2.7 -6.7 -5.9
Real After-Tax Wage 0.8 -0.8 -0.6 0.6 -1.4 -1.0
Capital Rents Index -4.2 -6.3 -5.4 -4.0 -6.1 -5.6
Output Price Index -2.4 -4.7 -4.0 -2.3 -4.9 -4.3
Current Net Rate of Return (Average) -9.3 -10.8 -10.4 -9.1 -9.9 -10.2
Expected Future Net Rate of Return -2.7 -4.0 -4.2 -2.8 -4.5 -4.4
Table R.22: Economy-wide Price Measures
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Regional Nominal After-Tax Wage
Region
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL -14.9 -29.4 -10.5 -9.8 -17.9 -8.7
WLG 1.0 6.4 6.5 -1.8 -5.1 -3.1
ONI 6.3 12.2 11.4 4.0 5.4 5.9
CAN -1.3 3.9 -22.2 -2.5 -4.2 -17.3
OSI 10.3 16.3 -18.5 1.2 -3.8 -15.0
Table R.23: Regional Nominal After-Tax Wage
Regional Consumer Price Index
Region
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL -5.4 -9.9 -5.4 -4.3 -7.4 -5.2
WLG -2.5 -3.0 -2.6 -3.0 -5.0 -4.4
ONI -2.1 -2.4 -2.1 -2.4 -3.5 -3.1
CAN -2.9 -3.4 -8.1 -3.1 -4.8 -7.2
OSI -1.5 -1.9 -7.7 -2.9 -5.1 -7.1
Table R.24: Regional Consumer Price Index
Regional Real After-Tax Wage
Region
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL -10.0 -21.6 -5.4 -5.7 -11.3 -3.6
WLG 3.6 9.8 9.4 1.2 -0.1 1.3
ONI 8.5 15.0 13.8 6.5 9.3 9.3
CAN 1.7 7.5 -15.4 0.7 0.7 -10.9
OSI 12.0 18.5 -11.7 4.2 1.4 -8.5
Table R.25: Regional Real After-Tax Wage
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Real GDP Per Capita
Region Baseyear ($)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
NZ 37306 -10.1 -12.1 -11.5 -9.9 -11.0 -11.0
Real Disposable Income Per Household
Region Baseyear ($)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL 95271 -19.6 -24.9 -17.4 -17.5 -20.1 -16.6
WLG 88394 -15.9 -13.2 -13.4 -16.8 -16.9 -17.2
ONI 75572 -17.0 -13.9 -14.5 -17.5 -15.3 -15.9
CAN 64292 -16.2 -13.5 -24.1 -16.5 -15.8 -22.0
OSI 88548 -16.6 -13.7 -26.7 -19.0 -18.8 -25.3
NZ 82902 -17.1 -16.9 -18.8 -17.1 -16.9 -18.5
Real Spending Per Household
Region Baseyear ($)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL 73403 -23.8 -33.7 -19.8 -20.0 -24.8 -18.3
WLG 70464 -15.1 -10.1 -10.4 -16.8 -17.4 -17.1
ONI 57243 -14.6 -9.5 -10.3 -15.8 -12.6 -13.2
CAN 50335 -16.1 -11.3 -30.3 -16.7 -16.0 -26.6
OSI 70474 -13.0 -7.9 -31.6 -18.1 -18.9 -29.1
NZ 64195 -17.6 -19.0 -19.8 -17.4 -18.2 -19.5
Real Saving Per Household
Region Baseyear ($)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL 21868 -5.4 4.5 -9.4 -9.1 -4.4 -10.9
WLG 17930 -19.2 -25.3 -25.4 -16.7 -14.8 -17.2
ONI 18329 -24.3 -27.6 -27.4 -22.8 -23.7 -24.3
CAN 13957 -16.8 -21.5 -1.4 -15.8 -15.2 -5.6
OSI 18074 -30.5 -36.2 -7.5 -22.6 -18.6 -10.8
NZ 18707 -15.3 -9.9 -15.1 -16.0 -12.8 -15.3
Table R.26: Welfare Measures
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Unemployment
Region Baseyear (000s)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL 37 31.6 80.7 31.6 22.0 49.1 27.7
WLG 13 5.0 5.1 5.0 9.7 25.0 17.3
ONI 36 -1.8 -1.8 -1.9 1.1 7.0 3.9
CAN 11 8.2 8.2 59.9 12.0 28.6 47.1
OSI 9 -6.9 -6.9 49.7 9.7 33.8 41.6
NZ 106 11.3 28.5 21.6 11.3 28.5 21.6
Table R.27: Unemployment
Labour Force Participation Rate
Region Baseyear (%)
% ∆ on Baseyear
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL 74.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
WLG 78.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.8 -0.3
ONI 75.7 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.0
CAN 77.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.5 0.1
OSI 77.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.4 -1.0 0.1
NZ 76.0 -0.2 -0.4 0.1 -0.2 -0.4 0.1
Table R.28: Labour Force Participation Rate
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Compensating Variation
Region
∆ in Income ($m)
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL 7349.6 15850.4 9308.5 5911.3 12218.9 8825.6
WLG 1095.4 1828.6 1799.5 1399.4 3091.4 2695.7
ONI 1721.2 3488.0 3204.8 2204.1 5053.3 4381.0
CAN 1115.7 1735.1 4074.5 1243.9 2562.8 3577.7
OSI 373.9 1114.0 4433.0 1227.1 3143.3 4045.7
Equivalent Variation
Region
∆ in Income ($m)
bsln7 sim701 sim702 bsln8 sim801 sim802
AKL 7920.1 18379.3 9942.2 6244.7 13490.8 9373.4
WLG 1118.1 1859.7 1822.9 1439.7 3253.8 2813.1
ONI 1733.4 3491.9 3204.1 2234.4 5160.3 4455.8
CAN 1146.6 1775.9 4547.5 1282.6 2690.1 3922.1
OSI 373.1 1106.7 4892.2 1255.6 3304.5 4414.2
Table R.29: CV and EV Measures
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